UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FANATICS COLLECTIBLES TOPCO, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

PANINI S.P.A.,

Defendant.

Case No.

COMPLAINT

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Plaintiff Fanatics Collectibles Topco, Inc. (hereinafter, "Plaintiff" or "Fanatics Collectibles," and collectively with its affiliates, "Fanatics"), through its undersigned attorneys, brings this complaint against Defendant Panini S.p.A. (hereinafter, "Panini") seeking damages and other appropriate relief in this forum, pursuant to a governing forum-selection clause, in order to remedy Panini's unfair competition, tortious interference with business relations, and breach of the duty to negotiate in good faith.

INTRODUCTION

1. This case highlights the stark contrast between two competitors in the sports and entertainment collectibles industry: it pits Fanatics Collectibles, the innovative disruptor, against Panini, the stagnant, long-time incumbent. Fanatics Collectibles is revitalizing the sports and entertainment collectibles industry by introducing innovations and quality enhancements that have resonated with athletes, players' associations, sports leagues, teams, and collectors. Its commitment to reinvesting in the industry has proved to be a winning strategy with these key stakeholders, significantly benefiting collectors and consumers. On the other hand, Panini has become complacent, failing to invest in marketing or innovation as it funnels profits back to its owners in Italy while openly trying to sell its business for nearly a decade. As Panini's licensing

deals neared expiration, licensors unsurprisingly chose Fanatics Collectibles as their new licensee that would commit long-term to the business, quite different from Panini's strategy of siphoning cash to its Italian owners. This case is about Panini's protracted campaign to squeeze the last dollars from its U.S. business by trying to block Fanatics' hard-earned success through a series of tortious, unfair, and unlawful actions.

- 2. Over the last two decades, Fanatics has continued to innovate in licensed fan gear. With a world-class organization, the company is best-known for cutting edge e-commerce, as well as designing, manufacturing, and selling officially licensed sports fan gear, jerseys, headwear, and other sports merchandise. During that time, Fanatics has become a fan favorite and trusted partner of athletes, players' associations, sports leagues, and teams thanks to a vision and business model that emphasize integrity, authenticity, quality, innovation, and customer satisfaction. In 2021, certain players' associations and leagues decided to exercise their right to license their intellectual property to Fanatics for collectible trading cards.
- 3. Like a sprinter benefiting from a head start, Panini had a sizable lead as the incumbent. Prior to Fanatics Collectibles' entry, and for the last 14 years, Panini held exclusive licenses for sports and entertainment collectible cards in the U.S. pursuant to long-term agreements—and Panini has long touted itself, even today, as the "world's largest sports and entertainment collectibles company" as a result. In spite of these long-term exclusive privileges with the players' associations and leagues, however, Panini failed to capitalize on opportunities that stood to benefit collectors and business partners. Instead of innovating and investing in growing the collectible cards business, Panini elected to funnel as much of its profits as possible to its owners in Italy. That choice to send profits to Italy instead of investing in its business yielded a track record of dismal customer service, quality control issues, shoddy product offerings, vast

numbers of outstanding redemption cards, and missed opportunities to grow revenues (which could in turn be shared with the players' associations and leagues) through secondary sales and by capitalizing on new phenomena such as "card breaking" (also known as "breaking")—where card packs are opened live online, generating interactive and suspense-driven experiences for viewers as the cards are revealed.

- 4. Notwithstanding Panini's substantial head start, Fanatics Collectibles overcame the gap by sharing an obviously superior vision and business model for the future of sports and entertainment collectibles, and by building upon Fanatics' track-record as a proven partner to the licensors with the ability to deliver quality, innovation, and customer satisfaction. That juxtaposed with Panini's embarrassing track record of dismal customer service, heavy reliance on the use of redemption cards (enormous amounts of which remain unfulfilled), egregious quality control issues, shoddy product offerings, and pervasive underinvestment—all while Panini put itself up for sale throughout the majority of the last decade.
- 5. Panini's mismanagement of its privileged position as exclusive licensee betrayed a lack of vision and a neglect of its obligations to both licensors and customers. Its licensors suffered from lost opportunities as Panini failed to devote remotely adequate resources to marketing, innovation, and customer service. Nor did Panini anticipate or participate in, much less allow its licensors to profit from, industry trends such as the explosion of secondary markets or the incredibly popular practice of card breaking. Panini's pursuit of short-term profits, underscored by its corner cutting, has also left collectors thoroughly dissatisfied. Panini has long failed to staff an adequate support team to field the flood of customer complaints it receives, resulting in a 95% customer abandonment rate and leaving Panini with an "F" rating from the Better Business Bureau.

- 6. Given these differences in track record and vision, it is no surprise that many players' associations and leagues (represented by negotiators who are highly experienced and knowledgeable) have embraced Fanatics Collectibles to usher in the next generation of trading cards. Over the course of the next few years, several players' associations and leagues will begin licensing their intellectual property to Fanatics Collectibles for a multi-year period, employing licenses that track the basic structure that defined the licensors' deals with Panini. And Panini well understands the procompetitive benefits of its own multi-year exclusive agreements with the players' associations and leagues, having repeatedly trumpeted those benefits:
 - Mark Warsop, Panini CEO: "Strategically, if you're in a non-exclusive environment you're more reluctant to invest in new brands and new technologies because you have a certain number of releases and you have to put your best feet forward. ... Whereas, when you have an exclusive, you can try new things. You can take risks to grow the hobby in a way you wouldn't be able to do with a non-exclusive." Mark Warsop has also explained that when there were more licensees for a particular product, "there was a lot of confusion and way too many products."
 - D.J. Kazmierczak, Panini SVP of Operations: "One of the key benefits [of
 the exclusive is that it] allows us to make the right numbers and types of
 release for the [sic] every channel, something that would have been more
 challenging to do in the past."
- 7. Beyond maximizing royalties for licensors, Fanatics Collectibles' model promises to afford marketing tools and vehicles for fan engagement so as to drive the overall popularity of the players and leagues. Whereas Panini's complacent leadership was content to perpetuate the

status quo—poor marketing, nonresponsive customer service, pervasive underinvestment in product quality, and an overreliance on (and lack of fulfillment of) redemption cards—Fanatics Collectibles was eager to push the industry to new heights by tapping into new revenue streams and business lines, developing innovative products to enhance fan engagement, expanding royalty payments for business partners, and generally investing in the long-term health and success of the industry. Put simply, when faced with a choice between (a) continuing in an exclusive relationship with a company that was not investing in its business (Panini) or (b) moving those exclusive relationships to a known and trusted partner and innovator willing to invest in growing the collectible cards business (Fanatics Collectibles), the licensors chose Fanatics Collectibles.

8. Having lost a number of major licenses, Panini's Italian owners embarked on a protracted, unlawful, and deceitful campaign of unfair trade practices, strong-arm tactics, and tortious misconduct to hamper Fanatics Collectibles' nascent business, in the hopes that it could force Fanatics Collectibles to pay an extortionate amount for Panini to terminate its licenses early, even though early termination would inure to the benefit of collectors and licensing partners—and Panini—alike. Desperate to sabotage Fanatics Collectibles' progress, Panini first stooped to providing falsified earnings projections to bait Fanatics Collectibles into continuing sham talks of terminating Panini's licenses, impeding Fanatics Collectibles' business plans to work with players' associations and individual athletes to grow the sports and entertainment collectible cards category. When that failed to work, Panini switched tactics and began a campaign of harassment in the courts. In particular, Panini brought suits against at-will former employees, who did not have noncompete restrictions, after they followed the industry currents to Fanatics Collectibles. And it threatened others who considered following their lead.

- 9. Specifically, in the spring of 2022, Fanatics and Panini agreed in principle (subject to licensors' approval) to terminate certain of Panini's licenses early, initially with a target effective date of July 31, 2022, thereby allowing Fanatics Collectibles to accelerate the licenses it had already been awarded. In return, Fanatics would pay Panini an early termination fee based on Panini's projected earnings for the remaining years of the licenses. Over the course of the next year, however, Panini dragged out the early termination negotiations in bad faith by slow-walking negotiations for several months and ultimately trying to pass off knowingly inflated earnings projections that translated to an unreasonably high early termination fee. Because of Panini's deceit, Fanatics Collectibles lost valuable parallel opportunities, devoted substantial internal resources, and spent tens of millions of dollars paying lawyers, accountants, and other professionals for their advice, negotiation, preparation, and diligence related to the transaction. Those funds and focus were spent in good faith and otherwise could have fueled opportunities to even further promote the intellectual property of its business partners and build its business overall. All the while, Panini knew early termination would never happen because Panini would never be willing to agree to a termination fee that matched its own accurate, real-world earnings projections. In fact, Fanatics eventually learned through private discussions with the CEO of Panini America that Panini itself was relying on a different, materially lower set of accurate, updated figures for its own internal use while still feeding Fanatics the pumped-up projections to string the negotiations along. In the end, Panini's purported moves towards reaching agreement on early termination were a series of head-fakes—an unfair tactic and a bid to advance its position through subterfuge rather than good old-fashioned competition.
- 10. Once Fanatics became wise to that scheme, Panini shifted gears and escalated its campaign, bringing litigation in Texas against Fanatics and a group of former employees who had

the legitimate right to seek out better opportunities, longer-term prospects, and a more modern, inclusive workforce at Fanatics Collectibles. In the ongoing litigation, Panini's former employees have testified to the emotional turmoil, failures of transparency, and bleak trajectory that led them to seek a brighter future at Fanatics Collectibles. Panini's policies and workforce composition are cause for further concern. Two years ago, Panini took the remarkable step of removing the express (albeit hollow) commitment to diversity to which it had previously paid lip service on its website. Alarmingly, Panini also removed race as a protected class from its code of conduct. Most recently, Panini's racially insensitive practices have drawn the attention of social activists, who have blasted the company for having "no Black leadership in the United States" despite employing "hundreds of employees in the United States" and deriving "75% of its business from selling depictions of Black and Brown athletes." Rather than facing reality and reckoning with the problems that prompted employee departures, Panini has instead waged war in court against several of the departing employees, while simultaneously and explicitly threatening their colleagues with similar litigation if they too depart—all in an effort to prevent those workers from seeking out more fulfilling employment and a brighter future.

11. Panini's unfair tactics don't stop there. Most recently, Panini (through its American subsidiary) filed a baseless and incoherent antitrust lawsuit against Fanatics in the Middle District of Florida. Not only is the lawsuit littered with factual inaccuracies, but Panini's own licensing practices and experience as the longstanding incumbent presiding over multiple, overlapping exclusive licenses with players' associations and leagues give the lie to any allegations that it is now an antitrust victim. The antitrust laws protect consumers, not entrenched incumbents like

Letter from Tamika D. Mallory and Rev. Michael McBride to Mark Warsop, *Re: Panini America Inc.'s ("Panini") Lack of Diversity In Its Executive Leadership* (May 15, 2023), https://thesource.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Letter-to-Panini-America2-002.pdf.

Panini who wish to avoid competition from new, innovative entrants like Fanatics Collectibles. Panini built its "world leading sports and entertainment collectibles business" through a series of long-term exclusive contracts—contracts that the players' associations and leagues believed were in their best interests at the time. It is hypocritical for Panini now to suggest that Fanatics Collectibles violated the antitrust laws simply because the players' associations and leagues chose to license their intellectual property to Fanatics Collectibles as opposed to Panini.

12. Panini's strategy is an admission of its ineptitude: rather than elevating the collector experience, granting licensors access to downstream opportunities, or improving the broader industry, Panini is trying to undermine its competitor through unfair tactics so that it may continue to treat its American subsidiary as an ATM serving its private owners in Italy. But Fanatics Collectibles will not be bullied. Fanatics Collectibles has nothing to fear from the baseless litigation that Panini has brought, as Fanatics Collectibles has done nothing other than outcompete Panini by convincing athletes, players' associations, and leagues that Fanatics Collectibles will maximize the value of their intellectual property in the future. That is called competition—and it is what the antitrust laws promote. All Fanatics Collectibles wants is to fairly compete in the industry, where all stakeholders will benefit from seeing both parties commit themselves, as Fanatics Collectibles so clearly has, to delivering products and services that promise improved experiences for consumers worldwide. To get there, however, Fanatics Collectibles must first put a stop to Panini's bad-faith acts and unrelenting campaign to hobble a new, innovative competitor. These parties should ultimately be judged on the merits of what they are each offering to licensors and customers alike. By that most important measure, Fanatics Collectibles has proved to be the company that is rightly poised to bring much-needed innovation to the marketplace in the coming years.

