

EXHIBIT E



CERTIFICATION

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/s/ Sandra Linen-Ward
SANDRA LINEN-WARD

1 Mr. Brunsdn: Hi, I'm Andrew Brunsdn, I'm one of the Inspectors General at
2 DOI.

3 Mr. Tillet: My name is Chris Tillet; I'm an Assistant General Counsel with
4 the General Counsel's Office here.

5 Mr. Richardson: Hi, I'm Justyn Richardson; I'm a Senior Policy Analyst.

6 Mr. Garcia: Hey Chief, my name is Mike Garcia; I'm an Assistant Inspector
7 General at DOI.

8 Ms. Charles: Mariah Charles, Confidential Investigator at DOI.

9 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, my name is Arturo Sanchez; I'm an Assistant Inspector
10 General here at DOI. And today is October 28th, it is 1029 hours.
11 You've met our team. And Chief, before we begin, we're gonna
12 go ahead and issue the interview warnings. I've got a copy here
13 for you.

14 Chief Monahan: Thank you.

15 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, this statement is being taken by the Department of
16 Investigations of the City of New York, pursuant to Chapter 34 of
17 the New York City Charter. You're gonna be asked a number of
18 specific questions concerning the performance of your official
19 duties. You have the option to remain silent, although you may be
20 subject to removal from the employment with the City if you fail to
21 answer material or relevant questions related to the performance of
22 your duties as an employee. The interview furnished and any
23 information or evidence resulting therefrom may be used in the
24 course of civil or administrative proceedings. Neither your
25 statements nor any information or evidence derived therefrom will

1 be used against you in subsequent criminal prosecution other than
2 for perjury or contempt arising from such testimony. If at any time
3 during this interview you wish to consult with your attorney, just
4 say so and we will give you an opportunity to do so privately.
5 Chief, thank you for acknowledging what I've just read, and if I
6 could just administer the oath please, --

7 Chief Monahan: Yes.

8 Mr. Sanchez: -- please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear or affirm
9 that the statements you are about to make in this interview shall be
10 the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

11 Chief Monahan: I do.

12 Mr. Sanchez: Thanks very much. Alright. Chief, you know that we have asked
13 you to come here today pursuant to a directive from the Mayor's
14 Office, through Executive Order 58, which has asked the
15 Department of Investigation and the Corporation Counsel to
16 conduct an independent investigation of NYPD's handling of
17 protests that began in late May, all the way through June 30th.
18 That's the purview of our review. And in the course of our
19 investigation we have asked the department to furnish documents
20 to us, and we have had the opportunity to interview several
21 members of the service at various ranks. And the purpose of today
22 is to help us learn from you. You know, you are situated in a very
23 unique place in the department as Chef of the Department, and
24 your perspective is invaluable to us. More than anything, it's
25 going to also help us, you know, contextualize the information we

1 have been reviewing and also the statements that we have been
2 taking and information we learned and gleaned through those
3 interviews. And then I ask that you please keep in mind as we are
4 asking questions; please note the basis of your knowledge. In
5 other words, if I ask you about a specific topic, it's important for
6 us to distinguish if that is firsthand knowledge you have gained or
7 if it is something that you have heard others discuss. At the same
8 time, I also ask that, you know, if -- if I am asking questions, if you
9 could please distinguish if those positions are your opinion. We
10 are going to be asking you for your opinion, or if those -- if it's the
11 department's stance. Because, both of those are also important to
12 us. And, again, I just want to reiterate if at any point you want to
13 chat with your counsel, not a problem at all, please feel free to
14 interrupt at any time and we can find a private area for you to
15 discuss. And that's -- that's all I have for the moment before we
16 begin. And we're going to have a couple of different sets of
17 questions, dealing with lots of different issues and I'm going to
18 also turn to my team after every section to see if they have any
19 specific questions related to those categories, and also I'm going to
20 give the team an opportunity to chime in at the end with follow-up
21 questions. Thank you, Chief. So we can go ahead and start with:
22 How long have you been at the NYPD?

23 Chief Monahan: I have been on just short of 39 years now. Came on October 25,
24 1982.

25 Mr. Sanchez: Seen a thing or two, I suppose.

1 Chief Monahan: Yeah. Been around.

2 Mr. Sanchez: And when were you promoted to Chief of Department?

3 Chief Monahan: January 18th of 2018.

4 Mr. Sanchez: Last year. If you could explain to us, what does the Office of the
5 Chief of Department do for the Department?

6 Chief Monahan: Alright, Chief of Department is in charge of all operational
7 functions of New York City Police Department. Reporting directly
8 to me, I have the Chief of Patrol, the Chief of Housing, the Chief
9 of Transit, the Chief of Detectives, and the Chief of
10 Transportation.

