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N THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
        NORTHERN DIVISION
    DONNA BUETTNER-HARTSOE, et a1. )
    Plaintiff,
    vs.
                )CIVIL ACTION NOS.
BALTIMORE LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL )20-3132, 20-3214, 20-3229,
ASSOCIATION, d/b/a CONCORDIA )20-3267, 21-691-RDB
PREPARATORY SCHOOL,
    Defendants.
                                    Baltimore, Maryland
                                    September 1 , 2022
                                    1:57 p.m.
                                THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR
                    MOTIONS HEARING
    BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICHARD D. BENNETT
    A PPEARANCES
On Behalf of the Plaintiff:
    BRIAN KETTERER, ESQUIRE
    CHRISTINA GRAZIANO, ESQUIRE
    JUSTIN A. BROWNE, ESQUIRE
On Behalf of the Defendant:
    GREGG E. VIOLA, ESQUIRE
    BRIAN S. GOODMAN, ESQUIRE
    GEOFFREY H. GENTH, ESQUIRE
    EVAN T. SHEA, ESQUIRE
    WILLIAM KING, ESQUIRE
Also Present:
    MEGAN MATTHEWS, ESQUIRE
    CONSTANCE BAKER, ESQUIRE
    CAROLINE BELESON, LAW CLERK
            (Computer-aided transcription of stenotype notes)
                            Reported by:
            Ronda J. Thomas, RMR, CRR
                Federal Official Reporter
            101 W. Lombard Street, 4th Floor
                        Baltimore, Mary7and 21201
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Ronda J. Thomas, RMR, CRR - Federal Official Reporter
(1:57 p.m.)
THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. This is calling the case of Buettner-Hartsoe, et al. v. Baltimore Lutheran High School, Civil Numbers 20-3132, 20-3214, 20-3229, 20-3267, 21-691-RDB with consolidated cases. The lead case being Buettner-Hartsoe, if I'm pronouncing those names correctly, et a1. v. Baltimore Lutheran High School Association, which is the predecessor of Concordia Prep School Academy. We are here on a Motion for Reconsideration as well as a Motion for Interlocutory Appeal.

I would note, first of all, that the standing orders of this Court provide that masks are to be worn in all public areas of the courthouse, with the exception of the courtroom if in the discretion of the presiding judge the participants have been adequately vaccinated.

I have been fully vaccinated and boosted and tested negative within the last two weeks, I guess, so I have my mask pulled down. So as we proceed, I'11 first inquire of the vaccination status of the parties.

Counse1, it doesn't mean you have to pull your mask down, you're encouraged to do so because it's a little bit easier for Ms. Thomas, the court reporter, but I'11 inquire as to that.

So on behalf of the Plaintiffs here, if counsel would identify themselves for the record.

MS. GRAZIANO: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Christina
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Graziano for the Plaintiffs, and I am in fact vaccinated and boosted.

THE COURT: Ms. Graziano, nice to see you. Welcome. Nice to see you.

MS. GRAZIANO: Nice to see you.
MR. KETTERER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Brian Ketterer on behalf of the Plaintiffs. I'm also vaccinated.

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Ketterer, nice to see you.
MR. KETTERER: Nice to see you too.
MR. BROWNE: Good afternoon, Judge Bennett. I'm Justin Browne, and I'm vaccinated.

THE COURT: Yes, nice to see all three of you. You can pull your mask down while speaking, you don't have to.

Mr. Browne, you can certainly come and sit at the trial table if you'd like. You're a matter of counsel of record. Nice to have you.

On behalf of the Defendants? First of a11, the Defendants Baltimore Lutheran High School Association doing business as Concordia Preparatory School.

MR. VIOLA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Gregg Viola on behalf of Baltimore Lutheran High school. I am vaccinated.

MR. GOODMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Brian Goodman on behalf of Codefendant Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, Southeastern District. I have been vaccinated and boosted.

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THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Goodman. Nice to see you as well. It's been a long tile.

MR. GOODMAN: It has been.
THE COURT: I'm going to take my mask fully off then. So with that, you all may be seated for a minute.

Let me just go over where we are on this. This dispute involves five consolidated cases brought by five different women, all former students of Concordia Preparatory School, once known as the Baltimore Lutheran High School.

And all five women have alleged that Concordia failed to take meaningful action to address a wealth of complaints of sexual assault and verbal sexual harassment.

Title XI of the Education Amendment Act of 1972 confers federal jurisdiction over institutions that are a recipient of federal funds. And the issue here is whether organizations with 501(c)(3) tax exempt status qualify as recipients of federal funds for purposes of Title XI.

On July 21st of this year, I issued an opinion denying the partial Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count 1 of the operative Amended Complaint in the lead case in this case, and essentially they're identical complaints in all of the cases.

I would first note that with respect to the Plaintiffs in this matter, there are three minor Plaintiffs. The minor Plaintiff by the initials H.C. through -- I'm sorry, N.H., first of all, through her mother, Donna Buettner-Hartsoe. If

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I'm pronouncing the name correctly. And then the minor Plaintiff H.C. through her mother Andrea Conrad. And then the minor Plaintiff A.G. through her mother Selena Barber.

And then we have two other Plaintiffs who are adults and do not choose to go through any other persons. They're adults and they've come forward. And that is Jennifer Pullen and Ariana Gomez. They are the other five Plaintiffs.

Are any of the Plaintiffs here in the courtroom today, Ms. Graziano?

MS. GRAZIANO: No, Your Honor. I would also point out as a factual verification, at the time that the Buettner-Hartsoe complaint was filed, N.H. -- or, yeah, excuse me, N.H. was a minor. She has now reached the age of majority. So I just point that out.

THE COURT: All right. She's still proceeding as N.H. through her mother, Donna Buettner-Hartsoe, though, correct?

MS. GRAZIANO: That's correct.
THE COURT: That's fine. She's entitled to do that, I'm just trying to clarify.

And there's an operative Amended Complaint, which is pretty much identical in all five of these cases. And this case is the lead case for purposes of filing. And essentially, there are four counts to the complaint.

There's a Count 1 alleging the violation of 20 U.S.C. § 1681, that being Title XI of the Education Amendment Act of

[^0] 1972.

And then Count 2 is negligent supervision and retention.
Count 3 alleges negligence.
Count 4 alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress.

I believe all of the complaints or the amended complaints all allege the same four counts if I'm not mistaken; is that correct?

MS. GRAZIANO: That is correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Correct from your point of view,
Mr. Goodman as well and Mr. Viola?
MR. VIOLA: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. GOODMAN: Your Honor, yes. I note for the record my client is only named in Counts 2 and 3 and not in Counts 1 and 4.

THE COURT: I was about to ask that, Mr. Goodman. Your client was not affected by -- well, I should not say was not affected by -- your client is Lutheran Church Missouri-Synod, Southeastern District, correct?

MR. GOODMAN: That is correct. We are not a named Defendant in Title XI. We were a named Defendant in Count 4 but we were dismissed.

THE COURT: Let me make a note of that.
MR. GOODMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So with respect to the Motion for
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Consideration, reconsideration of my ruling, your client had not moved in that fashion anyway under Count 1, correct?

MR. GOODMAN: No, I didn't think I had any standing to do so because we're not a named Defendant.

THE COURT: That's right. I'm just verifying that you're here and I'm going to be hearing from Mr. Viola on these arguments.

MR. GOODMAN: Thankfully I'm sure Your Honor will be glad to hear I have nothing to say about today's motion.

THE COURT: That's quite all right.
We had amicus briefs filed in this case. And just so the record is clear, amicus briefs that are in the lead case 20-3132. An amicus brief was filed on behalf of the Association of Independent Maryland and D.C. schools, better know as AIMS, I believe, in the community. And that was filed by the law firm of Kramon \& Graham, Geoffrey Genth and Steven Klepper are listed as counsel on that matter.

Are either Mr. Genth or Mr. Klepper here?
MR. GENTH: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You're certainly welcome, if you want to try to sit up here in the row up here. I'm going to grant the motion. I've permitted the amicus briefs to be filed. That's fine. Technically it's a pending motion and leave to file the amicus brief is being granted.

So Paper Number 134, I'11 include in an order, is granted

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for the reasons set forth in the record. And welcome to you.
If you would like to come up and sit in the front row in the back at least behind counsel table there are some empty chairs there. You are welcome to come up.

MR. GENTH: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And Mr. Klepper is not here; is that correct?

MR. GENTH: That's correct.
THE COURT: Nice to see you. There's also an amicus brief filed, Paper Number 136 filed on August the 11th by the National Association of Independent Schools that Mr. Evan Shea of the law firm of Venable has been listed as counsel of record.

Is Mr. Shea here?
MR. SHEA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Shea, nice to see you.
MR. SHEA: Nice to see you.
THE COURT: You're welcome to come forward and come up and sit in the back here. You're welcome to come.

MR. SHEA: Thank you, Your Honor. I'11 point out that Mr. William King from Venable --

THE COURT: Yes, Mr. King, nice to see you. I recognize you from years past. The record will reflect that Mr. King is a former law clerk of mine, which means it only got easier for him after his career commenced.

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(Laughter.)
MR. SHEA: And, Your Honor, Ms. Megan Matthews is the general counse1 for the National Association.

THE COURT: Yes. I'm sorry?
MR. SHEA: She's not counsel of record.
THE COURT: A11 three of you may come up and sit behind the defense table. We'11 be glad to have you. Come on up. Come on up.

MR. GENTH: Your Honor, general counse1 for the Association of Independent Maryland Schools, Constance Baker, Esquire is also here. Would it be acceptable if she came up as we11?

THE COURT: We11, if it is the Constance Baker, Esquire, then certainly she's welcome to come up.

Ms. Baker, nice to see you again. It's been a long time. Come on up. It's certainly nice to have you here.

I will inquire of any of you that want to speak. Have you all been fully vaccinated?
(A11 Counse1 - "Yes, Your Honor.")
THE COURT: That's a uniform "yes." And, Ms. Baker, I'm sure she's been vaccinated, she's always been very cautious. Nice to see you, Ms. Baker. Just come on up.

Have I overlooked anyone here that is counsel of record or amicus filing? We11, thank you very much. You all may be seated here.

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Let me just note, if I can, that the -- what I propose to do is we're first going to deal with a Motion for Reconsideration. And then after that we'11 deal with the Motion for Interlocutory Appeal.

Any objection from the point of view of the Plaintiffs on that?

MS. GRAZIANO: No objection, Your Honor.
THE COURT: From the defense, any objection,
Mr. Viola?
MR. VIOLA: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: So we will proceed in that fashion. And I'11 hear argument first on the Motion for Reconsideration and then I will indicate essentially what my ruling will be today on both of these. And then I'll follow up with a written opinion. Do my best to get it filed tomorrow on this matter.

Just starting off in terms of the matter of the Motion for Reconsideration. Essentially, that'11 be guided by Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in terms of the Court's analysis.

Just so the record is clear, as a matter of public record here, to establish a Title XI claim based on student sexual harassment, Plaintiff must show, one, that they were a student at an educational association, institution receiving federal funds. And that's the key phrase here as to that.

And then two, that they suffered sexual harassment that

[^1]were so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprived them of equal access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by their school.

Three, the school, through an official who has the authority to address the alleged harassment and to institute corrective measures, had actual notice or knowledge of the alleged harassment.

And four, the school acted with deliberate indifference to the alleged harassment. That's been summarized within the last year -- or actually last year by the Fourth Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Doe v. Fairfax County Schoo1 Board at 1 F.4th 257, an opinion in 2001 and actually an opinion to which I made reference in my written opinion.

So the analysis here is in terms of a Motion for Reconsideration is, I think, the Court is guided -- essentially the Fourth Circuit, there's been some variance in some of the cases as to whether the Court turns to Ru7e 54(b) or Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b), I think, guides this Court's analysis. The fourth Circuit, I think, has so indicated previously, and I have made reference to that, actually in an opinion last year in Cincinnati Insurance Company v. Fish where that is the rule that guides this Court's analysis as to a Motion for Reconsideration.

So with that, Mr. Viola -- am I pronouncing your name
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MR. VIOLA: Viola, that's correct.
THE COURT: I will be glad to hear from you. You can speak at the table or use the podium. Whatever you are more comfortable with.