THE PARTIES

13. Plaintiff Fanatics Collectibles is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New York, NY. Fanatics Collectibles is a subsidiary of Fanatics Holdings, Inc., alongside Fanatics Commerce Holdco, Inc, ("Fanatics Commerce") and other related entities operating different business units. Fanatics Holdings, Inc. and its subsidiaries are collectively referred to as "Fanatics." Fanatics has developed its brand as a leader in selling and producing licensed sports merchandise. For over 15 years, Fanatics has operated the official e-commerce sites for certain sports leagues in the United States, including the NFL, MLB, NBA, and NHL, along with many professional and collegiate teams. It has invested deeply in technology and marketing to better serve sports fans and its business partners and has significantly increased ecommerce sales for all of its business relationships. Thanks to Fanatics' track record of success with its partners, it has consistently expanded Fanatics' rights, including the right to produce a broad range of apparel such as jerseys, championship products, and most recently collectible products including trading cards. Fanatics has also partnered with major entertainment companies, including World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. ("WWE"). Fanatics sells licensed consumer products for these companies on its website, along with products related to music, pop culture, and other segments of the entertainment industry.

14. Defendant Panini S.p.A. ("Panini") is an Italian corporation with its principal place of business in Modena, Italy. It describes itself as the "world's largest sports and entertainment collectibles company" Based in Italy, Panini S.p.A. produces books, stickers, trading cards, and other consumer sports products through its collectible and publishing subsidiaries across the

² @paniniamerica, PANINI, https://www.instagram.com/paniniamerica/?hl=en (last visited Aug. 1, 2023).

globe.³ Panini has long enjoyed the right to produce soccer stickers exclusively and trading cards for Fédération Internationale De Football Association ("FIFA") and similar collectibles for the Union of European Football Associations ("UEFA").⁴ Panini S.p.A. benefits from long-held exclusive licenses with FIFA World Cup and the English Premier League, and dominates sales of soccer stickers across the European Union. It owns manufacturing facilities in Italy, where it manufactures its soccer stickers and other sports merchandise. Upon information and belief, Panini produces and markets well over 90% of the soccer stickers sold in Europe and across the globe.

- 15. Non-party Panini America, Inc ("Panini America") is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Irving, Texas. Panini America is a subsidiary of Panini S.p.A. Panini America holds licenses with athletes, players' associations, sports leagues, entertainment companies, and other entities, and otherwise operates Panini's U.S. business.
- 16. Non-party Mark Warsop is the current CEO of Panini America. Warsop has been CEO of Panini America since 2009 and previously served as Panini's marketing director. Before joining Panini, Warsop was a marketing manager at Topps Europe, a subsidiary of the Topps Company, Inc. ("Topps").

Panini, https://www.paninigroup.com/en/us/about-us (last visited Aug. 1, 2023).

⁴ Brand collaborations, FIFA (May 8, 2015), http://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/marketing/licensing/brand-collaborations.html; Greg Lansdowne, https://www.fifa.com/about-fifa/marketing/licensing/brand-collaborations.html; Greg Lansdowne, <a href="https://www.cardzreview), CARDZREVIEW.COM (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.cardzreview.com/peter-warsop-panini-epl-interview/.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- 17. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over all claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as complete diversity exists between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
- 18. This Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over Panini pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a) because Panini has transacted business within the State of New York and has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in the State, including by selling soccer stickers, sports and entertainment trading cards, and other products within New York state; soliciting sales of the same products and other business within New York state; and deriving substantial revenue from these sales and other business activities conducted in New York state. In addition, Panini is subject to personal jurisdiction in New York because it committed an array of tortious conduct aimed at Fanatics Collectibles—a New York-based company that felt the effects of this conduct in New York. This conduct includes making material misrepresentations of fact to Fanatics Collectibles; intentionally stringing Fanatics Collectibles along in dead-end negotiations for Panini to terminate certain of its licenses early (some of which negotiations occurred in New York); and tortiously preventing Fanatics Collectibles from hiring qualified employees.⁵
- 19. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the events and omissions giving rise to Plaintiff's claims occurred in this District, as set forth in the previous paragraph and elsewhere in this Complaint. Venue is further proper—and indeed, required—under a mutual non-disclosure agreement ("NDA") that Fanatics and Panini

⁵ For all purposes relevant to personal jurisdiction, executives of Panini America and Panini S.p.A. operate in tandem and make decisions together, and Panini America is 100% owned and controlled by Panini S.p.A. Accordingly, Fanatics treats Panini America as an arm of Panini for purposes of personal jurisdiction.

entered into on April 12, 2022, in connection with their negotiation of a potential early termination of certain of Panini's licenses.

20. The NDA provides, in relevant part:

Any court action or proceeding arising out of or relating to the subject matter of this Agreement shall be brought only in the federal or state courts located in the borough of Manhattan, New York. Each Party agrees and submits to the exclusive jurisdiction of these courts for any such action or proceeding and each Party agrees not to commence any such action or proceeding in any other court or forum. Each Party further acknowledges and agrees that the federal or state courts located in the borough of Manhattan, New York, are and would be convenient forums and irrevocably and unconditionally waives any objection to the laying of venue of an action or proceeding in such courts, and, further, irrevocably and unconditionally waives, and agrees not to plead or claim in any such court, that the action or proceeding has been brought in an inconvenient forum or should be transferred.

- 21. In addition, the term sheet between Fanatics and Panini for the early termination correspondingly provided for "[e]xclusive venue with the federal or state courts in Manhattan, New York," thereby confirming that both parties viewed New York as the proper forum for any disputes arising from the termination negotiations that are specifically at issue in this action.
- 22. Because this action arises from the negotiations and business relationship reflected in the NDA and term sheet, the instant action belongs before a New York court.

FACTS

A. Sports & Entertainment Collectibles

23. The sports and entertainment collectibles industry generates tens of billions of dollars in annual sales of memorabilia from areas such as sports, entertainment, music, television, and film; items from collectible trading card games (*e.g.*, Pokémon, Magic: The Gathering); merchandise from diverse entertainment franchises (such as Disney trading pins and Marvel action figures); game-worn sports jerseys, shoes, gear, equipment, and other memorabilia; and a variety of miscellaneous items such as ticket stubs and bobbleheads. Collectibles vary from autographs

and trading cards to action figures, pins, limited-edition trading game collectibles, and entertainment collectibles such as movie props and television posters.

- 24. Trading cards, one type of collectible product, are typically made of paperboard or other thick paper. Trading cards feature a range of subjects including athletes, cartoons, and characters from television, films, comic books, or the trading game itself. Key players in the sports trading card segment of the sports and entertainment collectibles industry include Fanatics Collectibles and Panini, as well as Upper Deck and Leaf. Before creating and selling a trading card featuring intellectual property like team logos or player images, the card creator must obtain the legal right to use the intellectual property from the owners. For sports trading cards in the U.S., relevant intellectual property is owned by sports leagues or organizations (e.g., the NFL, NBA, WNBA, MLB, NHL, FIFA, UEFA, UFC, NASCAR, colleges, etc.), and players' associations or individual athletes. Examples of players' associations include the NFLPA, NBPA, MLBPA, NHLPA, and others. Collectively, the athletes, players' associations, leagues, and other organizations that license intellectual property for sports cards are referred to as "licensors."
- 25. Additionally, subject to certain restrictions and limitations, trading card creators can now reach deals with individual college athletes before they join a professional players' association. For many years, NCAA rules prohibited college athletes from receiving compensation from third parties for use of their name, image, and likeness ("NIL") rights. These rules barred college athletes from being paid "to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial product or service of any kind." Those rules changed in 2021 with the enactment of various state laws allowing college athletes to monetize their NIL rights. As a result, college

athletes (as well as high-school athletes⁶) can now earn money from their social media presence, autographs, and trading cards.⁷ For the top college (and even high-school) athletes, their NIL rights can be extremely valuable; overnight, college athletes earned the right to monetize their rights. Likewise, the opportunity for card creators to sign these college athletes grew dramatically.

26. The players' associations and leagues that license rights for professional-level sports trading cards are run by experienced and knowledgeable executives. Licensing decisions involve careful consideration and planning to ensure a successful long-term partnership. Subject to extensive negotiations and deliberations, licenses are often awarded several years in advance, giving licensees time to build out the necessary logistics for production and distribution. Licensors have complete control over the process for awarding licenses. The licensors recognize that trading cards can contribute materially to the expansion of a sport's or athlete's popularity by acting as marketing tools and driving fan engagement. Professional sports intellectual property is valuable, and often licensed on a long-term basis, whether to sports trading card creators, merchandisers, sponsors, or media partners. Through these long-term licenses, licensees are given the opportunity and incentivized to invest heavily—including in manufacturing, marketing, logistics, infrastructure, customer relations, and more—all to support the long-term growth of the brand for the shared benefit of licensees, licensors, and ultimately consumers. Ten-year licenses are standard for sports leagues' media rights.⁸

⁶ Gena Terranova, Panini America Signs Tre Johnson To Exclusive Multi-Year Agreement, THE KNIGHT'S LANCE (June 27, 2023), https://blog.paniniamerica.net/panini-america-signs-trejohnson-to-exclusive-multi-year-agreement/.

⁷ Alan Blinder, College Athletes May Earn Money From Their Fame, N.C.A.A. Rules, N.Y. TIMES 2021. updated 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/30/sports/ncaabasketball/ncaa-nil-rules.html.

⁸ Ken Belson and Kevin Draper, N.F.L. Signs Media Deals Worth Over \$100 Billion, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2021, updated May 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/18/sports/football/nfltv-contracts.html.

27. Over the course of the past 70-plus years, the rights to sports trading cards have been licensed to a select group of companies for long-term deals (with extensions), including:

Manufacturer	<u>Sport</u>	Start year	End year
Topps	Baseball	1951	2021
Topps	Basketball	1969 1992	1981 2009
Panini	FIFA World Cup	1970 1998	1990 Present
Panini	UEFA European Championship	1980	2021
Donruss	Baseball	1981 2001	1998 2005
Fleer	Baseball	1981	2005
Fleer	Basketball	1986	2004
Upper Deck	Baseball	1989	2009
Upper Deck	Hockey	1990	2026
Upper Deck	Football	1991	2009
Topps	UFC	2009	2020
Panini	Football	2009	2026
Panini	Basketball	2009	2025
Panini	Hockey	2010	2014
Topps	Major League Soccer	2013	2021
Panini	NASCAR	2016	Present
Panini	UFC	2021	Present

And the full list of sports and entertainment cards is dramatically longer.

B. The Panini Era in U.S. Sports Cards

28. Panini grew its presence in the U.S. in 2009 by obtaining licenses from key players' associations and sports leagues and ultimately progressing into long-term exclusive licenses with a number of them. In 2009, Panini entered the U.S. by obtaining a sports card deal with the NBA,

dislodging the then-holder of the license.⁹ That same year, Panini America acquired Donruss, a U.S. trading card manufacturer with licenses from the NFL and NFL Players Association ("NLFPA").¹⁰ By 2011, Panini America had amassed rights to make cards for the NHL and its Players Association ("NHLPA"),¹¹ along with the MLB Players Association ("MLBPA"),¹² giving Panini America rights across four major U.S. sports leagues and their player groups. Panini's aggressive approach to the market also led to exclusive deals with NASCAR, WWE, the Collegiate Licensing Company, and UFC, dislodging existing licensees and securing various collectibles rights, portions of which extend at least through 2025. Over time, instead of innovating and expanding the collectibles category, Panini began to treat its sports card franchise like the proverbial cash cow, which Panini's Italian owners milked at the expense of its licensing partners, athletes, and collectors alike.

- i. <u>Panini's Outdated Business Model and Failure to Invest in Marketing, Downstream Sales, Secondary Markets, and Breakers</u>
- 29. Panini primarily sells to distributors, who then sell to retailers, hobby shops, and breakers at enormous markups, none of which flow to Panini or its licensors—and all of which work to the detriment of retailers, hobby shops, breakers, and ultimately collectors. While the reliance on distributors enriches distributors with outsized profits, it often results in significantly higher prices paid by the stakeholders, which are in turn passed on to collectors. This outdated

⁹ Darren Rovell, *Topps No Longer Tops With NBA*, CNBC (Jan. 28, 2009, updated Aug 5., 2010), https://www.cnbc.com/id/28895814.

Darren Rovell, *Panini Buys Donruss*, CNBC (Mar. 13, 2009, updated Aug. 5, 2010), https://www.cnbc.com/id/29678317.

Michael Long, Extended deal on the cards for the NHL, SPORTSPRO (Mar. 26, 2010), https://www.sportspromedia.com/news/extended deal on the cards for the nhl.

