

1 AARON D. FORD
Attorney General
2 LAENA ST-JULES (BAR NO. 15156)
Senior Deputy Attorney General
3 State of Nevada
Office of the Attorney General
4 100 North Carson Street
Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717
5 T: (775) 684-1265
E: lstjules@ag.nv.gov

6 *Attorneys for Secretary of State*
7

8 **IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
9 **FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

10 REPUBLICAN NATIONAL
COMMITTEE; NEVADA REPUBLICAN
11 PARTY; DONALD J. TRUMP FOR
PRESIDENT 2024, INC.; and DONALD
12 J. SZYMANSKI,

13 Plaintiffs,

14 vs.

15 CARI-ANN BURGESS, *in her official*
capacity as the Washoe County Registrar
16 *of Voters*; JAN GALASSINI, *in her*
official capacity as the Washoe County
17 *Clerk*; LORENA PORTILLO, *in her*
official capacity as the Clark County
18 *Registrar of Voters*; LYNN MARIE
GOYA, *in her official capacity as the*
19 *Clark County Clerk*; FRANCISCO
AGUILAR, *in his official capacity as*
20 *Nevada Secretary of State,*

21 Defendants.

Case No. 3:24-cv-00198-MMD-CLB

**DEFENDANT SECRETARY OF
STATE’S MOTION TO DISMISS**

22 Defendant Francisco Aguilar, in his official capacity as Nevada Secretary of State
23 (“Secretary of State”), moves to dismiss Plaintiffs Republican National Committee (“RNC”),
24 Nevada Republican Party (“NVGOP”), Donald J. Trump for President 2024, Inc. (together
25 with the RNC and NVGOP, the “Organizational Plaintiffs”), and Donald J. Szymanski’s
26 (together with the Organizational Plaintiffs, “Plaintiffs”) Complaint for Declaratory and
27 Injunctive Relief (Complaint) (ECF No. 1) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) for lack of
28 subject-matter jurisdiction and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.

I. INTRODUCTION

This lawsuit is another in a line of failed lawsuits challenging reasonable laws allowing the counting of ballots cast by election day but received shortly thereafter.¹ In fact, this is the second time that the Organizational Plaintiffs have challenged Nevada law allowing for the counting of mail ballots mailed on or before election day but received after election day. The Organizational Plaintiffs lost their prior lawsuit based on a lack of standing, *see Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Cegavske*, 488 F. Supp. 3d 993 (D. Nev. 2020), and are therefore barred by issue preclusion from re-litigating the issue.

Even without issue preclusion, Plaintiffs fail to establish standing. Their theories of injury are generalized, speculative, not fairly traceable to the challenged laws, and would not be redressed by a favorable ruling. Plaintiffs also fail to state any claim.

Plaintiffs are incorrect that the challenged laws are preempted. Federal law does not require cast ballots to be received by any specific date to be counted, and consistent with this conclusion, a majority of states have similarly enacted laws that allow for the counting of at least some ballots received after election day. Furthermore, Plaintiffs fail to allege any violation of a constitutional right. Nevada's challenged laws—counting ballots cast by election day but received shortly thereafter—do not at all burden a voter's ability to exercise the fundamental right to vote, but rather enhance it.

Plaintiffs make no secret that they seek to prevent the counting of Democratic votes. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 56–60. Their attempt to disenfranchise voters from a different political party should be rejected, and the Complaint should be dismissed.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Federal Law

The U.S. Constitution “invests the States with responsibility for the mechanics of [federal] elections, but only so far as Congress declines to preempt state legislative choices.” *See Foster v. Love*, 522 U.S. 67, 69 (1997) (citations omitted). For congressional elections,

¹ *See Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections*, 684 F. Supp. 3d 720 (N.D. Ill. 2023); *Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Way*, Civil Action No. 20-10753 (MAS) (ZNQ), 2020 WL 6204477 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2020).

1 states have the authority to regulate their “Times, Places, and Manner.” U.S. Const. art.
 2 I, § 4, cl. 1. For presidential elections, states establish the “Manner” of choosing
 3 Presidential electors, *id.* art. II, § 1, cl. 2, and Congress may “determine the Time of chusing
 4 the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes,” *id.* art. II, § 1, cl. 4.
 5 Encompassed within the manners of elections that states are authorized to regulate is the
 6 “counting of votes.” *See Smiley v. Hohn*, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).

7 The date for the election of representatives and delegates to Congress is “[t]he
 8 Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every even numbered year.” 2 U.S.C.
 9 §§ 1, 7. And presidential electors are appointed on “election day,” 3 U.S.C. § 1 (together
 10 with 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7, the “Federal Election Day Statutes”), which is the “Tuesday next after
 11 the first Monday in November, in every fourth year,” 3 U.S.C. § 21(1).

12 B. Nevada Law

13 Beginning on January 1, 2020, Nevada law provided for county clerks² to count (1)
 14 ballots postmarked on or before election day and received within seven days after election
 15 day; and (2) ballots with no or illegible postmarks that were received no more than 3 days
 16 after election day based on a presumption that they were mailed by election day. *See*
 17 Assembly Bill 345 of the 80th (2019) Session of the Nevada Legislature³ (“AB 345”) §§ 45
 18 (1)(b), (2), 48(2), 152(2)(b) (sections 45 and 48 repealed by Assembly Bill 321 of the 81st
 19 (2021) Session of the Nevada Legislature (“AB 321”) § 91); AB 321⁴ §§ 8(1)(b), 8(2), 92(3).
 20 These provisions initially applied only to absent ballots, AB 345 §§ 45, 48, but they were
 21 extended in 2020 to all mail ballots cast in an election held during a declared state of
 22 emergency in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, *see* Assembly Bill 4 of the 32nd (2020)
 23 Special Session of the Nevada Legislature (“AB 4”)⁵ §§ 8,(1), 20(1)(b), 20(2). Effective
 24 January 1, 2022, AB 321 § 92(3), the provisions apply to all elections and provide:

25 _____
 26 ² Elections in Washoe and Clark County are administered by each county’s registrar of voters.
 Registrars of voters are included in the definition, and are thus “synonymous with,” “county clerks” in
 NRS chapter 293. *See* NRS 293.040, 293.044; *see also* NRS 244.164. This Motion’s reference to county clerks
 27 includes registrars of voters.

³ Available at https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/80th2019/Bills/AB/AB345_EN.pdf.

⁴ Available at https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/81st2021/Bills/AB/AB321_EN.pdf.

⁵ Available at https://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/32nd2020Special/Bills/AB/AB4_EN.pdf.

