1			
1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA		
3	United States of America, ) Criminal Action ) No. 19-CR-018		
4	Plaintiff, )  SENTENCING		
5	vs. ) Washington, DC		
6	Roger Jason Stone, Jr., ) Date: February 20, 2020 ) Time: 10:00 a.m.		
7	Defendant )		
8	TRANSCRIPT OF SENTENCING		
9	HELD BEFORE		
10	THE HONORABLE JUDGE AMY BERMAN JACKSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE		
11	<del></del>		
12	APPEARANCES		
13			
14	For Plaintiff: JOHN D. CRABB  J.P. COONEY		
15	U.S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA		
16	555 Fourth Street, NW Washington, DC 20530		
17	(202) 252-1794 Email: John.d.crabb@usdoj.gov Email: Joseph.cooney@usdoj.gov		
18	Email: Joseph.Cooneyeusdoj.gov		
19	For Defendant: Seth Ginsberg  Law Office of Seth Ginsberg		
20	299 Broadway, Suite 1405		
21	New York, NY 10007 (212) 227-6655		
22	Bruce S. Rogow  LAW OFFICE OF BRUCE S. ROGOW, P.A.		
23	100 NE 3rd Avenue Suite 1000 Fort Loudondolo EL 33301		
24	Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 (954) 767-8909		
25	Email: Brogow@rogowlaw.com		

1	For Defendant:	Robert C. Buschel Tara A. Campion
2		BUSCHEL & GIBBONS, P.A. One Financial Plaza
3		100 S.E. Third Avenue
4		Suite 1300 Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33394
5		(954) 530-5301 Email: Buschel@bglaw-pa.com
6		Grant J. Smith STRATEGYSMITH, P.A.
7		401 East Las Olas Boulevard Suite 130-120
8		Fort Lauderdale, FL 33301 (954) 328-9064
9		Email: Gsmith@strategysmith.com
10		
11	Court Reporter:	Janice E. Dickman, RMR, CRR, CRC Official Court Reporter
12		United States Courthouse, Room 6523 333 Constitution Avenue, NW
13		Washington, DC 20001 202-354-3267
14		<pre>Email: JaniceDickmanDCD@gmail.com</pre>
15		* * *
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Good morning, Your Honor. This morning we have Criminal Case Number 19-18, United States 2 3 of America v. Roger J. Stone, Jr. The defendant is present and in the courtroom, Your Honor. The probation officer present 4 5 for these proceedings is Ms. Lustig. 6 Will counsel for the parties please approach the 7 lectern and identify yourself for the record. 8 MR. CRABB: Good morning, Your Honor. John Crabb and 9 J.P. Cooney for the United States. 10 THE COURT: Good morning. 11 MR. SMITH: Good morning, Your Honor. Appearing for 12 Mr. Stone, who is at the table. We have with us Bruce Rogow, 13 Tara Campion, Robert Buschel, and Seth Ginsberg --14 THE COURT: All right. Good morning. 15 MR. SMITH: -- Your Honor. 16 Thank you. 17 THE COURT: Thank you. 18 We're here this morning for Mr. Stone's sentencing. 19 This is a public proceeding, and you're all welcome to observe. 20 But this is not the only place where one can view these 21 proceedings in the courthouse. There's also an overflow 22 courtroom where there's a video and audio monitor. Anyone who 23 plans to react audibly in these proceedings is welcome to watch 24 in the overflow courtroom and to say whatever you please. 25 out of respect for all the parties and their safety, we're

going to maintain decorum here.

The final presentence report was filed in this matter on February 13th. Have both the defendant and the defense counsel had an opportunity to read it?

MR. GINSBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And the legal objections regarding the application of the various adjustments under the sentencing guidelines will be addressed in a few minutes.

But first, I want to ascertain with respect to factual objections to the presentence report. I know there were objections to the language in a number of the paragraphs regarding the offense that were largely transmitted to the probation office by the U.S. Attorney's Office, such as the use of the word "associate."

I think that's a perfectly vague and vanilla term that could fairly include someone who transmitted the number and nature of emails here. It certainly applies to Mr. Credico, who called himself a long-time friend.

I've read all the objections carefully, and I don't believe that there were any that were not already rectified, that require a change. I think they're an accurate summary of the evidence that was introduced at trial. To the extent you have concerns that the choice of vocabulary could have some bearing on the defendant's future, your objections are all noted in the presentence report.

1 I'm also not sure that it has any impact on the 2 defendant about the related case designation, and I have 3 already ruled on that issue twice. 4 But are there any facts that were set out that relate 5 to the defendant or his employment history or his medical 6 history or any other information that's incorrect? 7 MR. GINSBERG: None beyond what we stated in our 8 objections. 9 Should I speak at the lectern? Or is it okay to 10 speak from here? 11 THE COURT: I think, just for this point, we can hear 12 Obviously, when we get to hear your allocution, I'm going you. 13 to want to you at the lectern. 14 MR. GINSBERG: Understood. Thank you. 15 THE COURT: All right. So --16 MR. GINSBERG: With respect to the related case 17 issues, however, we respect the Court's ruling. But as stated 18 in our objections, there can be prejudicial impact from that 19 case being maintained in the presentence report. So we would 20 ask the Court to take that out of the presentence report, 21 regardless of its ruling regarding the applicability of the 22 designation. We think that it's unduly prejudicial to have it 23 in the presentence report itself. 24 And the only other issue is, we requested that the

letter of Mr. Credico become part of the presentence report,

25

1 and probation has declined to do that. And we would ask the 2 Court to direct that it become part of the presentence report. 3 THE COURT: Well, it's part of the docket. It's part of the record of this case. So, I can't take one letter and 4 5 isolate it and make it part of the presentence report. It's 6 certainly going to be referenced in the proceedings this 7 morning, and it is docketed. 8 With respect to the related case designation, I don't 9 know that you've actually specified any particular prejudice 10 that could flow to the defendant, but in an abundance of 11 caution, I'm happy to have that removed from the presentence 12 report before it goes to the Bureau of Prisons. 13 All right. And with respect to your other 14 objections, I'm going to overrule those. I think they're set 15 forth in the presentence report. 16 And with that, I'm going to accept the presentence 17 report, as it's been revised, as findings of fact at 18 sentencing. 19 Other than the guideline calculation and the pending 20 motion for a new trial, which we will take up after the 21 sentencing, are there any other legal disputes that need to be 22 resolved? 23 MR. GINSBERG: None that I can think of at the 24 moment, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Okay. All right.

In addition to the presentence report, which I've reviewed, I've received and reviewed additional materials concerning the defendant. Those include the government's sentencing memorandum, Docket 279, submitted to the Court on February 10th by the newly appointed U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia Timothy Shea and the four assistant United States attorneys and special assistant United States attorneys that tried the case.

I also received the government's February 11th supplemental and amended sentencing memorandum, Docket 286, also submitted by U.S. Attorney Shea and the assistant United States attorney for the District of Columbia, who is the acting chief of the criminal division. I note that the initial memorandum has not been withdrawn.

I also received the defendant's sentencing memorandum, Docket 280, with a number of letters and attachments, including letters from defendant's family members: His wife; his stepdaughter; his step-granddaughter, who is an adult; and, his sister-in-law; a letter from Randy Credico, who was a witness in the case.

Letters from family, friends, and colleagues, Rolando Conesa, John Morgan.

A letter from Jan Webster, the wife of an NFL player who doesn't know the defendant but was aware of his advocacy on behalf of NFL players with brain injuries.

1 A friend, Rabbi Henry Sheinkopf; Christian Josi; an individual named Norm Kent; Pastor Michael Grady of the St. 2 Anthony Catholic Church. 3 Another friend and spiritual brother -- as he 4 5 describes himself -- Dr. W. Randy Short. 6 Some attorneys who have worked with Mr. Stone are 7 Anthony Rupp, III; Carl Paladino, a former candidate for New 8 York state governor. 9 Other friends or friends of friends, Albert Owler, 10 Sharon Kaplan, Michael Caputo. 11 An attorney, Paul Jensen; colleague, Jane Bennett; a 12 friend and former executive assistant at Black, Manafort, Stone 13 and Kelly, Lynn Conforti. 14 Friends Frank Morano, John B. McGowen. An individual 15 named Itzhak Bak. 16 Brian David Hill, an individual who turned to 17 Mr. Stone for help seeking a pardon. 18 Other individuals, Gerard Houser, Kathleen M. 19 Coleman. 20 Also, I've received a number of letters from 21 individuals who describe themselves as concerned citizens in 22 the past few days. I've docketed as many of the letters as I 23 could as part of the docket. 24 I want you to know that I have read and that I 25 appreciate all of the letters and I've considered all of the

sentencing materials.

In a criminal case, there's a statute that tells me how I'm supposed to go about deciding what the sentence should be, it's 18 U.S. Code Section 3553. Section A of that statute lists a number of important factors I'm supposed to consider, and the advisory sentencing guidelines are one of the factors that I'm required to consider in determining the appropriate sentence for this offense.

I'm required to calculate what the guidelines would recommend in every case. And the sentencing statute says that the Court shall impose a sentence within the guideline range, unless the Court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind or to a degree not adequately taken into consideration by the Commission in formulating the guidelines.

For those of you who are new to this, or who woke up last week and became persuaded that the guidelines are harsh and, perhaps, sentencing shouldn't be driven by the rigid application of a strict mathematical formula and that individual consideration is, perhaps, required, I can assure you that defense attorneys and many judges have been making that point for a long time, but we don't usually succeed in getting the government to agree, and maybe that will continue.

In any event, the Supreme Court has made it quite clear, as both parties have pointed out and as this Court was

already well aware, that the guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, and that I have the authority and the duty to craft a sentence that considers all the statutory concerns.

Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that the statute requires an individual assessment of all of the factors. So, I plan to address each of them in some detail at a later point in these proceedings. But I'm going to begin, as I always do, with the calculation under the sentencing guidelines, and note, as I always do, that that's only one part of the analysis.

And the guidelines begin with the offense or offenses of conviction. Here, Mr. Stone was convicted after a trial by a jury of seven counts.

Count 1: Obstruction of a legal proceeding; that is, a congressional investigation, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 1505, and that statute provides for sentence of up to five years imprisonment or a fine of \$250,000.

If anybody in this room has sunglasses on, unless there's a medical reason, they need to take them off.

Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are five separate counts of making a false statement to the government, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 1001. The statute provides for a sentence of up to five years imprisonment on each count.

And Count 7, tampering with a witness, in violation of 18 U.S. Code Section 1512(b)(1), which provides that whoever, separate and apart from lying himself, knowingly uses

intimidation, threats, or corruptly persuades another person with the intent to influence, delay, or prevent his testimony in an official proceeding can face a penalty of up to 20 years imprisonment.

The jury found -- and I note that the defendant did not even contest this count in his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of trial, but simply submitted on the evidence -- that the defendant knowingly and intentionally corruptly persuaded or attempted to corruptly persuade Randy Credico with the intent to influence, delay, or prevent his testimony in an official proceeding.

There's no mandatory minimum sentence applicable to any count here, and it's entirely up to the Court whether the sentences for each should be consecutive or concurrent.

The guidelines, however, group the offenses for calculation purposes. §3D1.2(b) says: If there's a common scheme or plan and the same victim, you combine the counts when you figure out which guideline applies. And, according to that rule, you're supposed to use the guideline that would produce the highest offense level. And that here is the obstruction of justice guideline.

The guidelines provide a base level for each offense, and the base offense level for the offense of obstruction of justice under \$2J1.2 puts you at Level 14. That's where you start.

When you calculate the guidelines, the guidelines for any particular offense also recognizes certain specific offense characteristics, and the presence of those can increase or decrease the offense level from there.