¹² Tracy Hackler, *Breaking News: Panini America Inks Multi-Year Trading Card Deal with MLBPA*, THE KNIGHT'S LANCE (Sept. 15, 2011), https://blog.paniniamerica.net/breaking-news-panini-america-inks-multi-year-trading-card-deal-with-mlbpa/.

business model underscores Panini's inability to adapt to modern business dynamics and consumer trends. Its approach lacks the forward-thinking strategies, savvy marketing, and embrace of new opportunities and investment in technology evident in more progressive companies in the industry, such as Fanatics Collectibles. As the players' associations and leagues understood, Panini's complacent approach to managing its business resulted in it failing to adequately invest in marketing, overlooking downstream sales opportunities, disregarding burgeoning secondary markets, and failing to effectively leverage the emerging trend of breakers. Panini's lack of strategic investment and failure to capitalize on new opportunities have curtailed its growth potential, leaving it ill-equipped to compete effectively in today's rapidly evolving trading card industry in key ways.

- 30. First, Panini purportedly allocates approximately 1% of its revenues towards marketing. Other consumer products companies traditionally invest significantly in marketing to acquire new customers and maintain brand visibility, consumer engagement, and market share. They understand that a robust marketing strategy not only propels sales but also cultivates brand loyalty and drives long-term growth.
- 31. Second, Panini failed to capitalize on downstream sales of its products for its licensors. Historically, trading card royalties provided a significant revenue stream for leagues and associations. Under the prevailing royalty system utilized by Panini, the licensors are only compensated on the "first sale" of the trading cards, meaning that royalties are calculated as a percentage of the wholesale price that Panini charges to its distributors. Once the trading cards leave Panini's control and enter the retail or secondary market, the licensors no longer share in the revenues generated, even though the licensors' intellectual property is the most valuable component of these products.

- 32. This "first sale" royalty system has inherent limitations. While it provides a steady stream of revenues based on wholesale prices, it fails to account for the significant additional value that is often created downstream. As trading cards make their way from distributors to retailers, hobby shops, and collectors, their prices usually escalate significantly. This is especially true in the secondary market, where rare or high-demand cards can command exponentially higher prices. By leaving its business model unchanged, Panini has willingly enabled distributors to reap outsized profits at the grave expense of consumers, industry stakeholders, and Panini's licensors.
- 33. Under this system, athletes (directly or through players' associations) and leagues do not participate in these downstream revenue opportunities. As a result, they miss out on potentially substantial royalties that could have been earned if the system were structured to account for the true market value of the cards at every stage of the supply chain, rather than just the initial wholesale price to distributors.
- 34. The "first sale" royalty model is reflective of Panini's overall business strategy, which prioritizes distribution through intermediaries rather than direct engagement with consumers and the secondary market. Unfortunately, this approach limits the financial benefit to licensors and prevents them from fully capitalizing on the value of their licensed intellectual property. It also leaves Panini with less control over its products, depriving it and its licensors of the opportunity to engage with consumers downstream as much of the sports card community participates through hobby shops and secondary markets.
- 35. Third, Panini failed to develop a secondary market platform, ceding a multi-billion dollar business to third parties like eBay. The trading card industry was revolutionized by the advent of online trading platforms. These platforms facilitate a global exchange of trading cards, bringing together buyers and sellers from around the world in a dynamic, digital marketplace.

They also make it possible to conduct transactions with ease and speed that were unimaginable just decades ago.

- 36. Not only do these platforms allow for the buying and selling of individual cards, but they also offer services such as digital portfolios, price tracking, and even secure storage. They have effectively digitized the hobby, adapting it to a new generation of tech-savvy collectors who demand convenience and transparency.
- 37. Yet Panini has been remarkably slow to adapt to these trends. While other companies capitalized on the secondary market's growth and the opportunities it presents, Panini's lack of a strong online presence and digital strategy has resulted in missed revenue and customer engagement opportunities. Its model, which emphasizes selling to distributors and neglects direct engagement with most consumers and hobby shops, leaves much of the online platforms untouched.
- 38. Fourth, Panini also neglected an important newer segment of the secondary market—"breaking." Breaking involves individuals or businesses ("breakers") that buy boxes or cases of trading cards, then open them live on the internet for a paying audience. Each participant pays a fee for a share in the cards opened, often allocated by team, player, or card type. This trend has gained considerable momentum in recent years, particularly with the increasing popularity of live-streaming platforms. The emergence of breaking represents a remarkable shift in the way consumers engage with trading cards, transforming it into a shared, community experience. It offers another layer of excitement to the hobby, akin to the thrill of opening a pack of cards, but amplified by the sense of anticipation shared with others. Panini's approach, however, fails to leverage this trend. Its traditional business model, focused on selling to distributors and not directly engaging with collectors, hobby shops, and in this case, breakers, has failed to adapt to

these industry innovations. Panini's refusal to sell to breakers directly forces breakers to buy from distributors at marked up prices and pass those inflated prices on to collectors. This oversight opened the door for other companies to step in and capitalize on the breaker phenomenon, driving further participation and interest in trading cards.

39. By failing to seize these opportunities, Panini effectively ceded a significant chunk of potential income to other entities in the trading card ecosystem. This not only represents a lost revenue stream for Panini—and its licensors—but also a missed chance to engage more dynamically with the customer base, a critical factor in maintaining and growing business in a rapidly evolving industry.

ii. Panini's Poor Reputation Among Consumers

40. Not only has Panini failed to invest in a robust business model, marketing, or innovation, but critically it has also failed the most important constituency—collectors. In particular, Panini has conspicuously failed to field a dedicated customer service and support team for U.S. collectors, exemplifying Panini's larger disregard for consumers. Unsurprisingly, dissatisfaction has soared due to Panini's shoddy quality control and questionable marketing practices. For example, savvy collectors keep catching Panini mislabeling certain player patch cards as "game-worn" or "game-used," *i.e.*, incorrectly representing that the jersey patch embedded in this type of specialty card was worn by the player in question in a game. After one collector noticed the numbering on a so-labeled "game-worn" Russell Wilson patch card was off from the team's jersey design, Panini issued a statement confessing that certain cards featuring "event-worn" jerseys, which are much less valuable, had been "mistakenly labeled as 'game-worn' game-worn' jerseys, which are much less valuable, had been "mistakenly labeled as 'game-worn' game-worn' jerseys, which are much less valuable, had been "mistakenly labeled as 'game-worn' game-worn' jerseys, which are much less valuable, had been "mistakenly labeled as 'game-worn' game-worn' jerseys, which are much less valuable, had been "mistakenly labeled as 'game-worn' jerseys, which are much less valuable, had been "mistakenly labeled as 'game-worn' jerseys, which are much less valuable, had been "mistakenly labeled as 'game-worn' jerseys, which are much less valuable, had been "mistakenly labeled as 'game-worn' jerseys, which are much less valuable, had been "mistakenly labeled as 'game-worn' jerseys, which are much less valuable, had been "mistakenly labeled as 'game-worn' jerseys, which are much less valuable, had been "mistakenly labeled as 'game-worn' jerseys, which are much less valuable, had been "mistakenly labeled as 'game-worn' jerseys, which are much less valuable, had been "mistakenly


worn" due to an "oversight." Even after this *mea culpa*, collectors continued to find dubious labeling on Panini's cards, such as jerseys marked as "game-worn" or "game-used" after the player had retired or with labels from manufacturers that did not even make game jerseys:



BLOWOUT CARDS FORUM, https://www.blowoutforums.com/showthread.php?t=797728; 2014 Panini Flawless "Mislabeled" Game Worn Jersey Card Scam, YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BC6VL oWH34 (last visited Aug. 1, 2023).

Tracy Hackler, *Panini America CEO Addresses Jersey-Card Labeling Errors in 2014 Flawless Football*, THE KNIGHT'S LANCE (Nov. 18, 2014), https://paniniamerica.wordpress.com/2014/11/18/panini-america-ceo-addresses-jersey-card-labeling-errors-in-2014-flawless-football/.

¹⁵ @SportsCardNews, X (Feb 25, 2015, 10:05 PM), https://twitter.com/SportsCardNews/status/570781761644277761?ref (collectors spotting Panini game-used card for a player who had retired before the manufacturer started making game jerseys).





Darren Rovell (@darrenrovell), X (Apr. 30, 2017, 10:51 PM), https://twitter.com/darrenrovell/status/858876536820256769?ref (collectors spotting Panini game-used cards with patches from manufacturers who did not make game jerseys).

milehighmagic80 (@Isaacortiz0730), X (Apr. 29, 2019, 12:51 PM), https://twitter.com/Isaacortiz0730/status/1122906373728145409 (collectors spotting Panini gameused card for a NFL player who was already retired when the featured NFL shield was adopted).

- 41. Some of the other embarrassments aired by collectors and journalists include fake, machine-generated autographs, ¹⁸ player jersey patches from the wrong team, ¹⁹ and autograph cards sporting a blank autograph box. ²⁰
- 42. Panini's disregard for customers meant that many collector complaints and requests went unanswered. Most recently, NBC-NY reported that a collector who received defective cards had to resort to the network's consumer reporter program *Better Get Baquero* to obtain replacement cards after calling Panini for ten months to no avail.²¹
- 43. Panini's practices with redemption cards generates other continued fiascos and significant consumer dissatisfaction and backlash. A "redemption card" is a placeholder that can be exchanged ("redeemed") for a high-value autograph card that the manufacturer was unable to secure in advance of packaging the cards. For example, if Panini has yet not secured an autograph from a player, Panini inserts a redemption card into the pack instead.²² Once the autograph becomes available, Panini is supposed to provide it to the customer. Panini's currently outstanding redemptions, on a volume-adjusted basis, are estimated to be *5 to 10 times higher* than those issued by Fanatics Collectibles/Topps. Over-reliance on redemptions is in direct contrast to the approach

Ryan Cracknell, *Head of Beckett Grading Responds to Dak Prescott Panini Autograph Card Recall*, BECKETT, https://www.beckett.com/news/dak-prescott-autographs-recalled-by-panini (last visited Aug. 1, 2023).

[@]cardcollector2, INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/p/CngKJcOsQhy/?igshid=NTc4MTIwNjQ2YQ%3D%3D (last visited Aug. 1, 2023).

Jordan (@collectinghurts), X (May 28, 2023, 11:40 AM) https://twitter.com/collectinghurts/status/1662846249362669569?s=46&t=YvmVhv17xmlSiQjcFER5tQ.

NBC-NY (July 28, 2023), https://fanatics.ent.box.com/s/hg4gg6cbpi150oreucwqkwrt8utgpvx7.

²² Trading Card Glossary for The Beginner, FANATICS FORUM (Jan. 6, 2023), https://blog.fanatics.com/trading-card-glossary/.

of Fanatics, whose CEO has publicly and repeatedly expressed a desire to eliminate redemptions as a practice, and who has followed through on that promise, already having achieved material reductions in the 18 months since acquiring Topps—all to the significant benefit (and delight) of collectors.

44. Panini's sheer neglect of customer service has left collectors suffering repeated failures to fulfill redemptions. Despite assurances from Panini that it endeavors to redeem cards within 4 to 8 months, it is not uncommon for fans to wait *years* for redemptions from Panini. Reports abound of collectors waiting to be redeemed for as long as seven years.²³ Other collectors reported never receiving them at all or being sold redemption cards that had already expired.²⁴ Speculation grew that Panini was hoping the old redemptions would simply be forgotten so that they would never need to be fulfilled. Panini has done nothing to quell such speculation.




(https://www.blowoutforums.com/showpost.php?p=16515665&postcount=1)

BLOWOUT CARDS FORUM, https://www.blowoutforums.com/showpost.php?p=16516274&postcount=13 (last visited Aug. 21, 2023); BLOWOUT CARDS FORUM,

https://www.blowoutforums.com/showpost.php?p=16515665&postcount=1 (last visited Aug. 21, 2023).

²⁴ Kevin B. Brashear and Christopher S. Kitchen v. Panini America Inc, No. DC-20-08771 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Dallas Co., June 26, 2020), ¶¶ 16, 20-25.




(https://www.blowoutforums.com/showpost.php?p=16516730&postcount=16)

45. Instead, Panini has litigated with its own customers over its redemption card failures. In 2020, a group of consumers sued Panini America for deceptive trade practices, fraud, and other legal violations, claiming among other things that the company failed to honor and redeem redemption cards as promised, misled customers through false advertising related to the redemption card process, and purposely obscured the expiration dates associated with the redemption cards.²⁵ Regarding Panini's dismal customer service, the lawsuit alleges: "It is nearly impossible [for customers] to contact Panini through any means."²⁶

46. Most recently, Panini's redemption card practices took an even more disturbing turn. As collectors impatiently awaited the cards promised to them by Panini, they began to find them popping up on secondary markets like eBay. One collector was chagrinned to find that a "1/1" card (*i.e.*, a card with only one copy in existence) for which he received a redemption card from Panini—and for which he had been waiting for four years to be fulfilled—had mysteriously popped up on eBay and was just sold on May 23, 2023 for \$34,000:

²⁵ Complaint, *Brashear*, at ¶¶ 10-19.