1 1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 2 and chapter
2 293D of NRS, in order for a mail ballot to be counted for any
3 election, the mail ballot must be:

3 (b) Mailed to the county clerk, and:

4 (1) Postmarked on or before the day of the election; and

4 (2) Received by the clerk not later than 5 p.m. on the
5 fourth day following the election.

5 2. If a mail ballot is received by mail not later than 5 p.m. on
6 the third day following the election and the date of the postmark
7 cannot be determined, the mail ballot shall be deemed to have
8 been postmarked on or before the day of the election.

8 NRS 293.269921 (the “Mailbox Deadlines”).

9 **C. The Organizational Plaintiffs’ Prior Lawsuit**

10 In 2020, Donald J. Trump for President, Inc., the RNC, and the NVGOP sued then
11 Nevada Secretary of State Barbara K. Cegavske in the U.S. District Court for the District
12 of Nevada in connection with the implementation of AB 4. *See* Am. Compl. for Decl. and
13 Inj. Relief, *Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Cegavske*, Case No. 2:20-cv-01445-JCM-
14 VCF (D. Nev. Aug. 20, 2020), ECF No. 29 (“Cegavske Amended Complaint”). Among other
15 things, AB 4 provided that mail ballots would be counted if they were (1) “[p]ostmarked on
16 or before the day of the election” and “[r]eceived by the clerk not later than 5 p.m. on the
17 seventh day following the election,” AB 4 § 20(1)(b), and (2) “received by mail not later than
18 5 p.m. on the third day following the election and the date of the postmark cannot be
19 determined,” *id.* § 20(2).

20 The plaintiffs in the 2020 action challenged the legality of AB 4 § 20(2) because it
21 “allow[ed] absent ballots to be cast after Election Day but still be counted as lawfully cast
22 in the 2020 general election” in violation of, among other things, the Federal Election Day
23 Statutes. *See* Cegavske Amended Complaint ¶ 119. They also claimed that AB 4 §§ 20(1)(b)
24 and 20(2) “require[d] counties to accept and count ballots received after Election Day—
25 including ballots that may have been mailed after Election Day,” in violation of the right
26 to vote. *See id.* ¶ 167. Because maximizing opportunities for voters to vote should not be
27 a partisan issue, the Republican Secretary of State moved to dismiss, and the court granted

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1 the motion because the plaintiffs did not have either associational or direct organizational
2 standing. *See generally Cegavske*, 488 F. Supp. 3d 993.

3 **D. This Lawsuit**

4 Plaintiffs challenge Nevada’s laws providing for the counting of mail ballots cast by
5 election day but received up to four days after election day. *See e.g.*, Compl. ¶¶ 3–5. They
6 assert three claims. In Count I, Plaintiffs claim the Federal Election Day Statutes preempt
7 the Mailbox Deadlines. *Id.* ¶¶ 62–71. In Count II, Plaintiffs assert violations of the First
8 and Fourteenth Amendments because Plaintiffs must “spend money, devote time, and
9 otherwise injuriously rely on unlawful provisions of state law in organizing, funding, and
10 running their campaigns.” *Id.* ¶¶ 72–76. In Count III, Plaintiffs claim the Mailbox
11 Deadlines violate the Fourteenth Amendment because they allow the counting of
12 “illegitimate votes,” leading to vote dilution. *Id.* ¶¶ 77–82.

13 Plaintiffs request a declaratory judgment that the Mailbox Deadlines violate the
14 Fourteenth Amendment, 2 U.S.C. §§ 1, 7, and 3 U.S.C. § 1. Compl. at 16. Furthermore,
15 Plaintiffs request preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting Defendants from
16 enforcing the Mailbox Deadlines for the November 5, 2024 general election, which is just
17 over 5 months away. *See id.*

18 **III. LEGAL STANDARDS**

19 **A. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction**

20 Article III, § 2 of the U.S. Constitution limits federal court jurisdiction to “Cases”
21 and “Controversies.” *See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins*, 578 U.S. 330, 337 (2016). “One element
22 of the case-or-controversy requirement’ is that plaintiffs ‘must establish that they have
23 standing to sue.” *Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA*, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013) (citations
24 omitted). To establish the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing, “the plaintiff
25 must have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct
26 of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” *Spokeo,*
27 *Inc.*, 578 U.S. at 338 (citations omitted).

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1 “[L]ack of Article III standing requires dismissal for lack of subject matter
2 jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).” *Maya v. Centex Corp.*, 658
3 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation and emphasis omitted). “[T]he subject matter
4 jurisdiction of the district court is not a waivable matter and may be raised at anytime by
5 one of the parties, by motion or in the responsive pleadings, or *sua sponte* by the trial or
6 reviewing court.” *Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co.*, 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n.2 (9th Cir. 1988)
7 (citations omitted).

8 **B. Failure to State a Claim**

9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides for dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a
10 claim upon which relief may be granted. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
11 contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
12 on its face.’” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*,
13 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). It must also contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a
14 formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. “Factual
15 allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and
16 “nudge[] [a plaintiff’s] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” *Id.* at 555, 570
17 (citations omitted). Courts will “discount[] conclusory statements, which are not entitled
18 to the presumption of truth, before determining whether a claim is plausible.” *Chavez v.*
19 *United States*, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).

20 **IV. ARGUMENT**

21 **A. Plaintiffs Lack Standing**

22 Plaintiffs advance several theories of standing. The Organizational Plaintiffs claim
23 associational standing, *see* Compl. ¶¶ 13, 17, 19, and organizational standing based on a
24 diversion of resources and competitive harm, *id.* ¶¶ 5, 14, 49. Plaintiffs also claim vote
25 dilution as an alleged injury. *Id.* ¶¶ 4, 50–51, 56–60. The Organizational Plaintiffs,
26 however, are precluded from re-litigating standing after the *Cegavske* court found they did
27 not have standing in a lawsuit challenging the counting of mail ballots received after
28 election day. Even if they were not precluded, their theories fare no better this time around.

1 **1. The Organizational Plaintiffs Are Precluded from Challenging**
2 **the Counting of Mail Ballots Received After Election Day**

3 Issue preclusion applies where: “(1) the issue at stake was identical in both
4 proceedings; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided in the prior proceedings;
5 (3) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the issue was necessary
6 to decide the merits.” *Janjua v. Neufeld*, 933 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations
7 omitted). The question of the Organizational Plaintiffs’ standing to challenge the counting
8 of mail ballots received after election day has already been litigated and decided. In
9 *Cegavske*, the court held that the Organizational Plaintiffs did not have associational or
10 organizational standing to challenge the counting of mail ballots received after election
11 day.⁶ *See generally* 488 F. Supp. 3d 993. Issue preclusion therefore applies and bars re-
12 litigation of the Organizational Plaintiffs’ standing.