MR. VIOLA: I'm happy to speak at the table.
THE COURT: That's fine.
MR. VIOLA: Your Honor, the reason respectfully that the Court was wrong in its original opinion was because Title XI is spending clause legislation and spending clause legislation is different than other legislation. In Cummings $v$. Premiere Rehab, the Supreme Court just spoke on this issue just about four months ago, and it went through the history and discussed why spending clause legislation is different than other legislation. They observe that other legislation imposes a duty on a class of people.

But spending clause legislation is in essence a contract. It's in essence a contract between the Government and recipient of federal funds in which the recipient of federal funds agrees, in exchange for accepting some benefit, that it undertakes certain duties, including being subject to statutes such as Title XI, so it's in essence a different animal.

And in Cummings, the Supreme Court said that in order for an entity that receives federal funds to be bound by Title XI it had to, quote, "knowingly accept," unquote, and clearly

[^2]understand the obligations, so in essence it acts as a contract.

A recipient has to know by accepting whatever constitutes federal funds they're undertaking these obligations. The Supreme Court described it as having notice, the recipient has to have notice that they're undertaking these obligations.

The way that the Supreme Court said that that is done would be if it is unambiguous in the statute that for our purposes tax exemptions constitute a receipt of federal funds.

One of the other things that I think is important for the Court to keep in mind is the Cummings court also said, it basically has to be plainly obvious from the statute that receipt of federal funds -- I'm sorry -- tax exemption constitutes receipt of federal funds.

One of the things it said, they're not requiring a dive through treatises, 50 state surveys, or speculative drawing of analogies. Basically what they're saying it has to be clear from the statue.

And respectfully, I think that's why the Court's original opinion was wrong in that it's hard to say that it's unambiguous on the face of statute, and the law that tax exemptions constitutes receipt of federal funds. And the first place to look are the regulations.

And the regulations, whether they're from the Department of Education or Department of the Treasury, are all basically

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the same. And they have what has been described as a comprehensive list or a laundry list of things that constitute the receipt of federal funds. They all have two things in common: Number one, they all constitute affirmative receipt of benefits, affirmative receipt of money or property or services --

THE COURT: What was the date of the Supreme Court opinion in Cummings, by the way? I'm sorry.

MR. VIOLA: I want to say, Your Honor, it was April 28, 2022. I'm not positive. I know 2022, April of 2022. I want to say it's April 28, but I'm not positive of that. It is cited, I believe, in our -- at least in our reply.

THE COURT: I guess my point is it was definitely not cited in the paper you filed on August the 4th.

MR. VIOLA: Honestly, I don't believe it was, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm pretty sure it was not.
MR. VIOLA: That may be --
THE COURT: So if I missed something, if it was April 28th, you missed it on August 24th as well because you didn't cite that opinion in here.

MR. VIOLA: I believe you're correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. All right.
MR. VIOLA: But Cummings is controlling law, and I think it's instructive in this case.

THE COURT: What page is it cited in your reply? I'm sorry.

MR. VIOLA: Court's indulgence, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I have it right here, I see it. I see it in the reply brief filed last week.

MR. VIOLA: That's correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Actually the reply brief filed last Friday.

MR. VIOLA: Correct. It starts on Page 5 and the discretion of Cummings continues through at least page--

THE COURT: So I'm clear, that case involves the Rehabilitation Act and it had to do with emotional distress damages. It's not a Title XI case, correct?

MR. VIOLA: No, it's not.
THE COURT: I'm just trying to make sure I'm clear on that because you seem pretty emphatic Cummings is controlling.

MR. VIOLA: Understood.
THE COURT: I'm looking at it. You filed it last Friday, this is Wednesday. And I don't see that it necessarily justifies your position that Cummings is clearly controlling. I understand your argument. But Cummings didn't say a word about Title XI.

MR. VIOLA: Agreed.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. VIOLA: I'm not suggesting that it did --
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THE COURT: I got the impression that it did, so I'm feeling a little bit better than I did a few minutes ago. I was, like, how did I miss that?

MR. VIOLA: So let me talk to Your Honor why I think it is controlling.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. VIOLA: It's talks about spending clause legislation and Rehabilitation Act as well as Title XI, and there's no doubt that obviously Title XI is spending clause legislation.

So I think the analysis that the Supreme Court used in Cummings is applicable to other spending clause legislation cases like Title XI. And in essence, what they're saying is the recipient has to know and affirmatively in essence accept that -- in exchange for their receipt of federal funds, they are undertaking these duties.

And, like I said, I think that's the problem with the Court's opinion and why the Court's opinion is wrong because it doesn't recognize that spending clause legislation cases like Title XI, like this case, require that contract analogy that is discussed in Cummings.

And that's why I think Cummings is instructive in this. And Cummings doesn't state anything new. There's nothing new in Cummings of what I'm talking about. It starts with, I think it's Pennhurst, a case, like, maybe 1982 that starts this

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And that's why I'm saying I think the construct that spending clause legislation is different is controlling in this case and is the reason that, respectfully, I think the Court's original opinion was wrong. Because if you accept that then the -- for something to be --

THE COURT: Essentially, your argument is that spending clause legislation is akin to a contract?

MR. VIOLA: That's what it says in Cummings.
THE COURT: Okay. Right. And you're correct. I mean, I read the case that you cited earlier in terms of the paralyzed veterans case I think in 1986 and some others. I understand what your argument is.

MR. VIOLA: Right, right. I think that's controlling in this case because it's hard to say that the Title XI statute unambiguously says that tax exempt status is the receipt of federal funds. I think the opposite is true. If you look at the regulations, the regulations specifically do not include tax exemptions when they list what has been described as comprehensive or laundry list of things that constitute receipt of federal funds.

So any entity, like Concordia Prep, would not be on notice using the language of Cummings that they would be bound by Title XI. And I think that that's also borne out in the way that people or entities have treated tax exempt status.

[^3]And it's clear, at least from my review of the record, that 501(c)(3) status are under the impression that that constitutes receipt of federal funds for the application of Title XI. Even Plaintiff's expert in this case wrote an article after Your Honor issued an opinion, which said, this ruling -- I think the word used was sent "shockwaves" through the independent school community. And inherent in that is a recognition that previously no such schools believed that the tax exempt status constituted receipt of federal funds subjecting schools, like Concordia Prep, to Title XI.

Also, we cited in our papers in the frequently asked questions of the Paycheck Protection Program there was -- one of the questions that they -- the Small Business Administration anticipated getting was, well, I'm a tax exempt entity, if I accept PPP loans, does this now subject me to Title XI and spending clause legislation?

And again, inherent in that is the assumption that those entities that were tax exempt 501(c)(3) status entities were not subject to Title XI. We also cited the Title VI manual for the Department of Justice that said that it's not.

THE COURT: It's interesting by the way that you mentioned the Payment Protection Program in the face of the COVID because of one of the Plaintiffs here, H.C., the minor Plaintiff through her mother, Andrea Conrad, attended the school from the fall of 2019 to the spring of 2020. And

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apparently the record reflects that from March to April of 2020 that Payment Protection Plan funds were received from the Small Business Administration.

Is that not correct?
MR. VIOLA: I think your dates are inaccurate, Your Honor. You said March to April, I think you meant April --

THE COURT: I meant March/April of 2020.
MR. VIOLA: I'm sorry, received in March, I think it was April, but I'm not positive, yes. Generally you're correct.

THE COURT: So that is totally apart from your argument as to the matter of tax exempt status under 501(c) (3). But one of the five Plaintiffs here apparently attended a school during the period of time when there were funds directly received, correct?

MR. VIOLA: We11, to parse out the distinction, we've not moved for reconsideration on that particular issue. We've just moved for reconsideration on whether tax exempt status constitutes the receipt of federal funds. This is I think beyond the scope of the Motion for Reconsideration, but the allegations, our position is, what happened to H.C. all occurred in the fall of 2019.

THE COURT: You mean in terms of the alleged events?
MR. VIOLA: Exactly. Because the other thing, too, is that there was nothing -- no facts giving rise to any of the

[^4] claims, Title XI or otherwise, after March of 2020. Kind of makes sense because they were all at Concordia Prep. Like, other schools were remote at that time.

THE COURT: Does your Motion for Certification for Preliminary Injunctive Relief for the Interlocutory Appeal, does that also relate -- does that not include H.C. or not?

MR. VIOLA: It does include H.C., but it includes H.C. for the proposition as to whether tax exempt status constitutes federal financial assistance.

Because what we intend to do, there's no secret to anybody in this room, is to say that it's factually different. Even if the PPP loan program -- and I'm not conceding that that PPP loans do constitute receipt of federal funds. But even if they do, I think it's irrelevant in H.C.'s case because of the factual basis of it. But we don't have to -- we purposely didn't move on that to just not muddy up the analysis and make it a very clean issue of law that does tax exempt status constitute the receipt of federal funds. And that goes a little bit to the second issue of the potential interlocutory appeal. So it is a pure question of law and includes no question of fact.

So that's just -- just cleaning that up. Trying to clarify for you, if that makes sense, Your Honor.

So based on that, it's hard, under the state of the law, to reach a conclusion that unambiguously indicates that tax

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exempt status is federal financial assistance.
In fact, the regulations would draw any reasonable entity to the opposite conclusion. And I think it's borne out by the fact that almost all entities that are established in the record, that are 501(c)(3) entities, reach the conclusion that they were not subject to spending clause legislation like Title XI.

So that reaches the inescapable conclusion that those entities weren't on notice of it. And there was no basis for them to be on notice of it because there's nothing in the law that would cause them to believe that.

And like I said before, the Cummings case says you don't have to do this exhaustive review of the law to figure that out. It has to be -- it has to be plain and obvious from the statute and the law that tax exempt status is federal financial assistance and that's simply not the case here.

And when you look at it through that construct, and you go back and you look at the cases that go either side, if you look at the Johnny's Icehouse case, they talk about spend spending clause legislation. And part of the --

THE COURT: That's the 2001 case in the Northern District of Illinois, correct?

MR. VIOLA: Right. And if you look at that opinion, Your Honor, the Court expressly says, in essence, the regulations that define what is federal financial assistance

[^5]don't include tax exemptions, and they all include affirmative benefits.

And then that also reached the step of saying it also is consistent with the foundation of spending clause legislation, what I'm talking about here. That it's the contract that Your Honor talked about. In essence, there's got to be some agreement that they're accepting -- the entity is accepting the money, the federal funds, in exchange for the agreement to be obligated to spending clause legislation, whether it's the Rehabilitation Act, whether it's Title VI, whether it's Title XI. Respectfully, I don't think it makes a difference. That's why Johnny's Icehouse is the correctly decided case. And it's also the reason why McGlotten is incorrectly decided.

I think McGlotten is a Title VI case. They kind of all run together at some point.

But McGlotten, basically they recognize --
THE COURT: You're referring to the case in District of Columbia 1972?

MR. VIOLA: Correct, Your Honor. They recognize that there's nothing in the statute to suggest a tax exempt status constitutes the receipt of federal funds. There's nothing in the legislative history. There's nothing in the regulations.

So under what I would think the Cummings court would analyze the issue, they would say, well, that makes it clear that it's not unambiguous that tax exempt status constitutes --

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THE COURT: What was the basis, Mr. Viola, for example the Eleventh Circuit clearly doesn't go your way in the M.H.D. v. Westminster School cases.

MR. VIOLA: I respectfully disagree with Your Honor. That case -- they don't reach the issue. What they say is the argument is not frivolous.

THE COURT: The argument is not what?
MR. VIOLA: Is not frivolous. And it's in a footnote. And they say the argument is not frivolous. That's hardly a ringing endorsement. They did that in talking about the subject matter jurisdiction. But they didn't analyze the issue. They didn't get in-depth. They essentially said that if you make an argument like that it doesn't give rise to Rule 11 sanctions.

I think that a fair reading of that case is not -- I respectfully think it does not stand for the proposition that tax exempt status constitutes a receipt of federal funds.

THE COURT: Are there any cases you think that agree with me?

MR. VIOLA: I would think that the McGlotten case is consistent with your opinion. It's a Title VI case, but I think it's incorrectly decided.

THE COURT: We11, I mean, I do note that there's authority. Just so the record is clear, you make it sound as if my case is unheard of, and you haven't acknowledged any case

[^6]that agrees with me. I guess I have to ask you if I missed something.