11 Mr. Sanchez: How large is that -- the shop, Chief of Department's Office,
12 roughly?

13 Chief Monahan: How large is what?

14 Mr. Sanchez: How many -- how many employees under the umbrella of the
15 Chief of Department?

16 Chief Monahan: I -- I would roughly -- 18 to 20 in Patrol, another 7 in Detectives,
17 SO -- I also have the Chief of Special Operations under me also.
18 Probably close to 30,000.

19 Mr. Sanchez: That's a --

20 Chief Monahan: Direct -- Directly responsible -- give or take, somewhat (unclear).

21 Mr. Sanchez: (Unclear) --

22 Chief Monahan: Yeah.

23 Mr. Sanchez: -- ballpark -- I appreciate it. You know, the NYPD has a lot of
24 experience in the department specifically dealing with large-scale
25 protests: Thomson -- Thompkins Square Park, '88; Crown

1 Heights, '91; Washington Heights, '92; RNC in 2004; Occupy
2 Wall Street. Was there anything that made this summer's protests
3 stand out from the others you have had experience with?

4 Chief Monahan: So now I was on the scene for Crown Heights, I was a captain in
5 Washington Heights during the Washington Heights incidents, the
6 World Economic Forum; I was inspector on the scene for those.
7 During the RNC, I was the Commander -- the Deputy Chief -- I
8 was the Commander of the Mobile Field Forces for the entire
9 RNC. And the events that happened in May of this year were
10 unlike anything I had ever experienced before in my career. It was
11 unprecedented. What we went through was unlike any other
12 demonstration or riot that we've had in the City before.

13 Mr. Sanchez: Can you (unclear) that a little bit? What -- what specifically made
14 it stand out this time?

15 Chief Monahan: The physical attacks on police officers that were persistent, that
16 even when arrests were being made, attacks continued. Prolonged
17 attacks on the police officers, with every sort of object thrown at
18 them. Starting heavily at the Barclays Center on -- on that Friday
19 night. It was something that was unexpected, completely
20 unexpected by us. We were hit with just about every sort of object
21 that could possibly have been thrown at us, sprayed at us. I have
22 never seen that before. When teams move in to make arrests in the
23 past, once arrests were made, people usually started to disburse.
24 They didn't. As you tried to make arrests with people who were
25 throwing things, it was organized events to prevent us from getting

1 to the people behind, like people joining arms preventing us to get
2 to the people that were throwing the things. I just had never seen
3 that before.

4 Mr. Sanchez: Thank you, Chief. What was your role with respect to this
5 summer's protests?

6 Chief Monahan: I was -- I was in command. I was in command of operations
7 throughout the City.

8 Mr. Sanchez: And as -- in that position you would have specific supervisory
9 responsibilities?

10 Chief Monahan: Yes.

11 Mr. Sanchez: Were you involved in any of the following regarding these
12 protests: response planning?

13 Chief Monahan: Yes.

14 Mr. Sanchez: The implementation and execution of those plans?

15 Chief Monahan: Yes.

16 Mr. Sanchez: And were these -- was this taking place from 1PP or from the field
17 or both?

18 Chief Monahan: We had meetings in 1PP and then a lot was being done from the
19 field. I was out on the scene, I tried to make out -- I tried to
20 respond to as many incidences that were going on throughout the
21 entire days. I was basically doing 18-hour tours.

22 Mr. Sanchez: (Unclear).

23 Chief Monahan: Yeah, yes. They were long days.

24 Mr. Sanchez: And did -- were there any post-protest briefings that were
25 happening day by day?

1 Chief Monahan: Yes.

2 Mr. Sanchez: And who was involved in those conversations?

3 Chief Monahan: Myself, the Commissioner, our Operations Division, Chief
4 Pichardo. Tommy Galati.

5 Mr. Sanchez: When did you first become personally involved in the oversight of
6 these protests?

7 Chief Monahan: From the beginning. On Thursday -- Thursday evening at Union
8 Square Park.

9 Mr. Sanchez: Are you always personally involved with protests?

10 Chief Monahan: Once they become larger scale, yes. Small-scale ones are usually
11 handled by the boroughs, but once it starts to become large scale,
12 then I get myself personally involved.

13 Mr. Sanchez: And what -- what is the threshold between small scale and large
14 scale?

15 Chief Monahan: As you spoke, Washington Heights, Thompkins -- (unclear) things
16 that you remember --

17 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah.

18 Chief Monahan: -- things that are national news, things that are extremely large in
19 scope.

20 Mr. Sanchez: Gotcha. And it's just not a number of participants or anything like
21 that, it's just --

22 Chief Monahan: No. The number and the violence, if at all, involved.

23 Mr. Sanchez: Okay. How does your role differ when you are on the ground
24 versus when you are working from 1PP or another place?