13 The issue of standing is identical between the two cases. In *Cegavske*, the court held
14 (1) the organizations lacked associational standing, *id.* at 1001; (2) the organizations failed
15 to assert a cognizable injury based on a diversion of resources, *id.* at 1001–03; (3) the
16 organizations’ alleged injury of vote dilution was generalized and speculative, *id.* at 1000;
17 and (4) the organizations did not have competitive standing, *id.* at 1003. These are the
18 same theories of injury that Plaintiffs advance here to again challenge the counting of mail
19 ballots received after election day. Even if Plaintiffs claim they are raising new arguments
20 to support standing, issue preclusion still applies. The issue the Organizational Plaintiffs
21 seek to re-litigate here is standing, and standing was finally and necessarily decided by the
22 *Cegavske* court. *See Paulo v. Holder*, 669 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 2011) (“If a party could
23 avoid issue preclusion by finding some argument it failed to raise in the previous litigation,
24 the bar on successive litigation would be seriously undermined. . . . The issue sought to be

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⁶ While it is Donald J. Trump for President 2024, Inc. that is a plaintiff in this lawsuit and it was
Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. that was a plaintiff in *Cegavske*, issue preclusion still applies. Apart
from focusing on different election years, the two organizations are identical. Both organizations have been
“the principal committee for President Donald J. Trump’s” campaign, Compl. ¶ 18; *Cegavske* Amended
Complaint ¶ 11, and they have the exact same interests. *See In re Schimmels*, 127 F.3d 875, 881 (9th Cir.
1997) (“‘Privity’ . . . is a legal conclusion ‘designating a person so identified in interest with a party to former
litigation that he represents precisely the same right in respect to the subject matter involved.’”).

1 relitigated in this case is Paulo’s eligibility for § 212(c) relief, which was decided in the
2 previous proceeding by the district court.”).

3 Standing was also actually litigated and decided in the prior litigation after a full
4 and fair opportunity to litigate the issue, and the court’s decision on standing was the basis
5 for dismissal of the prior action. There can be no question that issue preclusion applies
6 where a case is dismissed for lack of standing. *Love v. Villacana*, 73 F.4th 751, 755 (9th
7 Cir. 2023). It even applies where the decision finding a lack of standing was erroneous. *Id.*
8 Together with claim preclusion, the purpose of issue preclusion is to “protect against ‘the
9 expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserv[e] judicial resources, and
10 foste[r] reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decision.”
11 *Taylor v. Sturgell*, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (citation omitted). The Organizational
12 Plaintiffs’ attempt to continue litigating the question of standing should be rejected.

13 **2. Even if Issue Preclusion Does Not Apply, the Organizational**
14 **Plaintiffs Do Not Articulate a Cognizable Injury**

15 Even absent issue preclusion, the Organizational Plaintiffs have not established
16 standing.

17 **a. Diversion of Resources for Representational and**
18 **Observational Purposes Is Not Adequately Alleged in the**
19 **Complaint**

20 To claim direct organizational standing, the Organizational Plaintiffs would need to
21 show “both a diversion of [their] resources and a frustration of [their] mission[s].” *La*
22 *Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v. City of Lake Forest*, 624 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th
23 Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). The Organizational Plaintiffs appear to concede that they
24 cannot assert a theory of diversion of resources based on education of voters or combatting
25 voter fraud. *See* Compl. ¶ 6. Instead, they claim they will need “to divert resources to
26 conduct election activities beyond election day.” *Id.* Specifically, they point to Nevada law
27 that allows Republican representation on mail ballot central counting boards and
28 observation of the handling and counting of mail ballots. *Id.* ¶ 48.

1 But the Organizational Plaintiffs do not explain how this alleged diversion of
2 resources results in a cognizable injury. They must “show that [they] would have suffered
3 some other injury if [they] had not diverted resources to counteracting the problem.” *La*
4 *Asociacion*, 624 F.3d at 1088. They “cannot manufacture the injury by . . . simply choosing
5 to spend money fixing a problem that otherwise would not affect [them] at all.” *Id.* (citation
6 omitted). Nothing in the Complaint explains how the Organizational Plaintiffs would
7 suffer any injury if they did not expend resources on representation and observation. The
8 use of resources for these purposes is not fairly traceable to the challenged laws allowing
9 for the counting of mail ballots received after election day; the Organizational Plaintiffs
10 would instead be expending those resources as a result of their “own budgetary choices.”
11 *United Poultry Concerns v. Chabad of Irvine*, 743 F. App’x 130, 131 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation
12 omitted); *see also Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Way*, Civil Action No. 20-10753
13 (MAS) (ZNQ), 2020 WL 6204477, at *11 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2020) (“*Way II*”) (in challenge to
14 law allowing for the counting of mail ballots arriving after election day, holding Plaintiffs’
15 assertion of needing to hire and educate poll watchers unavailing because Plaintiffs “cannot
16 manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of
17 hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending”).

18 Furthermore, as the Organizational Plaintiffs acknowledge, mail ballots must be
19 counted “on or before the seventh day following the election.” Compl. ¶ 39 (quoting
20 NRS 293.269931). Presumably, with or without the challenged laws, the Organizational
21 Plaintiffs would expend resources to be represented on counting boards and observe the
22 counting of ballots. They offer nothing to suggest that absent the challenged laws, the
23 counting of mail ballots would be completed faster. For instance, absent the Mailbox
24 Deadlines, individuals who would otherwise mail their ballots on election day might mail
25 their ballots earlier, resulting in no decrease in ballots to be counted. It would be
26 speculative to claim that the Mailbox Deadlines have an impact on the time it takes to
27 count mail ballots. And as discussed below, any risk of vote dilution is speculative and not
28 certainly impending, and the Organizational Plaintiffs cannot “manufacture standing” by

1 incurring costs in response to that speculative risk. *Clapper*, 568 U.S. at 416
2 (“Respondents’ contention that they have standing because they incurred certain costs as
3 a reasonable reaction to a risk of harm is unavailing—because the harm respondents seek
4 to avoid is not certainly impending. In other words, respondents cannot manufacture
5 standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical
6 future harm that is not certainly impending.”); *Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v.*
7 *Boockvar*, 493 F. Supp. 3d 331, 380–81 (W.D. Pa. 2020) (“[S]pending money in response to
8 [a] speculative harm cannot establish a concrete injury.”)