If it's your position that my opinion is a total outlier, then just explain to me how the Central District of California last month, as well as the Eastern District of North Carolina in June, essentially came to the same conclusions? But if you think that they're totally different than my case, please indicate to me why.

MR. VIOLA: In terms of the California case, Your Honor, that case involved the PPP loan and the court reached the conclusion that PPP loan did constitute receipt of federal financial assistance.

So it wasn't a pure analysis of whether tax exempt status is -- constitutes receipt of federal financial assistance. And the other, I forget the name of the case you're talking about in California.

There's no analysis beyond, it just relies on McGlotten. So it just parrots McGlotten. And I think that because it doesn't have any recognition of the contractual analogy, the contractual basis of spending --

THE COURT: We11, McGlotten, Mr. Viola, I notice there are two words you haven't mentioned here, and that's public policy.

MR. VIOLA: Right.
THE COURT: And McGlotten has spoke to public policy

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in terms of rejecting an argument to narrow an analysis in terms of a spending clause in a manner that is inconsistent with its purpose, which the purpose being to eliminate discrimination in programs or activities.

What is the public policy of Title XI, Mr. Viola?
MR. VIOLA: We11, the public policy is to eliminate disparate treatment between the sexes.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. VIOLA: But that's part of the reason McGlotten is incorrectly decided. It ignores the fact that this is spending clause legislation. McGlotten is not heavily cited in a lot of cases. And a lot of cases decided after it, including Johnny's Icehouse, go the other way.

And Johnny's Icehouse is a better-decided decision. And frankly, Johnny's Icehouse is consistent with Cummings $v$. Premier Rehab, and McGlotten isn't. Because McGlotten doesn't recognize the contractual relationship between a recipient of funds and the Government. Again, McG7otten is decided one way but it's incorrectly decided.

THE COURT: I understand.
MR. VIOLA: Because that's why Johnny's Icehouse is a better-decided case. And there are other cases, Stewart, Bachman, those all recognize spending clause legislation. And those are decided consistent with how, I think, this Supreme Court would analyze the issue. And I think they would analyze

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it consistent with the cases that are the majority of the cases. The majority holds that tax exempt status is not the receipt of federal financial assistance.

THE COURT: Again, just so we're clear, in terms of the spending clause legislation argument.

MR. VIOLA: Well, I think both in terms --
THE COURT: No, I'm trying to make sure, you're pretty emphatic about your argument, Mr. Viola, and I'm trying to make sure the record is clear. You're referring to a lot of cases with respect to the spending clause legislation, including Cummings which you just cited five days ago. But there's not -- there are not so many overwhelming cases on this Title XI question.

MR. VIOLA: I don't mean to suggest that there are.
THE COURT: I'm trying to make sure we're clear on that, okay. You're citing these various cases and it keeps coming back to spending clause legislation.

The record will reflect that the many cases you're citing have to do with the spending clause legislation. And I understand what your document is with respect to specific funding. I do not believe the record reflects, nor has your briefing reflected, that this is so abundantly clear when it comes to Title XI legislation.

MR. VIOLA: Well, Johnny's Icehouse is Title XI.
THE COURT: Clearly it does. And Johnny's Icehouse
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was decided in 2001. I believe the case that you take issue with, the McGlotten case, was decided in 1972. I'm not saying -- it's abundantly clear to me that there's a variance of arguments on this. But this is not -- this, you know, to imply that spending clause legislation, all these cases are so abundantly clear that you just automatically factor them into Title XI, and that's why we're having the hearing because I'm trying to have you explain to me why it's so abundantly clear that I'm wrong?

MR. VIOLA: Well, to me, that's the common theme is --
THE COURT: I understand. I want you to address public policy then. I want you to address public policy. Because public policy has been interwoven in Regan v. Taxation with Representation by the Supreme Court in 1983. The Bob Jones University case in 1983 addressed the public policy matters as to discrimination. It did not speak to the mandates of Title XI, but it did speak as to a matter of public policy.

MR. VIOLA: But those weren't -- I don't mean to interrupt you and be disrespectful.

THE COURT: Then don't. Then don't.
MR. VIOLA: Sorry.
THE COURT: But in terms of public policy, I think you need to address the matter of public policy because the position that you're taking here is that the matter of the phrase "receiving federal funds" that was addressed by the

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Fourth Circuit in Doe v. Fairfax County school Board last year, that the spending clause legislation cases make it abundantly clear that there has to be this specificity.

And Title XI is dealing with specifically, of the four criteria as noted by the Fourth Circuit, is specifically dealing with suffering sexual harassment that's so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprived them of equal access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by their school.

You would acknowledge I'm sure, Mr. Viola, or perhaps you would not, that the allegations in this case certainly allege fairly severe sexual harassment. That's what's in these cases, is it not?

MR. VIOLA: I agree that that's what's alleged.
THE COURT: Al1 right. So the point is that your view is that any public policy considerations don't in any way support a broader analysis, that receiving federal funds is interpreted strictly within the spending clause legislation cases that you've cited?

MR. VIOLA: The cases that you cited, Your Honor, in terms of the public policy, Bob Jones and Regan, they're not spending clause legislation cases. Bob Jones is an IRS regulation which basically said, we don't think that entities that have a racially discriminatory admissions practice deserve 501(c)(3) status.

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So that's why I'm saying I don't think public policy analysis -- and respectfully I also think it's part of the reason that the Court was incorrect in its opinion in relying on the public policy analysis. Because the case that the Court relied upon is not a spending clause legislation case. It's something that's completely different, and so I think that that's not the proper analysis in this particular case.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand. I understand. Overwhelming, I understand your argument. And how is it different from your original argument? How is what we're arguing here different from your original submissions? It's pretty axiomatic that filing for Motions of Reconsideration is not just to regurgitate a prior argument.

So under factors under Ru7e $60(b)$ there is six predicate factors as to that: It's a mistake, inadvertence, surprise, inexcusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, the judgment is void, the judgment has been satisfied, or any other reason justifying relief.

I guess except for the Cummings case that you're now citing that was decided in April, exactly what is the change in the landscape here from my ruling made a month ago?

MR. VIOLA: We11, the Cummings case is not one that was available during the original briefing.

THE COURT: I thought you said the Cummings case was decided in April?

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MR. VIOLA: Well, I mean the original briefing, when we first briefed the original motions, I think it was in January.

THE COURT: A11 right. So your point on that is that that case is a change in the law essentially that would justify reconsideration?

MR. VIOLA: I don't think it changes the law.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. VIOLA: I think it clarifies the law. But also one of the basis for Motion of Reconsideration that we cited in the papers was that the Court -- the phrase that's used is "dead wrong." We would take the position that the Court was dead wrong. Respectfully, of course.

THE COURT: Mr. Viola, I've said on more than one occasion, the best preparation for this job up here is I was the quarterback of a losing high school football team.

We're laughing here.
So I have a pretty thick hide. So I'm trying to understand what your argument is. I know you strongly disagree with it. I know you have great faith in the spending clause legislation. I know it doesn't apply automatically to Title XI, although you argue that it does.

But I'm trying to get a handle on what is the great change here that I would justify my just changing my opinion. Obviously you disagreed with it. You don't just file Motions

[^7]for Reconsideration because you don't like opinions. You file it because there's a basis for it.

MR. VIOLA: Right. We take the position, Your Honor, that the original opinion was dead wrong.

THE COURT: I understand. That doesn't give rise to reconsideration. There's got to be some other basis.

MR. VIOLA: Well, my understanding of the law is that if it is dead wrong that it does give rise to Motion for Reconsideration.

THE COURT: In fairness to you, I don't see Rule 60 (b) or Rule 54(b) says it's dead wrong. I gather the argument is is that it's a mistake, I guess, or inadvertence. Right?

MR. VIOLA: Correct, Your Honor. And also I'd like to point out, the Cummings case clarifies the issue and it speaks to what the current -- basically the -- almost the identical construct of the current Supreme Court views spending clause legislation cases.

THE COURT: To extent do the spending clause -- and I'm really asking you because I'm not sure. To what extent do the spending clause limitation cases deal with matters of important public policy?

MR. VIOLA: Again --
THE COURT: In the area of discrimination or whatever. Just tell me which ones.

MR. VIOLA: A11 the spending clause legislation is
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important. But again, I get back to I don't think that the public policy is the analysis in this particular case as to whether tax exempt status constitutes federal financial assistance.

THE COURT: So I'm clear, with respect to the minor Plaintiff H.C., your argument, in addition to the matter of the 501(c)(3) status not being federal funding, is also that with respect to the specific allegations that were raised, and the matter of the complaint itself -- one second here -- that as to that, H.C. was -- apparently the Payment Protection Plan funding under COVID was in March to April of 2020 -- or she was -- that's when the funding was received apparently. And your argument is that while H.C. was a student there, it was from the fall of 2019 to the spring of 2020, and the alleged specific actions that are specified all occurred in the fall of 2019 and didn't occur in 2020. So that's a factual argument, is it not?

MR. VIOLA: Again, as I mentioned before, Your Honor, we didn't -- we didn't raise that issue. The only issue that we took reconsideration on is whether tax exempt status constitutes federal financial assistance.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. VIOLA: We purposely did not take issue with anything with regard to Paycheck Protection Program.

THE COURT: We11 then, so with respect to that, there
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would not be, in your view, any reconsideration nor any interlocutory appeal then as to H.C.; Is that correct?

MR. VIOLA: I think that it would be with regard to whether the tax exempt status constitutes receipt of federal financial assistance. And then we can, you know, depending on how that is ruled upon, we can make a determination later as to whether there's a factual basis as to whether there's an additional reason that potentially H.C. --

THE COURT: You mean a factual dispute about when the acts occurred as to H.C.?

MR. VIOLA: I'm not sure.
THE COURT: You mean a factual dispute as to when the actions took place?

MR. VIOLA: Yes, yes.
THE COURT: How is that not in the province of the jury? How is that a matter of law?

MR. VIOLA: I'm not suggesting it is a matter of the 1aw.

THE COURT: Then as to the minor Plaintiff H.C., regardless of my ruling with respect to 501(c) (3) status constituting receipt of federal funds, with respect to the minor Plaintiff H.C. attending the school from the fall of 2019 to spring of 2020, in light of the receipt of Payment Plan Protection funds from the school in the spring of 2020, it would be a factual question, would it not, as to whether or not

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Count 1 could proceed before the jury?
MR. VIOLA: Yes, unless there's no factual basis that anything took place in the spring, which I think is what the record reflects. I'm not suggesting the record is before you now, but I think that's ultimately what's going to be borne out.

THE COURT: This could be important, you know, in terms of the matter of supplemental jurisdiction for this Court. And it also is a factor in terms of whether or not there should be an interlocutory appeal.

So $I$ don't think it's a minor matter, Mr. Viola. If the allegations are what they are, and she was a student, if your theory is, well, the actual alleged violations had to occur in the spring of March 2020, around the time that the Payment Plan Protection money was received or there's not a receipt of federal funds. The nature of these allegations have to do with negligent supervision and retention in Count 2. Count 4, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Count 3, negligence, and the fact patterns that outlie all that.

And as to Count 1, a violation of Title XI in terms of it may be a factual question that would have to be submitted in terms of whether or not there was inactivity or malfeasance on the part of the school in the aftermath of complaints by the minor Plaintiff H.C.

So I'm giving you an opportunity to address that because
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that may be important in terms of whether or not this Court -even if the Fourth Circuit were to disagree with me and reverse me on Title XI, whether or not there would be supplemental jurisdiction with respect to -- certainly as to the -- as to those causes of action as to H.C.

I'm asking how would that be handled?
MR. VIOLA: We11, I don't think -- unless I'm missing something, that is not relevant to -- it's only relevant to the determination of Title XI in --

THE COURT: Well, what I'm trying to ask you, I'm obviously not asking the question properly because I'm not getting an answer -- I apologize.

MR. VIOLA: I'm not trying to --
THE COURT: What I'm saying to you is you're also here seeking the matter of -- the granting of an interlocutory appeal on this.