Under the obstruction of justice guideline, there is a specific offense characteristic, \$2J1.2(b)(1)(B), that says: If the offense involved causing or threatening to cause physical injury to a person or property damage in order to obstruct the administration of justice, you add eight levels.

The applicability of this guideline to this case is disputed. The defense opposed adding this enhancement in its memorandum, which I've read. But if there's anything you wish to say about the guideline in particular, you're welcome to do so now.

MR. GINSBERG: Thank you, Your Honor, for the opportunity to address this issue.

There are situations in which a person's reputation is such that words, even though on their face they may not be threatening, the law imputes a threat to those words. And this sometimes comes up in extortion cases.

Here, we submit that this is the exact opposite.

Even though the words, on their face, could be read as threatening, in the context of the dialogue between Mr. Credico and Mr. Stone, it's our position that these words -- it's not that they weren't a serious enough threat to trigger the

guidelines, as the government suggests in the cases that it has cited, but, rather, that the words themselves did not constitute a threat at all.

Mr. Stone is known for using rough, provocative, hyperbolic language. Mr. Credico knew that. They have a long, 20-year relationship. And in the context of that private conversation, Mr. Credico understood that it was just Stone being Stone; he's all bark, no bite. And, therefore, it's our position that those words do not trigger the guideline offense level increase because there's no threat at all.

Now, there's been some talk about Mr. Credico being concerned that these words could become a threat if they were communicated to the public. But the keyword there is "if." Mr. Stone did not threaten to communicate these words to the public. There's no indication of that in the context of their communications or otherwise in the record.

So, given Mr. Credico's subjective understanding, based on their longstanding relationship, the words themselves, though threatening on their face, in this context do not trigger the guideline because they are not threatening at all.

THE COURT: Do you have a case that says that the victim's subjective understanding is the linchpin of the analysis?

MR. GINSBERG: I do not have a case that says that the victim's subjective understanding is the linchpin.

However, the cases on which the government relies all involve situations where the victim did understand the communication to be a threat.

In United States Versus Plumley the words in that situation were: I will kick your asses.

The case involved underlying violence. There was no violence underlying this case. And the dispute there wasn't that the words didn't constitute a threat. First, the defendant said: I never said that. And then he said: Well, but if I said it, it wasn't serious enough. It's not a serious level threat.

But the victim understood it to be a threat.

THE COURT: What is your position about whether I can consider the grand jury testimony that was filed from Mr. Credico that's on the docket in this case in connection with this issue?

MR. GINSBERG: Well, the Supreme Court says that Your Honor can consider almost anything. But I think what we have here is trial testimony where he said he didn't feel threatened.

And we have a letter where not only does he say he didn't feel threatened, he says: If I -- most notably was after Mr. Stone's defense attorney asked if I had ever thought Mr. Stone was going to steal or harm my dog Bianca. My answer was an emphatic No. At the time, I was hoping he would follow

that question with another, asking if I had ever personally felt threatened by Mr. Stone. The answer would have been the same. I never in any way felt that Stone himself posed a direct physical threat to me or my dog. I chalk this up to bellicose tirades, to Stone being Stone; all bark, no bite.

So, that is what Mr. Credico wants the Court to consider. The Court is, of course, free to consider anything that it deems relevant, but I think the trial testimony and the submission to the Court in the context of sentencing should be the most impactful.

The other cases that the government cites, similarly, involve threats that were understood by the victim to be threatening. In *United States versus Bahkairi* there were photos sent to the victim and to -- with -- depicting the victim's family members, indicating that he intended to harm them. The defendant -- the defendant displayed a rifle, suggesting that he had the means and the willingness to carry out the threats.

In *United States versus Smith*, a defendant said: I'm going to kick her ass.

But what was the context there? The context was she burst into someone's home uninvited, unannounced, and said:

Your daughter is pressing charges against my son. He's going to be in jail because of what your daughter is saying. I'm going to kick her ass.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

In all of those cases, the victims felt threatened. So, no, I do not have a case that says that the subjective understanding of the victim is controlling. But, I also don't have any other cases where the subjective understanding of the victim was such that he knew it wasn't a threat. And in this instance, this eight -- it's an eight-level increase, as the Court is aware. That's a very blunt instrument. You know --THE COURT: I have the authority to deal with that when we get to variances, wouldn't you say? MR. GINSBERG: Yes. And I'm hoping you will. But in the first instance, I do believe that the correct application of the guidelines is important, because the degree of variance is going to be based, I would assume, in part, on where we start. And ratcheting up the offense level here eight levels based on a statement that was made in private, there was no threat of publication, and the victim himself said he didn't -- he never viewed it as a threat, and the nature of the relationship. It's a 20-year relationship. THE COURT: All right. I think I understand your argument. Thank you. MR. GINSBERG: Thank you, Judge. THE COURT: Mr. Crabb, the initial memorandum filed by the government included this enhancement in its calculation.

The second memo doesn't actually contest the applicability of

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

the guideline. It says only that it's been disputed by Mr. Credico, who asserts that he didn't perceive a genuine threat. Although, it then acknowledges, quote, Mr. Credico's subjective beliefs are not dispositive as to this enhancement. Are you prepared to address this or any other quideline provision this morning? MR. CRABB: Yes, Your Honor, I am. THE COURT: All right. The memo says that the total offense level is, quote: Arguably, 29. And the enhancements, the second ones, are, quote: Perhaps technically applicable, close quote. What exactly are you trying to tell me here? MR. CRABB: Your Honor, our position here is that this enhancement applies, and we ask the Court to apply it, the eight-level enhancement for threats, pursuant to 2J1.2(b)(1). As the Court's indicated through its questions, there's no subjectiveness requirement for this enhancement to apply. In fact, the cases that the government has previously cited, and we stand by, make it clear that there's no requirement of seriousness with respect to the threat. And the fact is that the defendant threatened both Mr. Credico's personal safety and his pet. And we believe this enhancement applies, and we ask the Court to impose it in calculating the appropriate guideline range here. THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

I conclude that the adjustment does apply, and so adding eight levels to where we started, at Level 14, we're now up to Level 22.

The evidence included numerous written communications, including emails and texts in which the defendant repeatedly urged Mr. Credico to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, to claim a failure of recollection, to do a Frank Pentangeli, a shared reference to The Godfather that Credico immediately understood to mean feign a lack of knowledge, or to straight out lie, all to support the false narrative advanced by Stone, that Credico had been an intermediary between Stone and Julian Assange, to whom Stone publicly referred in early August of 2016.

This effort began in the fall of 2017, when the committee sought Credico's testimony, and it continued when Stone and Credico became of interest to the Office of Special Counsel investigation.

On April 9, 2018, as Credico continued to balk and he continued to insist, as he had before Stone even testified, that Stone knew full well that Credico didn't even know

Julian Assange at the time Stone made his public statements, defendant Stone emailed him and threatened: I'm going to take that dog away from you. Not a fucking thing you can do about it either because you are a weak, broke piece of shit. I will prove to the world that you are a liar, close quote.

Mr. Credico, who had no wife or children, was extremely close to his dog of 12 years, and Roger Stone knew that well. Later, on the same day, defendant Stone also wrote to Mr. Credico, quote: I am so ready. Let's get it on. Prepare to die, cocksucker.

Defendant's memorandum refers to this as banter, which it hardly is. But the defendant also emphasizes that Credico testified that he was not actually scared that Stone would hurt his dog, and that Credico has since said that he didn't think that Stone posed a physical threat to him.

I note, since the defense has informed me that I can consider this material, that that is not consistent with his grand jury testimony, which was closer in time to the actual threats, at which time he said he was hiding and wearing a disguise and not living at home because he was worried, if not about Trump, about his -- about Stone, but about his friends.

So, I think his level of concern may have changed over time.

The law makes it clear that \$2J1.2(b)(1)(B) of the guidelines, quote, Does not impose an additional seriousness requirement beyond the fact of a violent threat, close quote. That's the *United States versus Bahkairi*, 714 F.3d 1057 at 1061, from the Eighth Circuit, quoting *United States versus Plumley*, 207 F.3d 1086.

The subjective affect of a threat on a recipient or whether the threatened injury or damage was attempted or

carried out is not the triggering event. Application of the enhancement turns on whether the defendant made a threat, and that's all. That's *United States versus Bender*, 927 F.3d 1031 at 1033, Eighth Circuit, at -- from 2019: The enhancement does not require that Bender's acts caused some type of harm, such as death, injury, or even an apprehension of retaliation. The defense asserted in its pleadings that the enhancement doesn't apply to lesser threats, but none of the cases it cites stands for the proposition that the seriousness of a threat determines the application of the enhancement.

In *United States versus Sanchez*, the Eighth Circuit, again, 676 F.3d 627, rejected arguments that the enhancement didn't apply given that the defendant didn't mean for her statements to be threatening or to be communicated to the witness because neither argument addresses whether the threats made were, in fact, threats.

The guideline plainly applies. Even if one considers the threat to the dog to be property damage, that's covered too. Application Note 5 explains that the guideline includes threats of property loss or damage, quote, Threatened as a means of witness intimidation.

But as the second government's memorandum appears to be suggesting, as the defense has argued, the vague nature of the threat concerning any physical harm and its actual impact on Mr. Credico can be considered when I determine whether this

sentence should fall within the guideline range or not, and they will.

So we're still at Level 22 so far, and we're still calculating the guidelines.

Returning to the guidelines for obstruction of justice, the offense of conviction, we're still under the offense level and trying to figure that out. There is another specific offense characteristic which could apply, which is \$2J1.2(b)(2). If the offense resulted in substantial interference with the administration of justice, you add three levels.

The defense says, well, I've already been sentenced for the obstruction of justice in Count 1. But that's not a proper objection to a specific offense characteristic for obstruction of justice. The way the guidelines work is they say an obstruction of justice, you start at Level 14, but then there's other factors that could take it up from there. One was the threats. Another one is the substantial interference.

The government includes this enhancement in its memorandum No 1. It didn't take it back in Memorandum No. 2.

Do you wish to address it's applicability here?
MR. CRABB: Yes, Your Honor.

We believe this enhancement, 2J1.2(b)(2), applies, as we set forth in both of our memoranda. And we ask the Court to consider, most specifically, the appropriate basis for this

application is the offense of conviction does not address whether or not the obstruction was successful. This enhancement specifically addresses that, the successfulness of the obstruction.

Here, the defendant's obstructive behavior was successful and we ask the Court to impose this enhancement.

THE COURT: All right.

The defense, again, I believe, provided me a memorandum on this subject. But, if you would like to emphasize points between the argument, I'll give you the opportunity to do that.

MR. GINSBERG: As indicated in our memorandum, the only case that we have found that addresses the applicability of this guideline offense level increase in the context of congressional testimony found that it does not apply in that context, unless there is a showing that there was an unnecessary substantial expenditure of governmental or judicial resources.

The government has not offered any evidence that that is the case. Probation has not indicated any evidence that that is the case. And our view is that, therefore, because this obstructive conduct of which Mr. Stone stands convicted did not occur in the context of a criminal investigation or judicial proceeding, the guideline does not apply based on the commentary to the guideline 2J1.2, Comment 1. And that case is

United States versus Weissman, 22 F.Supp. 2nd 187, in the Southern District of New York, from 1998.

The Court said there: Because Weissman's conduct occurred within the context of a congressional inquiry rather than a criminal investigation or a judicial proceeding, the only circumstance specified in the application notes pertinent to the case at bar is the, quote, unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental or court resources.

There's been no showing of that here. So our first part of this is that the guideline simply doesn't apply because the congressional testimony and other conduct related to the congressional investigation doesn't trigger the guideline.