9 **b. Diversion of Resources for Voter Education Is Not**
10 **Adequately Alleged in the Complaint**

11 Next, while the Organizational Plaintiffs appear to repudiate reliance on a theory of
12 diversion of resources based on voter education because it was already rejected in *Cegavske*,
13 see Compl. ¶ 6, they also claim they will need to divert funds they would use for in-person,
14 election day get-out-the-vote activities to “mail-ballot-specific get-out-the-vote operations,”
15 *id.* ¶ 49. As the *Cegavske* court held, educating voters on voting rights is not a cognizable
16 diversion of resources injury. See 488 F. Supp. 3d at 1001–02. The Organizational
17 Plaintiffs do not allege that absent voter outreach and education, their voters would not
18 vote. See *id.* at 1002 (“If plaintiffs did not expend any resources on educating their voters
19 on AB 4, their voters would proceed to vote in-person as they overwhelmingly have in prior
20 elections.”). They do not explain what problem they would be counteracting by diverting
21 resources to educating voters about mail voting as opposed to in-person, election-day
22 voting. The goal is to get voters to vote by election day, and it does not matter whether the
23 Organizational Plaintiffs want to encourage in-person voting as opposed to mail-ballot
24 voting.

25 At bottom, Plaintiffs’ “diversion of resources in response to . . . unpostmarked ballots
26 is ‘more of a generalized grievance, than an organizational injury.’” *Way II*, 2020 WL
27 6204477, at *11 (citation omitted). “Finding a cognizable injury because an organization
28 spends money on routine costs such as hiring, training, and educating staff in response to

1 a new law ‘would be to imply standing for organizations with merely “abstract concerns
2 with a subject that would be affected by an adjudication.”’” *Id.* (quoting *Lane v. Holder*,
3 703 F.3d 668, 675 (4th Cir. 2012)). “A finding along those lines would imply that a sincere
4 plaintiff could bootstrap standing by expending its resources merely in response to the
5 actions of another.” *Id.* “Such a rule would not comport with the case or controversy
6 requirement of Article III of the Constitution.” *Id.* (citation omitted).

7 **c. The Organizational Plaintiffs Fail to Allege a Cognizable**
8 **Competitive Electoral Harms Injury**

9 The Organizational Plaintiffs also claim “competitive electoral harms,” Compl. ¶ 6,
10 presumably based on their assertions that Democratic voters tend to vote later than
11 Republican voters, *id.* ¶¶ 56–60. Competitive standing was already considered and rejected
12 in *Cegavske*. The court explained that the Organizational Plaintiffs’ competitive standing
13 theory failed because “their candidates face no harms that are unique from their electoral
14 opponents.” *Cegavske*, 488 F. Supp. 3d at 1003. The Mailbox Deadlines do not create any
15 uneven playing field; all voters are afforded the same opportunities to vote, and all
16 candidates are afforded the same opportunities to receive votes. In any event, as discussed
17 below, Plaintiffs’ theory of vote dilution based on the Mailbox Deadlines is deficient.

18 **d. The Organizational Plaintiffs Do Not Have Associational**
19 **Standing**

20 Associational standing requires organizations to have members who “would
21 otherwise have standing to sue in their own right.” *Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert.*
22 *Comm’n*, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). For the same reasons Plaintiffs do not have standing
23 based on vote dilution (as discussed below), the Organizational Plaintiffs also do not have
24 associational standing.

25 **3. Vote Dilution Is Impermissibly Generalized and Speculative**

26 Plaintiffs claim that Republican candidates and voters are disproportionately
27 injured based on a theory of vote dilution. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 56–60. The *Cegavske* court
28 already concluded that the Organizational Plaintiffs’ theory of vote dilution as a basis for

1 standing failed because it was generalized and speculative. *Cegavske*, 488 F. Supp. 3d at
2 1000 (“Plaintiffs’ alleged injury of vote dilution is impermissibly ‘generalized’ and
3 ‘speculative’ at this juncture.”). Nevertheless, because vote dilution appears to be the only
4 theory of standing for the individual plaintiff, the Secretary of State addresses it separately
5 here.

6 **a. The Individual Plaintiff’s Alleged Vote Dilution Injury Is**
7 **Not Cognizable**

8 As to Plaintiff Szymanski, his “right to vote is ‘individual and personal in nature,’”
9 and only “voters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals have
10 standing to sue’ to remedy that disadvantage.” *Gill v. Whitford*, 585 U.S. 48, 65–66 (2018)
11 (citations omitted). But as this Court has recognized, a “[p]laintiff[s] purported injury of
12 having [his] vote[] diluted due to ostensible election fraud may be conceivably raised by any
13 Nevada voter.” *Paher v. Cegavske*, 457 F. Supp. 3d 919, 926 (D. Nev. 2020) (Du, J.). “Such
14 claimed injury therefore does not satisfy the requirement that [the plaintiff] must state a
15 concrete and particularized injury.” *Id.* (citations omitted). Vote dilution as a theory of
16 standing has been rejected in a “veritable tsunami” of decisions. *O’Rourke v. Dominion*
17 *Voting Sys. Inc.*, Civil Action No. 20-cv-03747-NRN, 2021 WL 1662742, at *9 (D. Colo. Apr.
18 28, 2021), *aff’d* No. 21-1161, 2022 WL 1699425 (10th Cir. May 27, 2022); *see also Wood v.*
19 *Raffensberger*, 981 F.3d 1307, 1314–15 (11th Cir. 2020) (vote dilution where “no single
20 voter is specifically disadvantaged’ if a vote is counted improperly” is “a paradigmatic
21 generalized grievance that cannot support standing”); *Bost v. Illinois State Bd. of Elections*,
22 684 F. Supp. 3d 720, 732 (N.D. Ill. 2023) (“Plaintiffs suggest the dilution posed by the Ballot
23 Receipt Deadline Statute violates the Elections Clause, but . . . Plaintiffs do not allege an
24 injury beyond the general grievance that all Illinois voters would share if that were the
25 case.”).