MR. VIOLA: Right.
THE COURT: That is purely a matter of law. And I guess my question to you is how is it purely a matter of law as to 501(c)(3) status as to the minor Plaintiff H.C., when I've already noted in my opinion that -- with respect to my opinion of July 21st I specifically noted that as to the Plaintiff H.C. I denied your motion for partial summary judgment, apart from the matter of the 501(c)(3) analysis, because there's no dispute as to her enrollment period. And that the school

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applied for and received a PPP loan through the Small Business Administration and that loan was forgiven, ultimately, as of November 20 -- I'm sorry, November 10 of 2020.

So my point to you is, how does the -- how does the claim of the minor Plaintiff H.C. not survive regardless of -- in terms of going to a jury regardless of the 501(c)(3) analysis?

MR. VIOLA: We11, I think I said before, what I was trying to say, maybe I didn't say it. It would in terms of the factual issue as to whether that overlapped for the --

THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. VIOLA: -- for Title XI.
THE COURT: So the Title XI case would stay alive as to her and would have to go to the jury.

MR. VIOLA: For the time being, I guess --
THE COURT: You say "for the time being," for what time being?

MR. VIOLA: We've got motion for summary judgment coming up.

THE COURT: I understand.
MR. VIOLA: I guess where I'm getting hung up is I think that the record is ultimately going to be borne out that there's nothing in the record to suggest that during the time that CPS had received the PPP loan, that there's any allegations giving rise to any of H.C.'s complaint, whether it's Title XI or otherwise.

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#### Abstract

THE COURT: I'm not going to go rule ahead of time on this, but how does it not, in terms of inactions or malfeasance, to take no steps, to not deal with a situation that's been presented? How does that not -- I'm having a hard time understanding, Mr. Viola, how you frame this strictly in the context of when the alleged sexual acts in the locker room, for example, took place. And unless the school was receiving federal funds on that day, that if the school received funds five or four months later that that doesn't constitute receiving federal funds -- when the nature of this complaint is not just a specific day, but the inaction of a school during a time period?


MR. VIOLA: Respectfully, Your Honor, I think where we're getting hung up is going to be ultimately on an examination of the factual record. H.C. was not -- there was nothing in the locker room with H.C., I think you're talking about the N.H. case. But that was an incident that happened off campus in the fall of 2019. And I think that the record is going to reflect that there wasn't a lack of inaction. That the school dealt with it and there was no issues that H.C. had beyond the fall of 2019. That's why we're getting hung up on this back and forth.

I'm not trying to be difficult. What I'm saying is I think we have a pure question of law on just the issue of whether tax exempt status constitutes federal financial

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assistance. And I agree with you that the issue with H.C., that has to be dealt with later and make a determination as to whether this is a factual dispute or not.

I don't think that's ultimately going to be borne out. You may disagree with me.

THE COURT: I understand. I'm asking the question for a reason. There's an issue that floats here in terms of supplemental jurisdiction.

MR. VIOLA: I understand.
THE COURT: Essentially, what you're seeking is to have these cases be dismissed and then issues with having -then these Plaintiffs have to refile in state court. This is not a removal and remand. They were not filed in state court to begin with. They were filed here.

The issue here is a matter of dismissing these cases or granting summary judgment on Title XI and then the issue of whether or not this Court would have any basis for supplemental jurisdiction, essentially.

MR. VIOLA: I understand.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Viola. I apologize if I was a little bit aggressive on my questions. But I have these hearings -- I really was going to try to deal with this in a phone call on the record. The record will reflect that counsel were pretty serious they wanted a hearing, so that's why we've got a hearing.

Ronda J. Thomas, RMR, CRR - Federal Official Reporter MR. VIOLA: I would have preferred to do it in person anyway. I'm thick-skinned, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's fine. I'm glad to have you all here. I ask questions. That's why we're here. Thank you very much. And I'11 give you time to respond in a minute.

MR. VIOLA: A11 right.
THE COURT: With that, Ms. Graziano, Mr. Ketterer, whoever would like to address this you can stand at the table or the podium or whatever you would like.

MS. GRAZIANO: I'11 stand at the table.
THE COURT: That's fine. Just pull the microphone a little closer to you. There you go. That's fine. Thank you.

MS. GRAZIANO: Sure, Your Honor. Thank you for allowing me to be heard. I'11 attempt to be brief because I think Your Honor actually addressed a great deal of my argument and your comments to my brother counsel. But really, why we're here on this issue for a Motion for Reconsideration isn't to rehash the merits. Although I'm happy to do that to the extent that it pleases Your Honor.

But we're to determine, as you rightly pointed out under Rule 60 , is this clear error or is there some new issue or new fact or new law to support overturning your previous order? And that's just not in play here.

And I think Your Honor very aptly noted that Cummings was decided on April 22nd, 2022. It was completely absent from my

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brother's moving papers in moving to reconsidering. And so this idea that we're going to come time and time again before Your Honor out of dissatisfaction with the outcome of a Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, flies in the face of what the standard is for a motion to reconsider.

I would further say to Your Honor, you know, if we're talking about instead of bootstrapping new arguments, which I would claim that the Defendant is doing, if we want to look at cases that have been decided or orders that have been issued after Your Honor's order was entered in July, you hit the nail on the head. The E.H. v. Valley Christian Academy order which came down in the Central District of California July 25th, just four days after your order, I think, is really illustrative.

And I'11 point out that my brother says that this particular Order did not deal with or consider tax exempt status, which is false. That case did not just concern a PPP loan, though it did. The Court in its holding -- and I have a copy of this Order should Your Honor wish to see it.

THE COURT: I've read it. They didn't cite my case slightly earlier, I note that, but they did rule the same way I did.

MS. GRAZIANO: It ruled the exact same way, Your Honor. In fact, the Court ended its treatment of the issue by saying "Accordingly, the Court holds that Valley Christian's tax exempt status confers a federal financial benefit that

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obligates compliance with Title XI."
So I'm glad that Your Honor is familiar with it. So I just wanted to point out the clarification that this Order was issued, not just with respect to the PPP loan but also to that school status.

Again, Your Honor, you're quite right that the facts of that case are almost identical in terms of allegations, and almost identical in that order to the arguments that were raised by the Defendant in this courtroom today, and also the cases that were relied upon.

I'm sure Your Honor recalls reading in the E.H. Order that the Johnny's Icehouse case was cited left, right, up and down, just as it has been by my brother. And again, we're hearing the same cases over and over, the same arguments over and over and that's a merit-based argument.

And I think Your Honor was quite right earlier in saying dissatisfaction or upset or whatever you want to describe it as with a ruling doesn't give rise to the level of error that warrants a Motion for Reconsideration.

And I also just want to point out, since my brother did spend such a great deal of time speaking about the Cummings case, that case is about damages on1y, about how spending clause legislation is a contract, as my brother rightly noted.

But the Court was talking about what damages are available when there's a contract with the Government part and parcel to

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that spending clause. And said that because it's contractual in nature, the only damages that are available then are contractual damages, so not emotional distress damages.

So it's a little bit of a stretch to say then that the Cummings case can be applied to this issue en masse, when it's really very, very narrow. And I don't think it all changes the thought process or the analysis that this Court underwent in reaching its order.

But I will also say this, Your Honor, and I think that you really hit this in the Order that you issued. We're not just talking about tax exception, right? We're talking about 501(c)(3) status, which in and of itself is a contract with the Government.

You've got these nonprofit organizations coming forward and saying "Look, in exchange for the benefit that we confer, the good that we give to society, in exchange we want this panoply," or we're going to take advantage of this panoply of benefits, including tax exemption.

But it's far beyond that. It is clearly and truly a contract. I think we see that even when we look at some of the other Title VI cases that Your Honor cited. They might not be exactly factually on point talking about Title XI, although we know from Supreme Court precedent that Title XI is of course modeled after Title VI.

But we have the Regan case going back to the ' 80 s telling

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us that a grant is the same thing as -- and a subsidy is the same thing as a cash gift from the Government, right. So if we agree that the 501(c)(3) status is a contract with the Government, which is the equivalent of a grant, and we look at -- my brother made much discussion of the C.F.R.s and the regulations, 34 C.F.R. 106.2, the definitions for Title XI of what constitutes federal financial assistance, number one, is a grant or a loan. So all we have to do, again, is look to Regan which tells us that a grant is the same thing as a gift of cash from the Government.

So any way we slice it, Your Honor, a 501(c)(3) entity is keeping money that would otherwise belong to the government and in that fashion is a direct recipient of federal financial assistance.

So I really don't think it's so convoluted. I really don't think these bootstrapped arguments, some of which should have been and for whatever reason weren't part of my brother's original moving papers, they're extraneous. They're not persuasive. They're not authoritative.

When we look at the Supreme Court precedent on the issue of when an entity is a recipient of federal financial aid and then what constitutes federal financial aid, as I said borne out by the Regan case, also borne out by Grove City and NCAA, coupled with as you pointed out the authority from the Eleventh Circuit. Whether or not, you know, a footnote wasn't enough

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for my brother counsel, it's certainly enough for the Court in its Order.

Then we look at some lower court decisions like the Fulani case, as well as the McG7otten case, which I disagree with my brother, I think that was soundly decided. We clearly see that assistance provided through the tax system is within the scope of Title VI. As we know from the Supreme Court, Title XI is a mirror of Title VI. It's unambiguous.

So this idea that schools like Concordia Prep, schools like the Defendant who do have that 501(c)(3) status, were just utterly in the dark, and it was so unambiguous, and they weren't on notice that they were going to be held to the mandates and requirements of Title XI is just unavailing. Because it's clear when you look at the precedent that they were given this grant. They were given this money, basically, from the Government and as such are on the hook for -- for Title XI.

And I would just point out again, I know I mentioned to Your Honor that we're talking about 501(c)(3) status as opposed to just tax exemption. This is not this broad-based policy. I didn't read Your Honor's opinion, and I certainly tried to make this point in our opposition to my brother's motion. We're not -- I don't think that the Court's Order does this and we're not certainly asking for some broad-based proclamation that every school that gets a tax exemption is subject to Title XI.

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We're here today talking about one Defendant, their conduct, their status as a 501(c)(3) entity, and how they used that conduct and benefited financially from that status in a manner that places them under the auspices of Title XI.

So this idea, and my brother mentioned it, and I know it's in his papers and we've got, you know, fine counsel here today from various entities nationwide, this idea that this issue affects such a great many schools and it's going to be so onerous for schools to come into compliance with Title XI is, frankly, unavailing. And it's not a reason for this Court to reconsider a sound --

THE COURT: Let me make sure if I understand your argument in that regard, is that the specific criteria of Title XI, that's at issue here, is the matter of -- as was noted by the Fourth Circuit in the Doe v. Fairfax County case -- is the matter of the sexual harassment that being so severe, pervasive and objectively offensive. And so an official who has the authority to address the alleged harassment, and the school acting with deliberate indifference, all of those factors have been listed by the Fourth Circuit last year. And I'm trying to understand your point about the limit of noting that 501(c)(3) status may constitute receiving federal funds is in the context of this type of sexual harassment section.

Is that what your argument is?
In fairness to the Defendants, I'm trying to inquire in
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terms of the breadth of it. I understand the reaction of -and I understand the amicus briefs that have been filed in terms of the breadth of it in that the 501(c)(3) status is not just merely important to private schools, some would say it's the very core of the existence of private schools. And there's more than a few private schools who would be severely jeopardized, their very existence would be jeopardized if they didn't have 501(c)(3) status.

I wouldn't want to be in charge of fundraising for a private school if 501(c)(3) status was taken away. And indeed, it's pretty clear that most people realize that all the fundraising, the financial status of schools is very dependent upon the donations of alumni and very dependent upon 501(c)(3) status. I certainly understand the amicus briefs that were filed by local and national independent school organizations.

MS. GRAZIANO: As do I, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I will note for the record I was fully aware of that when I issued the opinion.

MS. GRAZIANO: Of course, Your Honor. And I will say this, I'm going to ask the Court in the moment if I can include my brother counsel.

THE COURT: Sure.
MS. GRAZIANO: Very appreciative of that. If I can say before I turn to him, Your Honor, that's certainly not lost on me. I know Your Honor at one time was a board member of a

[^8]private school in Maryland. I'm a board member of a private college. So I completely understand the implications for institutions.

My point is merely there's a difference between 501(c)(3) status, which is something that's solicited, that's a position that's applied for and granted in exchange for -- there's a consideration there, like a contract, versus a mere tax exemption.