25 Chief Monahan: When I'm on the ground it gives me that personal perspective of

1 what's happening. I would do the same function of talking to
2 commanders on the scene; the commander on the scene of the
3 incident is in charge of the incident that is taking place. I confer
4 with them, I see what they need, same thing I would be doing if I
5 was in headquarters calling them. But now I have that personal,
6 in-the-face conversation of what's going on.

7 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, how effective was the communication structure that was in
8 place regarding the protests?

9 Chief Monahan: It was good. The conversations I was having regularly with
10 Intelligence, with my field commanders, as incidents were
11 happening anywhere within the City, I was able to contact them. I
12 had Pichardo, and me and Pichardo would be in different areas,
13 making sure that we had eyes on everything that was going on.
14 Chief Harrison in the Detective Bureau, if there was anything
15 going on, and coordinated all through Eddie Mullane, who's
16 running Operations.

17 Mr. Sanchez: And, you know, as Chief of Department, how do you insure that
18 information is commu-- communicated effectively between those
19 key players?

20 Chief Monahan: We all talk. We all call. Calling back and forth to one another,
21 making sure that if Tommy Galati gave me information about
22 something that was going to be happening in Brooklyn North, then
23 I'm reaching out to Jeff Maddrey and Fausto Pichardo, making
24 sure they have that same information, Eddie Mullane in Operations
25 has it too, and that he is disbursing it to all the field commanders.

1 Mr. Sanchez: And the field commanders would be the ones relaying it to the --
2 disseminating it to the rest of the rank and file?

3 Chief Monahan: Exactly.

4 Mr. Sanchez: Is protest response policy generally commanded from a central
5 location?

6 Chief Monahan: Generally, no. It's according -- again, this is -- the massive size of
7 this protest caused it. We have protests in New York City every
8 day that are handled just on a local level. There was nothing of
9 this scope -- I don't think there has ever been anything of this
10 scope in New York City before, so that had to be handled on a
11 centralized level.

12 Mr. Sanchez: How do you account for discrepancies and how similar protests
13 were handled in different parts of the City?

14 Chief Monahan: Everything was based on violence or potentiality of violence in
15 those locations. Each commander who had eyes on the scene was
16 given the authority to make decisions that had to be made at that
17 point in time. It's impossible to sit in headquarters and truly
18 understand what's going on when you're not out there seeing it, so
19 we allowed those commanders to make that decision. So, every
20 borough commander who's working was given that authority to
21 make decisions on what he had to do at each one of these protests.

22 Mr. Sanchez: I understand. Chief, how many protests did you attend personally
23 between May 28th and June 20th?

24 Chief Monahan: Every day I was at a different one. Quite a few.

25 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah.

1 Chief Monahan: The guidance was for officer knowledge so that an officer would
2 understand this is what happened, this is something to look out for,
3 this is something to be aware of.

4 Mr. Sanchez: Okay. Do you recall any of the intel received, that you received
5 directly that addressed the threats or risks to officers?

6 Chief Monahan: Off the top of my head, I don't recall. We had so much different
7 things.

8 Mr. Sanchez: But there was -- you recall certain things?

9 Chief Monahan: Yeah.

10 Mr. Sanchez: Yes?

11 Chief Monahan: Yes.

12 Mr. Sanchez: Would you say that the department strategy was driven by the
13 intel?

14 Chief Monahan: No. I would say the department strategy was driven by what we
15 observed on the ground and what was happening on a day to day.
16 Intel was there, we had it, but there's nothing better than actually
17 seeing what was going on and understanding what's on the intel,
18 like talking about it and actually seeing it in -- in play when you're
19 right out on the street.

20 Mr. Sanchez: Chief, you touched on this a little bit earlier on in protest
21 operations, but say, at a particular protest, you know, whoever was
22 in charge of that team saw something that needed to be related to
23 you. How would that go? How would that reach you? Would it
24 be a direct call --

25 Chief Monahan: Yes.

1 Mr. Sanchez: -- to you?

2 Chief Monahan: Yes.

3 Mr. Sanchez: It wouldn't go through a chain of people, it would just go straight
4 to you.

5 Chief Monahan: Yeah. I was dealing with the borough commanders on scene.
6 Sometimes it would go through Pichardo to me. That would be the
7 only one who had (unclear).