26 Plaintiff Szymanski therefore does not have standing.

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1 **b. The Organizational Plaintiffs’ Alleged Vote Dilution**
2 **Injury Is Not Cognizable**

3 The Organizational Plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish Republican candidates and
4 voters as disproportionately impacted, *see* Compl. ¶¶ 14, 56, 60, is also unsupported. This
5 is an extension of the Organizational Plaintiffs’ competitive electoral harms theory of
6 standing that has already been rejected, as explained above. It is also entirely unlike the
7 kind of vote dilution that can be a basis for standing. For example, vote dilution can be a
8 basis for standing where there are “irrationally favored” voters, such as where voters from
9 one county are disfavored based on malapportionment. *See Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186,
10 207–08 (1962). All voters and candidates have the exact same opportunities under the laws
11 here, and the Mailbox Deadlines do not irrationally favor any voter or candidate. The
12 Organizational Plaintiffs’ theory of vote dilution is too generalized and is not
13 particularized.

14 Even if the Organizational Plaintiffs’ theory of disproportionate impact to
15 Republican voters and candidates could be a basis for standing, the Organizational
16 Plaintiffs fail to allege any non-speculative harm. They allege that (1) Democratic voters
17 cast more mail ballots than Republican voters, *id.* ¶¶ 56, 57, 59, and (2) Democratic voters
18 vote later than Republican voters, *id.* ¶ 58. But nothing they cite supports that mail ballots
19 arriving after election day “disproportionately break for Democrats.” *See id.* ¶ 56. First,
20 in the 2022 general election, Democratic voters cast 239,924 mail ballots, and Republican
21 voters cast 153,155 ballots. Nev. Sec’y of State, *2022 General Election Turnout*,
22 <https://perma.cc/N7G7-RUQ9>. Republican voters cast a massive amount of mail ballots in
23 the last general election, and the gap between Republican and Democratic voters voting by
24 mail has been narrowing significantly over time. *Cf.* Nev. Sec’y of State, *2020 General*
25 *Election Turnout*, <https://perma.cc/Z6F3-SM4N> (319,149 Democratic mail ballots and
26 181,003 Republican mail ballots cast in the 2020 general election); Nev. Sec’y of State, *2024*
27 *Presidential Preference Primary Turnout: Cumulative Presidential Preference Primary*
28 *Election Turnout – Final* (Feb. 20, 2024), <https://perma.cc/7USY-5NMY> (107,987

1 Democratic mail ballots, representing 80.1% of Democratic votes cast, and 60,862
2 Republican mail ballots, representing 75.1% of Republican votes cast, cast in the 2024
3 presidential preference primary election).⁷ Plaintiffs’ theory that Republican voters will
4 cast fewer mail ballots in the 2024 general election compared to Democratic voters is
5 speculative. *See Way II*, 2020 WL 6204477, at *6 (“It is difficult—and ultimately
6 speculative—to predict injury from evidence of past injury.”).

7 Second, Plaintiffs cite nothing to suggest that mail ballots that arrive after election
8 day are more likely to come from Democratic voters. Their only citation for this proposition
9 is an article from 2020 that says nothing about mail ballots arriving after election day
10 coming more from Democratic voters than Republican voters. *See* Compl. ¶ 58 (quoting Ed
11 Kilgore, *Why Do the Last Votes Counted Skew Democratic?*, *Intelligencer* (Aug. 10, 2020),
12 <https://perma.cc/R78D-3Q58>).⁸ The article explains that Democratic votes tend to be
13 counted later than other votes, a phenomenon that is in part explained by Democratic
14 voters casting more “provisional ballots” and because mail ballots tend to be counted later
15 than in-person ballots. *See* Ed Kilgore, *Why Do the Last Votes Counted Skew Democratic?*,
16 *Intelligencer* (Aug. 10, 2020), <https://perma.cc/R78D-3Q58>. The article also theorizes,
17 based on one individual’s speculation, not actual facts, that Democratic voters may vote by
18 mail later in an election cycle, but there is no indication that Democratic voters
19 disproportionately cast mail ballots that arrive after election day. *See id.* Moreover,
20 Plaintiffs do not allege how many mail ballots were received and counted after election day
21 for any election, and certainly nothing suggesting that late-arriving mail ballots could
22 change the results of an election. Plaintiffs fail to allege any injury that is “certainly
23

24 ⁷ Plaintiffs rely on the Secretary of State’s 2020 and 2022 general election reports and 2024 primary
25 election report in their Complaint. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 57, 59. The agency reports are therefore incorporated by
26 reference and subject to judicial notice, and they can be considered in this motion to dismiss without
converting it to a motion for summary judgment. *Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc.*, 899 F.3d 988, 999,
1001–02 (9th Cir. 2018); Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2).

27 ⁸ This article is also incorporated by reference and can be considered on this motion to dismiss. *See*
28 *Khoja*, 899 F.3d at 1002 (“[I]ncorporation-by-reference is a judicially created doctrine that treats certain
documents as though they are part of the complaint itself. The doctrine prevents plaintiffs from selecting
only portions of documents that support their claims, while omitting portions of those very documents that
weaken—or doom—their claims.”).

1 impending” or that there is a “substantial risk” that injury will occur, *Susan B. Anthony*
2 *List v. Driehaus*, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014), and their theory is therefore too speculative to
3 support standing.

4 **c. Plaintiffs Do Not Establish that Their Requested Relief**
5 **Would Redress Their Alleged Vote Dilution Injury**

6 Finally, it is, at best, speculative that Plaintiffs’ requested relief would redress their
7 supposed injuries. *Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (“[I]t must be
8 ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable
9 decision.’”). They do not so much as allege that, absent the challenged laws, Democratic
10 voters would fail to cast valid votes or that election results would be different. This is a
11 further, independent basis that Plaintiffs fail to establish standing. Rather than wasting
12 money on litigation to try to disenfranchise voters, Plaintiffs’ efforts would likely be better
13 spent on remedying their own self-inflicted wound of discouraging Republican voters from
14 voting by mail. See Ed Kilgore, *Why Do the Last Votes Counted Skew Democratic?*,
15 *Intelligencer* (Aug. 10, 2020), <https://perma.cc/R78D-3Q58> (noting Donald Trump’s
16 “intense efforts to demonize voting by mail”).

17 **B. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Claim**

18 In addition to failing to establish standing, the Complaint also fails to state a claim
19 upon which relief can be granted. It must therefore be dismissed.

20 **1. The Federal Election Day Statutes Do Not Preempt the Mailbox**
21 **Deadlines**

22 In their first claim, Plaintiffs assert that the Federal Election Day Statutes preempt
23 the Mailbox Deadlines. See Compl. ¶ 69. Not so. Congress originally enacted the Federal
24 Election Day Statutes in 1872 “to remedy more than one evil arising from the election of
25 members of Congress occurring at different times in the different States.” *Foster*, 522 U.S.
26 at 69, 73 (quoting *Ex parte Yarbrough*, 110 U.S. 651, 661 (1884)). “Congress was concerned
27 both with the distortion of the voting process threatened when the results of an early
28 federal election in one State can influence later voting in other States, and with the burden

1 on citizens forced to turn out on two different election days to make final selection of federal
2 officers in Presidential election years.” *Id.* (citation omitted). Neither of those concerns are
3 implicated by the Mailbox Deadlines.