THE COURT: That's fine. I'11 be glad to hear from Mr. Ketterer, that's fine. And anyone else who wants to respond. Mr. Viola will have a chance to respond or Mr. Goodman. And for that matter, any of the amicus counsel. I'm more than welcome to have any of them respond. I understand what the implications of this are.

MR. KETTERER: Your Honor, just briefly. I don't want to have two people arguing.

THE COURT: That's all right. I can waive that loca1 rule if I want. This is important. I'm more than willing to have an input of anybody that wants to speak.

MR. KETTERER: Very good, Your Honor. I appreciate that. What I would say directly to you is this, 501(c)(3) status is not what's under the microscope or under implication. This idea there's a public policy concern, which Your Honor has consistently in both its original Order and here today has voiced concerns about the concerns that Title XI sort of

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implicates and is trying to protect, that's really what the case is about. It's about protection of young women.

THE COURT: At private schools.
MR. KETTERER: In private schools. The question is is that how is it that Concordia Prep School used its 501(c) (3) status? Right. So we can say, well, tax exemption is one of the benefits of 501(c)(3) but that is not the only benefit of 501(c)(3) status. There are other benefits, both financial and non-financial benefits that are implicit within that contract or that contractual relationship with the Government. So that's number one.

Number two, how did Concordia use it? If you go to the Concordia website today, what you see is a panoply of a whole section of fundraising efforts. And those fundraising efforts do this, they specifically target and utilize the contracted benefit they got from the government, 501(c)(3) status, in order to raise money, to use that money in a way that is specifically directed to the very things that Title XI specifies and enumerates are covered within that particular statute.

So the frame of this is always tax exemption, tax exemption, tax exemption. And, there are 501(c)(3) entities that use it, maybe as just a tax exempt status. They take the benefit. That's a question -- and I believe that there's more than adequate case law, the weight of the evidence more than

[^9]supports that being considered federal financial assistance.
But in this case, Your Honor, in Concordia Prep School's case, in the manner in which they use it, they use it in a way that is for further financial gain. They take that federal benefit and they explode it in another manner. And that is a benefit that directly benefits their pocketbook.

Money that would otherwise wind up in the Government's pocket for many individuals, many companies, many corporations, where does it land? It lands with CPS as an express grant of the relationship and the contractual nature. So even assuming defense counsel's argument, the contractual nature of that relationship specifically lines CPS's pockets. I don't know about any of the other associations. And I don't know about any other private schools. And I don't know exactly what they do or do not do. But what I do know is what Concordia Prep does in its public view and how it is they use that 501(c)(3) status.

Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you very much. Thank you all very much.

MS. GRAZIANO: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Viola, I'11 be glad to hear from you in response.

MR. VIOLA: Sure. The Court's ruling was pretty clear as to the tax exempt status constituted federal financial

Ronda J. Thomas, RMR, CRR - Federal Official Reporter assistance. I'm not sure how we're trying to parse this out now.

THE COURT: In the context of an educational institution.

MR. VIOLA: Right, but how it differs somehow if they use it for fundraising or not, as the Court aptly pointed out, I think you said you wouldn't want to be any fundraiser for any tax exempt institution -- or didn't want to be any sort of tax exempt institution that didn't use it for fundraising. I mean, they're trying to draw a distinction without a difference. Either the Court makes the ruling that tax exempt status constitutes federal financial assistance and we can do whatever, appeal or not.

I don't see how they're parsing out particular exceptions involving CPS. And I'm happy to ask amicus counsel if they disagree with that.

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. VIOLA: The only other thing I want to talk about --

THE COURT: In fairness to you, I think that's very apt. I certainly read the implications when I issued the opinion. That in the context of Title XI, in terms of an education institution, in context of Title XI and sexual harassment that in terms of those mandates that are very specific, that the 501(c)(3) status constitutes receiving

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federal funds and not necessarily abiding by your argument with respect to the spending clause legislation because, so the record is clear, that there's broad public policy with respect to Title XI. And we're not just talking about Government contracts and spending clause legislations and apportionments from acts of Congress, we're talking about significant, significant changes in 1972 that were important to literally all women in the United States and all young women in schools. There's no doubt about that. In terms of the revolution and the development of women sports in college. Suddenly young women are getting recruited to colleges for sports, not just young men. And in terms of the implications as to all these mandates of Title XI, including sexual harassment.

So that I think that you're right in terms of -- you can't really parse this down and make it limited. I understand the breadth of it.

The breadth of it is is that a young woman in Towson High School doesn't have greater protection from sexual harassment than does a young woman at Concordia Prep for the specific reason, well, we get our money straight from the state or the feds and we don't. That's the point of it. Let's make sure it's abundantly clear on the record.

As far as I'm concerned they're trying to parse this into spending clause legislation and shoehorning it in, in terms of the narrowness of these doctrines, with no disrespect,

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Mr. Viola, that's not what we're talking about here. There's no way you can limit Title XI in that fashion. That legislation was passed 50 years ago with earth-shaking results across society. Without question.

And I fully understand the import of my opinion in that regard. And I don't think you can parse that down. It's Title XI and young women and the protections and the benefits they receive. And what I want to ask you, I'm trying to understand why this is so onerous because you've avoided public policy. You cannot avoid public policy in this analysis, with all due respect. And there's very likelihood I'm going to let you all go down to Richmond. I want to make sure you understand so the record is clear, you just can't ignore public policy and say: Well, here we're going to shoehorn this in. This is spending clause limitation and here's this case on this law and this case on this law.

And that's why I emphasize that you have a very definite dearth of Title XI cases. There is not an overwhelming authority. There is many cases that go my way as go your way.

Johnny's Icehouse is a case you've cited a lot today in your opinion. You needed to because there aren't that many cases specifically on Title XI, despite your effort to try to shoehorn them in the spending clause limitation.

But I think in fairness to you, I need you to explain to me why is this so onerous? There's some suggestion in terms of

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implementing regulations that, for example, I saw somewhere in the papers in terms of having a designated official that has to deal with these kinds of issues, apparently which is the case under Title XI.

Explain to me how that is so onerous for Concordia Prep to have the same kind of person assigned to these matters as Towson High School?

And anybody -- and I would be glad to hear from those who filed amicus briefs. I really want to be educated on this and it's good for the record.

Mr. Shea, nice to see you here.
MR. SHEA: Your Honor, it's a pleasure to see you, as always.

THE COURT: I mean, serious7y, where is this so onerous to a private school? Where is this great burden that's placed upon a private school? And tell me where is this huge matter of just sort of pushing public policy aside and looking at the spending clause limitation figure?

MR. SHEA: Your Honor, that's precisely why we submitted our amicus brief is to show that the implications of both the onerousness and the other implications of this kind of compliance.

And to quibble, I would say this is, from our perspective, this is not about protecting women. This is about how women are protected in these schools. And the point is, Title XI is,

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frankly, designed for large school systems and universities. And to answer your precise question about how onerous it is, Title XI's implementing regulations require not one designated Title XI coordinator, but they require three specific people. They require a Title XI coordinator. They require someone to investigate the --

THE COURT: The allegation.
MR. SHEA: -- the allegation, and someone to adjudicate it. And the three of them have to be different people. Not only do they have to be three different people, they have to be trained on very complicated concepts of law. Privilege, they have to apply privilege rules. These are all in the regulations, Your Honor, we cited them --

THE COURT: Yes, I saw it.
MR. SHEA: They have to apply privilege, they have to not consider privileged material. They have to consider relevance. They have to only consider what is legally relevant. They have to analyze what is sexual harassment claim under the legal definition of sexual harassment and dismiss any claim that's not -- that doesn't meet the claim of sexual harassment.

And they have to -- I can go through this ad nauseam, but it amounts to what is essentially a quasi-legal, quasijudicial proceeding.

And our clients are institutions that in some cases have
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80 students. We have one member that has 10 faculty members. For them to designate three different of those 10 faculty members to fill these positions and comply and be trained on them and implement these very complicated and specific procedures is just not something they're equipped to do.

And it's not that they're not capable and able to protect women from sexual harassment complaints. They do so every day, very, very effectively. But they have procedures and policies in place that are tailored to both their size and their mission.

So you have schools that, frankly, every day make the difficult decision not to accept federal funds, actually accept money, knowing that it could mean the difference between them failing or not. There are maybe schools that didn't take Payment Protection Plan money knowing that they could fail and they could have to close. But they knew -- not that they didn't want to protect women, but they knew that these very specific prescriptive requirements are just not something that they're ever going to be able to accomplish.

We cite in our brief Johns Hopkins University, which obviously is a totally different animal, but they have an entire division of their university. Fifteen employees, seven of whom are full time investigators, I might be getting the numbers wrong, and 11 of whom are lawyers. They have a whole division. And all they do, the whole division, all they do is

[^10]implement the procedures that are required by Title XI that are very specific and change all the time from administration to administration that if they don't comply with they're in violation of Title XI.

To go back to where I started, this is not about whether or not to extend more rigorous and greater protection to women. This is about how that should be implemented and what's the most appropriate way, given the institution that you're talking about. And for a small school with 80 students and 10 faculty member --

THE COURT: Mr. Shea, you and I both know that's the rare example.

MR. SHEA: Well, Your Honor, just to give some numbers to that --

THE COURT: I'm sorry, Mr. Viola, do you want to say something?

MR. VIOLA: Concordia Prep, I believe their enrollment was 104 students over seven grades.

THE COURT: Seven grades, yes. Okay.
MR. SHEA: Your Honor, the National Association of Independent Schools, which is one of the seven independent schools we represent, 12 percent of their members have under 100 students. So it's not the rare case. It's a large number of --

THE COURT: Let me ask you this, I don't mean to
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interrupt, because we can spend a lot of time on this, but I'm really interested. I'm familiar with those three people that are required. I'm very familiar with it.

MR. SHEA: Understood, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And you have one person that investigates the allegation. You have one person who sets the policy and tries to make sure everyone is aware of it. You have another person who investigates the claim. And you have a third person who acts essentially as the judge and determines if it's up or down, in terms of whether they find there was or was not, if there was some violation of school policy.

It's very similar to school honor boards and private schools have school honor boards, public schools have school honor boards.

And I must tell you, just so the record is clear for purposes of the Fourth Circuit record, I don't find how onerous that is for three faculty members to perform that role. I really don't. And I think -- I must tell you, in all candor, while I understand the reaction of the private schools associations, I also suggest, if this goes down to Richmond as quickly as perhaps $I$ think I'11 let it go, we need to reflect quickly upon the matter of public policy, the matter of implementation of public policy, the importance of public policy, and the implication that public high school students have certain mechanisms that they can undertake and are certain

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sanctions. But the private schools, not so much. Just don't worry, they'11 do the right thing --

I'11 be there and finish in a minute, Ms. Graziano.
-- but they'11 do the right thing. But they don't fal1 within the ambit of it.

You and I both know -- I have the benefit of knowing a lot of the lawyers in this room, some of whom have also been the benefit of the private school system, you and I both know that the pandemic was nothing to private schools compared to what it would be if they didn't have 501(c)(3) status. Ms. Graziano has aptly noted the emphasis on that that.

I mean, I can't imagine, when I served on the board of a private school in this area if you suddenly had 501(c) (3) status jeopardized, first of all you can't get the foundation money. Do you agree with that, Mr. Shea?

MR. SHEA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: You don't get a dime of foundation money. Al1 these foundations, AS Abe11 Foundation, all these foundations, not a penny can go to a school that doesn't have a 501(c) (3) status.

Alumni are asked to give money and they're told: Well, you may or may not be able to deduct it.

501(c)(3) status is at the very core of private schools. It is not just a minor matter.

And to understand -- I just absolutely, so the record is
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abundantly clear in terms of Mr. Viola's very intense and very good argument, I do not see that Title XI can be shoehorned into the spending clause legislation like some of these cases because it's an enormously significant piece of legislation and had a major impact on American society.

And we all know that when that law was passed we had nowhere near the issue of lifting up the issue of sexual harassment. We all know that it's been shocking to all of us over the last 15 or 20 years in terms of these allegations coming forward now.

But that's part of what Title XI did in my view.
And the notion that it's so particularly onerous, and I have read your briefs, and I have no difficulty with you all participating in this litigation, and I think you should have, and I agree with it, but I'm not going to back off from how significant the opinion is.