²⁶ *Id.* ¶ 14.




Other collectors have since come forward with similar experiences.²⁸

47. Social media reflects a never-ending stream of customer complaints and dissatisfaction about Panini, as shown in the below series of tweets from a one-week period in mid-July 2023.

²⁷ @carl_zou, INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/p/CspktHvpnFz/?hl=en (last visited Aug. 1, 2023).

Shaiel Ben-Ephraim, *Are Your Pending Panini Redemptions Going To Someone Else?*, CARDLINES.COM (May 30, 2023), https://cardlines.com/panini-redemption-sales-scandal.



- 48. It is no surprise that the Better Business Bureau has given Panini America an "F" rating for its abysmal customer treatment, including its failure to honor redemptions or even communicate with customers inquiring about redemptions.²⁹ Fanatics, by contrast, maintains an A+ rating on the Better Business Bureau's website.³⁰
 - iii. Panini Is Doomed by Its Lack of Long-Term Commitment to the Business
- 49. Panini's egregious track record can be partially explained by the fact that Panini's ownership has been trying to sell its business, without success, for roughly a decade. Perhaps most famously, Panini tried (and failed) to merge with Alex Rodriguez's Special Purpose Acquisition Company ("SPAC") in 2021. Although the proposed transaction would have required the approval of relevant licensors *and* extensions of licenses, Panini did not even *discuss* the transaction with these licensors, even as it was engaging in talks with Rodriguez. Panini's view of itself as the

²⁹ Shaiel Ben-Ephraim, *Strong Misdeed Allegations Against Panini America*, CARDLINES.COM (Nov. 26, 2021), https://cardlines.com/strong-misdeed-allegations-against-panini-america/; https://cardlines.com/strong-against-panini-america/; <a href="https://cardline

Fanatics, Inc., BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU, https://www.bbb.org/us/fl/sunrise/profile/online-shopping/fanatics-inc-0633-30000854 (last visited Aug. 2, 2023).

inevitable incumbent apparently led it to believe that its licensors would have no choice but to approve the transaction, regardless of their views on how it may affect their business.

50. In short, Panini has proven time and time again that its top priority is not collector experience or benefiting other industry stakeholders, but funneling profits back to Italy. So Panini's business partners have sought out better prospects. As far back as 2014, the NHL and NHLPA opted not to renew their partnership with Panini and to license their trading cards exclusively to the Upper Deck Company. In 2021, after a full bidding process in which Panini participated, the NHL and NHLPA again opted for Upper Deck over Panini. By summer 2021, some of Panini's business partners in the U.S.—the multiple sports players' associations and leagues—made their dissatisfaction and lack of belief in Panini known by announcing new licensing contracts with Fanatics Collectibles instead of Panini.

C. Fanatics Is Transforming the Sports and Entertainment Collectibles Industry

51. Coinciding with Panini America's decline, Fanatics has been revolutionizing the sports and entertainment collectibles business with a fresh model and vision that values and prioritizes the industry's key stakeholders—athletes, players' associations, collectors, leagues, and teams—rather than simply focusing on its own profits.

i. <u>Fanatics' Entry into Collectibles</u>

52. In 2021, multiple players' associations and leagues were searching for something new, while Panini's complacent, checked-out leadership was preoccupied trying to sell their business and taking licensing renewals for granted. Against this backdrop, Fanatics approached the players' associations and leagues with a new, more compelling value proposition. As a more

Tracy Hackler, *Panini America Issues Statement Regarding NHL/NHLPA Licensing Situation*, THE KNIGHT'S LANCE (Feb. 27, 2014), https://blog.paniniamerica.net/panini-america-issues-statement-regarding-nhlnhlpa-licensing-situation.


long-term partner, Fanatics Collectibles would invest in the industry as a whole—including through marketing, customer service, improving manufacturing quality and timeliness, and related lines of business such as sports card manufacturing. As a more innovative partner, Fanatics Collectibles would sell directly to consumers, hobby shops, retailers, and "breakers," thereby allowing for better engagement with collectors and opening up new revenue streams for its licensors. Instead of relying entirely on distributors, Fanatics Collectibles evolved its distribution practices to reduce reliance on middlemen and increase servicing of hobby shops and breakers directly. As a result, in just the last 18 months, Fanatics Collectibles has grown from working directly with approximately 280 hobby shops and breakers to nearly 700 (a number that continues to grow rapidly)—increasing the profitability of those hobby shops and breakers and giving them a better opportunity to invest in, and grow, their own businesses and the industry as a whole, ultimately to the benefit of collectors. By selling directly and substantially reducing reliance on distributors, Fanatics Collectibles is growing the market and benefitting consumers through lower pricing. Moreover, as a more *inclusive* partner, Fanatics Collectibles would share a greater percentage of revenue earned through the marketing and sale of the licensors' intellectual property with players and leagues. Historically, players and leagues supplying content for sports trading cards only profited off the initial sale of the card (i.e., the sale from a manufacturer to a distributor). Fanatics Collectibles disrupted that traditional model by offering players and leagues the right to share in revenues it receives from not only primary sales—which were already more lucrative given Fanatics Collectibles' increased direct-to-consumer sales—but also from secondary markets (e.g., through its Fanatics Live platform), as well as from complementary businesses.

53. In the end, the players' associations and leagues made the only logical choice—they chose to partner with Fanatics Collectibles instead of Panini. Tellingly, although Fanatics

Collectibles sought no restrictive negotiation covenants, such as exclusivity, the licensors did not even ask Panini to bid on renewal of their licenses, clearly recognizing Panini's value proposition paled in comparison to that presented by Fanatics Collectibles. Indeed, licensors could see that Fanatics Collectibles was a more attractive partner in every respect. Whereas Panini had surfed an uptrend in a cyclical industry that reached an unprecedented peak during COVID-19, Fanatics—through raw ingenuity and innovation—had grown from a \$10 million company into a \$6 billion company in less than two decades. Whereas Panini had a selfish, profit-first mindset, Fanatics had developed a reputation as a dedicated long-term partner with a demonstrated ability to create growth and value for business partners. Whereas Panini's owners were trying (and failing) to cash out at the earliest opportunity, Fanatics was a future-focused visionary committed to the long-term investment in, and growth and health of, the industry.

- 54. The best test of ingenuity is success, and Fanatics has proven its ingenuity by consistently outperforming the competition in the eyes of industry stakeholders. Fanatics' track record in collectibles speaks for itself. Since entering the space two years ago, Fanatics Collectibles has won key licenses with the NFL, NFLPA, MLB, MLBPA, NBA, and NBPA—all of whom chose Fanatics Collectibles over Panini. Fanatics Collectibles' groundbreaking deals with the MLB and MLBPA ended Topps' 70-year run as the licensee for baseball cards. Fanatics then entered into a transaction to acquire Topps, giving Fanatics Collectibles the right to design, manufacture, and distribute baseball cards immediately, instead of having to wait until its own deals with MLB (in 2026) and the MLBPA (in 2023) began.
- 55. The licensors' decision to choose Fanatics Collectibles has already been thoroughly vindicated. For example, Fanatics Collectibles (through Topps) grew baseball card sales 30% in

2022 and has grown it an additional 15%+ in 2023 thus far. Meanwhile, the NFL and NBA are currently experiencing meaningful declines as a result of Panini's years of stewardship:



Fanatics Collectibles achieved its superior results by doing what Panini would not do: making significant marketing investments, product innovations, customer service enhancements and investment, significant product quality and manufacturing improvements, a significantly diminished reliance on redemptions, and a significant reduction in product delays. While Panini has virtually no customer service and a ~95% customer abandonment rate, ³³ Fanatics Collectibles' top-of-the-line customer service boasts a ~3% abandonment rate. Similarly, while Panini is heavily reliant on redemption cards—prompting the backlash described above—Fanatics Collectibles is able to rely significantly less on redemptions given its operational prowess, strong relationships with athletes who sign cards and more innovative product offerings, and it intends to eliminate them entirely over time except in limited situations.

56. Fanatics Collectibles has also had great success with college players who have declared their intent to participate in the draft ("rookies"), following the recent sea change on NIL

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³² Nat Turner (@natsturner), X (May 14, 2023, 8:51 PM), https://twitter.com/natsturner/status/1657911619584655364?s=42&t=cf5qfUoX9U6bUWaniG3 NYw.

A company's customer abandonment rate is the percentage of customers who call the company's customer service line and give up before speaking with a representative (*i.e.*, abandon the attempt), usually because of long wait times.

rights allowing college athletes to enter deals before they join players' associations. Earlier this year, Fanatics Collectibles struck key deals to create trading cards for star football and basketball rookies. Panini competed for dozens of these rookies, but Fanatics Collectibles won every player it pursued, even though Panini offered nearly every rookie the same or, in most cases, more money. The rookies chose Fanatics Collectibles because they wanted a partner who cared about the industry and cared about them—and not just about short-term profits. As one example, Fanatics Collectibles proved its commitment to the industry by conceiving and creating a viral "Rookie Premiere" marketing video, in which legendary NFL players (including Joe Montana, Tom Brady, Aaron Rodgers, Jerry Rice, Peyton Manning, and Rob Gronkowski) provided personalized words of wisdom and signed jerseys to star rookies. The rookies praised the special experience that Fanatics Collectibles created.³⁴

57. Fanatics Collectibles' MLB rookie patches are another example of how Fanatics Collectibles has capitalized on the hype surrounding rookie players: this spring, Fanatics Collectibles and Topps introduced this new memorabilia patch created specifically for trading cards from MLB rookies making their debuts. These 1/1 cards contain an authentic patch worn by an MLB rookie during his debut game.³⁵ Fanatics Collectibles' partners at the MLB and MLBPA praised this innovation. For example, the MLBPA's Executive Director stated: "For a Player there is no bigger moment than the first time they step onto a field for their Major League debut. The Debut Patch is one way to capture the timeless nature of this moment and provide fans the

Jared Dubin, *Breakout player for every NFL team in 2023: Chiefs' Kadarius Toney enters new season as Patrick Mahomes' WR1*, CBS SPORTS (July 23, 2023), https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/one-breakout-player-for-each-nfl-team-entering-2023-big-jordan-love-season-would-be-huge-for-packers.

Fanatics debuts new MLB rookie patches as part of its expansion into collectibles, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 30, 2023), https://www.fastcompany.com/90871389/fanatics-mlb-rookie-patches-topps-trading-cards-collectibles.

opportunity to be part of it by collecting a player-worn item."³⁶ The Commissioner of the MLB offered similar praise: "A Major League player's debut day is a cause for great celebration and the culmination of many years of hard work. ... I think this particular initiative is crucial to the development of deeper fan engagement."³⁷

- 58. Professional sports players and leagues have long praised Fanatics as a partner. In Tom Brady's words: "Fanatics is a brand synonymous with authenticity, in both the merchandise they provide and the timeless memories they create that go well beyond a jersey or a football." More recently, the NFL's chief media and business officer remarked on the NFL's "belief that [Fanatics] is building a business that is new, unique and valuable." ³⁹
- 59. The same is true of Fanatics' entertainment partners. WWE's Head of Corporate Development recently commented: "Fanatics has been an amazing partner and will immediately bolster WWE's event retail business. Expanding our partnership will allow WWE to further expand our offering to fans and grow merchandise revenue in 2023 and beyond."⁴⁰

³⁶ *Id*.

³⁷ Fanatics unveils special MLB Debut Patches for player jerseys, rookie cards, SPORTS COLLECTORS DIGEST (Mar. 30, 2023), https://sportscollectorsdigest.com/news/mlb-debut-patches-rookie-cards-fanatics-tops.

Mike Chiari, *Tom Brady, Fanatics Agree to Long-Term Contract for Exclusive Memorabilia*, BLEACHER REPORT (Oct. 21, 2021), https://bleacherreport.com/articles/2914408-tom-brady-fanatics-agree-to-long-term-contract-for-exclusive-memorabilia.

³⁹ Jessica Golden, *NFL*, *MLB* and players unions lead the latest round of investment in rapidly growing Fanatics, CNBC (Apr. 6, 2022), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/06/nfl-mlb-players-unions-lead-latest-investment-in-fanatics.html.