4 **a. Plaintiffs’ Allegation that There Is Only One Federal**
5 **Election Day Is Inconsistent with Federal Law, as Voting**
6 **Before Election Day Is Clearly Permitted**

7 Federal laws speaking of an “election” of a Senator or Representative “plainly refer
8 to the combined actions of voters and officials meant to make a final selection of an
9 officeholder.” *Foster*, 522 U.S. at 71. As the Ninth Circuit has held, election day is the
10 “consummation’ of the process rather than any day during which voting takes place.”
11 *Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Keisling*, 259 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, a state
12 can allow voting to occur before election day without violating federal election day statutes.
13 *Id.*; see also *Millsaps v. Thompson*, 259 F.3d 535, 547 (6th Cir. 2001) (“An ‘election’ under
14 the federal statutes requires more than just voting, and the Early Voting Statutes do not
15 create a regime of combined action meant to make a final selection on any day other than
16 federal election day.”); *Voting Integrity Project, Inc. v. Bomer*, 199 F.3d 773, 777 (5th Cir.
17 2000) (“In short, the Texas Early Voting statutes further the important federal objective of
18 reducing the burden on citizens to exercise their right to vote by allowing them to vote at a
19 time convenient to them, without thwarting other federal concerns.”).

20 **b. Counting Ballots After Election Day Is Also Permitted by**
21 **Federal Law**

22 Just as the Federal Election Day Statutes do not preclude a voter from casting a vote
23 before election day, the Federal Election Day Statutes also do not foreclose the counting of
24 ballots cast by election day. There is nothing requiring that all election activities cease on
25 election day; indeed, “official action to confirm or verify the results of the election extends
26 well beyond federal election day.” See *Millsaps*, 259 F.3d at 546 n.5. For instance, the
27 counting of mail ballots extends through the seventh day after an election,
28 NRS 293.269931, and boards of county commissioners canvass returns on or before the

1 10th day following the election, NRS 293.387(1). Federal law even specifies that official
2 activities relating to the appointment of presidential electors may continue beyond election
3 day; each state’s executive can wait until “6 days before the time fixed for the meeting of
4 the electors” to “issue a certificate of ascertainment of appointment of electors.” 3 U.S.C.
5 § 5(a)(1). The counting of ballots is part of “the mechanics” that states retain authority
6 over unless preempted, *see Foster*, 522 U.S. at 69, and the Federal Election Day Statutes
7 do not provide for the counting of all ballots on election day.

8 **c. Federal Statutes Are Silent on When Ballots May Be**
9 **Received and Counted**

10 Similarly, the Federal Election Day Statutes do not set a date for when an official
11 must receive mail ballots. *See Bost*, 684 F. Supp. 3d at 736 (“There is a notable lack of
12 federal law governing the timeliness of mail-in ballots.”); *Donald J. Trump for President,*
13 *Inc. v. Way*, 492 F. Supp. 3d 354, 372 (D.N.J. 2020) (“*Way I*”) (“The Court finds that New
14 Jersey’s law permitting the canvassing of ballots lacking a postmark if they are received
15 within forty-eight hours of the closing of the polls is not preempted by the Federal Election
16 Day Statutes because the Federal Election Day Statutes are silent on methods of
17 determining the timeliness of ballots.”). This conclusion is bolstered by Congress’s choice
18 not to establish a ballot-receipt deadline despite a widespread practice of states permitting
19 ballots to arrive after election day. *See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.*, 489
20 U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989) (“The case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak where
21 Congress has indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal
22 interest, and has nonetheless decided to ‘stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever
23 tension there [is] between them.”); *Keisling*, 259 F.3d at 1175 (“What persuades us of the
24 proper outcome in this difficult case is the long history of congressional tolerance, despite
25 the federal election day statute, of absentee balloting and express congressional approval
26 of absentee balloting when it has spoken on the issue.”); *Bomer*, 199 F.3d at 776 (“We are
27 unable to read the federal election day statutes in a manner that would prohibit such a
28 universal, longstanding practice of which Congress was obviously aware.”).

1 The District of Columbia and most states count at least some ballots that arrive after
2 election day.⁹ See *Bost*, 684 F. Supp. 3d at 736 (“Despite these ballot receipt deadline
3 statutes being in place for many years in many states, Congress has never stepped in and
4 altered the rules.”).

5 **d. Congress Has Recognized that Ballots Can Be Received**
6 **After Election Day**

7 Congress also enacted the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act of
8 1986 (“UOCAVA”), which provides for absentee ballots in federal elections for specified
9 voters. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301-20311. Notably, UOCAVA provides for the delivery of
10 absentee ballots but does not require that the absentee ballots be delivered by election day.
11 Instead, UOCAVA requires the “implement[ation] of procedures that facilitate the delivery
12 of marked absentee ballots . . . not later than the date by which an absentee ballot must be
13 received in order to be counted in the election.” 52 U.S.C. § 20304(b)(1). Congress therefore
14 recognized that absentee ballots cast pursuant to UOCAVA could be received after election
15 day if a state’s law so provided. And the executive branch has similarly sought to ensure
16 that UOCAVA voters are not disenfranchised by seeking court-ordered extensions of ballot-
17 receipt deadlines. *Bost*, 684 F. Supp. 3d at 737; see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, *Cases Raising*
18 *Claims Under the Uniformed And Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act*, [https://www.
19 justice.gov/crt/cases-raising-claims-under-uniformed-and-overseas-citizen-absentee-voting
20 -act](https://www.justice.gov/crt/cases-raising-claims-under-uniformed-and-overseas-citizen-absentee-voting-act) (collecting UOCAVA cases, including cases where extensions of ballot-receipt deadlines
21 were requested). “The[] longstanding efforts by Congress and the executive branch to
22 ensure that ballots cast by Americans living overseas are counted, so long as they are cast