I recognize how significant the opinion is. Ms. Graziano is not quite correct to say: Well, I'm going to narrow this here.

I'm not narrowing it at all.
As far as I'm concerned, 501(c)(3) status to any private school is receipt of federal funds in the context of Title XI legislation when it comes to Title XI claim based on student-on-student sexual harassment. That that falls within that, and they must abide by it.

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And the notion that it's particularly onerous as to these three people that appointed -- you've correctly summarized the three people. I don't find that to be very onerous. It is not a Johns Hopkins University system with house counse1. And you're right, many of these major universities have extensive offices. That's, you know, it is what it is.

But I just think that we're sort of treading through new ground here. And in fairness to AIMS, the Association of Independent Maryland Schools, as well as to the national organizations, I didn't just jump on this opinion. If you note, these motions for these five cases were pending for a while. And I did reflect upon them and the opinion might have been short, but I think it was to the point.

Anything else you want to add on this, Mr. Shea?
MR. SHEA: No, Your Honor. Only just to reiterate that under no way, shape or form are my clients or their members in any way against all the great things that Title XI has accomplished or all the things of the goals it is designed to achieve. Again, what we are taking issue with is that it's designed for all entities everywhere. And not just --

THE COURT: A11 private school entities anywhere is your point.

MR. SHEA: Well, all schools everywhere, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Right. A11 private schools everywhere because it's clearly applicable to public schools. They all

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get federal funding. Is there any dispute about that? Is there a public school in the United States that doesn't get some sort of federal funding?

MR. SHEA: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Al1 right. That's it in a nutshell. That might be the most important thing we've established today.

Literally, there's not one public high school in the country that does not receive federal funding to place them under the same mandates as we're now dealing with here in this case, correct?

MR. SHEA: Correct, Your Honor. Although they are different sizes and complexity.

THE COURT: Different size, whatever, it could be a very small -- not just a huge, urban public high school. It could be a very small public high school in a rural area of the United States. If it's a public high school, they're going to get federal funding of some sort, correct?

MR. SHEA: True, Your Honor. Although the state machinery, even if it's in a small, rural area they have systems that are larger than 100 -student private schools.

THE COURT: We11, in fairness to you, just to continue with that, the reality is -- again we're a little bit off on terms of any of us having expertise on this -- but I'm fairly certain that in rural areas of public high schools you may have certain administrators that cover more than one school.

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MR. SHEA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And I think that's probably the case so that you have in a rural area of the United States you have someone who is an investigator who may be an investigator for more than just one high school and probably also you agree with that.

MR. SHEA: Absolutely, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And the point is, there would be also another investigator, another person who would then preside and they may preside at more than one high school. So I'm not suggesting that there aren't ramifications for even smaller schools, and I hear you. But that's the way it is. That's my view of it.

MR. SHEA: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you very much, Mr. Shea. And thank you for the quality of your briefing. And thank you to your group that's here from Venable. Thank you very much.

And Mr. Genth, do you want to be heard on this?
MR. GENTH: Your Honor, very briefly.
THE COURT: Sure.
MR. GENTH: Geoffrey Genth for the Association of Maryland Independent Schools, Your Honor.

I represented AIMS only since Your Honor's July opinion. I have had the privilege and the pleasure to be outside general counsel for a number of independent Maryland schools starting

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25 years ago, Your Honor.
Title XI was passed 50 years ago. Congress did not intend Title XI to cover independent schools. The Executive Branch for the education department has never understood Title XI to cover independent schools.

Independent schools, with the exception of the PPP blip that began two and a half years ago, never understood since 1972 that they were subject to Title XI.

There's been a consensus, therefore, that Title XI doesn't apply to independent schools merely on account of tax exempt status. It could be that Congress didn't understand what its enactment meant in that the education department has been getting it wrong. That could be. And it could be that the independent schools have been getting it wrong by not understanding that they've been subject to Title XI since it was enacted in 1972.

I respectfully submit that there's another possibility, and that is that the congressional intent and the executive interpretation of that intent has at all times been correct in that independent schools are independent of a lot of government regulation, including Title XI. And there's a good reason for that, Your Honor, in terms of public policy.

It's okay for Congress to have these sort of contractual spending arrangements if they have highway funds for whatever, and say: Here's the quid pro quo, we'11 give you the highway

Ronda J. Thomas, RMR, CRR - Federal Official Reporter money, you've got to the bring the speed limit down to 55 .

It's a great public policy, I believe, in favor of lower speed limits.

But that doesn't mean there's a contract between every independent school and the federal government with regard to Title XI. It's never been understood to me that way.

THE COURT: Let me ask you something, how do you react to paralle1 definitions under Title VI and antidiscrimination public policy as contained under Title VI?

MR. GENTH: We11, Your Honor, my partner, Steve Klepper, drafted our brief, but I think that's the Bob Jones case, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. GENTH: There would have been no reason to do that analysis if Title XI by itself --

THE COURT: My question to you, correct me if I'm wrong, certainly Title VI and the antidiscrimination public policy contained in Title VI has been incorporated to apply to private institutions, has it not?

MR. GENTH: Not on account of their tax exempt status, Your Honor. I don't believe so, no. That's -- I think that's the Bob Jones case. And I think Mr. Klepper got it right in the briefing and saying the very premise of all these cases -and you're right, Your Honor, there are not a ton of cases out there. There are some things that are just so understood.

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It's hard to find cases that decide that a cat is not a canine because there's not a lot of people arguing about like.

What I'd like to report based on my experience, as outside general counsel for independent schools, is that this is changing the universe, if it changes this way. It's not for the better.

Mr. Shea, whose arguments I think are 100 percent on point, has got it right. This is hugely onerous. That school with 10 students -- excuse me, 10 faculty members -- they're a client of mine. Ten faculty members. Only 10. It's basically a one-room schoolhouse.

And it's not just about appointing three people. You've got to train them. And then, you know what, if you get the procedures wrong, you get sued for that. There are major universities throughout this country, Your Honor, they can't get it right.

And then every four years somebody else comes into the White House and you have a new Department of Education and they switch the Title XI regulations. And then you deal with that.

What we deal with now -- I was on the phone with a client very recently -- transgender. Huge battleground. And it goes back and forth like a ping-pong ball between the political parties. The independent schools are doing their jobs, they're protecting young women.

And what they don't need, this government overlay 50 years
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after the enactment of the statute to come into play. There are causes of action here that exist and could be brought if they're valid under applicable state law. But respectfully --

THE COURT: Ah, that's the key point there, Mr. Genth. That's the key point. Under state law. No federal jurisdiction.

MR. GENTH: That's correct. That's the way it's been for 50 years. And respectfully, if Congress didn't intend Title XI to apply to independent schools, and I respectfully submit it didn't, certainly didn't understand it. Respectfully to the Court, the whole world outside the legal area in these cases going back and forth, no one understands or has thought that Title XI applies to independent schools. And it could be that they've all just got it wrong.

But I submit there's the other possibility, which is that the Department of Education, which is in charge of all this -I mean, through all the Democratic administrations, and I guess Republican administrations too, they have wanted to do good things and reform the world in this area. It never occurred to any of them that tax exempt status meant recipient to Title XI.

And I'11 respectfully submit it wasn't because they weren't intelligent enough to realize that, it was because that's the law. This is spending legislation. And there is a very good public policy argument for not having quasi-judicial proceedings in a tiny school that may be K through 5, K through

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6. These schools address these issues every way -- every day. And they should be allowed the flexibility as independent schools, independent of the government, to fulfill their missions.

Independent schools are filled with some of the most idealistic and good-doing people. And they should be allowed in the setting outside of the government to pursue their missions.

So that's, you know, and, Your Honor is absolutely correct. If you're in for a penny, you're in for a pound. Ms. Graziano cannot say: Oh, it's just this little -- it's the whole thing. It's all those officers. It's all the --

THE COURT: Well, the issue here is in terms of the sexual harassment prohibitions under Title XI. That's what's involved here in terms of specifically the section that deals with student-on-student sexual harassment. And the criteria as summarized by it Fourth Circuit recently of those four criteria that they were a student at an educational institution receiving federal funds. And the phrase that we're dealing with is "receiving federal funds." What does that phrase mean? Does it have to be a direct grant or do they receive federal funds from the point of view of tax deductibility contributions to the school. That's precisely what's before us.

MR. GENTH: We11, Your Honor, I don't understand the limiting principle. If you're tax exempt status, it means you

[^11]receive federal funds for purposes of Title XI. Maybe I'm misunderstanding the Court's question, but doesn't that mean that all Title XI apply?

THE COURT: Like many things, Mr. Genth, I can't project exactly how the litigation proceeds in terms of the interpretations of these phrases.

MR. GENTH: But, I mean, if Title XI applies to independent schools on the basis of tax exemption, it's not just some of Title XI, it's all of Title XI. And we have quasi- judicial proceedings because of something that happened on the playground with two eight year olds. And what I would say --

THE COURT: I guess you don't have much faith in courts throwing out those kind of cases.

MR. GENTH: We11, I --
THE COURT: Are you suggesting that we have three years of litigation over that? And I mean, in all candor, Mr. Genth, there's a remarkable lack of faith in a judicial system here. Do you really think a judge is going to have an eight year old can make a complaint and have a frivolous lawsuit be filed and not just bounce it out of court?

MR. GENTH: Your Honor, I have utter faith in the judicial system. And I had a great privilege of, as you know, serving with Judge Harvey. I forget if he was in this courtroom. I have a great faith in the judicial system.

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What I have less faith in, as outside counsel for schools, is that every parent is sane, well-balanced, and always going to on7y advance responsible arguments. And it is a huge -- if the Court wants to know what the burden is, to deal with a quasi-judicial process and a parent saying, my eight year old was teased because of her pigtails -- and I know this sounds ridiculous -- but it is ridiculous -- it's not hard for me to conjure this up. In my representation of school I deal with these things.

THE COURT: There's no reason to conjecture. How often does that occur in public schools? Tell me the -- cite to me the litigation that has arisen in public schools across the United States. And there's an agreement, so the record is clear for the Fourth Circuit, every public school in the United States is exposed to the onerous task that you say is too onerous for private schools.

Please explain to me and tell me, and maybe I can have you document it. I want you to document how many frivolous lawsuits over pigtails and eight year olds in a lower school have been filed in the United States.

MR. GENTH: Your Honor, I have not done that research.
THE COURT: I'm sure you haven't. I'm sure you haven't.

MR. GENTH: I could, Your Honor.
THE COURT: No, with all do respect, Mr. Genth, I'm
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not going to go have you waste time or your client waste time or money on it.

I respectfully suggest, I respectfully suggest that there has not been this wave of litigation over eight year olds throughout the United States based upon these provisions of Title XI. Clearly the record is perfectly clear here, we're talking about private schools and public schools. There is no question that every argument about how onerous it is, how difficult it is, that in terms of specific funding legislation all public schools are subjected to this.

And I must tell you, I know of no -- well, actually the proof in the pudding is this, you know what it is, we can watch television -- and I've entertained as you may know many international delegations. They are, like, shocked at what they see on the TV screens, the lawyers hawking their wares. Every one of them. Europe, Asia, they just stare in disbelief. And they watch lawyers hawking their wares. And I explain to them that lawyers are allowed to do this.

I will tell you, I have not seen a lot of ads for lawyers that talk about if you think your child is being mistreated at the school, and there's been a frivolous this or that, or your child is wearing pigtails, your child has been bullied, please call this telephone number. I haven't seen that on the TV screens. That's a pretty accurate measure of what does or does not happen because if there was a market for it, I guarantee we

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would see a lawyer advertising on television.
MR. GENTH: I would submit to you that not every legal problem and legal headache makes its way into a lawsuit.

THE COURT: What I'm trying to say is you're posturing that there's this potential wave of litigation that this is so earth-shaking, my opinion and the opinion in California are so earth-shaking. And Mr. Viola wasn't particularly persuaded by the Eleventh Circuit's opinion back in 1989, which I think goes the way of my opinion.

There's no question there's a division of authority on this. And that's why it's important to build a record for the Fourth Circuit.

But my point is, the notion that this is catastrophic, catastrophic to private schools, I don't see where it's been so catastrophic to public schools. And I would challenge you a11 -- I'm sure you can find a case somewhere. But the notion that this has been so catastrophic and onerous and crippling, it doesn't seem to have been that catastrophic to the public schools in the area.