Even were the Court to find that the guideline is applicable, however, the government takes a fairly myopic view of the impact of Mr. Stone's conduct. The government's argument is, essentially, the House Committee that investigated these issues was denied access to Mr. Credico and was denied access to Mr. Corsi and various documents, mostly the communications between the two gentlemen and Mr. Stone.

In making that argument, however, the government ignores the broader context, which is that there were other investigations simultaneously going on in which this same conduct was investigated. Specifically, the Special Counsel's Office also investigated these same things.

THE COURT: Well, Mr. Stone tried to get Mr. Credico

not to testify before them also; isn't that correct?

MR. GINSBERG: Mr. Stone does not stand convicted of interfering with Mr. Credico's testimony in any other proceeding but before the House. And, in fact, the Special Counsel's Office did speak to Mr. Credico.

They not only spoke to Mr. Credico, Mr. Credico provided them his computers, backup hard drives, access to old versions of all of his documents, his cell phones, his private communications, both text messages, email communications, communications over encrypted applications. They had an unusually large amount of material from Mr. Credico. They also spoke with Mr. Corsi, at length, numerous times.

And, effectively, the Special Counsel's Office came to the same conclusion that the House came to, which is that there was no evidence of any coordination, collusion, or conspiracy between any member of the Trump campaign and any agent of the Russian government involving the obtaining and dissemination of emails from the Democratic National Committee and others.

So --

THE COURT: Well, I think there were certainly some indications that, perhaps, the witnesses had not been entirely forthcoming, also. But, that's neither here nor there. I don't think that's the decisive issue here.

MR. GINSBERG: Agreed. And the -- whether they were

entirely forthcoming before the Special Counsel's Office or not, one can assume that they would have been similarly forthcoming before the House Committee, had they testified there.

The bottom line is, at the end of the day, the so-called denial of Mr. Credico and Mr. Corsi and their various communications to the House Committee, based on the outcome of the Special Counsel's Office, indicates that, in effect, Mr. Stone deprived the House of information that was, ultimately, of no investigative value, of any materiality.

And I note that the guideline requires not just some interference, but substantial interference. That's the increase that we're talking about, whether the conduct had substantial interference with the administration of justice.

So, you have a situation where we have a perfect example of what would have happened if they had Corsi and Credico and their communications. Ultimately, the conclusion's, essentially, the same. And so I think the myopic view of just looking at the House Committee report and saying: Well, it made these conclusions and it didn't have these people, therefore, there was an impact, that ignores the big picture.

And, again --

THE COURT: Well, didn't you and I try to talk about the bigger picture and his threats to Credico to not testify

1 and not talk to the FBI and not talk to Office of Special 2 Counsel? Didn't you just tell me I'm not supposed to think 3 about that, and I'm only supposed to look at what happened with the House, because that's all he's been convicted of? 4 5 MR. GINSBERG: I didn't say that you're not supposed 6 to think about that. I said that the impact of his conduct 7 with respect to this guideline is how did it impact the 8 administration of justice? 9 THE COURT: All right. And you're saying that the --10 MR. GINSBERG: The government --11 THE COURT: -- lack of impact, when they actually got 12 the information at the end of the day in the other 13 investigation, bears on the answer to that question. 14 MR. GINSBERG: I think it's dispositive. And I think 15 that the government's focus, the evidence that the government 16 points out, is that the way that you determine the impact is by 17 saying the House didn't have Corsi, Credico, or their 18 communications. But, we know when the Special Counsel's Office 19 had Corsi, Credico and their communications, they didn't reach 20 a different result. 21 So it's very hard, I think, to conclude that the 22 denial of those three things to the House Committee had a

So it's very hard, I think, to conclude that the denial of those three things to the House Committee had a substantial impact. Perhaps the report would have been somewhat different, but there can't be any material or substantial difference in their report as compared to the

23

24

25

```
1
       Special Counsel's Office report.
2
                 THE COURT: All right.
 3
                 Anything else?
                 MR. GINSBERG: Not on this point. But, if I just may
 4
 5
       briefly correct one thing.
 6
                 I apologize, but I've done my very best to become as
 7
       familiar with the record as I have been able in the time that
       I've been involved with this case.
 8
 9
                 But, it was brought to my attention that -- I don't
10
       know that this will change Your Honor's ruling in any way, but
11
       it was brought to my attention that Mr. Credico's grand jury
12
       testimony was not part of the record of these proceedings in
13
       any way, shape, or form, and the government hasn't offered it
14
       in support of the threat level --
15
                 THE COURT: It was an exhibit that's on the docket.
16
       It was sealed, but it existed.
17
                 MR. GINSBERG: Okay.
18
                 THE COURT: I forget who gave it to me at this point,
       but it's on the docket. I don't have the number in front of
19
20
       me. But --
                 MR. GINSBERG: I take Your Honor's word.
21
22
                 THE COURT: Otherwise, I would have never had the
23
       opportunity to see it.
24
                 MR. GINSBERG: Then I stand by my prior position.
25
                 THE COURT: All right.
```

I'm going to rule that the guideline applies. Adding the additional three levels, we get to Level 25.

Substantial interference with the administration of justice, as defined by the guideline, includes a premature or improper termination of a felony investigation, an indictment, verdict, or any judicial determination based on perjury, false testimony, or other false evidence, or the unnecessary expenditure of substantial governmental or court resources.

Obviously, if the offense of obstruction of justice can specifically apply to a congressional investigation, then, I believe, the specific offender characteristics that relate to obstruction of justice can apply to a congressional investigation. And I do believe that the record supports the notion that governmental resources were unnecessarily expended.

Mr. Stone lied, and he said he had no documents, no emails or texts with his claimed intermediary with

Julian Assange; no emails or texts with people associated with the campaign concerning his contacts with WikiLeaks. So the committee did not issue a subpoena for the trove of material Stone had in his possession and lost that opportunity to consider them and to delve further.

They spent considerable resources and they wasted them going after Credico as the supposed intermediary. They lost the benefit of his testimony when he acceded to pressure from Stone not to testify, and they didn't hear from Corsi, who

wasn't identified by Stone at all.

This obstruction lead the committee to reach incorrect conclusions about the lack of evidence that would contradict Stone's claims.

The defense argument that, well, eventually, the Office of Special Counsel got the information and none of it proved anything is completely beside the point, and it is highly speculative. He misdirected the committee by denying the existence of evidence of communications, trying to pass information to and from Julian Assange, and evidence reflecting his reports on those communications to the campaign and it led to an inaccurate, incorrect, incomplete report.

The defendant's arguments about his relative insignificance to the matters under investigation, again, go to the question of a variance and not the applicability of the guideline.

So, we're now at Level 25 for the offense itself, but the guidelines say we're not finished yet. The guidelines also have adjustments that apply to the offender, and they can take the calculation up or down based on the presence or absence of various aggravating and mitigating factors.

The presentence report did not include an adjustment for the defendant's role in the offense. However, the government's memorandum did. And it asked me to add two points under \$2B1.2(b)(3)(c) for an aggravating role, because his

```
1
       criminal activity was otherwise extensive. I think they meant
2
       §2B1.1(c), which says: If the defendant was an organizer,
 3
       leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity that
       involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.
 4
 5
                 Does the government want to address this enhancement?
                 MR. CRABB: Yes, Your Honor.
 6
 7
                 THE COURT: All right.
 8
                 MR. CRABB: And first, if I may, Your Honor, I
 9
       believe we did have a typographical error. We were referring
10
       to 2J1.1(b)(3)(C), is, I believe, what we had intended to
11
       reference with respect to the extensive of scope, planning and
       preparation of the obstruction. I apologize if there's a
12
13
       typographical error in our filing.
14
                 THE COURT: All right. Well, I wasn't -- I haven't
15
       even looked at that because you said 2B1, which is role in the
16
       offense, and, I think, you called it role in the offense, and
17
       that's what the defense responded to. And that relates to the
18
       number of participants involved in the scheme, and so I don't
19
       think it applies here because there's really no indication that
20
       anybody was involved in this other than Mr. Stone,
21
       notwithstanding his attempt to get Mr. Credico involved.
22
                 So, what are you pointing me to now?
23
                 MR. CRABB: Again, I apologize for our mistake there,
24
       but, we're asking the Court to consider 2J1.1(b)(3)(C).
25
                 MR. GINSBERG: Your Honor, it's actually 2B1.2.
```

1 MR. CRABB: Excuse me, again. Your Honor, this particular adjustment to the 2 3 quidelines applies if the obstructive conduct was extensive in 4 scope, planning, or preparation. It's our position, based on 5 the record before the Court, that there was extensive scope in 6 the obstructive behavior here. 7 As the Court is well aware, there were a series of lies made to the committee. There were false letters submitted 8 9 to the committee. There was the obstructive behavior with 10 respect to Mr. Credico. Based on those facts, we believe this enhancement 11 applies, showing that the obstructive behavior was extensive in 12 13 scope. 14 THE COURT: All right. Has the defense been advised, 15 before this minute, that this is what we're talking about? 16 MR. GINSBERG: Yes, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: All right. Someone might have mentioned 18 it to me. But, I'll give you an opportunity to address it. 19 And if somebody has a copy of the quidelines and would like to 20 hand them up and let me look at it, that would be useful also. 21 MR. GINSBERG: I have them. 22 23

THE COURT: So, it says: If the offense, A, involved the destruction, alteration, or fabrication of a substantial number of records, documents, or tangible objects; B, involved the selection of any essential or especially probative record,

24

25

document, or tangible object to destroy or alter; or C, was otherwise extensive in scope, planning, or preparation.

And I think C is somewhat -- is part of a series, and it derives some meaning for the two that came before, increase by two levels.

All right. Go ahead.

MR. GINSBERG: It's our view that this does not apply. The cases that address this, in particular, the two that the government cited, involve much more extensive conduct. Here, essentially, all you have is five false statements in the context of very lengthy testimony, and, yes, a long stream of text messages. But, basically, that's what it is, is a stream of text messages between two people.

The conduct here does not fall outside the normal realm of the guideline such that it is extensive in scope. It was fairly focused in its scope. It wasn't extensive in its planning. I think there was very little evidence of planning or preparation.

The case that the government relies on is

United States versus Petruk, 836 F.3d 974, from the Eighth

Circuit in 2016. And the Court in that case found that the

defendant had concocted an elaborate plan to manufacture false

evidence of a confession. And in doing that, the defendant,

who was incarcerated, enlisted someone on the outside to find a

third party to pretend to be someone who was involved in the

offense. The defendant drafted multiple versions of a script that he wanted the supposed person involved in this conduct to read. He sent that information to his would-be coconspirator under the name of another inmate to avoid detection.

He used coded language in doing it so that if it were intercepted, it would not be understood. And he created a system where he had this person prepared to read this false script in order to exculpate himself, with the idea that it would be overheard on the prison telephones by the prison authorities and then be brought to the attention of the Court and introduced as false evidence in a trial.

That is certainly a lot more planning and preparation than anything that went on here.

THE COURT: All right. The probation office did not find this enhancement to be applicable and neither do I. I don't think that we're looking at extensive scope or planning. As is contemplated by that guideline, I don't think it applies to these facts. So, I'm not going to add two more levels at this point for that. So, we're still at Level 25.

Now, however, we do go on to other sections of the guidelines that look to other aggravating and mitigating factors, and both the presentence report and the government's memorandum point to §3C1.1, obstructing or impeding the administration of justice. And that is this prosecution now we're talking about, not the House investigation, that adds two

levels.

And the guideline says: If the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded or attempted to obstruct or impede the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and the obstructive conduct related to his offense of conviction and any relevant conduct or a closely related offense, you increase by two levels.

And the government's memorandum, the first one, said it applies. It detailed in five pages the defendant's post-indictment attempts to stoke public sentiment against the prosecution and the Court, and to bring media attention to the case, all in violation of Court orders, and this series of inaccuracies, contradictions, and omissions in his representations to the Court.