23 ⁹ See Ala. Code § 17-11-18(b); Alaska Stat. § 15.20.081(h); Ark. Code Ann. § 7-5-411(a)(1)(A)(ii)(a);
24 Cal. Elec. Code § 3020(b); D.C. Code § 1-1001.05(a)(10B); Fla. Stat. § 101.6952(5); Ga. Code Ann. § 21-2-
25 386(a)(1)(G); 10 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/19-8(c), 5/18A-15(a); Ind. Code § 3-12-1-17(b); Kan. Stat Ann. 25-1132(b);
26 Md. Code Ann., Elec. Law § 9-309; Md. State Bd. of Elections, *Mail-in Voting: Information and Instructions*
27 *for the 2024 Elections*, <https://elections.maryland.gov/voting/absentee.html> (“How do I return my voted
28 ballot?”); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54 § 93; Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.759a(18); Miss Code Ann. § 23-15-637; Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 115.920(1); NRS 293.269921(1)(b), (2); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 19:63-22(a); N.Y. Elec. Law § 8-412(1);
N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 16.1-07-09; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3509.05(D)(2)(a); Or. Rev. Stat. § 254.470(6)(e)(B);
25 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3511(a); R.I. Gen. Laws § 17-20-16; S.C. Code Ann. § 7-15-700; Tex. Elec. Code Ann.
§ 86.007(a)(2); Utah Code Ann. § 20A-3a-204(2)(a); Va. Code Ann. § 24.2-709(B); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 29A.40.091(4); W. Va. Code § 3-3-5(g)(2).

1 by Election Day, strongly suggest that statutes like the one at issue here are compatible
2 with the” Federal Election Day Statutes. *Id.*

3 Nothing in the Federal Election Day Statutes preempts the counting of mail ballots
4 received after election day. The question of preemption here is whether the Mailbox
5 Deadlines authorize mail ballots to be cast after election day. They do not. Under
6 NRS 293.269921(1)(b) and (2), mail ballots must still be cast by election day. While
7 Plaintiffs nakedly allege that NRS 293.269921 allows ballots to be cast after election day,
8 *see* Compl. ¶¶ 69, 73, 78, the Complaint contains no allegation, plausible or otherwise,
9 supporting the contention that ballots counted under the Mailbox Deadlines are not cast
10 by election day. *See Way I*, 492 F. Supp. 3d at 372 (“The Court finds, with a high degree of
11 confidence, that ballots lacking a postmark and received within forty-eight hours of the
12 closing of the polls are timely cast.”); *Gallagher v. New York State Bd. of Elections*, 477
13 F. Supp. 3d 19, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (“[T]he Court concludes with a high degree of confidence
14 that ballots received by the NYCBOE on June 25 were mailed on June 23 or earlier.”). Such
15 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
16 statements, do not suffice.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs’ first claim
17 fails.

18 **2. The Mailbox Deadlines Do Not Violate the Right to Stand for** 19 **Office**

20 In their second claim, Plaintiffs allege that the Mailbox Deadlines violate the First
21 and Fourteenth Amendments with respect to the right to stand for office. They assert that
22 they will be forced “to spend money, devote time, and otherwise injuriously rely on unlawful
23 provisions of state law in organizing, funding, and running their campaigns.” Compl. ¶ 74.

24 Plaintiffs offer nothing more than “naked assertions devoid of further factual
25 enhancement,” and their Complaint consequently does not suffice. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678
26 (cleaned up). As discussed above, the Mailbox Deadlines are not “unlawful” as they are not
27 preempted by Federal law. Plaintiffs’ second claim is therefore as baseless as their first.
28 Further, Plaintiffs do not plausibly allege that the Mailbox Deadlines would cause them to

1 expend additional resources or otherwise modify their actions. With or without the Mailbox
2 Deadlines, Plaintiffs almost certainly would still choose to be represented on mail ballot
3 central counting boards and to observe the handling and counting of mail ballots. *See*
4 Compl. ¶ 48. They also already will spend money on voter outreach, and they do not explain
5 why they would need to spend money differently based on the Mailbox Deadlines since the
6 goal is to get voters to vote. *See id.* ¶ 49. At bottom, “[s]pending time and money on
7 campaigning is an inevitable feature of running for office, and Plaintiffs do not contend
8 that the extra time and money they might have to spend due to the [Mailbox Deadlines]
9 prevents them from standing for office at all.” *Bost*, 684 F. Supp. 3d at 739.

10 Even if Plaintiffs had included sufficient plausible allegations in support of their
11 claim, the claim would still fail. Electoral process regulations are evaluated under the
12 *Anderson/Burdick* standard, which comes from the Supreme Court’s decisions in *Burdick*
13 *v. Takushi*, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) and *Anderson v. Celebrezze*, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). “The
14 *Anderson/Burdick* framework arose out of the Supreme Court’s resolution of competing
15 constitutional commands and the practical realities of voting laws.” *Ariz. Democratic Party*
16 *v. Hobbs*, 18 F.4th 1179, 1186 (9th Cir. 2021). The framework recognizes that “as a
17 practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair
18 and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic
19 process.” *Id.* at 1186–87 (citation omitted). Courts “must weigh ‘the character and
20 magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth
21 Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward
22 by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration
23 ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’” *Id.*
24 at 1887 (citation omitted). Where a law imposes a “[l]esser burden[], . . . a State’s ‘important
25 regulatory interests’ will usually be enough to justify ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory
26 restrictions.’” *Id.* (citation omitted).

27 Here, Plaintiffs have not explained how the Mailbox Deadlines, which make voting
28 and receiving votes easier, would violate the Constitution. *See Short v. Brown*, 893 F.3d

1 671, 677–78 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he appellants [have not] cited any authority explaining
2 how a law that makes it easier to vote would violate the Constitution.”). Even if the Mailbox
3 Deadlines could be construed as imposing some kind of burden, they impose “no unequal
4 weighting of votes, no discrimination among voters, and no obstruction or impediment to
5 voting.” *Pub. Integrity All., Inc. v. City of Tucson*, 836 F.3d 1019, 1027 (9th Cir. 2016)
6 (citations omitted). All voters are entitled to take advantage of the Mailbox Deadlines and
7 all candidates are entitled to receive votes that are cast consistent with the Mailbox
8 Deadlines. Far from obstructing or impeding voting and the receipt of votes, the Mailbox
9 Deadlines make voting and receiving votes easier. Any burden therefore is not severe.
10 Accordingly, the Mailbox Deadlines are easily justified by Nevada’s important regulatory
11 interests in encouraging and allowing as many voters to exercise their fundamental right
12 to vote as possible.