MR. GENTH: Well if Your Honor would like, with permission, I would ask my firm to present some legal authority or legal research we could. What I would submit, though, is this, that sort of fact-finding, that's what Congress does when it enacts things. That's what the Department of Education can do. But this imposition on the basis of tax exemption on

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independent schools of Title XI compliance, it is -- it's effectively an amendment, I would suggest, respectfully, to Title XI 99, 50 years after it was passed.

Because Title XI was spending legislation and it talks about receiving government aid.

THE COURT: Right.
MR. GENTH: So that's the gist of the question.
THE COURT: Sure. We all understand what the legal
issue is. Thank you, Mr. Genth. Thank you very much. Certainly goes without saying, thank you for what you've done for the private schools which you represent. And I understand the seriousness of it.

The simple fact of the matter we've been regurgitating over issues that well represented, as I suggested to Mr. Viola earlier in his argument, there's really no new ground here. There's one case that has been said, a Cummings case, cited in a brief filed five days ago having to do with the spending, essentially the issue as to the spending clause legislation. Doesn't relate to Title XI at all. But that has been cited.

And the criteria here with respect to Motions for Reconsideration under an analysis, essentially, under Rule 60(b), essentially the analysis is Ru7e 54(b) in terms of reconsidering any decision of the Court and may be revised at any time before the entry of final judgment. But motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders are not subject to

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those strict standards.
And the Fourth Circuit has suggested that rule 60 (b) standard guides the District Court's analysis. And that goes back to the Fourth Circuit opinion in Fayetteville Investors 936 F.3d. 1462, a Fourth Circuit opinion in 1991.

So as I've previously noted in some of my other opinions, the analysis here is under Rule $60(\mathrm{~b})$ and $60(\mathrm{~b})$ provides extraordinary relief and should only be invoked under exceptional circumstances, as this Court has often held going back to Judge Nickerson, an opinion in 2010: To support a motion under Rule $60(b)$, the moving party must demonstrate timeliness, a meritorious defense, a lack of unfair prejudice to the opposing party, and exceptional circumstances. And the threshold requirements are met if the moving party under 60(b) establishes one of the six predicates, any one of them, mistake or inadvertence.

I understand Mr. Viola has very strong and wel1-presented arguments that I'm dead wrong. I don't see the phrase "dead wrong" anywhere in the rule, but I understand what his argument is. I don't happen to think that I'm dead wrong. But that's my job to make decisions and then the Fourth Circuit will review what I've decided.

Newly discovered evidence. There's no newly discovered evidence here since my opinion.

Fraud or misrepresentation or other misconduct isn't an

[^12]issue here.
The judgment is void or there's a judgment that has been satisfied or any other reason justifying relief.

The simple fact of the matter is that Plaintiffs face a high bar to succeed on a Motion for Reconsideration. And a mere disagreement with the Court's ruling is not enough to justify a Motion for Reconsideration as this Court has previously held under the Lynn v. Monarch Recovery, 953 F.Supp. 2d 612, an opinion of this Court in 2013.

And indeed one of my colleagues has noted that -- I forget -- I should note which one because it's lovely language, it's not mine, I'm fairly certain -- is that: The prior judgment cannot bid me, quote, "just maybe or probably wrong," and Mr. Viola, it doesn't mention dead wrong there -- but we're laughing here. It says "maybe or probably wrong."

But then it says "It must strike the court as wrong with the force of a five-week-old unrefrigerated dead fish." And that is the language of one of my colleagues at 891 F.Supp. 2d 739, an opinion in 2012.

I'm glad Mr. Viola is laughing with me here. We have to find out who wrote that because I have to tell him along with the dead fish it's being dead wrong I guess is the point.

Yes, Mr. Viola?
MR. VIOLA: I'm not trying to be disrespectful, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: I know you're not. I'm teasing you. And laughing with you. No problem. There it didn't say they have to be dead wrong. It has to be so obvious that it smells like a dead fish.

MR. VIOLA: I think there is a case that says dead wrong too. Don't quote me.
(Laughter.)
THE COURT: I'm glad you're laughing with me on this. The point is that this bar, that bar, has not been met. I'11 do a quick opinion on this. If I don't get it out tomorrow we'11 get it out by Tuesday because it's a long Labor Day weekend. And Ms. Beleson is just now with me. It's her first week, and I'm not going to have her work through the first weekend that she works for me. You don't have to worry about that. We'11 file it on Tuesday.

I think, if we've got time here, maybe we could take a -Ronda, how you doing? Do you want a quick break?

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm okay, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I'd like to go into the matter of the interlocutory appeal because the District Court's Order denying a Motion for Summary Judgment or denying a Motion to Dismiss is interlocutory and may be appealed only if the District Court certifies it under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). That the Order involves a controlling question of law as to there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and that an

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immediate appeal from the Order may materially advance the ultimate determination of the litigation. And two, the Court of Appeals permits such an appeal. They're really the standards here.

As to that, the Defendants have requested -- the motion is essentially one for reconsideration of my ruling or an interlocutory appeal in the alternative. I'm certainly willing to entertain that.

So with that, Mr. Viola, if you would like to address it I'11 be glad to hear from you on this. Or Mr. Goodman.

MR. GOODMAN: Your Honor, on this point I would like to be heard.

THE COURT: I'11 be glad to hear from you.
MR. GOODMAN: I'11 be brief, but I'11 let Mr. Viola go first.

THE COURT: A11 right. Go ahead.
MR. VIOLA: Your Honor, this is addressed significantly in our brief. I don't have too much else to add here.

Again, I think the controlling issue of law, we talked about why this is a controlling legal question, and you talked about it as we11, does tax exempt status constitute federal financial assistance.

THE COURT: Pretty precise issue.
MR. VIOLA: Exactly. Pure question of law. And then
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you also touched on which one is correct. But I think we can agree that there are cases that go both ways so it meets the second criteria. And then the third criteria --

THE COURT: We didn't agree on that earlier -- I'm laughing -- but we do agree on it now. There are cases that go both ways.

MR. VIOLA: We agree to disagree as to who is right. (Laughter.)

THE COURT: We're laughing. But that's the point, there's definitely the California case that says it goes my way. The Johnny's Ice whatever from 2001 doesn't. I think the Eleventh Circuit goes my way. There's no Fourth Circuit authority.

MR. VIOLA: I'11 throw Stewart and Bachman in, whatever.

THE COURT: That's right.
MR. VIOLA: But I think we agree that there's a difference of opinion of the law, not of the facts. And then also that it would terminate the advance determination of litigation. And Your Honor spoke about this before in terms of potential jurisdictional issues if the appeal is ultimately granted, the Title XI is out of the case and the appeal is ultimately -- Your Honor is ultimately reversed.

So I think all of those things that the requirements for the certification for interlocutory appeal have been met. And

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one of the other issues, too, is that we've talked at length about the independent schools that are here today being represented. It also has a profound impact on those schools as we11.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. VIOLA: Whether we agree the propriety of it or otherwise, I think there seems to be ample evidence in the record that they've been operating under the assumption that tax exempt status doesn't constitute federal financial assistance and Title XI doesn't apply. So they're entitled respectfully to guidance as soon possible on that, so they can make whatever decision is appropriate. Included with that is Concordia Prep.

So unless the Court has any questions on that?
THE COURT: No, thank you very much, Mr. Viola. With that, Ms. Graziano or Mr. Ketterer, I'd be glad to hear from you.

Oh, I'm sorry. Mr. Goodman, I overlooked you.
MR. GOODMAN: I will be very brief.
THE COURT: By the way, Mr. Goodman, I would be remiss if I didn't know note I'm really not sure if the -- is it the Victorian Theater at Gilman School is it called Good Vic?

MR. GOODMAN: It's the Young Victorian Theater.
THE COURT: The Young Victorian Theater. I'11 take judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Goodman has been the

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backbone of the Young Victorian Theater at the Gilman School here in Baltimore for decades. He started at a very young age. I'm not going to inquire about the contributions that have been made to the Young Victorian Theater. And I don't know that my ruling affects the Young Victorian Theater because it's an adjunct of the Gilman School. But if you think that it may then tell me if you're worried about that.

MR. GOODMAN: Since you brought it up, we were an adjunct at Gilman School for 17 years, and in 1988 we went independent, in 1989 we garnered 501(c)(3) status which we have.

THE COURT: Good.
MR. GOODMAN: And we do receive state funding. So all these issues are relevant for my little theater.

THE COURT: But you're not an educational institution and you're not subject to Title XI.

MR. GOODMAN: I guess not.
THE COURT: You may not be, I guess not.
MR. GOODMAN: I know we're 501(c)(3). But anyway, thank you for your nice words.

THE COURT: That's quite all right.
MR. GOODMAN: It's pretty amazing.
The only thing I wanted to say on this issue is -- and I don't want to speak inappropriately at this hearing about the substance -- but this lawsuit as -- we didn't have anything to

Ronda J. Thomas, RMR, CRR - Federal Official Reporter do -- we're not in the Title XI count, and we didn't brief
that.

But if an interlocutory appeal is going to essentially put this case on hold for however long it takes for the Fourth Circuit to rule, this case has been hanging over my client's head like the Sword of Damocles since it was filed. Next week summary judgments are due. We're going to be filing summary judgments. I think all the parties are filing summary judgments. They feel very strongly that they should not be in this suit. I don't want to argue the merits at this point.

But if -- on behalf of the Synod we would not want to see this case, itself, delayed where it's just going to be sitting around while the other two parties go to the Fourth Circuit to argue this Title XI motion in a count we're not even involved in. So we would not want to see an interlocutory appeal granted.

THE COURT: I understand. I'm not sure how we would be able to do that, quite frankly. I understand.

MR. GOODMAN: I know that. But I just wanted to make my record.

THE COURT: I understand. There really won't be a whole lot. I mean, I understand it's like the Sword of Damocles. Count 2 negligent supervision and retention and Count 3 negligence as to your client, but there isn't going to be anything happening. I mean, the cases would essentially be
stayed pending an interlocutory appea1. And there's certainly nothing for you to do other than just wait. It's not like it's going to -- I'm not for a minute ignoring your issue in terms of it hanging over your client's head. But there's no cost to your client. There's nothing for your client to do but wait for the rulings.

MR. GOODMAN: Right. There's no legal cost, but, trust me, I'm dealing with a client -- there's a significant -even though it's the Synod, which is the equivalent of the archdiocese, there's a big emotional cost to them.

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. GOODMAN: They've spent a tremendous amount of time and money defending what they believe to be is something they shouldn't even be in. And if I have to tell them now: Well you know what, they're going to the Fourth Circuit on the Title XI issue and it's going to be stayed for a year and a half. They're going to be very upset.

And I gather there's not a way that you can keep our --
THE COURT: I don't think so. I don't think so. It doesn't occur to me that quickly.

With that Ms. Graziano or Mr. Ketterer, I'll be glad to hear from you.

MS. GRAZIANO: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: We've talked about the legal issue and that cuts a different way for your client when it comes to the

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matter of interlocutory appea1, but I'11 be glad to hear from you.

MS. GRAZIANO: Sure. I'11 try to be brief, Your Honor, as we11.

You know, I think, again when we talked about the Motion for Reconsideration, I started by saying "Why are we here, right?" Why are we here talking about a Motion for Interlocutory Appeal when we know quite well in the Fourth Circuit the tendency or the favor of the circuit is to appeal everything all at once. Especially when it's not an issue that will dismiss an entire litigation outright.

So while I'11 be the first person to agree with Your Honor about the importance of this decision, which I believe you arrived at quite soundly, it's not one that rises to this level of immediacy that it needs to be sent up on interlocutory appeal now. It is absolutely an issue that can be appealed at the termination of this litigation post trial.

And I think one of the things that's really important about this, Your Honor, you brought up the Butler case, that case says in black and white: The questions are not controlling if litigation will proceed regardless of how that question is decided.

And while obviously this discussion has been very robust, and there's a very profound public policy interest in, quite frankly, your opinion being upheld, it is not the case that

[^13]these five cases rise and fall on the Title XI claim. As Your Honor aptly noted earlier, they will proceed on their other state law counts.