WWE® & Fanatics Expand Partnership to Include All Global Event Retail and Merchandise Operations, BUSINESS WIRE (Apr. 18, 2023), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20230418005782/en/WWE%C2%AE-Fanatics-Expand-Partnership-to-Include-All-Global-Event-Retail-and-Merchandise-Operations.

ii. Fanatics Collectibles' Investment in GCP

- 60. After acquiring Topps, Fanatics Collectibles made a strategic investment in the card-solutions company GC Packaging LLC ("GCP") in an effort to shore up manufacturing issues that were affecting Fanatics Collectibles and various other companies in an industry fraught with significant quality issues, capacity constraints, consistent delivery issues, theft, and underinvestment caused by industry cyclicality.
- 61. GCP is a full-service card-manufacturing solutions company known for its expertise in trading card production. For more than 40 years, various trading card companies, including Topps, have used GCP to convert trading cards from design to reality. GCP handles a comprehensive array of card-making processes, such as printing, laminating, foil stamping, embossing, wrapping, packaging, and more.
- 62. In the years leading up to Fanatics Collectibles' investment in GCP, the cardsolutions industry as a whole was fraught with issues. Supply chain hiccups, poor quality control,
 and missed delivery dates had long been issues, and rising demand for sports trading cards from
 2017 to 2020 only exacerbated them further. Then in 2020, COVID-19 rocked the industry with
 supply-chain issues at the same time as consumer demand skyrocketed to unprecedent levels,
 correlating to an unprecedented increase in delays and quality control issues as already-thin
 capacities were nearly stretched to breaking.
- 63. GCP was no exception to the industry's troubles. By the time Fanatics Collectibles acquired Topps (late 2021), high demand and underinvestment had resulted in pervasive quality control issues, significant capacity issues, numerous delivery delays, and even theft issues. More than 70% of GCP's jobs were late in the last quarter of 2020, and the situation only worsened in 2021. This was especially problematic for Topps (and by extension, Fanatics Collectibles) as

Topps relied on GCP to produce approximately 40% of its trading cards. Collectors of trading cards demand perfection—rightfully so—and GCP's difficulties in meeting demand were having a severe impact on Topps' reputation. Moreover, while companies in other sport-adjacent markets—such as the sports video game and sneaker markets—have been able to capitalize on heavily promoted release dates in order to generate additional demand for their products, sports trading card companies lacked reliable printing solutions that could deliver cards on schedule for major release dates. That inability to create—and appropriately market—reliable release dates meant leaving opportunities for greater sales on the table.

- 64. To remedy Topps' supply chain issues and ensure production could meet demand, Fanatics Collectibles invested in GCP. Independent card-manufacturing solutions companies, like GCP, have little ability or willingness to invest in their own improvement as, for years, the trading card trends have been largely cyclical in nature. Companies that spend time and capital building capacity to meet demand run the risk of finishing right as that demand dries up. As such, a number of trading card companies have invested in or acquired their own card-manufacturing solutions. This enables the trading card company to grow the card-manufacturing solutions alongside demand—Pokémon, one of the largest trading card companies, bought Millennium Print Group in 2021; likewise, Panini has its own manufacturing solution abroad. Indeed, even Panini America's CEO, Mark Warsop, believed Fanatics Collectibles was the future, advising the CEO of GCP to sell to Fanatics.
- 65. Fanatics Collectibles' investment in GCP has paid off for collectors. In the last 18 months, Fanatics Collectibles' investment in GCP has allowed it to: (i) tighten quality control, already reducing the number of cards that fell short of "centering" standards by 70%; (ii) increase capacity from less than 300 million to over 400 million packs per year; (iii) substantially reduce

delays, allowing trading card companies to meet precise release schedules far more often; (iv) enhance security procedures, resulting in significantly less theft which can impact cards' uniqueness; and (v) increase investment and innovation, with GCP doubling its capex since investment, deploying state-of-the-art innovations, and investing in new facilities.

- 66. Fanatics Collectibles' investment has benefited itself and Topps, as well as GCP's other customers—including Panini. Indeed, not only did Panini's output improve directly as a result of GCP's increased capacity, but Panini's share of that capacity grew over time from 49% (of less than 300 million) to 61% (of over 400 million), resulting in GCP producing significantly more packs for Panini. Fanatics Collectibles' investment also clearly benefited trading card collectors, given the increase in not only the amount of card production available, but their quality and timely production as well.
- 67. Ironically, while GCP may have been plagued with issues prior to Fanatics Collectibles' investment, at this stage, Panini has become the problem for GCP. Panini has failed, and continues to fail, to supply deliverables including production files, autographs, and memorabilia/relics to GCP on time, causing delays and complications at GCP—as capacity that is reserved and not used is lost—and resulting in GCP recently in 2023 missing its budget and profit goals by tens of millions of dollars.

iii. Fanatics Collectibles' Growth

68. Licensors have recognized the dynamic new opportunities Fanatics Collectibles offers, and licensors such as Bundesliga, colleges, Disney, F-1, Fortnite, MLB/MLBPA, NBA/NBPA, NFL/NFLPA, UEFA, UFC and WWE have all chosen to enter into license agreements with Fanatics Collectibles. Those licenses have varying terms depending on the interests of the licensor (the holder of the IP rights). Yet, for all its success, Fanatics Collectibles'

share of the sports and entertainment collectibles market remains small—in fact, much smaller than Panini's as of today. Indeed, Fanatics Collectibles' portfolio of sports licenses largely resembles Panini's—except that many of Fanatics Collectibles' key licenses will not kick in until late 2025 or early 2026. The following chart compares Fanatics Collectibles' suite of licenses to Panini's past or present licenses:

<u>Fanatics</u> <u>Collectibles</u>	<u>Panini</u>
MLB	FIFA
MLBPA	MLBPA
NFL	NFL
NFLPA	NFLPA
NBA	NBA
NBPA	NBPA
F-1	NASCAR
UFC	UFC
WWE	WWE
Colleges	Colleges
Bundesliga	EPL
UEFA	UEFA

69. Panini also holds licenses with other major collectibles licensors such as Marvel, the global entertainment goliath.

D. Panini's Unlawful Campaign to Disrupt Fanatics Collectibles

70. Unable to keep pace with Fanatics Collectibles and having lost key licenses in football and basketball beginning in 2025, Panini launched a campaign of dirty tricks. Panini's

intention behind these maneuvers was twofold: to disrupt Fanatics Collectibles' momentum and to possibly coax Fanatics Collectibles into early transitioning its remaining license years, a maneuver that would lead to an undeserved windfall profit for Panini and its Italian owners. Panini strung Fanatics Collectibles along by negotiating a sham agreement with respect to the early termination of certain licenses. In fact, Panini had no intent to consummate that agreement, which served merely as a vehicle to stall Fanatics Collectibles' development of its business, as Fanatics Collectibles believed that it would be able to rely on Panini personnel, many of whom could freely join Fanatics Collectibles following the early termination of Panini's licenses. Panini then turned to wielding litigation and the threat of litigation as a weapon to prevent its employees from seeking greener pastures at Fanatics Collectibles. Finally, Panini filed an unfounded antitrust action against Fanatics in Florida.

- i. <u>Panini Bait-and-Switches Fanatics with Sham Prospects of Early Termination</u>
- 71. Unable to keep up with Fanatics Collectibles fair-and-square, Panini engaged in a campaign of stalling, misdirection, and misrepresentation against Fanatics Collectibles. With many of Fanatics Collectibles' licensing rights commencing after licenses held by Panini were set to expire in 2025-2026, Panini engaged with Fanatics in February 2022 about the early termination of certain of its licenses, which would facilitate an early transition of these licenses to Fanatics Collectibles, in exchange for a lump-sum fee equivalent to Panini's projected earnings for the remaining license years, less a discount factor.
- 72. Fanatics Collectibles welcomed the opportunity, recognizing that the collaboration could ensure a smooth transition for its licensor partners and for collectors. The proposed early termination would be extremely lucrative for Panini. At the time Fanatics and Panini began their discussions, the COVID-19 pandemic and the rise of NFTs brought a surge in demand and value

for sports cards. As a result, the potential early termination presented Panini with the opportunity to secure compensation for years of future earnings predicated on unusually favorable market conditions and historically high valuations at that time. The huge cash infusion that Panini would receive from the early termination would allow it to remain highly competitive in the industry for years to come.

- 73. In furtherance of these discussions, Fanatics and Panini held numerous meetings, both in-person and virtual, and exchanged numerous communications by phone and email. Several of the in-person meetings took place in New York and were attended by representatives of Panini and/or Panini America. The negotiations that took place by videoconference, call, or email typically involved Fanatics' New York-based agents and representatives participating from New York.
- 74. The first milestone in negotiations occurred in May 2022, when the companies reached an agreement in principle: with the approval of the licensors, Panini would terminate the remaining years on certain licenses with players' associations and sports leagues. In exchange, Fanatics Collectibles would pay Panini an early termination fee based upon Panini's projected earnings for the residual term of the licenses. But unbeknownst to Fanatics, Panini knew that it was materially underperforming against its annual projections by nearly 30%—a reality it intentionally disguised and fraudulently concealed to maintain an inflated termination fee. Fanatics received these false representations in New York.
- 75. Closing was initially set for July 2022, but this date repeatedly slipped as Panini delayed, and delayed some more. Panini's delays were perplexing considering that Panini stood most to gain from quick execution, which would give Panini the unique opportunity to take advantage of the sky-high valuations that COVID-19 and the NFT-related industry fervor had

created. Yet even in the absence of any substantive disagreements, Panini routinely went weeks without providing any comments on draft transactional documents. More than once, Panini waited over a month to return its mark-up of the term sheet. Fanatics Collectibles, on the other hand, made every effort to advance negotiations, retaining top-tier lawyers and other advisers, engaging in robust due diligence, promptly turning comments on the parties' working term sheet, and leveraging key connections to secure commitments from lenders to fund the early termination payment to Panini. In doing so, Fanatics Collectibles devoted vast amounts of time, energy, and capital to effectuate the early termination. Despite all of Fanatics Collectibles' best efforts, Panini's repeated delays resulted in monthly postponements of the targeted closing date.

- 76. Around October 2022, after several months of stalling by Panini, Fanatics attempted to advance the discussions by drafting a long-form agreement to memorialize the detailed terms of the anticipated early termination. However, Panini continued to stonewall with serial delays and inexplicable intransigence. It took Panini 28 days to send Fanatics its initial mark-up of the long-form agreement, and a later turn took Panini 34 days before returning its mark-up. Panini exhibited equally egregious delays with respect to other deal documents and diligence tasks. Ultimately, Panini's stalling delayed closing for the rest of 2022 and into 2023.
- 77. As Panini stalled, the collectibles industry grew more challenging. By early 2023, market realities had dramatically changed. The COVID-19 pandemic was showing signs of subsiding, and 2022's "crypto winter" (which also adversely affected demand for NFTs) coincided with a general downturn in economic conditions.
- 78. It was around this time that Fanatics learned Panini had created falsified financial projections to inflate the amount of the early termination fee, as part of its efforts to dupe Fanatics Collectibles into continued negotiations. Astonishingly, Warsop admitted to Fanatics privately

that Panini was maintaining two sets of projections during negotiations with Fanatics: (1) an internal set that Panini used and relied on to properly budget and operate its business, and which had been approved by Panini's Italian owners, and (2) a separate, much rosier set of falsified projections that were carefully and systematically fed to Fanatics for its consumption at the direction, and with the endorsement, of Panini's Italian owners. This was not some off-hand comment; in a series of meetings that occurred on November 14, 2022, November 19, 2022, December 5, 2022, December 11, 2022, and January 16, 2023, Warsop repeatedly confessed that Panini's own internal projections for 2023 had been revised downward by hundreds of millions of dollars in annual profits. During the January 16, 2023 meeting, Warsop confirmed that Panini's Italian owners had formally approved these reduced figures.

- 79. Even as it became clear to Fanatics that the projections provided by Panini's owners in Italy materially misrepresented the attractiveness of Panini's business, Panini continued to reiterate to Fanatics that it stood by the same inflated earnings projections. On January 26, 2023—ten days after Warsop confirmed that Panini's Italian owners had formally approved the reduced figures—Panini provided Fanatics with financial projections that still overstated its future earnings by hundreds of millions of dollars in 2023. A month later (on February 26, 2023), in complete contradiction to this representation, Warsop confirmed once more that Panini's internal projections for 2023 were down dramatically in line with its actual earnings in 2022. Because the early termination price was directly tied to Panini's projections, its inflated projections were designed to justify an inflated price.
- 80. Panini employed other maneuvers to extract an inflated termination fee. While Fanatics Collectibles engaged with Panini about the potential for early termination of Panini's licenses, Panini repeatedly threatened, both explicitly and implicitly, that Fanatics would face an

antitrust lawsuit if the parties failed to reach agreement. In this respect, Panini was attempting to strong-arm Fanatics into paying the falsely inflated fee that Panini wanted.