13 **3. The Mailbox Deadlines Do Not Violate the Right to Vote**

14 Plaintiffs’ third claim that the Mailbox Deadlines violate the Fourteenth
15 Amendment is entirely predicated on the incorrect assertion that mail ballots received after
16 election day are illegitimate. *See* Compl. ¶¶ 79–80. As discussed above, the Federal
17 Election Day Statutes do not preempt the Mailbox Deadlines, and Plaintiffs offer nothing
18 else to suggest that mail ballots counted pursuant to the Mailbox Deadlines are
19 illegitimate. The third claim therefore fails.

20 **C. Laches Bars Plaintiffs’ Request for Injunctive Relief Prohibiting** 21 **Defendants from Enforcing the Mailbox Deadlines for the 2024** 22 **General Election**

23 “Laches is an equitable defense that prevents a plaintiff, who with full knowledge of
24 the facts acquiesces in a transaction and sleeps upon his rights.” *Danjaq LLC v. Sony*
25 *Corp.*, 263 F.3d 942, 950–51 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). “To
26 demonstrate laches, the defendant must prove both an unreasonable delay by the plaintiff
27 and prejudice to itself.” *Id.* at 951 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Laches
28 applies in the election context, even if a plaintiff can make out a constitutional violation.

1 *See Soules v. Kauaians for Nukolii Campaign Comm.*, 849 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1988).
2 The critical questions for the application of laches in elections cases are “1) whether [the
3 plaintiffs] knew the basis of their alleged . . . claim sufficiently in advance of the election
4 that they had ample opportunity to seek preelection relief; and 2) whether [the plaintiffs]
5 have advanced an adequate explanation for their failure to seek preelection relief.” *See id.*

6 The Organizational Plaintiffs have had Nevada’s laws on counting mail ballots
7 received after election day on their radar since 2020 when they filed the *Cegavske* lawsuit.
8 *See* Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, *Donald J. Trump for President, Inc.*
9 *v. Cegavske*, Case No. 2:20-cv-01445-JCM-VCF (D. Nev. August 8, 2020), ECF No. 1 ¶ 98
10 (“Section 20.2 of AB4 conflicts with 3 U.S.C. § 1 by permitting absent ballots that have not
11 been postmarked to be counted if they are received by 5:00 pm three days after Election
12 Day (based on a presumption that those ballots were mailed on or before Election Day).”).
13 The current, nearly identical version of the Mailbox Deadlines was approved by the
14 Governor on June 2, 2021, and has been effective since January 1, 2022. *See* AB 321
15 § 92(3). Now, nearly three years after the Mailbox Deadlines were approved, and over two
16 years from their effective date, Plaintiffs bring this challenge. There can be no excuse for
17 this delay. Given that the Organizational Plaintiffs already tried to challenge Nevada’s
18 laws on counting mail ballots received after an election in 2020, Plaintiffs unreasonably
19 delayed in waiting to bring this lawsuit until the 2024 election cycle was already underway
20 and only six months before the 2024 general election.

21 Nevada had a presidential preference primary election on February 6, 2024, *see*
22 NRS 298.650(1), and will shortly have a primary election on June 11, 2024, NRS 293.175(1).
23 The Mailbox Deadlines have already been in effect in 2024. Yet Plaintiffs ask that
24 Defendants—the Secretary of State and Clark and Washoe County officials—change horses
25 midstream and be enjoined from enforcing the Mailbox Deadlines for the November 5, 2024
26 general election. *See* Compl. at 16. The Secretary of State has expended significant
27 resources to train election workers on voting laws and to provide voters with guidance and
28 information on how to vote. If Plaintiffs’ requested relief is granted for the 2024 general

1 election, the Secretary of State will be prejudiced by having to expend additional significant
2 resources to educate voters and election workers, and there is still a substantial risk that
3 some voters will not be apprised of the change to the Mailbox Deadlines and will cast ballots
4 that will not be counted.

5 Additionally, voting by mail saves taxpayer funds; it allows counties to cut down on
6 election day expenditures. A change in laws governing mail ballots might cause voters to
7 not vote by mail, which would result in an increase in taxpayer dollars needing to be spent
8 for elections.

9 Furthermore, because county officials are tasked with the counting of mail ballots,¹⁰
10 Plaintiffs' request that only two counties' officials—Washoe and Clark County—be enjoined
11 from enforcing the Mailbox Deadlines would allow preferential treatment for voters in
12 counties other than Washoe and Clark County, thereby imposing a burden on voters in
13 Washoe and Clark County. It would also place the 2024 general election ballot counting
14 procedures at odds with the Nevada Constitution, which grants each voter the right “[t]o a
15 uniform, statewide standard for counting and recounting all votes accurately as provided
16 by law.” Nev. Const. art. 2 § 1A(10); *see also* NRS 293.2546(10). The Secretary of State
17 would be highly prejudiced in having to suffer the potential disenfranchisement of voters
18 of the state for which he serves as Chief Officer of Elections, and also would be potentially
19 subjected to lawsuits by voters who claim a violation of their rights under the Nevada
20 Constitution.

21 Finally, in the context of elections, an unreasonable delay “can prejudice the
22 administration of justice ‘by compelling the court to steamroll through . . . delicate legal
23 issues in order to meet’ election deadlines.” *Ariz. Libertarian Party v. Reagan*, 189 F. Supp.
24 3d 920, 923 (D. Ariz. 2016). The 2024 general election is just over five months away, which
25 gives very little time for this Court and potentially appellate courts to determine whether
26 to enjoin enforcement of the Mailbox Deadlines before the 2024 general election.

27
28 ¹⁰ *See, e.g.*, NRS 293.269929 (county clerk appoints mail ballot central counting board);
NRS 293.269933 (mail ballot central counting boards process mail ballots); NRS 293.387 (boards of county
commissions canvass returns); *see also* Compl. ¶¶ 21, 23.

1 An accelerated schedule for briefing delicate issues of election law would cause prejudice to
2 the Secretary of State as well.

3 The Court should decline to grant Plaintiffs' requested relief prohibiting Defendants
4 from enforcing the Mailbox Deadlines for the 2024 general election based on the doctrine
5 of laches.

6 **III. CONCLUSION**

7 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should dismiss the Complaint.

8 DATED this 30th day of May 2024.

9 AARON D. FORD
10 Attorney General

11 By: /s/Laena St-Jules
12 LAENA ST-JULES (Bar No. 15156)
13 Senior Deputy Attorney General
14 Office of the Attorney General
15 100 North Carson Street
16 Carson City, Nevada 89701-4717
17 T: (775) 684-1100
18 E: lstjules@ag.nv.gov

19 *Attorneys for Secretary of State*