THE COURT: We11, they may or may not. I don't know that's a given, Ms. Graziano. If there is no Title XI claim then the matter of whether or not this Court exercises supplemental jurisdiction is within the discretion of the Court. And I would -- give me one second here.

The matter of supplemental jurisdiction, it certainly may be there with respect to H.C.'s claim, depending upon certain factual predicates. But in terms of four of these five Plaintiffs, in terms of being in federal court, if the Fourth Circuit reverses my opinion and finds that 501(c)(3) status does not amount to federal funding under the applicable sexual harassment section of Title XI, the matter of my continuing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those four cases, perhaps five, certainly those four cases, specifically the cases involving N.H., A.G. and Jennifer Pullen and Ariana Gomez may not proceed. It would be a summary judgment entered in terms of -- or dismissal of some sort.

I mean, just in terms of how it would play out. There's no jurisdiction of this Court. May not be.

MS. GRAZIANO: I'm sorry, Your Honor. You hit the nail on the head, it would be the Court's discretion if given how advanced these cases are, as my brother alluded we're on

[^14]the eve of summary judgment motions. It's not for me to say whether this Court would or wouldn't exercise supplemental jurisdiction.

I will just point out, as Your Honor mentioned, the H.C. case is a case that's a little bit different than the other four --

THE COURT: Yes.
MS. GRAZIANO: -- with the PPP issue. There's certainly a difference between the parties in terms of our understanding of the facts, in terms of the timeline and import of relevance incidents and kind of the prelude that led up to the assault of that Plaintiff that is relevant for the factual timeline.

So I would just submit to Your Honor that even if the Fourth Circuit is to reverse Your Honor on the issue of the 501(c)(3) status, the Conrad case remains viable because of the receipt of the PPP loan.

So if there's a summary judgment motion or some other mechanism that would remove -- if it's a factual determination for a later date, that's not something that's going to be impacted by this interlocutory appeal.

So it's not the case that sending this issue up on interlocutory appeal and having the Fourth Circuit reverse Your Honor just automatically cleanly gets rid of all these cases.

One, there's one case that's exempt from that ruling. And
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two, Your Honor could still elect to retain those cases. So that is an issue that muddies up that first criteria.

You know, we've discussed of course the differences of opinion. I would just say again to Your Honor, that the Supreme Court precedent is quite clear. And I think it's very articulately laid out in Your Honor's order, that the differences of opinions are inferential mostly in the Johnny's Icehouse case, which Your Honor already considered and rejected.

And then thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, deciding this issue now doesn't advance determination of this 1itigation. We would still need a trial. Again, totally understanding what Your Honor said about supplemental jurisdiction in four of the five cases or all five cases winding up in state court, but again that's not an automatic. There is a likelihood or at least a chance that one or all five of those cases could remain in federal court.

It doesn't eliminate complex issues in the sense, not to dismiss the importance of Title XI, but say we do proceed to trial before Your Honor in this court, we're presenting the same negligence evidence. We're presenting the same liability evidence. The question of damages is not altered by whether or not Title XI stays in this case. You know how I know that, Your Honor? Cummings. The case that my brother cited.

So it's not such that we can't have this case move
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forward. We're so close to the end. We're at dispositive motion -- summary judgment motions. It doesn't impede the parties' ability to talk settlement. It doesn't impede the parties' ability to move forward with the cases. There's no good reason why this issue can't be decided on appeal later. There's just no reason for this immediate pause. As you said, it could be -- my brother, Mr. Goodman, said it could be months, if not years, that this is on hold. There's no reason that this has to happen now and can't happen later.

And frankly, the impact or the import of a waiting period on these other institutions is not for the Court's decision today. Yes, it's a factor, but it's not determinative on the factors enumerated by the Fourth Circuit on when an interlocutory appeal is appropriate.

And frankly, a delay prejudices the Plaintiffs and other similarly-situated individuals who are left without recourse in private schools when they suffer sexual assault and sexual discrimination. I think that limbo period is more of greater import than the impact on private schools that have ample resources and funding and monies to put towards bringing their policies and procedures within the purview of Title XI.

So with that, I thank Your Honor and I'm happy to answer any questions you have.

THE COURT: No, thank you very much, Ms. Graziano. Anybody want to be heard on that further? Mr. Shea?

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I guess I do have a question for you, Ms. Graziano. What is a private school in Maryland to do with respect to the matter of awaiting a trial in this case and a verdict and waiting in terms of processes they must follow? What are the implications of that?

MS. GRAZIANO: Sure. I'm glad you asked this, Your Honor. I think this speaks to what my esteemed colleagues in their amicus briefs and in their comments today alluded to. Certainly it is a period of limbo, for lack of a better word. But I would submit to Your Honor -- and this is going to come out at trial --

THE COURT: It's not limbo per se in terms of if an interlocutory appeal is granted, I stay the case. It doesn't have any binding effect upon the private schools until the Fourth Circuit rules; isn't that correct?

MS. GRAZIANO: That is correct, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Does defense counsel agree with that? Ms. Baker is here. She's an expert in this area of the lawsuit. She's from the national association, I believe, Ms. Baker, for the National Association of Independent Schools; is that right?

MS. BAKER: Your Honor, I'm general counsel for the Association of Independent Maryland and DC School --

THE COURT: A11 right. That's fine. My point is this, if there's a stay and it's appealed to the Fourth

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Circuit, there's no binding obligation on the part of any private schools. My view is to do anything [sic] until the Fourth Circuit rules, isn't that where we would be from your point of view?

MS. GRAZIANO: Yes and no, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Is that correct, Mr. Shea, from your point of view?

MR. SHEA: Your Honor, it also depends on what is controlling authority and what's persuasive. But more or less that's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I know that it would make everyone nervous.

MR. SHEA: Right.
THE COURT: But --
MR. SHEA: -- the Fourth Circuit have been --
THE COURT: It reminds me of the old joke that federal judges tell themselves: What's the difference between God and a federal judge? God doesn't think he's a federal judge.

We're laughing here.
My point is that my ruling -- I understand the implications. I certainly understood the depth of Mr. Genth's concerns. My point is I have no difficulty, from the point of view of the importance of this of having a stay, there's other issues aside, and letting the Fourth Circuit determine it. Until then there's no earth-shaking event that takes place with

[^15]respect to any of the private schools. They're free to continue as they do so. It's an open issue waiting for court resolution. That's something that I think is important here.

This case has been going on for a while, Ms. Graziano. I don't know how quickly the Fourth Circuit would get to it. I believe they would get to it quite quickly down there.

MS. GRAZIANO: If I understand my brother correctly, I don't think he's representing that private schools or independent schools believe that they're bound to your ruling today.

THE COURT: We11, they may or may not.
(Laughter.)
THE COURT: I think they have a much higher comfort leve1, Mr. Graziano, if I enter a stay -- and they're all nodding in agreement with me -- if I enter a stay and grant the interlocutory appeal and then it goes down to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Richmond. And I can even note that one of my esteemed colleagues from my old law firm that is in this area of the law, she's back there nodding her head as well.

The point is, I don't for a minute ignore the importance of this decision. And I certainly can understand why everyone would like it to have -- as opposed to another pair of eyes, certainly three pairs of eyes with three judges and maybe even the en banc Fourth Circuit. I don't know. The point is I have

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no difficulty with that.
Although I'm sensitive to Mr. Goodman's client and trying to get it resolved, and I'm sensitive to the situation of these five young women. You filed the lawsuit, you know, and came into this court under federal question jurisdiction.

MS. GRAZIANO: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And under federal question jurisdiction under 1331 this is a federal question jurisdiction, that's why you're here is because of Title XI. You chose in this venue, which is fine. You have every right to do so, but it raised issues that we need to address.

MS. GRAZIANO: Of course, let me just say by way of conclusion one other thing, Your Honor, that bears on the discussion that you had with other of my brothers' counsel regarding the onerousness or why is this so important? Why is one of the considerations that Your Honor has, sending this up so that it can be decided for the sake of clarity for these schools. The standard for negligence or the standard for how schools, even ones who don't receive federal funding, should be conducting investigations into alleged sexual assaults, incidences of sexual harassment, bullying, no matter how trivial folks want to characterize the instances as being, that standard is informed by Title XI. Our expert is going to come to this trial and say that.

So this idea that schools are going to have to completely
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revamp their policies and procedures. Yeah, they're going to have to designate some faculty members or some staff to perform those enumerated rules, but they should be almost in lockstep with Title XI anyway just by the standard of care.

I think Your Honor really hit the nail on the head with some of your earlier comments, which is that the onerousness to a school with 10 faculty members, that's not who we litigate for, right, we're not litigating for the exception. We're not litigating for the 10 percent school that's so small to have that be impactful. I would also just raise these are schools that charge tuition. These are schools that have multiple athletic directors and brand new turf fields and all of these fancy things. No disrespect of private schools. I'm a product of a private university. As I said I'm on the board of the university. My son goes to private school here in Baltimore. I have the utmost respect.

But the fact is they have the funds for those outputs. They have the funds to pay these fine lawyers to show up here today, but what's reprehensible to me, Your Honor, is to then come in this courtroom to say: Whoa, whoa, whoa, it's really going to be onerous for us to not know how to act for the next year and a half. They have money for all of the expenditures but they won't spend money on training their staff, and faculty and making sure that these kids are protected.

When the policies and procedures are left up to

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interpretation, we end up with the situation that quite frankly brought us to this courtroom today, Your Honor. So I think again, let's keep our eyes on the public policy consideration which is protecting these children, regardless if they go to private school or public school.

And with that, I thank Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Graziano. I will tell you that I think that there was reference earlier by your side of my having been on the board of one of the private schools. I actually then made reference to it later in these proceedings. I think you might be surprised at the extent to which schools are all that flush with money. There's a lot of different issues that come up. I don't really think that's an issue.

I'm certainly going to grant the interlocutory appeal in this matter on this issue. It's an important issue. And we'11 get this opinion out on Tuesday or Wednesday of next week.

The record will reflect that I will be issuing a stay order and permitting the filing of an interlocutory appeal on this precise issue to go down to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. And I think that's the safest, fairest way to do it. And I recognize the implications of my decision, and I recognize the split in authority. I don't agree necessary that I'm out there alone on this. There are certainly cases, including the Eleventh Circuit, that go my way. But this is a very important issue, and I understand the

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implications of it. And certainly the parties are free to go down to the Fourth Circuit to appeal this. And I think it should be fine.

With that, I want to thank you all for very thorough arguments and particularly, Mr. Viola, if I was tough on you to start I apologize. As Mr. King, my former law clerk, will tell you I enjoy these hearings. I enjoy the give and take but you're entitled to know what I'm thinking and usually most lawyers like that. So I let them know what I'm thinking in trying to flush it out. We put it all out here on the table and we really, I think, made a lot of progress.

Hopefully we built a good record for the Fourth Circuit here and the Fourth Circuit is going to have to address this. There is very serious policy considerations that are involved and that's where we are.

Un1ess there's anything further, thank you all very much. It was nice having you all here.

MR. GOODMAN: I have one last question. I assume that the summary judgment motions due next Friday is out?

THE COURT: They're done. Everything is just going to stop. Everything is going to stop. This case stopping. It's a stay. The case is stayed and then we'11 stop. And this is an important matter in terms of -- there's a lot of things that have to be resolved here and to deal with this in a vacuum would be very difficult.

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And quite frankly, I don't think it's in your client's interest, Ms. Graziano, long-term for that. I think it's probably better that we get this clarified.

So it's been nice having you all here. And I enjoyed it.
MR. GOODMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Goodman, I gather that the Young Vic theater is finished for the summer.

MR. GOODMAN: Thank God, yes. It's exhausting. I'm not as young as I used to be.

THE COURT: Some of the people here will tell you that's true for me, particularly in the last week.

With that, this Court stands adjourned for the day.
(A11 Counse1 - "Thank you, Your Honor.")
(Hearing concluded at 4:10 p.m.)

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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER

I, Ronda J. Thomas, Registered Merit Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, do hereby certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 753, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically-reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States.

Dated this 10th day of September 2022.


Ronda J. Thomas, RMR, CRR Federal Official Reporter

BUETTNER-HARTGSED, eqd-ev-03132-RDB Document 150 Filed 09/12/22 Page 96MథTIQMS HEARING-9/1/2022 BALTIMORE LUTHERAN HIGH SCHOOL, et al.

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