- 81. As a result of Panini's delays, misdirection, and misrepresentations, Fanatics Collectibles missed out on lucrative business opportunities worth roughly \$200 million in revenue over the last year. Before entering negotiations with Panini, Fanatics Collectibles had arranged certain potential deals adjacent to Panini's established licenses. Specifically, prior to and during the negotiations with Panini, Fanatics Collectibles had agreed to a present-day licensing arrangement with the NBA Players Association and had numerous opportunities with the upcoming NFL rookie class. None of these contemplated licenses violated Panini's existing licenses. Once the parties agreed in principle to an early termination of certain of Panini's licenses, however, Fanatics Collectibles paused pursuing these other deals because it reasonably believed it would no longer need to acquire the licenses that it was exploring, as it would obtain substantively similar licenses through the early termination.
- 82. By the time early termination talks terminated, Fanatics Collectibles had missed the opportunity to pursue valuable parallel business opportunities. When the parties finally reached an impasse in early 2023, the NFL rookie class for 2022 had already been drafted, effectively preventing Fanatics Collectibles from entering into license arrangements with the rookies. And while Fanatics Collectibles was able to re-enter and salvage its negotiations with the NBA Players Association after its negotiations with Panini terminated, Fanatics Collectibles missed out on a full year of revenue stream as Panini deceptively led it down a path to nowhere. Together, Fanatics Collectibles estimates that these missed opportunities would have generated a minimum of \$200 million of revenue for Fanatics Collectibles in the first year alone.

- 83. Also as a result of Panini's misdirection, Fanatics Collectibles leveraged key lender relationships to no end, spent tens of millions of dollars paying lawyers, accountants, and other professionals to perform extensive due diligence work, invested in new facilities and expansion, and suffered other harm in connection with the early termination—which Panini knew would never happen because Panini was unwilling to negotiate in good faith.
- 84. Fanatics Collectibles was not alone in suffering from Panini's drawn-out misdirection campaign: consumers also suffered, as did the industry at large. By tying up Fanatics' senior leadership in dead-end early termination talks that lasted nearly a year, Panini prevented Fanatics Collectibles from devoting its full attention to creating, improving, and delivering better products and services for the group that matters most—collectors. A strong sports and entertainment collectibles industry requires an engaged and loyal consumer base. Unlike Panini, Fanatics Collectibles' defining mission is to serve collectors and constantly improve their experience. By standing in Fanatics Collectibles' way, Panini harmed the entire industry to the detriment of collectors.
 - ii. <u>Panini Uses Litigation to Prevent Its Employees from Joining Fanatics Collectibles</u>
- 85. After drawing out licensing negotiations in bad faith, Panini next resorted to heavy-handed litigation threats to scare its at-will employees away from joining Fanatics.
- 86. While negotiating to no avail with Panini, Fanatics Collectibles deferred hiring new employees to build out its growing sports card business in anticipation that certain of Panini's employees would naturally transition to Fanatics Collectibles as part of the early termination. In early April 2023, shortly after talks fell apart, Fanatics Collectibles posted over 100 job openings to support its existing collectibles business, and to prepare for the impending start of certain of its

licenses, which began as early as October 2023 and included such sports as basketball (NBPA), UFC, tennis, boxing, and football.

- 87. Fanatics Collectibles expected many Panini employees would be interested, given that Panini's sports business was struggling and its owners continued to attempt to sell the business to third parties, even as a number of Panini's licenses approached expiry. Given the circumstances, Fanatics Collectibles assumed that those employees who worked on products associated with those licenses would be concerned about their futures and would be interested in working for a new, dynamic participant in the card collectibles space.
- 88. That month, 37 former Panini employees chose to leave the company and join Fanatics Collectibles. Fanatics Collectibles gave them essential roles across its marketing, operations, athlete relations, and product development departments, and those employees have been active and productive since they were hired. Fanatics Collectibles had a business need for these employees (today it still has over an additional 100 open job openings to support its growing business), and would have hired them earlier if Panini had not bait-and-switched Fanatics Collectibles into dead-end talks of early termination.
- 89. Another reason for the departures was that Panini's workforce was suffering from low morale. Former Panini employees who joined Fanatics Collectibles recall the emotional turmoil, stress, and lack of transparency that drove them to leave for Fanatics Collectibles. Multiple Panini employees did not feel their salaries were reflective of what they deserved. Remarkably, Warsop himself acknowledged Panini's stinginess towards employees. In May 2023, Warsop told Fanatics that Fanatics Collectibles' hiring of Panini America employees was great for Panini America because it finally got Panini's owners to open their checkbook after years of being "cheapskates" toward workers.

90. On the diversity front, Panini's intolerant workplace culture has occasioned public concern and criticism. Strikingly, Panini in 2021 removed its previously proclaimed commitment to workplace diversity from its code of ethics. It went still further by removing "race" from what Panini lists as the classes protected from workplace discrimination. It is no surprise, therefore, that social-justice advocates recently sent scathing letters to Panini and top sports league executives protesting the stark contrast between the lack of Black employees at the company and the enormous sums that Panini has made from the talents and contributions of Black athletes. Since entering the U.S., Panini has generated massive revenues selling football and basketball cards featuring Black and Brown athletes, who comprise the overwhelming majority of NBA and NFL players. Yet, as one letter observed, "[t]here are virtually no Black executives at the senior level [at Panini America]," and there is "very little Black employment at any level of the organization." Another letter blasted Panini for having "no Black leadership in the United States" despite

Compare Code of Ethics, Panini S.p.A. at 8 (Dec. 1, 2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/prod-paninicx-store/info/PANINI_SpA_Code_of_Ethics.pdf ("The Company believes diversity is an opportunity in terms of innovation and development through dialogue and exchanging ideas, opinions and experiences.") with The Code of Ethics, Panini S.p.A. at 2, 5 (Dec. 17, 2021), https://a.storyblok.com/f/71890/x/ee6c3e7ee1/panini_spa_code_of_ethics.pdf. Panini S.p.A.'s 2016 code of ethics is archived on Panini America's website. Panini S.p.A.'s current code of ethics is available on Panini S.p.A.'s website.

Compare Code of Ethics, Panini S.p.A. at 8 (Dec. 1, 2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/prod-paninicx-store/info/PANINI SpA Code of Ethics.pdf ("Discriminatory behaviour based on race, religion, age, health, political and trade union opinions, nationality, sexual orientation and in general any personal quality of a human being is not admitted in internal and external relations.") (emphasis added) with The Code of Ethics, Panini S.p.A. at 5 (Dec. 17, 2021), https://a.storyblok.com/f/71890/x/ee6c3e7ee1/panini spa code of ethics.pdf ("Panini s.p.a. condemns any conduct that harms individual personality, and, in particular, disapproves of and forbids, in its own organisational context, any discriminatory behaviour founded on nationality or origin, religious creed, age, health condition, political and trade union opinions, sexual orientation, and on any and all other subjective characteristics or conditions.").

⁴³ Eileen Reslen, *The scathing letter sent to NFL, NBA, MLB execs over Panini's alleged 'racial injustice'*, N.Y. Post (May 24, 2023), https://nypost.com/2023/05/24/tamika-mallory-accuses-panini-of-racial-injustice-in-scathing-letter-to-sports-leagues/.

employing "hundreds of employees in the United States" and deriving "75% of its business from selling depictions of Black and Brown athletes."44

The scathing letter sent to NFL, NBA, MLB execs over Panini's alleged 'racial injustice' New York Post

By Eileen Reslen

Despite Panini's public commitments to diversity, Panini falls far short of its ideal. Panini has no Black leadership in the United States. While this failure would be notable for any organization, Panini's lack of diversity is especially shocking since its multi-billion dollar business has been built on the backs of Black and Brown athletes. Indeed, Panini, which has hundreds of employees in the United States, has derived 75% of its business from selling depictions of Black and Brown athletes.

91. Rather than address the root causes of these employee departures—and unable to keep its employees even with heavy-handed offers of pay raises and other incentives—Panini retaliated against its former employees with legal action. On April 14, 2023, Panini instituted an action in Texas state court against Fanatics and seven longtime former Panini employees who had joined Fanatics Collectibles. 45 Each and every named defendant was an at-will employee without any non-compete covenant restraining their move to Fanatics Collectibles. Even so, Panini sought immediate injunctive relief preventing Fanatics and the former employees from using Panini's

Letter from Tamika D. Mallory and Rev. Michael McBride to Mark Warsop, Re: Panini America Inc.'s ("Panini") Lack of Diversity In Its Executive Leadership (May 15, 2023), https://thesource.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Letter-to-Panini-America2-002.pdf.

⁴⁵ Panini America, Inc. v. Eli Nicholas Matijevich, Jr. et al., No. DC-23-04798 (Tex. Dist. Ct., Dallas Co., Apr. 14, 2023).

supposed trade secrets and enjoining the former employees from recruiting more Panini employees. ⁴⁶ The Texas state court initially granted Panini's application for a temporary restraining order, with language agreed to by the parties, and ordered expedited discovery. ⁴⁷

- 92. For the sake of avoiding further dispute, Fanatics consented to a temporary injunction barring the seven former employees from recruiting other Panini employees and enjoining both Fanatics and the seven former Panini employees from using Panini's confidential information.
- 93. While the litigation remains ongoing, the record developed provides zero support for the notion that Fanatics or Panini's former employees did anything unlawful. Panini accuses Fanatics of trade secret misappropriation because former employees left with thumb drives, but neutral forensic evidence has confirmed that no former employee ever accessed any Panini-related information on the thumb drives after leaving Panini. Meanwhile, Panini's alleged "trade secrets" are a hodgepodge of public or valueless categories of information. For example, Panini suggests that the identity of its employees is a trade secret, but its corporate representative readily agreed that this information is public knowledge.
- 94. Panini's heavy handed legal threats have succeeded at preventing other employees from joining Fanatics Collectibles. Since the first wave of employee departures, Panini has initiated a campaign of intimidation, leveraging the threat of further litigation to stem the tide of further employee departures. Panini has reportedly threatened current employees, regardless of seniority or whether they were under non-competes, with legal actions should they choose to transition to Fanatics Collectibles. Upon information and belief, Panini's scare tactics,

⁴⁶ Complaint, ¶¶ 28, 57-58.

⁴⁷ Temporary Restraining Order, Apr. 17, 2023.

compounded by its actual suit against certain former employees, have instilled a climate of fear among its personnel. Consequently, many more Panini employees have been deterred from joining Fanatics Collectibles and forced to remain captive at Panini as their sole avenue for maintaining gainful employment in the industry. These are qualified, experienced employees who would add great value at Fanatics Collectibles.

iv. Panini Alleges "Antitrust" Violations to Protect Its Incumbency

95. In early August 2023, Panini finally came through on its longstanding threats to bring a (baseless) antitrust action against Fanatics. In its latest move to thwart Fanatics' rise, Panini (through Panini America) has filed a federal action against certain Fanatics entities in Florida.⁴⁸ Panini America's lawsuit, which alleges violations of federal antitrust laws and state tort laws, is factually inaccurate, legally incoherent, and ultimately upside-down. At bottom, Panini is misusing the antitrust laws to try to insulate itself against competition, and doing so after Fanatics has proved to be the superior option, on the merits, for licensors as well as consumers. Indeed, while Panini is directing its allegations against Fanatics, what Panini is really doing is challenging decisions by sports leagues and players' associations to license their exclusive intellectual property rights as they deem best, in furtherance of their interests and those of consumers. Moreover, Panini is faulting conduct by Fanatics (including Fanatics' displacement of Panini, after Panini displaced Topps) that is no different from what Panini did to position itself in prior years. Examples of Panini's disingenuousness jump out from its complaint:

➤ Panini's Track Record. Panini America alleges that "its superior innovation and competitive success have made it a market leader." But Panini's actual

⁴⁸ *Panini America, Inc. v. Fanatics, Inc. et al.*, No. 8:23-cv-1721 (M.D. Fla., filed Aug. 3, 2023).

⁴⁹ Complaint, Panini America, Inc. v. Fanatics, Inc. et al., ¶ 1.

track record tells a much different story—of dismal customer service, enormous amounts of unfulfilled redemption cards, egregious quality control issues, shoddy product offerings, and pervasive underinvestment. The upshot has left athletes, players' associations, leagues, entertainment properties, and collectors hungering for a new alternative over the last decade, while Panini devoted itself to hoarding profits and trying to sell its business.