The supplemental memorandum says: Well, this enhancement overlaps, to a degree, with the offense conduct in this case.

I'm not sure I understand that assertion. As proposed, the guideline is not meant to cover any pre-indictment conduct at all. And, yes, the guideline says it doesn't apply if obstruction of justice is the charge of conviction; but, that's not true, say the guidelines, if there is further obstruction during the prosecution.

The government also said in its supplemental memo:

```
1
       It's unclear to what extent the defendant's obstructive conduct
2
       actually prejudiced the government at trial.
 3
                 But that isn't the test. Obstruction is an attempt;
       it doesn't have to be successful. And the administration of
 4
 5
       justice is a little bit more than whether they got in the
 6
       prosecution's way.
 7
                 So, what is the government's position today on
       whether this applies or doesn't apply?
 8
 9
                 MR. CRABB: Your Honor, the government's position is
10
       that the guideline's enhancement set forth in 3C1.1 applies
11
       here for the reasons set forth in the original sentencing
12
       memorandum.
13
                 THE COURT: All right. Is there anything further you
14
       want to say about it?
15
                 MR. CRABB: Not unless the Court has questions for
16
       me.
17
                 THE COURT: Okay. Fine.
18
                 The defense says: Well, these issues ceased well
19
       before the trial began.
20
                 And that, unfortunately, does not appear to be true,
21
       given the reporting by Alex Jones of Mr. Stone's reaching out
22
       to him while the trial was ongoing.
23
                 The defense also says, quote: As was made plain
24
       during the relevant proceedings, the conduct in question
25
       resulted, in large measure, from the exacerbation of a
```

longstanding battle with anxiety that was heightened during the pendency of this action, close quote.

I'm not sure that was established with evidence at any point in the proceeding. I'm certainly willing to grant that being a criminal defendant did increase Mr. Stone's anxiety, but the conduct is exactly the sort of provocative public statement, not necessarily grounded in truth, that the defendant has been trading in for years, as the evidence at trial established, and as I was just told with respect to the first enhancement.

Even after he first denied and then acknowledged personally selecting the crosshairs photo, he sat there telling me: Yes, I'm going to follow any restrictions on talking about the investigation; but, forgetting to mention that he had a book on the subject wending its way to publishers as we spoke. I certainly haven't seen anything that would attribute that to mere anxiety.

The defense also says his conduct, quote: Didn't cause significant further obstruction of the prosecution of the case, close quote.

And, so, I would like the -- to hear the defense on this. But, first, I would like to know where you get that test from. Do I have to find significant further obstruction of the prosecution of the case for this guideline to apply?

MR. GINSBERG: One moment, Your Honor.

1 (Pause.) 2 MR. GINSBERG: With respect to the test, Your Honor, 3 the -- such an adjustment, quote: Is not to be applied to the offense level for obstruction of justice, except if a 4 5 significant further instruction occurred during the 6 prosecution. 7 And that's United States sentencing guideline §3C1.1, Note 7. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. During the prosecution, yes. 10 Further obstruction of the administration of justice during the 11 prosecution. MR. GINSBERG: Significant further obstruction. 12 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. GINSBERG: So, that's where the test comes from. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 16 MR. GINSBERG: Beyond that, we stand on our papers 17 and leave it to the Court to decide. 18 THE COURT: All right. I think the place to look for 19 quidance about what the adjustment is supposed to cover is the 20 guideline itself. Application Note 3 says that obstructive 21 conduct can vary widely in nature, degree of planning, and 22 seriousness. 23 And it says, Application Note 4 will set forth 24 examples of the types of conduct to which it applies. And 5

sets forth examples of less serious forms of conduct to which

25

it's not intended to apply.

It also says: Although the conduct to which this adjustment applies is not subject to precise definition, if you compare what's in 4 and 5, that should assist the Court in determining whether application of this adjustment is warranted in any particular case.

So, if you look at what's in Note 5, the list of things to which the adjustment doesn't apply, none of them are analogous. They're all things like giving the police the wrong name when they stop you, making false statements after you've been arrested.

Application Note 4 contains what is supposed to be a non-exhaustive list of examples of the type of conduct to which this should apply. A. is threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a codefendant, witness, or juror directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so;

- B. has to do with suborning perjury;
- C., producing or attempting to produce false or
  altered documents;
- D., destroying or concealing evidence or getting someone else to do it;
- E., escaping or attempting to escape from custody or willfully failing to appear;
- F., providing materially false information to a judge or magistrate judge;

1 G., providing a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer that obstructs the investigation; 2 3 H., providing materially false information to a probation officer in a presentence investigation; 4 5 I., other conduct prohibited by the obstruction of 6 justice provisions in Title 18; 7 J., failing to comply with a restraining order or injunction issued; 8 9 K., threatening the victim of the offense in an 10 attempt to prevent the victim from reporting the conduct. 11 None of them are 100 percent on point. But, 12 certainly, A., threatening or intimidating a juror or a 13 factfinder in the case; F., providing false information to a 14 judge; and J., not complying with the restraining order. 15 the orders here are not the ones specifically mentioned in the 16 list, it's not necessary that there's an exact fit. The list 17 is supposed to be illustrative. 18 And given the similarity of the conduct in this case 19 to what's listed in A., F., and J., I find that the quideline 20 The defendant engaged in threatening and intimidating 21 conduct towards the Court, and later, participants in the 22 National Security and Office of Special Counsel investigations 23 that could and did impede the administration of justice. 24 I suppose I could say: Oh, I don't know that I 25 believe that Roger Stone was actually going to hurt me, or that

he intended to hurt me. It's just classic bad judgment.

But, the D.C. Circuit has made it clear that such conduct satisfied the test. They said: To the extent our precedent holds that a \$3C1.1 enhancement is only appropriate where the defendant acts with the intent to obstruct justice, a requirement that flows logically from the definition of the word "willful" requires that the defendant consciously act with the purpose of obstructing justice.

However, where the defendant willfully engages in behavior that is inherently obstructive, that is, behavior that a rational person would expect to obstruct justice, this Court has not required a separate finding of the specific intent to obstruct justice.

Here, the defendant willfully engaged in behavior that a rational person would find to be inherently obstructive. It's important to note that he didn't just fire off a few intemperate emails. He used the tools of social media to achieve the broadest dissemination possible. It wasn't accidental. He had a staff that helped him do it.

As the defendant emphasized in emails introduced into evidence in this case, using the new social media is his "sweet spot." It's his area of expertise. And even the letters submitted on his behalf by his friends emphasized that incendiary activity is precisely what he is specifically known for. He knew exactly what he was doing. And by choosing

Instagram and Twitter as his platforms, he understood that he was multiplying the number of people who would hear his message.

By deliberately stoking public opinion against prosecution and the Court in this matter, he willfully increased the risk that someone else, with even poorer judgment than he has, would act on his behalf. This is intolerable to the administration of justice, and the Court cannot sit idly by, shrug its shoulder and say: Oh, that's just Roger being Roger, or it wouldn't have grounds to act the next time someone tries it.

The behavior was designed to disrupt and divert the proceedings, and the impact was compounded by the defendant's disingenuousness. As the opinion in *Henry* pointed out in *U.S. versus Maccado*, 225 F.3d 766, at 772, the D.C. Circuit even upheld a §3C1.1 enhancement for failure to provide a handwriting example because such failure, quote, Clearly has the potential to weaken the government's case, prolong the pendency of the charges, and encumber the Court's docket.

And the record didn't show a lack of such intent. The defendant's conduct here certainly imposed an undue burden on the Court's docket and court personnel, as we had to waste considerable time convening hearing after hearing to get the defendant to finally be straight about the facts, to get the defendant to comply with court orders that were clear as day,

and to ensure that the public and that people who come and go from this building every day were safe. Therefore, I'm going to add the two levels, and we are now at a Level 27.

So, now what? Now, what do the guidelines do? The guidelines have a sentencing table. It's a grid. The offense level goes down the left side and your criminal history category goes across the top and then you compare the two to find out where is the recommended sentencing guideline range for this case.

The defendant has no prior criminal history. That puts him in Criminal History Category Roman numeral I. This means that his lack of any prior criminal history, which both the defendant and the government exhorted me to consider, is actually already baked into the guidelines to some extent. The advisory sentencing guideline range that applies to Level 27 is 70 to 87 months, or 5.8 to 7.25 years, and a fine of \$25,000 to \$250,000.

Without it, without the last two levels, if we'd been at Level 25, the guideline range would have been 57 to 71 months, or 4 3/4 to almost 6 years, and a fine of \$20,000 to \$200,000.

I note that the initial government guideline calculation at Level 29, or 87 to 109 months, came out to a 7 1/4 to a 9-year range. And the government's supplemental brief points out, if I had calculated as it had asked me to

with respect to all the other enhancements, but he didn't receive the eight-level enhancement for threats at all, even that would have resulted in an advisory sentencing guideline range of 37 to 46 months.

Once I determine what the applicable guideline range is, I have to consider whether there are any motions within the guidelines for a downward departure. The defense mentioned several guidelines that could bear on this issue, but I just want to know right now whether you are seeking a formal departure, or you're simply asking me to take into consideration his age and his health? And I believe you've also argued his diminished capacity at the time he committed the offense.

MR. GINSBERG: We're not seeking a departure. We have 3553 arguments, but no guideline departure arguments.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.

So, now the guideline has been calculated. But, as I said at the beginning, that's just the starting point. The parties have put their views in writing, but now is the time that they also get to speak.

Would the government like an opportunity to speak regarding the appropriate sentence in this case?

Mr. Crabb, I'm happy to hear from you. And as I understand it, you're representing United States of America in the case of the *United States of America versus Roger Stone*. I

```
1
       fear that you know less about the case, saw less of the
2
       testimony and the exhibits than just about every other person
 3
       in this courtroom, with the possible exception of the defense
 4
       attorney who just joined the team.
 5
                 So, before we get to your allocution, is there
 6
       anything you would like to say about why you're the one
 7
       standing here today?
                 MR. CRABB: Your Honor, I have four points that I
 8
 9
       would like to briefly address, which I think will incorporate
10
       that. May I do that?
11
                 THE COURT: All right.
12
                 MR. CRABB: Thank you.
13
                 First, Your Honor, I want to apologize to the Court
14
       for the confusion that the government has caused with respect
15
       to this sentencing and the difficulties surrounding that. I
16
       want to make clear to the Court that this confusion was not
17
       caused by the original trial team. The original trial team had
18
       authorization at the U.S. Attorney's Office to file this
19
       sentencing memorandum that they submitted to the Court Monday
20
       before last.
21
                 THE COURT: Let me just follow up on that.
22
                 So they -- the trial team wrote it?
23
                 MR. CRABB: Yes, Your Honor.
24
                 THE COURT: But someone higher up than them had to
25
       approve it?
```

```
1
                 MR. CRABB: Correct, Your Honor.
                 THE COURT: Does that include you?
2
 3
                 MR. CRABB: I was part of the process, Your Honor.
                 THE COURT: All right. Did it go all the way to the
 4
 5
       U.S. Attorney?
                 MR. CRABB: Yes, the U.S. Attorney reviewed it, Your
 6
 7
       Honor.
                 THE COURT: Did he approve it?
 8
 9
                 MR. CRABB: Yes, Your Honor.
10
                 THE COURT: And did the U.S. Attorney's Office for
11
       the District of Columbia then have to get approval from Main
       Justice before it was filed?
12
13
                 MR. CRABB: I don't know the exact requirements. I
14
       know that there was consultation between the United States
15
       Attorney's Office and Main Justice.
16
                 THE COURT: Did they receive the approval from Main
17
       Justice before they filed it?
18
                 MR. CRABB: No, Your Honor. My understanding is
19
       based on what the Attorney General has stated, is there was a
20
       miscommunication between the Attorney General and the
21
       United States Attorney for the District of Columbia as to the
22
       authorization and the expectations that the Attorney General
23
       had.
24
                 THE COURT: But, it was approved by everyone whose
25
       name was on it, including the U.S. Attorney?
```