8 Mr. Sanchez: But you're on the phone a lot it seem -- it would seem?

9 Chief Monahan: Yeah.

10 Mr. Sanchez: Was there ever an instance where the intelligence collected by the
11 department did shape the strategy?

12 Chief Monahan: Most of the intelligence was used for just knowledge. I wouldn't
13 say it shaped the strategy. Again, our strategies were based on --
14 Intel would be -- would shape it by how big a response we may
15 need to a location. So if we got information that there was going
16 to be a problem at -- at a certain location, we would have a bigger
17 response to that location, and we would be more aware or more
18 keen of what's going on. And it could determine how lenient we
19 were or weren't in the course of a demonstration.

20 Mr. Sanchez: So it was -- it was a little impactful?

21 Chief Monahan: Yeah, it was, yeah. In particular at that point.

22 Mr. Sanchez: You know that Commissioner Shea provided some testimony to
23 the Attorney General, and during that testimony the Commissioner
24 mentioned that there was inclusion of outside agitators at these
25 protests. What -- what is an "outside agitator," exactly?

1 Chief Monahan: An outside agitator would be someone who is trying to direct
2 crowds to do things. Who were trying to get protestors to act in a
3 certain way, or trying to direct them to do things. You know, we
4 had information -- as you looked around the country, similar
5 tactics were used in New York that were used elsewhere. So we --
6 we believed and -- and from Intel that there was sources out there
7 that was sharing information between what was happening in
8 Portland, what was happening in Seattle, what was happening
9 throughout the country, [coughs] excuse me, and New York.

10 Mr. Sanchez: Did you personally have conversations with folks here and other
11 departments in other cities?

12 Chief Monahan: No, I did not.

13 Mr. Sanchez: And alright, before we move away from intel, I wanted to see if the
14 team had any questions regarding the intel?

15 Mr. Brunsten: One follow-up, Chief, this is Andrew Brunsten again. I -- I think
16 you partly answered this question, but I just wanted to follow up
17 on it. I think you may have said that, you know, when asked about,
18 you know, discussions that may have happened with officers in the
19 field or officers that were responding about the intel, that they
20 would be provided with messages, such as, you know, "this is
21 something to know about" or "this is something to be aware of,"
22 and I -- I was wondering whether you, or anyone else who you
23 might be familiar with in the department or in leadership, provided
24 any instruction or guidance to commanding officers as to how to
25 message or how to guide officers in terms of how to interpret or

1 understand that intelligence?

2 Chief Monahan: All according to what the intelligence was. A lot of the
3 intelligence was tactics that had been utilized throughout the
4 country, whether it's a de-a-- de-arresting tactics that we had seen,
5 different objects that were being thrown, the idea of hiding bricks
6 along a route that a march was going to go. This was so our cops
7 would have a knowledge to look for these sort of things when they
8 were out there, so it was incumbent upon our supervisors to relay
9 this to the cops.

10 Mr. Sanchez: Do you want water? I'll get you some.

11 Chief Monahan: [coughs] Excuse me. Excuse me.

12 Mr. Brunsten: No problem, we'll give you a minute.

13 Chief Monahan: Whenever I talk for an hour or --

14 Mr. Brunsten: Yes, I know whenever I talk for an hour or two straight, without
15 water --

16 Chief Monahan: All of a sudden I get, if I don't have any water the throat just dries
17 up.

18 Mr. Brunsten: Absolutely. Understood.

19 Chief Monahan: Beautiful. Thank you.

20 Mr. Sanchez: Not a problem.

21 Chief Monahan: Thank you very much.

22 Mr. Sanchez: Okay.

23 Chief Monahan: Much better.

24 Mr. Brunsten: Okay, great. And so, just following up on that question -- and
25 thank you. Thank you for that. So -- so what -- what would be

1 your -- your impression as to the, you know, the kind of impact of
2 the type of intelligence that was, you know, that was -- that was
3 collected and then -- and then provided to MOS in the field. You
4 know, what -- what was sort of the impact or effect of that
5 information on, you know, the mindset of officers in terms of what
6 they were going to be responding to, you know, and given
7 particularly some of what we talked about, about how, you know,
8 some of the intel showed, you know, various information about
9 real or potential threats of violence.

10 Chief Monahan: I don't know if it had that much of an impact because anyone who
11 was out there was observing the violence. Everyone who worked
12 from day one observed what was going on. All the intel did was
13 tell you other things to look for while you were out there to make
14 sure. I mean, from the day at Barclays, like I said, we started
15 getting pounded that day. It had everyone, who even wasn't on
16 the scene, all they had to do was turn on the TV and they were able
17 to see it.

18 U/M: (Unclear).

19 Mr. Sanchez: I hope not.

20 Chief Monahan: Are you guys still there?

21 Mr. Brunsten: Yup. Yup.

22 Chief Monahan: Okay.

23 Mr. Brunsten: Thank you. Thank you.

24 Mr. Tillet: Do -- do we keep losing you, Arturo, because of an idle thing?

25 Mr. Sanchez: Yeah.