- Fanatics' Competition for Licenses. Panini America cries foul because it "was not given an opportunity to bid or otherwise compete for the licenses Fanatics acquired." ⁵⁰ But sophisticated licensors choose for themselves whether or not to run a bidding process. Here, the licensors independently decided not to solicit bids from Panini because Panini had made painfully clear throughout its long tenure that it lacked the vision, leadership team, and willingness to invest and deliver the way that Fanatics Collectibles is positioned and committed to do. Simply stated, it was obvious to licensors that the bold, comprehensive, and innovative vision Fanatics Collectibles brought to the table marked the path forward for the future and would best serve the interests of collectors and licensors alike. And Panini should well understand why licensors here proceeded as they did, having *itself* acquired licenses (including its longheld NFLPA license) without having to participate in a bidding process.
- ➤ Rookie Deals. Panini America alleges that Fanatics "den[ied] Panini access" to rookies to "depriv[e] Panini of the ability to include those players' original, handwritten autographs with its trading cards during the remaining years of

⁵⁰ *Id.* ¶ 70.

Panini's existing licenses." ⁵¹ This allegation, too, is demonstrably false. Fanatics Collectibles had strong business reasons for entering the rookie deals, which are expected to generate collector excitement and hundreds of millions in year-one revenue alone and have already ignited successful, viral marketing campaigns. Notably, Panini fails to mention that it competed for dozens of these rookies and lost *every single one* to Fanatics Collectibles, even though Panini offered nearly every rookie the same or, in most cases, more money.

➤ Long-Term, Exclusive Deals. Panini claims "[t]he duration of Fanatics' exclusive-dealing arrangements are well beyond anything that is necessary for any legitimate economic or other purpose." This allegation ignores the fact that the licensors choose the terms upon which to license their intellectual property. It also flouts basic economic theory, as well-known to and long trumpeted by Panini itself. Long-term, exclusive IP licensing incentivizes parties to work together to grow and improve a business. Fanatics' long-term deals are enabling it to invest deeply in marketing, product development, and innovation; to build strong, lasting relationships with athletes; and to take a variety of steps to improve the industry and enhance collector experience, including as reflected in Fanatics' GCP investment. Collectors fare better, not worse, in a world where licensors have long-term deals with Fanatics as opposed to Panini.

⁵¹ *Id.* ¶¶ 5, 107.

⁵² *Id.* ¶ 69.

- ➤ Topps Acquisition. Panini America faults Fanatics' acquisition of Topps, while ignoring Panini's materially indistinguishable acquisition of Donruss. Panini adds that "Topps had almost no choice but to sell" because "Fanatics had acquired twenty-year exclusive deals with Topps's primary business partners—MLB and the MLB Players Association." Yet Panini itself was in the same position as Topps—having lost its key licenses to Fanatics Collectibles—and Panini remains independent today, refuting the notion that Topps had no choice.
- Panini" and that the investment compromises Panini's ability produce cards "according to the exacting standards Panini requires." ⁵⁴ This, too, is demonstrably false. Fanatics invested in GCP in order to improve an industry that has been plagued by problems with significant quality issues, capacity constraints, consistent delivery delays, numerous theft issues, and underinvestment. Fanatics' investment benefits everyone, including Panini—which has seen its share of GCP's capacity grow substantially since Fanatics' investment, resulting in GCP producing significantly more packs for Panini. Collectors should judge for themselves whether Panini truly maintains "exacting standards," as Panini alleges. But the facts are that Fanatics' investment in GCP has been improving the quantity, quality, and security of GCP's production, and, in fact, has even expanded GCP's facilities, all for the benefit of collectors and the industry as a whole.

⁵³ *Id.* ¶ 75.

⁵⁴ *Id.* ¶ 86

- Alleged "Raid" of Employees. Panini America alleges that Fanatics hired dozens of its employees "to harm Panini's current ability to perform under its existing licenses and shore up Fanatics' monopoly power by putting Panini out of business." To the contrary, Panini employees were desperate to escape from Panini's dim prospects and bleak, outdated workplace environment, and they eagerly flocked to Fanatics Collectibles. More would have joined Fanatics Collectibles had it not been for Panini's tortious threats of legal action against them.
- ➤ "Fir[ing]" of Distributors. Panini America claims that Fanatics is "abus[ing] its market power" by terminating relationships with distributors. ⁵⁶ In truth, Fanatics has yet even to step into most of the licenses in question. As it does, however, Fanatics will be prioritizing selling directly to hobby shops, retailers, and breakers. And Fanatics' approach will benefit licensors and consumers, as it will avoid the enormous markups charged by distributors, which reduce profit margins for Fanatics' business partners and subject consumers to higher prices.
- 96. Collectors, fans, and commentators quickly seized on the hypocrisy of Panini America's lawsuit, *i.e.*, complaining that Fanatics had fairly won long-term licenses with many of the same licensors with whom Panini has enjoyed a relationship for many years. On August 4, 2023, shortly after filing its lawsuit, Panini issued an out-of-touch public statement bragging that it had supposedly "driven the trading card category to unprecedented heights never before witnessed among our licensed partners and players through the development of the industry's most


⁵⁵ *Id.* ¶ 106.


⁵⁶ *Id.* ¶ 130.

popular trading card brands."⁵⁷ Social media begged to differ—and had a lot to say about it. Panini was immediately met with a sea of criticism from collectors, fans, and commentators who expressed dismay and incredulity at Panini's arrogant (and dubious) self-characterization in its statement. Of the 250+ postings in response to Panini's public statement that poured in over the next two days, through August 6, more than 95% were negative towards Panini. The onslaught of angry consumers and commentators was piercing:⁵⁸


Panini America (@PaniniAmerica), X (Aug. 4, 2023, 1:52 PM), https://twitter.com/paniniamerica/status/1687521935607885824?s.

 $^{^{58}}$ See **Appendix A** for a full compilation of responses to Panini's public statement.





97. Indeed, Panini's underpaid and overworked social media team gave up after hiding a dozen or so negative replies:



98. Panini's clumsy attempts to hide negative reactions to its postings about its lawsuit garnered further ridicule from collectors, fans and other commentators:







* * *

- 99. To be clear, Fanatics intends to present a robust defense—and prevail—against Panini America's baseless lawsuit. What should be said here and now is that Panini's lawsuit is merely the latest installment in Panini's ongoing campaign to stifle Fanatics' rise through any and all means (other than competition on the merits).
- laws on their head. Fanatics Collectibles is a dynamic new player that presented expanded economic opportunities to licensors, including players' associations and leagues, for their intellectual property. These licensors—who are led by experienced and knowledgeable businesspeople—decided that their future was brighter if they licensed their intellectual property to Fanatics Collectibles. That is not an antitrust violation. It reflects competition and the fundamental principle that an entity has the freedom to license its intellectual property rights exclusively, non-exclusively, or not at all. Panini has no real standing to complain that these licensors exercised that freedom to enter into a new exclusive relationship with Fanatics Collectibles, a new and innovative player in the industry. And Panini's antitrust litigation plainly lacks merit considering that, *e.g.*, Panini expanded its global business to the United States in 2009 based on exclusive licenses with licensors, a number of which it *still* has.⁵⁹ The antitrust laws

See, e.g., Terry Lefton, Five more years for Panini's NBA trading card deal, SPORTS BUSINESS J. (Oct. 29, 2012), https://www.sportsbusinessjournal.com/Journal/Issues/2012/10/29/Marketing-and-Sponsorship/NBA-Panini.aspx ("The NBA surprised the trading card industry in 2009 when it signed a virtual unknown brand in Panini while dropping two household names in Topps and Upper Deck. At the time, Panini had no U.S. offices nor staff."); Rich Mueller, NBA Trading Card License to Remain with Panini, Sports Collectors Dailly (June 1, 2017), https://www.sportscollectorsdaily.com/nba-trading-card-license-remain-panini/ ("The league and the trading card maker announced [in June 2017] what they called a 'long-term, multiyear extension' of the exclusive trading card contract first signed in 2009. The deal means Panini won't be facing any competition from other trading card makers for at least the next several years.").

protect competition, not incumbent competitors like Panini who failed to convince its long-term partners to enter into a new exclusive relationship with it.

101. By Panini's own account, it remains the global market leader to this day. Panini America's social media accounts also describe Panini as the "global leader in licensed sports & entertainment collectibles" or, alternatively, "the world's largest sports and entertainment collectibles company":



⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Panini America, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/PaniniAmerica/ (last visited Aug. 2, 2023).





102. Panini and its leadership have made similar statements to the press and in blog posts on countless occasions, ⁶³ as well as in pitch materials. When it was attempting to combine with

⁶¹ @paniniamerica, INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/paniniamerica/?hl=en (last visited Aug. 2, 2023).

⁶² @officialpaniniamerica, TIKTOK, https://www.tiktok.com/@officialpaniniamerica?lang=en (last visited Aug. 2, 2023).

See, e.g., Gena Terranova, Panini America Signs Quinn Ewers to Exclusive Autograph Trading Card Agreement, THE KNIGHT'S LANCE (July 13, 2023), https://blog.paniniamerica.net/paniniamerica-signs-quinn-ewers-to-exclusive-autograph-trading-card-agreement; Gena Terranova, Panini America to Immortalize Select Top Youth Football Players with Their Very Own Exclusive NFT KNIGHT'S Rookie Trading Cards, THE LANCE (July 2023), https://blog.paniniamerica.net/panini-america-to-immortalize-select-top-youth-football-playerswith-their-very-own-exclusive-nft-rookie-trading-cards; Gena Terranova, Panini America Signs Tre Johnson to Exclusive Multi-Year Agreement, THE KNIGHT'S LANCE (June 27, 2023), https://blog.paniniamerica.net/panini-america-signs-tre-johnson-to-exclusive-multi-yearagreement.

Alex Rodriguez's SPAC, for example, Panini boasted that it was "the largest global sports and entertainment trading cards & collectibles company," elsewhere describing itself as a "[g]lobal market leader in the Collectibles industry." In the words of Peter Warsop, Panini's then-Licensing Director, "[t]he two biggest Football Collectable programmes anywhere are the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA Euro tournaments. Panini have [sic] exclusive rights for both 2020 and 2022. Looking back over the years at Panini sales achievements the World Cup has grown with each and every tournament since we started in 1970 and is now the world's biggest collectable event. The same is true of the Euros, where we have grown every one of them since we started in 1980." The list of examples goes on.⁶⁴ A global market leader losing the competition for a few contracts is not an antitrust issue—and by calling it one, Panini seeks to turn the antitrust laws upside down to try to extract more money for its Italian owners.

103. Nor can Panini legitimately complain about Fanatics Collectibles' investment in a single printing firm (GCP), which followed the *recommendation made by Panini's own CEO* (Warsop) to GCP. As explained above, Fanatics Collectibles' investment clearly benefits the industry and consumers, increasing the capacity to produce 100 million more card packs annually, while making improvements to ensure the quality of the cards and their timely production. And, to manufacture cards, Panini can still use GCP, its own manufacturing plant in Italy, the services of another printing company (such as U.S.-based companies like Carlson Print Group, Rex3, R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company and foreign manufacturers like Sinigaglia), or acquire another facility.

See, e.g., Matt Bowen, *The FUTRSPRT Interview Series: Panini CEO Mark Warsop*, MEDIUM (Dec. 30, 2019), https://medium.com/futrsprtpodcast/the-futrsprt-interview-series-panini-ceo-1014d25bab6c (Mark Warsop stating in a 2019 interview that, in three years, Panini would "still be known for being the largest company in the world when it comes to collectibles").

104. The same is true of Fanatics Collectibles' acquisitions of Topps in light of Panini's earlier acquisition of Donruss, the second oldest card company in the United States, in 2009. That acquisition allowed Panini to assume Donruss' NFL and NFLPA licenses, ⁶⁵ similar to how the Fanatics Collectible-Topps deal allowed Fanatics Collectibles to assume Topps' MLB and the MLBPA licenses.