1 MR. CRABB: Yes, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Well, did your office have to wait for 3 Main Justice to get back to you before you could file it? 4 MR. CRABB: I'm not sure if I understand the Court's 5 question. What I understand is that there was a 6 miscommunication before it was filed between the Attorney 7 General and the United States Attorney as to what the 8 expectations were from the Attorney General and what the 9 appropriate filing would be. 10 THE COURT: Well, can you elaborate? Do you have any 11 personal knowledge about what the nature of that 12 miscommunication was? 13 MR. CRABB: No, Your Honor, I don't. 14 THE COURT: You're not suggesting now that anything 15 that was in the first filing about the nature of the offenses 16 or the calculation of the guidelines or the evidence in the 17 case was incorrect, are you? 18 MR. CRABB: I'm not, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: All right. Continue with what you were 20 about to tell me. 21 MR. CRABB: Thank you, Your Honor. 22 The second point I would like to briefly address is I 23 want to state, and I would like to emphasize this, that the 24 original sentencing memorandum filed by the trial team was done 25 in good faith. Sentencing is not an exact science. Reasonable

```
1
       minds can differ as to what an appropriate sentence may be.
       But, as the Court has alluded to earlier in this proceeding, it
2
 3
       is generally the policy of the United States Department of
       Justice to request guideline sentences. And there was nothing
 4
 5
       in bad faith about what was done by the original trial team
 6
       here.
 7
                 THE COURT: Well, it's not just a question of whether
 8
       it was good faith. It was fully consistent with current DOJ
 9
       policy; isn't that true?
10
                 MR. CRABB: Yes, Your Honor. If I may add one point
11
       to that.
12
                 As I've said, it's consistent with the Department of
13
       Justice policy to request a sentence within the guidelines.
14
       But, it's also the Department of Justice policy, as set
15
       together in the Justice Manual, that there should be a
16
       particularized review of any case applying the law to the facts
17
       and circumstances of any defendant's case before --
18
                 THE COURT: The current policy of this Department of
19
       Justice is to charge and prosecute the most serious offense
20
       available in order to get the highest level guideline; is that
21
       correct?
22
                 MR. CRABB: That's the general policy, Your Honor.
23
       If I --
24
                 THE COURT: And I've been told by assistants standing
25
       before me that they aren't even allowed to recommend or agree
```

```
1
       to a sentence below the guideline range without supervisory
       approval in your office; is that correct?
2
                 MR. CRABB: That's true, Your Honor.
 3
                 THE COURT: All right. Continue.
 4
 5
                 MR. CRABB: Thank you, Your Honor.
                 The third point I would like to briefly address, Your
 6
 7
       Honor, is the Department of Justice and United States
 8
       Attorney's Office is committed to enforcing the law without
 9
       fear, favor, or political influence. This prosecution was and
10
       this prosecution is righteous. The defendant was found guilty
11
       by a jury of his peers of committing serious crimes:
12
       Obstructing justice, lying to Congress, and witness tampering.
13
                 We believe that based on those crimes of conviction,
14
       the Court should impose a substantial period of incarceration.
15
                 THE COURT: All right. Now, with respect to the
16
       second filing, your name is on it and you're the one that
17
       signed it, physically signed it. So does that mean that you
18
       wrote it?
19
                 MR. CRABB: Your Honor, I'm not at liberty to discuss
20
       the internal deliberations and how materials are prepared
21
       within the United States Attorney's Office or the Department of
22
       Justice. But, the Court's right, I signed that document and
23
       submitted it.
24
                 THE COURT: Well, were you directed to write it by
25
       someone else?
```

1 MR. CRABB: Your Honor, I apologize. I cannot engage in those discussions of internal deliberations. 2 3 THE COURT: All right. Is there anything else you want to tell me about why I should impose a substantial period 4 5 of incarceration in this case? 6 MR. CRABB: Nothing more than to reiterate that this 7 is a righteous prosecution and the offenses of conviction are serious and has been set forth in more detail in the original 8 9 sentencing memorandum as to the nature and circumstances of the 10 offense, which, as the Court has pointed out to me, the Court 11 knows better than I do. 12 THE COURT: All right. Well, are you making a 13 recommendation as to what the sentences should be? Other 14 offices, I think, that's standard operating procedure, to not 15 make a recommendation and just defer to the Court. But, the 16 usual U.S. Attorney's Office of the District of Columbia's 17 practice is to stand here and advocate for a particular 18 outcome. 19 So, are you not planning to do that today? 20 MR. CRABB: Your Honor, that brings me to the last 21 and final point I wanted to make for the Court. 22 May I address that now? 23 THE COURT: Yes. 24 MR. CRABB: Your Honor, the last point I would like 25 to make is that under the unique facts and circumstances

presented in this matter, it is particularly appropriate for the government to defer to the Court with respect to what the specific sentence would be in this case.

We understand that, as happens in all sentencings that are adjudicated in this courthouse, that the Court will consider the entire record in this matter, that the Court will consider the guidelines and the appropriate sentencing factors, and that the Court will consider the submissions of the parties, which the Court has already referred to, and the submission of the probation office. And, most importantly, the Court will rely on its own sound judgment and experience.

To add to that, Your Honor, given this Court's unique experience with related cases before this Court, and this Court's record of thoughtful analysis and fair sentences imposed in those cases, the government has the utmost confidence that we defer to the Court, and we have confidence that the Court will impose a just and fair sentence in this matter.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

MR. CRABB: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Would defense counsel like to speak on

the defendant's behalf?

MR. GINSBERG: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GINSBERG: Having reviewed the record in this

case, Your Honor, it's clear that the Court, throughout these proceedings, has endeavored to make rulings designed to keep these proceedings focused on the evidence in this courtroom, and on this case and this case alone.

And now, as the Court is about to sentence Mr. Stone, we believe that it is critically important that the Court continue to do just that, and not to focus on all of the many things that are going on outside of this courtroom, for the sentence that the Court is going to impose today is a sentence that is going to be imposed on a real person; not a media figure, not a political character, but a real person.

And I'm sure the Court is accustomed to defense lawyers standing before it and talking about the impact that a sentence has on a defendant's family. But, in this case, given Mr. Stone's larger-than-life persona, I think it's particularly important to remind the Court that Mr. Stone is, in fact, not simply that public persona, but a human being. A person with a wife, who is here today; children, who are also here with us; grandchildren, others who support and care for him. And he's also soon to be a great grandfather.

And it is with these things in mind that I ask the Court to consider the full scope of the person who stands before you for sentencing, and to step back and evaluate this case not in the hyperbolic terms that were uttered during the height of battle in the course of litigation in a trial, but

from a more objective perspective that places this case in the broader scheme of cases of a similar nature, with defendants similarly situated, generally speaking, but also considering sentences imposed on defendants in cases that emanated from this investigation and related investigations in order to avoid, as the law requires, any unwarranted disparities.

And as the Court noted, we do want the Court to realize that Mr. Stone, at 67 years old, stands before Your Honor with no criminal record. It's true that's factored into the guidelines to some extent. But, there's significant evidence that people who are first-time offenders at Mr. Stone's age have, effectively, no likelihood of recidivism. And that is something that, I think, should weigh into the Court's calculation, because it is one of the factors that 3553(a) states is an important goal of sentencing, the specific deterrence.

THE COURT: Yes, there's a difference being in Category I when you're 21 and being in Category I when you're 67.

MR. GINSBERG: Yes. We've all had experience with that.

And as outlined in the letters that the Court has received and detailed on the record, Mr. Stone has many admirable qualities. The Court received letters from people Mr. Stone knows quite well who are very close to him, and

people who he hardly knows or doesn't know at all.

He's devoted himself to worthwhile causes, and critically, not just through monetary contributions, like many. And not to disparage that, but there's something different when a person gives of his own time and his own efforts to try to help people, to try to support causes. It's different than just writing a check. We're thankful for all who do that, but there's something, I think, that it speaks to someone's character when they go out of their way to give of themselves.

He's devoted himself, for example, to causes that benefit veterans. He also devotes considerable time to the welfare of animals. And he, in that regard, has offered his services, pro bono, to a lobbying group that has successfully fought to end certain cruel testing on animals.

He's also done a great deal of work to assist NFL players who have suffered from traumatic brain injuries. In fact, that work caused a person, the wife of a retired NFL player who doesn't know Mr. Stone, to write to Your Honor and say this man, who has, really, no particular connection to me or my husband or any of these other NFL players who have suffered these horrible injuries, has done such tremendous work that he's had a direct personal impact on our lives.

That's something that, I think, takes Mr. Stone outside of the norm.

He's also, as reflected in the letters, a spiritual

person, and a person who has worked with groups to help bridge racial divides in this country.

And on a less grand scale, the Court also received a letter which, I think, is particularly telling. It's a letter from one of Mr. Stone's former employees, and it describes Mr. Stone in very, very personal terms, as a mentor, as someone who is kind, generous with his time, helpful. And, I think, this letter is telling, because grand public gestures aside, as worthwhile as they may be, I think you can judge a person's character best by the way he treats those closest to him, particularly people in a subordinate role.

And that letter, I think, is important in understanding who Mr. Stone really is, not the larger-than-life political persona that he plays on TV, but the real person, who goes home every day to his wife and his family, and who works day to day with people who respect him, who care for him, and who have stood up to tell the Court as much.

Now, of course, as I noted earlier, he does have a family and he is devoted to them and they will suffer tremendously if he is incarcerated. And, indeed, they've already suffered quite a bit, beginning with the horrific circumstances under which he was arrested, horrifying circumstances that, really, had quite an impactful negative experience for them.

And so in some sense, with -- although I said we

should focus only on what's in the courtroom, with the intense public scrutiny that this case has engendered and the particular stresses of this case, both for Mr. Stone and his family, the process, really, to some extent, has already been the punishment.

Now, I recognize that the jury has found that Mr. Stone violated our laws and that the Court must impose sentence on him. But, as the law also states, that sentence should be sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the aims in the statute. And one of those aims is to promote respect for the law.

And in this proceeding, as in any proceeding, there is always an awareness that what is done in our courtrooms sends a message to the broader public. And here, as in every case, the most important message that can be sent is one of fairness of the judicial system and justice for all who come before it, because it is that message that will promote the greatest respect for the law.

Now, as the government pointed out in its supplemental sentencing submission, the guidelines in this case disproportionately escalate Mr. Stone's sentencing exposure to a level more typical of cases not of obstruction of justice, but of armed robbery. In fact, the government indicated, as Your Honor is aware, that a sentence far less than 87 to 108 months would be appropriate here. Far less.

1 And so for all of these reasons, including, most 2 importantly, Mr. Stone's age, his health, and his lack of 3 criminal history, we respectfully submit that a non-incarceratory sentence is appropriate here. 4 5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 6 Mr. Stone, you have the opportunity now to say 7 anything that you would like me to consider before I impose 8 sentence. I do understand that you went to trial, you asserted 9 your innocence, and you're likely going to be filing an appeal. 10 So you and your team may have decided that you should not 11 speak, and I respect that completely and won't hold it against 12 you if you don't, but just want to let you know that this is 13 your opportunity. 14 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, I choose not to speak at 15 this time. 16 Thank you very much. 17 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 18 At this point I want to take a short break, and then 19 we'll return. Once again, the clock on the wall and the watch 20 on my arm are in somewhat different time zones. So I believe 21 it's approximately 11:20, and we'll resume in about 10 or 15 22 minutes. 23 Thank you. 24 (Recess.) 25 THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: Your Honor, recalling Criminal

1 Case Number 19-18, the United States of America v. Roger Stone. 2 Mr. Stone is present in the courtroom. 3 For the government we have Mr. Crabb and Mr. Cooney. For defense we have Mr. Ginsberg, Mr. Rogow, 4 5 Mr. Buschel, Mr. Smith, and Ms. Campion. 6 THE COURT: All right. Unsurprisingly, I have a lot 7 to say. Ordinarily, the defendant and counsel stand at the 8 lectern while I go through my remarks, so I'm going to ask you 9 to step up now. 10 All of you? All right. 11 MR. ROGOW: We're the ones --12 THE COURT: You may want to rethink that. 13 MR. BUSCHEL: Just us, Judge. 14 THE COURT: All right. 15 The best tool I have for structuring my thinking 16 about the task that falls to me today is the statute, which I 17 always find to be thorough and a helpful listing of all the 18 relevant consideration. So what I'm going to do now is what I 19 always do, which is go through every single factor. Following 20 that process ensures that I handle every case in the same 21 manner as the ones that came before. 22 The first factor that the statute tells me I must 23 consider is the nature and circumstances of the offense, which 24 is where you have to start before you can assess what sentence 25 would be proportionate or just.

One letter writer wrote to me: In politics, the successful person doing all the right things for all the right reasons can be, and will be, vilified and maligned in a high-profile way by adversaries to get political advantage.

That is what happened and what is happening to Roger Stone.

People that he confronted with his talents, rightfully placed, sought to derogate him, call him names, and accuse him of political advantage.

That is most certainly not what happened here. Those are not the circumstances of this offense. He has not been prosecuted by his adversary or anyone else's adversary, and he was not prosecuted to enable anyone to gain political advantage.

This case did not arise because Roger Stone was being pursued by his political enemies. It arose because Roger Stone, characteristically, injected himself smack into the center of one of the most significant issues of the day. Let me give that some context.

In June 2016, during the run-up to the last presidential election, the head of WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, publically announced that WikiLeaks had information concerning the democratic candidate Hillary Clinton that was awaiting publication. Shortly thereafter, the Democratic National Committee announced that its server had been hacked by the Russians. On, approximately July 22nd WikiLeaks began

releasing thousands of DNC emails.

Three days later, the evidence showed Mr. Stone emailed a person he knew named Jerome Corsi, RE: Get to Assange.

Stone encouraged Corsi to get to Assange in the Ecuadorian embassy in London, and he suggested that the pending WikiLeaks emails, allegedly, dealt with the Clinton Foundation.

There were other emails between the two, including one on August 2nd from Corsi to Stone: Word is, our friend at embassy plans two more dumps. One shortly after I'm back, second in October. Impact planned to be very damaging. Time to let more than Podesta be exposed as in bed with the enemy if they're not ready to drop HRC. That appears to be the game hackers are now about. Would not hurt to start suggesting HRC old, memory bad, had stroke -- neither he nor she will. I expect that to be much of the next dump focus, setting the stage for foundation debacle.

On August 3rd, Stone reaches out to the campaign manager, Paul Manafort: I have an idea -- in his words -- to save Trump's ass.

Just a few days later, after that, Stone began making a series of public statements, at least five between August 8th and August 16th, announcing that he was in communication with Assange, and suggesting that he knew what was coming.

Initially, he stated that he had communicated with Assange. He

then back-peddled and clarified that he had communicated, but through an intermediary. He referred to the intermediary as a "back channel," a "trusted mutual friend."

During the same time period Stone was communicating with senior members of the Trump campaign, including deputy campaign chair Richard Gates, and CEO Steve Bannon about WikiLeaks plans.

On August 18 he emailed Mr. Bannon: Trump can win, but time is running out. I do know how to win this, but it ain't pretty. Campaign has never been good at playing the new media.

Bannon responds with: Let's talk ASAP.

Later, in August, Stone learned that a friend and radio personality named Randy Credico had managed to set up an interview with Assange. So beginning in September 2017, Stone started emailing Credico, asking him to relay a request to Assange concerning which additional emails would or should be released. This went on in September and October, and when Credico would indicate that he had information -- although, apparently, he didn't -- Stone would turn around and pass it along to Bannon, etcetera.

From the start, though, Credico consistently reminded Stone that he could not possibly have been the intermediary Stone had spoken about in early August because he hadn't even met Assange as of the time Stone was proudly making

announcements about his contact.

Thereafter, in January 2017, the United States House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence announced an investigation into allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election.

As part of that investigation, the House Intelligence Committee was also looking into whether Russia was involved in obtaining and transmitting stolen documents that were eventually released by Wiki, and whether there were any leaks between any of that and the Trump campaign.

In the public version of its parameters for Russia investigation, dated March 1, 2017, the committee said that the investigation would seek to answer four questions, including what Russian cyber activities and other active measures were directed against the United States and its allies, and did the Russian active measures include links between Russia and individuals associated with political campaigns or any other U.S. persons.

The announcement went on, quote: Chairman Nunes said the Intelligence Committee has been investigating Russia for years and warning about the Putin regime's hostile international actions, its aggressions in cyberspace, and its influential international propaganda campaign. The committee is determined to continue and expand its inquiries into these areas, including Russian activities related to the 2016 U.S.

elections. On a bipartisan basis, we will fully investigate all the evidence we collect and follow the evidence wherever it leads.

Stone let the committee know he would volunteer to testify and, unsurprisingly, the committee asked him to come to talk about what he had publicly stated.

Stone, of course, knew that his claimed contacts with Assange would be a subject of the testimony. His own opening statement to the committee reveals his understanding that his contacts with or transmittal of messages or requests to WikiLeaks or Assange, either directly or through a middleman, would be a subject of the committee's inquiry.

And, sure enough, the transcript of the September 26 hearings include multiple questions to Stone about Assange and WikiLeaks, as well as statements by members of the committee of both parties made to him while he was testifying, emphasizing the importance of any communications with WikiLeaks to their inquiries.

The importance of the subject matter was born out by the report written by the republican majority on the committee. Matters investigated by the committee, they said, include allegations pertaining to involvement in or knowledge about the publication of stolen emails.

They also wrote: Particularly in light of Candidate
Trump's expressed enthusiasm for WikiLeaks, the committee

examined the relationship between his associates and the stolen emails.

It added: During his testimony to the committee,

Stone addressed three public statements suggesting he might
have important information about and potentially advance
knowledge of disclosures during the 2016 campaign, including an
August 2016 public speech about purported contacts with
Julian Assange.

Stone did testify before the committee on September 26, 2017. He claimed he had only one intermediary. Then and after, the members repeatedly exhorted him to identify this supposed intermediary. He let the committee know it was Randy Credico. But, he said he had no emails or texts that would shed any light on the issue. It was all false.

And afterwards, he endeavored mightily to make sure the person he had falsely named didn't tell the truth and mess up the story. That is why he was indicted; not for his political activities.

In fact, the record shows that when the Department of Justice formally asked the committee for the hearing transcript and other materials about the defendant, on December 20th, 2018 the then chair of the committee, Republican Congressman Devin Nunes, transmitted the information to the department, quote: Pursuant to a committee vote, close quote.

And, quote: With no restrictions on use by the

Special Counsel's Office of other components of the Department of Justice, close quote.

The notion that this case rises and falls with whether Russian interference has been proven, or whether Russia was actually behind the hack of the DNC computers is also false. This defendant was not charged with or convicted of having any role in conspiring with the Russians. He was not even charged with or convicted of lying about Russian collusion or about who was behind the hack.

So, let's review what the case is about and what he's being sentenced for.

In Counts 2 through 6, he was convicted of knowingly and willfully making material false statements to the House Committee on September 26, 2017.

Count 2, the evidence established that he testified falsely that, quote: He did not have emails with third parties about the head of WikiLeaks and that he did not have any documents, emails, or text messages that refer to Julian Assange.

That was his testimony.

At the hearing, the defendant was asked how he communicated with the individual he had publicly described on August 8th as his go-between, mutual friend, or intermediary. He was asked: Did you have any?

And he said: Over the phone.

1 Question: Did you have any other means of communicating with the intermediary? 2 3 Answer: No. No text messages not on the list? 4 5 No. 6 Another question: So you have no emails to anyone 7 concerning any discussions you've had with third parties about 8 Julian Assange? You have no emails, no text, no documents 9 whatsoever, any kind of that nature? 10 That's correct, not to my knowledge. Answer: 11 So you never communicated with your intermediary in 12 writing in any way? 13 No. 14 Never emailed him or texted him? 15 He's not an email guy. 16 So all your conversations with him were in person or 17 over the phone? 18 Answer: Correct. 19 This is not mere equivocation. This is not the 20 product of confusion. The exhibits alone establish that these 21 answers were plainly false with respect to both Corsi and 22 Credico, with whom he carried on a lively, lengthy, and often 23 quite profane correspondence. 24 In Count 3, he was convicted of testifying falsely 25 that, quote: His August 2016 references to being in contact

with Julian Assange were references to communications with a single go-between, mutual friend, and intermediary, who he identified as Randy Credico.

During his testimony Stone made it clear that there was only one source, and it was clear from his testimony that he was talking about Credico. He said it was a journalist who had interviewed Assange, who had been to the embassy.

After the testimony, Stone supplied Credico's name in a letter. This was well established to be false, since the text and emails showed that Credico and Stone had never talked about Assange until after Stone decided to inform the public that he had been talking to Assange through an intermediary.

This count also demonstrated how carefully the jury worked to consider the evidence in light of the instructions and elements of each offense. It sent back several thoughtful notes asking for clarification and guidance.

In Count 4, Mr. Stone was convicted of testifying falsely that he did not ask the person he referred to as his go-between, mutual friend, or intermediary to communicate anything to Assange, and did not ask the intermediary to do anything on his behalf. Documents establish that this answer was plainly false with respect to both Corsi and Credico.

Count 5, he testified falsely that he and the person he referred to as his go-between, mutual friend, and intermediary did not communicate via text message or email

1 about WikiLeaks. Again, this was a flat-out lie. There were 1500 emails and texts with Credico alone. 2 3 Count 6, the written record and testimony of both Steve Bannon and Richard Gates established that he testified 4 5 falsely before the committee when he said that he never 6 discussed his conversations with the person he referred to as 7 his intermediary with anyone involved in the Trump campaign. 8 Both witnesses acknowledge getting updates from 9 Mr. Stone. They took him seriously, and they welcomed his 10 particular brand of political assistance at a time the campaign 11 needed all the help he could get. 12 Mr. Bannon was asked: When Mr. Stone wrote to you, 13 'I do know how to win this, but it ain't pretty,' what, in your 14 mind, did you understand that to mean? 15 Answer: Well, Roger is an agent provocateur. He's 16 an expert in opposition research. He's an expert in the 17 tougher side of politics. And when you're this far behind, you 18 have to use every tool in the toolbox. 19 Question: What do you mean by that? 20 Answer: Well, opposition research. Dirty tricks. 21 The types of things that campaigns use when they've got to make 22 up some ground. 23 Bannon also testified that he viewed Stone as the

campaign's contact point with Assange. So this was yet another

lie that shut off important avenues for the committee to

24

25

investigate.

This count is also important because it showed -- the evidence showed that Stone was not just communicating with campaign personnel, but he talked to the candidate himself.

Part of the evidence that supplied the basis for the conviction on this count was from Rick Gates, who was in the car when then Candidate Trump was talking to Mr. Stone on the phone. And who, as soon as the call was over, made a statement to Gates about what Assange was about to do.

Count 7, tampering with a witness. The evidence established that the defendant knowingly and intentionally, corruptly persuaded or attempted to corruptly persuade

Randy Credico with the intent to influence, delay, or prevent his testimony in an official proceeding.