105. In sum, despite its position as the global leader in the sports and entertainment collectibles industry with ample resources, Panini is either unable or unwilling to legitimately compete with Fanatics Collectibles on the merits. As explained above, Fanatics has been able to grow its partnerships with licensors, including players' associations and leagues by being a better competitor. Fanatics Collectibles is a more *inclusive* partner than Panini (by delivering a new model that enables athletes and licensors to earn more for the use of their intellectual property); a more *innovative* partner than Panini (by opening up new revenue streams for licensors through selling directly to consumers, hobby shops, retailers, and "breakers"); and a more *long-term* partner than Panini (by investing in the industry as a whole through marketing, customer service, and related lines of business such as sports card manufacturing). Unable or unwilling to rise to meet the challenge of Fanatics Collectibles' competition, Panini's baseless accusations of antitrust violations should be seen for what they are: a hypocritical and desperate attempt to stymie Fanatics Collectibles' innovation and growth so that Panini can keep funneling profits back to its owners in Italy.

⁶⁵ See, e.g., Darren Rovell, *Panini Buys Donruss*, CNBC (Mar. 13, 2009, updated Aug. 5, 2010), https://www.cnbc.com/id/29678317 ("While Panini is the world's largest publisher of collectibles and has worldwide distribution of its products, the [2009 acquisition of Donruss] will quiet the talk of concern over Panini's relative lack of experience in the American market.").

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Count 1: Unfair Competition

- 106. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of every paragraph of this Complaint.
- 107. Unable to compete fairly in the industry, Panini has employed a pattern of unfair and deceptive practices to harm Plaintiff and benefit itself.
- 108. As described above, Plaintiff had the opportunity to pursue lucrative deals with NBA players and pre-draft NFL rookies in spring 2022.
 - 109. Panini knew or should have known of these opportunities.
- 110. To prevent Plaintiff from pursuing these opportunities within the limited window, Panini bait-and-switched Plaintiff with a sham prospect of early termination.
- 111. Namely, Panini knowingly and intentionally sidetracked Plaintiff by using stall tactics, falsely inflated earnings projections, and other bad-faith tactics to string Plaintiff along. Once the parties entered into an agreement in principle in early spring 2022, Plaintiff reasonably believed it would no longer need to acquire the competing licenses, as it would obtain licenses covering the same subject matter through the proposed early termination. This was a diversion. Employing bad-faith dilatory practices, Panini intentionally ran the clock on negotiations, postponing closing for months through delays and other bad-faith tactics until Plaintiff's window to acquire the competing licenses had closed. By the time talks terminated, Plaintiff's ability to timely acquire the NBPA license was impeded, and the window to reach agreements with the NFL rookie class had expired completely for 2022.
- 112. Panini's actions—proposing early termination, and then stringing along Plaintiff through stall tactics and false earnings projections—were unfair, intentional, and done in bad faith.

- 113. Were it not for Panini's intentional actions to induce Plaintiff to enter sham negotiations, Plaintiff would have pursued the deals with NBA players and pre-draft NFL rookies in the spring of 2022.
- 114. By preventing Plaintiff from doing deals with NBA players and NFL rookies for which Panini had competing licenses, Panini misappropriated Plaintiff's ability to pursue these deals. Panini also misappropriated the time, effort, and attention of Plaintiff's leadership by tying them up in dead-end negotiations for nearly a year, during which period they had less time, opportunity, and incentive to pursue deals that would have competed with Panini's business.
- 115. As a result of Panini's actions and unlawful misappropriation, Plaintiff missed out on hundreds of millions in revenue and earnings from competing licenses, lost the time and attention of key senior leadership personnel, invested in new facilities and expansion, and spent tens of millions of dollars in costs and fees paying lawyers, consultants, accountants, and other advisers to help negotiate early termination in vain. These losses benefited Panini by preventing competition on its NBA and NFL Players Association licenses for an entire season and tying up its competitor for almost a year with sham negotiations.

Count 2: Tortious Interference with Business Relations

- 116. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of every paragraph of this Complaint.
- 117. Plaintiff has sought to hire a number of employees to support its sports and entertainment collectibles business.
- 118. Many of the employees interested in and qualified for these positions are current or former Panini employees. These Panini employees are at-will employees who are not subject to non-competition obligations.

- 119. Knowing that Plaintiff is hiring, Panini has intentionally interfered with Plaintiff's opportunity to employ Panini's current or former employees by threatening litigation should the employees enter into employment with Plaintiff.
 - 120. Panini's litigation threats are meritless.
- 121. Panini acted willfully and maliciously by making these threats in order to deprive its employees of alternative employment and Plaintiff from qualified employees, especially as Panini's licenses have expired or are expiring and it has no business need for many of the threatened employees.
- 122. Panini's unlawful actions have caused Plaintiff to suffer economic harm by depriving it of the ability to hire qualified, sought-after employees.

Count 3: Breach of the Obligation to Negotiate in Good Faith

- 123. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference the allegations of every paragraph of this Complaint.
- 124. Plaintiff and Panini reached an agreement in principle for Panini to terminate the remaining years on existing licenses with certain players' associations and leagues for an early termination fee.
- 125. The agreement in principle between Plaintiff and Panini was a preliminary agreement to negotiate in good faith.
- 126. Once the offer from Plaintiff to pay a fee in exchange for Panini terminating the remaining years on existing licenses was accepted, Panini had a duty to use its best efforts to negotiate with Plaintiff in good faith and then close the transaction on customary and reasonable terms.
- 127. Panini breached its obligation to negotiate in good faith when, after the parties reached an agreement on the material terms of a contract, Panini (1) knowingly utilized inflated

financial projections during the subsequent negotiation, and (2) delayed the proposed closing date for over six months, evidencing a lack of intention to ever close.

128. As a direct result of Panini's breaches, Plaintiff missed out on hundreds of millions in revenue and earnings from competing licenses with NBA players and pre-draft NFL rookies and leveraged key lender relationships to no end and spent tens of millions of dollars paying lawyers, accountants, and other professionals to perform extensive due diligence work in connection with the proposed early termination.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

129. Plaintiff hereby respectfully requests trial by jury on any and all issues so triable.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

- 130. Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully seeks the following relief:
 - actual damages, punitive damages, and any such other relief available under the causes of action stated here;
 - ii. pre- and post-judgment interest on this monetary relief;
 - iii. equitable relief in the form of an injunction prohibiting the illegal conduct complained of here;
 - iv. the costs of bringing this suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees; and such other, further, and different relief as to the Court appears just and proper.

DATED: August 7, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN LLP

/s/ Michael B. Carlinsky

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Attorneys for Plaintiff Fanatics Collectibles

APPENDIX A:

SOCIAL MEDIA REACTIONS TO PANINI'S "STATEMENT ON FANATICS ANTI-TRUST"



Panini America Statement On Fanatics Anti-Trust

blog.paniniamerica.net/panini-america...

ON FANATICS ANTI-TRUST



OFFICIALLY LICENSED COLLECTIBLES

Since entering the U.S. market in 2009, Panini America's goal has been to bring new collectors and consumers into the trading card category, rejuvenate the marketplace to benefit everyone from mass retailers and hobby stores, our licensed partners at the leagues and players associations and the individual athletes that we highlight and contract to individual deals to develop the most compelling products.

All while catering to the consumer and growing the overall trading card category globally.

Throughout our 60+ year history as the Panini Group

Panini America was the first of any trading card manufacturer to embrace, support and welcome casebreakers into the trading card community recognizing that how they consumed the product opened the door to engaging more consumers and building new collectors. This element helped provide a roadmap for how hobby stores could execute and engage their customers during one of the most challenging periods businesses experienced when customers couldn't get to stores.

ueuicatea direct-to-consumer platform in china that caters to more than one million followers and ensures that our licensed partners can reach fans of their respective sport through trading cards all over the

The Panini Group and Panini America remain committed to growing the overall trading card category across the entire global ecosystem to cater to

ensed partners and our professional As the market leader we take that




Sports Card News @SportsCardNews

Panini better hope nobody on that jury has redemption cards 😝



world.

@NatsRealist




If @PaniniAmerica wants to protect the health of the card market then maybe yall should start getting people the thousands of dollars worth of redemptions you owe us and maybe bringing the price of the products down because your slowly but surely pricing more n more people out.



To see these ppl say they value their responsibility in the market is laughable.

Every time I look through my WC Prizm cards I feel like throwing up. Cards that are SSP and animal prints completely beat up, off centered and scratched.

All Panini cares for is getting paid.



You forgot to add panini America was the first company to introduce player worn relics that are worthless. You don't care about the consumer. You care about money. I hope you lose. Stop the player worn crap

ΞΘ



Panini social media team is in shambles





Max @homiejswagkilla

Panini America Statemen



Ric Ellis @RicEllisCards Their customer service is quite literally known for being one of the worst in the collectibles scene. Not to mention them taking credit for the trading card boom in 2020–21, as if Pokémon TCG didn't also explode?

Well this post isn't going as expected.

trading card and welcome community

OFFICIALLY LICENSED COL

Since entering the U.S. of America's goal has been consumers into the tradithe marketplace to bene retailers and hopby store



Look at the hidden replies (a) I think I'd rather have a monopoly than a company like Panini having ANY marketshare in sports cards.



Player cards from team sports that have the team logo and name edited out are worth less than nothing to me.

Also, touting a China based location is far from the flex you believe it to be.

These are reasons your products are not part of my sport card collection.





DirtyWorldCollects
@DirtyWorldGamin

Hey @PaniniAmerica instead of being soft & bloccing your actual customers, can you actually maybe fulfill your redemptions??







Panini America

Panini America Statem

blog.paniniamerica.net



every, single, thing, you've, done to the hobby, the past 3 years, has been pure GREED without the CUSTOMER in mine AT ALL

Bullmascot @bullmascot

sincerely shut the f up

😂 yeah so new collectors can't afford half of football products! Not really something to be proud of not to mention letting card stores online set the market for your products that should be \$200 no matter what year it was!

ners and d provide a te and most

athletes that we highlight and col deals to develop the most compe

All while catering to the consume

@yefnob1326

Panini are blocking replies to this post in record time. Promote the person running this account to handle redemptions.



Dreamweaver1984 @LexSportsCards

panini is mad that they cant be a monopoly on the industry... they loved it when they held all the cards (no pun intended, and now they are mad there is competition.

both companies should exist, id argue that the single use licenses are much more perverse than either company on their own... end the bs licenses





Card Aficionado @CardAficionado


I guess we're just going to gloss over the number of brands, IP, and innovation that Panini acquired as they entered the US market particularly from Donruss/Playoff. For Pete's sake, the Rated Rookie logo they flash all over is from an acquisition.



Jeffrey Silva @jeffwsilva

The hidden tweet list is long on this one 😂





A holes.



Must suck to suck.



Panini America

@PaniniAmerica


Panini America Statem



Tom FC

@fantasydonkey

blog.paniniamerica.ne





The Drip @swooshables

Well well well... Look who's come crawling back #tradingcards

ort and welcome rd community umed the product ore consumers and

Since entering the U.S. market in 2009, I America's goal has been to bring new of consumers into the trading card catego the marketplace to benefit everyone from retailers and hobby stores, our licensed leagues and players associations and the athletes that we highlight and contract deals to develop the most compelling po



Logan

@SD_Sarcaster

Yea, Panini's such a great company that they simply block unhappy customers and hide the issues they're bringing to light! Definitely a company we want to stand behind!



Raul ◎ @SlagaCards · Aug 4 Rest in piss

of Group and Panini America remain and to growing the overall trading card across the entire global ecosystem to cater to rs, our licensed partners and our professional

Panini America, v

10:52 AM · Au



Lake_Isabella_Card_Guy @Blucrew0402

@coffeebreak_YT Here a good story to look into panini scamming people with there NFT market and unfilled redemption cards. See hidden replies



スポル23 @svol23

リプ欄誰も味方いなくて笑える (笑)


みんな同じ不満持ってるということで(笑)


ファナティクス社に取り込まれたほうがやっぱり良くなるんですかね。 Translated from Japanese by Google

The reply column is funny because no one is on your side (laughs)

Everyone has the same dissatisfaction (laughs)

It would be better if it was taken over by Fanatics.














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


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your shop for 2.5 years. No reply or follow up.





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





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
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
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


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


rging unreal prices for boxes. I hope Fanatics buries it.


Wyle @KyleWil38113338 · Aug 4 *


Meanwhile I'm still waiting on a redemption going on over a year.

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ON FANATICS ANTI-TRUST

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Since entering the U.S. marke America's goal has been to bri the marketplace to benefit ev retailers and hobby stores, our leagues and players association

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
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
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
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





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





Dallas Card Company @Dallascardcomp · Aug 4 Y'all down bad eh? Throw in the flag and stop acting like y'all were about the customer that's total bs, we need change in the hobby and y'all couldn't bring it. Q 17 0 仚

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
DO THIS MAN! BOO!

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




Whitt UpShott Cards @WhittnessCards · Aug 4 Honor Your Redemptions.



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yal can f off and no one cares

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