The evidence includes the numerous written communications, including emails and texts in which the defendant urged Credico, over and over again, to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, to claim a failure of recollection, to do a Frank Pentangeli, and/or to advance a false narrative, that Credico had been the intermediary between Stone and Julian Assange, to whom Stone publicly referred in early August 2016.

This went on for months, as Stone urged Credico to stonewall Congress and then the FBI and the Office of Special Counsel.

Stone went so far as to doctor a copy of a letter his lawyer sent to the committee falsely identifying Credico as the intermediary, adding a number of flattering details about Credico that were never provided to the committee at all, but were intended to assuage Credico and have him be unconcerned about the letter.

In a telling exchange, Stone also revealed his own motivation to shield the President from evidence that could reflect badly on him. On December 1st, 2017, he testified — he texted to Credico: If you testify, you're a fool. Because of Trump, I could never get away with asserting my Fifth Amendment rights, but you can.

Stone knew that some would view it as incriminating for both him and the campaign if he asserted his right to testify and said nothing. So he lied instead. And then he tried to make sure that the lie was not exposed.

Whether Stone was ever actually in communication with Assange or not, he understood full well that it could reflect badly on the President if someone learned that he'd exchanged emails with Corsi and Credico about what Assange was about to do or that he'd sent messages trying to get Assange to release emails on a particular topic on a particular schedule, or that there were emails between himself and Bannon, Gates, and Manafort as he reported in on all of this to the campaign.

Stone also put pressure on Credico by intimating that

he would involve one of Credico's close friends, a widow whose husband he'd been close to, in the matter if Credico tried to deny that he was the intermediary. Randy Credico testified that Stone said he had an email that would prove that Margaret Kunstler would be involved. That he could prove it through her that I was the back channel. That he would use that, and he would use the text messages that I had that Ms. Kunstler involved.

Credico was asked: Well, did it concern you that Mr. Stone was talking about revealing Ms. Kunstler's name?

Answer: Yes. She's a very close friend of mine.

And, you know, she's an older woman, and I didn't want to drag
her through this. You know, I didn't want to drag her name
through this. And then all of that culminated in the threats
to the dog and the prepare to die."

I really did appreciate the sensitivity and the concern that went into Randy Credico's letter about the damage caused to individuals and families by incarceration, as well as his trial testimony, repeated in his letter, that he didn't believe Stone, a dog lover -- which is a good thing -- would actually harm his dog, and his later assertion that he doesn't believe that Stone would have harmed him.

It's nice that Mr. Credico has forgiven Stone not only for that, but for his conduct that was testimony about -- in the case, apparently in New York, many years ago, when he

publicly blamed Credico for something else nefarious he'd done, threatening an elderly man over the phone. And he published embarrassing accusations about drug use to keep Mr. Credico from defending himself and saying it was Stone and not him.

But, all that says more about Mr. Credico than Stone.

And the record does indicate that these events may well have struck him differently at the time.

He also appeared on the stand to be a highly nervous individual. And it may well be that, even today, he just doesn't want to be known as the reason behind a tough sentence.

But, even if you acknowledge, as I have to here, that the evidence of actual physical threats was not strong, and that the person involved is asking for lenience, both indicate that one needn't be too harsh in sentencing the defendant for the threat aspect of Count 7; it doesn't do anything to negate or minimize the corrupt, unlawful campaign to influence Credico's testimony. And for that fact alone, he was guilty of tampering with a witness.

Finally, there was Count 1. Given all this evidence that led to the convictions on Counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7, the evidence also showed that the defendant corruptly influenced, obstructed, or impeded, or tried to corruptly influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which an investigation was being undertaken by a committee of the United States of the House of Representatives

when he testified falsely and misleadingly on September 26th, when he lied about the existence of responsive records in response to their requests, when he attempted to have Randy Credico testify falsely, or to prevent him from testifying, and when he submitted or caused to be submitted a letter that falsely and misleadingly described his communications with Credico.

This effort to obstruct the investigation was deliberate, planned, not one isolated incident, and conducted over a considerable period of time. And Stone lied and sought to impede production of information to whom? Not to some secret anti-Trump cabal, but to Congress. To the elected representatives of both parties who were confronted with a matter of grave national importance.

At that time, both the Senate and the House, including the House Committee that asked him to provide documents and to answer questions, were controlled by the Republican Party. The chair of the House Committee that asked the defendant to answer questions and provide documents was a republican, Devin Nunes.

In the statement that he issued, along with the ranking minority member of the committee, entitled Intelligence Committee Chairman Ranking Member Establish Parameters for Russia Investigation, that Chairman Nunes said: This committee will seek access to and custody of all relevant information.

This investigation is a national security necessity, and anything less than a full accounting of all the facts will be insufficient to protect the country and meet the expectations of the American people.

So that's what the defendant did. That's the nature and circumstances of the offense.

But, the statute also requires me to look at the history and characteristics of the defendant, who the defendant is. Certain themes emerged, even from the people who submitted letters on his behalf attached to his memo. There are letters that tell me he cultivated a career image of a bare-knuckled brawler in politics.

One friend and letter writer wrote: He's a provocateur who enjoyed, even relished, the spotlight.

They called him a dirty trickster, a political hit man. These are the people who wrote on his behalf.

But those friends, along with his family, have also painted a portrait of the personal side of Mr. Stone; loving, caring, funny. Quote: A good man, close quote.

Several letters report that when he got married, he treated his stepdaughter and her daughter as his own.

Supported them through times of crisis and transition, and through good times as well. The granddaughter, who's now grown, wrote a beautiful letter of her own, attesting to the bond that they share.

I've learned about the lengths he went to to support his in-laws when they were struggling with the devastating effects of Alzheimer's disease.

He has not just been caring and generous within his family. He provided housing and support for an elderly friend who was no longer able to live alone on his boat. He assisted another disabled woman when she was homeless. He's rescued countless dogs and listened and came to the aid of many friends.

It's consistent with the letters from others who aren't related, who shared friendships even across the political divide, and who have come together with Mr. Stone on issues such as medical marijuana and the strict drug laws that used to apply in New York City.

He added his voice, his political acumen to important causes such as animal rights, ending inhumane treatment and medical experimentations, same-sex marriage, criminal justice reform, product safety standards, compensation for retired football players with brain injuries, and encouraging the Republican Party to take a hard look at issues facing people of color in America. The letters are compelling and they are sincere and it's all part of the picture before me.

It's important to note today, though, to the people who emphasized this side of the defendant, that I am not passing judgment on Roger Stone as a man. That falls to a

higher authority. If, as his friend John Morgan said, There is good in his life, and good yet to give, he will have ample opportunity to continue to do just that.

It falls to me to sentence him just for the conduct for which he was found guilty by a jury based on sworn testimony in this courtroom, and based, most of all, on his own voluminous Tweets and emails in this case.

The defense, in its allocution, talked about not paying too much attention to his persona, but the defendant chose it and cultivated it. And I was told that the publicity and attention swirling around this case has already caused considerable stress for the defense and his family, but he was at the heart of a great deal of it. Through his press conferences and social media posts, he made the choice to stoke it.

I've been asked to consider the impact of a sentence on his family. And it's worth noting that sentencing can have a devastating impact on family members, and courts in this country are called upon to put that aside every day when they have to incarcerate or deport people who have children who depend on them, elderly parents who depend on them. So, it's something that we always have to think about.

But, it's also important to note that the responsibility for that hardship does not lie with the prosecutors, and it doesn't lie with the Court. It flows from

the defendant's conduct.

I think there's probably a lot of truth to

Mr. Credico's characterization when he said: Stone enjoys

playing adolescent mind games and pulling off juvenile stunts,

gags, pranks. He shamelessly invents and promotes outlandish

and invidious conspiracy tails. But the bottom line is, Mr.

Stone, at his core, is an insecure person who craves and

recklessly pursues attention.

The problem is that nothing about this case was a joke; it wasn't funny, it wasn't a stunt, and it wasn't a prank. Stone's conduct displayed flagrant disrespect for the institution of government established by the Constitution, including Congress and this Court. And I'll venture to say that even many adolescents know the difference.

The sentencing statute also provides that I am required to impose a sentence that is sufficient but not greater than necessary to accomplish the purposes that are set out in the statute. Therefore, another factor I must consider is the need for the sentence imposed, number one, to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense.

Two, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care or correctional treatment

in the most effective manner. And I'm supposed to think about the kinds of sentences available.

The guidelines are supposed to be the starting point of that analysis. And I agree totally with Mr. Ginsberg that they're a blunt instrument. The guidelines, though, and the sentencing commission and the appellate courts require district courts to explain why, if they're going to vary from the guidelines. And the Department of Justice's own manual calls for advocacy for guideline sentences in most situations.

The government's initial memorandum was thorough, well researched, and supported. It was true to the record. It was in accordance with the law and with DOJ policy, and it was submitted with the same level of evenhanded judgment and professionalism that they exhibited throughout the trial. Any suggestion that the prosecutors in this case did anything untoward, unethical, or improper is incorrect.

But I am concerned that seven to nine years, or even the 70 to 87 months, as I calculated the guideline range, would be greater than necessary. I sincerely doubt that I would have sentenced him within that range, even if the sentencing had simply proceeded in its typical fashion, without any of the extraneous commentary or the unprecedented actions of the Department of Justice within the past week.

I agree with the defense and with the government's second memorandum, that the eight-level enhancement for

threats, while applicable, tends to inflate the guideline level beyond where it fairly reflects the actual conduct involved.

However, the defendant's request for probation -- although the memo is also a professional product of appropriately zealous advocacy and based on the record -- is simply not sufficient.

The defendant has pointed me to certain provisions within the guidelines that would permit the Court to depart or vary. One is his age. And guidelines there in \$5H1.1 say:

Age may be a reason to depart downward in a case in which the defendant is elderly and infirm, or where this characteristic is present to an unusual degree, and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered by the guideline.

So, clearly, this is not a situation where a departure is warranted, and the defense did not ask for one, but it is a factor that I need to take into consideration when I sentence the defendant.

They also pointed to \$5H1.4, his health. The guidelines say there: Physical condition or appearance, including physique, may be relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted, if the condition or appearance, individually or in combination with other characteristics, again, is present to an unusual degree, and distinguished the case from typical cases covered by the guideline. An extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to depart downward in the case of a seriously infirm defendant.

Defendant has not pointed to any evidence that would show that he has a condition that's not managed with medication, or the kind of issue that would warrant a departure, and he keeps himself physically fit.

Paragraphs 103 and 106 through 108 detail any medical information, and I've taken them into consideration.

But, it's important to note that in the year since the case has been before me, in addition to traveling here for court appearances, he's filed nine motions to travel elsewhere, with most trips including multiple stops. He's not only been all over Florida, but he's been to the Western District of Tennessee, the Northern District of Illinois, Michigan, Buffalo, Los Angeles, and several other cities in California, as well as Rochester, New York.

And all that is on top of the fact that his conditions of release permitted him to travel to the Southern District of Florida, the Southern District of New York, the Eastern District of New York, D.C., and the Eastern District of Virginia without any court order at all. So, I have no idea how many trips he's taken during that period to conduct the business that he said he needed to conduct.

The purpose of the trips described to me were to earn a living. Public appearances or private gatherings have not appeared to be compromised by his health.

Also, this record of travel belies the narrative

being disseminated that I silenced him or took away his ability to speak or to earn a living. When the case began, there were no restrictions on Mr. Stone at all. After he posted an incendiary, threatening post regarding the Court, I took the suggestion of the defendant's own First Amendment lawyer and barred him from making comments about this case, but that was all.

Couldn't obey that either. When he was still on bond, he continued to post about others involved in the investigation, and that led to the requirement that he not Tweet or post or use Instagram. He withdrew his own appeal of that condition, and he didn't even ask to be relieved of it pending sentence. But there has never been a prohibition on his writing, giving a speech and getting paid for it, or any other means of earning a living.

The defense, in its memorandum, also points to the guideline for diminished capacity, \$5K2.13. And there the commission says: A departure may be warranted if the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly reduced mental capacity, and the significantly reduced mental capacity contributed substantially to the commission of the offense.

Well, granted, there are some medical issues; granted, there is some anxiety. But there has been no evidence that any of it substantially reduced his mental capacity, or

even reduced it at all. He's still writing and speaking. And there's no evidence that any physical or psychiatric condition made a substantial contribution to his conduct. There's been no evidence of any contribution, and no evidence presented related to the relevant time period. And it's totally inconsistent with every public statement made by the defendant at the time and since.

So I don't believe that that section even is a factor that would support a variance. Although, I will take his age and his health into account.

It falls to me, then, given the disparity between the two recommendations I have in front of me and the inflated nature of the guidelines, to assess what sentence is appropriate with the benefit of all the submissions, but, also, my own judgment, and the benefit of the judgment of my colleagues which have been expressed in the range of cases that have come before this court in the past. It is not an exact science.

What sentence is sufficient to recognize the seriousness of this offense and to punish someone who feels justified and proud to act with impunity and outside the law? So when do you cross the line into greater than necessary for a defendant who's 67 years old and never spent a day in jail before? And is the answer the same if you're trying, as Congress says you must, to promote respect for the law more

broadly, and to convey a message and deter others?

The only people who think this is easy are the ones who don't have to make the decision. Many people weighed in, formally through letters, informally by calling chambers, pontificating on cable TV, and in blogs, op-eds, and Tweets.

One letter writer, in a letter submitted by the defense, said: I've taken note that you're about to sentence Roger Stone with respect to his plea to a criminal charge having to do with political activity.

There's no reason for concern for that. The charge had nothing to do with political activity. And if you watched the trial, you know there was very little evidence about his political activity that was part of the record in the case. He's not being sentenced for what Credico described as his shameless promotion of conspiracy theories.

I received a letter submitted by the defense from Mr. Stone's federal election law attorney in Florida. He said: There is no gain saying that Mr. Stone has made a career taking full advantage of the First Amendment in pursuing his client's electoral aims. In so doing, Mr. Stone has engendered many enemies. These efforts are despised because they are effective. Therefore, I submit that you should not hold against Mr. Stone the fact that his career has pushed the bounds of political license, because however distasteful some have found Mr. Stone's work to be, it is fully protected by our

Constitution.

I have received letters urging me not to silence an important voice in the public arena, but that will not be an element of this sentence in any way. I expect he will keep talking. And as you've just heard when I went through the elements of the offense, he was not convicted and is not being sentenced for exercising his First Amendment rights, his support of the President's campaign or his policies. He was not prosecuted, as some have complained, for standing up for the President. He was prosecuted for covering up for the President.

One of the defendant's friends wrote to me and said:

I believe, sincerely, I've never seen or heard any credible

first account -- firsthand account of Roger doing anything

illegal -- I'm sorry. The friend wrote, and I believe he wrote

sincerely, to say, quote: I've never seen or heard any

credible firsthand evidence of Roger doing anything illegal,

close quote.

To that I have to say, I've just gone through all the evidence. All of this underscores the fact that it is for good reason that the criminal justice system assigns the responsibility for sentencing to someone who is actually aware of what the charges are and what the evidence was that was introduced in the courtroom.

This case also exemplifies why it is that this

system, for good reason, demands that the responsibility falls to someone neutral. Someone whose job may involve issuing opinions in favor of and against the same administration in the same week, and not someone who has a longstanding friendship with the defendant. Not someone whose political career was aided by the defendant. And surely not someone who has personal involvement in the events underlying the case.

They were entirely inappropriate, but I will not hold them against the defendant either. It would be equally improper to be buffeted by the winds blowing from the left, the enthusiastic callers who object to what the defendant stands for. I cannot and will not sentence him for the behavior of those he supports. Sentencing is personal, and it's based on the evidence.

Roger Stone will not be sentenced for who his friends are or for who his enemies are. He's not going to be sentenced for his reputation or his personality or his work. The record doesn't begin to enable me to figure out which supposed dirty tricks he actually committed and which he just took credit for, and it doesn't matter.

The touchstone in this case is the offense. And even the government's supplemental memorandum, which helpfully acknowledges the harshness of a strict guideline outcome, says, quote: It remains the position of the United States that a

sentence of incarceration is warranted here, close quote.

And I believe Mr. Crabb said substantial period of incarceration in his allocution.

Why is that? It's because the defendant lied about a matter of great national and international significance. This is not campaign high jinks. This is not Roger just being Roger. He lied to Congress. He lied to our elected representatives.

The sentence is not just about punishing him, but also deterring others and upholding the law. It has to send the message that witnesses do not get to decide for themselves whether Congress is entitled to the facts based on what they think about the topic being investigated, or who they fear could be embarrassed by the topic being investigated. There was nothing unfair, phony, or disgraceful about the investigation or the prosecution.

The House Committee, which, at the time, Stone testified was under the control of the Republican Majority, the Senate Intelligence Committee, which remains under the control of the Republican Majority, the Special Counsel, who was appointed by and serving under the supervision of the acting attorney general of this administration, and the current inspector general of the current Department of Justice all investigated the circumstances surrounding the election.

And all have concluded, like the multiple agencies

charged with protecting the United States' national security, that the fact that there was a Russian attempt to interfere in the election was beyond debate. It's a matter of enormous public concern. And, therefore, the House Committee had legitimate grounds, indeed, a duty to inquire how materials belonging to the DNC ended up in the hands of WikiLeaks, and whether Russia played any role in that.

The committee had legitimate grounds, indeed, a duty to inquire whether there was any involvement, encouragement, collaboration on the part of the campaign. The legitimacy of the inquiry is an entirely separate question from whether anyone found enough evidence to draw a conclusion at the end of the day.

Roger Stone took it upon himself to lie, to impede, to obstruct before the investigation was complete. And he endeavored to influence the result. How could the committee do its job and reach the correct conclusion under those circumstances?

And what is the response of the defense to it? How does it view the evidence?

At trial, the defense appropriately questioned Randy Credico's credibility and Rick Gates's credibility, but it was largely Stone's own emails and his own texts that proved the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.

So what did the defense say to the jury on his

behalf?

So what. So what?

Of all the circumstances in this case, that may be the most pernicious. The truth still exists. The truth still matters. Roger Stone's insistence that it doesn't, his belligerence, his pride in his own lies are a threat to our most fundamental institutions, to the very foundation of our democracy.

And if it goes unpunished, it will not be a victory for one party or another. Everyone looses because everyone depends on the representatives they elect to make the right decisions on a myriad of issues -- many of which are politically charged but many of which aren't -- based on the facts.

Everyone depends on our elected representatives to protect our elections from foreign interference based on the facts. No one knows where the threat is going to come from next time or whose side they're going to be on, and for that reason the dismay and disgust at the defendant's belligerence should transcend party.

The dismay and the disgust at the attempts by others to defend his actions as just business as usual in our polarized climate should transcend party. The dismay and the disgust with any attempts to interfere with the efforts of prosecutors and members of the judiciary to fulfil their duty

should transcend party.

Sure, the defense is free to say: So what? Who cares?

But, I'll say this: Congress cared. The
United States Department of Justice and the United States
Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia that prosecuted
the case and is still prosecuting the case cared. The jurors
who served with integrity under difficult circumstances cared.
The American people cared. And I care.

Finally, the sentencing statute says that I must consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct. The guidelines are supposed to fulfil that purpose, and I concluded that the guideline Level 27 points to 80 to 87 months.

For comparison purposes, the government's supplemental brief points out that if I calculated, as it asks me to with respect to all the other enhancements, but he didn't get the eight-level of enhancements for threats at all, that would have been Level 21, or a range of 37 to 46 months. But, I disagreed with their two-level enhancement for role in the offense. So, if I didn't take the threat into account at all, I would have been at Level 19, which is 30 to 37 months.

These considerations suggest that even the guideline I calculated is greater than necessary. But I can't ignore the

circumstances involving Mr. Credico entirely. They have to factor into the analysis. A sentencing range that would give no consideration to his threatening conduct wouldn't fairly address the seriousness of the offense.

And even if you put the offense aside -- the threat aside, on top of his own lying, we have a pressure campaign to get someone else to lie, and we have the utter disrespect that he exhibited towards these proceedings.

At the end of the day, once you leave the math and you get back to the business of judging, the statute requires that the sentence must be proportionate, and that also weighs heavily on my thinking. This may be one of the strongest factors that points to a downward variance.

There were very few comparable cases. Generally, they involve some period of incarceration, but, also, generally, lower than the guideline range. The government pointed to Rita Lavelle, who got a six months sentence; Congressman Hansen, 12 months. But those cases involve more personal matters. There were no threats involved. Still, there was some jail time to be served.

The government points to the *Solofa* case. Defendant got 37 months for tampering with a witness and obstruction of justice. It was an OIG, FBI, grand jury investigation into bribes and kickbacks into the sale of school bus parts to the Department of Education in American Samoa. And this defendant

instructed an undercover officer how to lie and hide documents, although there were no violent threats involved.

The most analogous case is probably the prosecution of Scooter Libby, who received 30 months for his false testimony before the grand jury, which also related to national security issues. And the falsehoods were the basis for an obstruction of justice count alone. There was no witness tampering component, much less a threat component.

The defendant points to some of the false statement cases and other Office of Special Counsel cases as comparators, but, largely, they're not analogous. Cases involving a single lie to the FBI or investigators, particularly those involving people who then pled or cooperated are not at all analogous.

Mr. Manafort was sentenced for 13 months for the witness tampering and obstruction of justice offense alone. That simply involved getting one's story together, and no threat to do bodily harm. And even if you leave the threat out, the defendant's persistence in getting Credico to tell the story he wanted him to tell was worse than what was involved with Manafort. But, that's still a benchmark for a witness tampering offense that wasn't included in the sentence that Scooter Libby got.

Therefore, in an exercise of my discretion, after consideration of all the statutory factors, the sentence that I find to be imposed that is sufficient but not greater than

1 necessary is as follows: 2 It's the judgement of the Court that you, 3 Roger J. Stone, Jr., are hereby committed to the custody of the 4 Bureau of Prisons for a term of 40 months on Count 1. 5 On Counts 2 through 6 you will be sentenced to 12 6 months on each count, to run concurrently with the sentence on 7 Count 1. 8 Count 7, you'll be sentenced to a term of 18 months, 9 to run concurrently with Count 1. 10 This would have been my sentence with or without the 11 three-point adjustment under \$2J1.2(b)(2) for substantial 12 interference. 13 Under Section 18 U.S. Code Section 3143(a)(2), I find 14 by clear and convincing evidence you're not likely to flee or 15 pose a danger to any other person or the community, and you 16 will be permitted to voluntarily surrender on a date no earlier 17 than two weeks after the Court has ruled on your pending motion 18 for a new trial. 19 I recommend that you be designated to serve your 20 sentence at a facility as close as possible to your family in 21 Fort Lauderdale, Florida. 22 You're further sentenced to pay a \$20,000 fine. 23 Court will waive the imposition of interest or penalties that 24 may accrue on the balance.

You are also required by law to pay a \$100 special

25

assessment on each count, for a total of \$700. The special assessment is immediately payable to the Clerk of the Court for the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

If you change your address, within 30 days of any change you have to notify the Clerk of the Court of any change until such time as this obligation is paid in full. While you're incarcerated you can make payments on the special assessment through your participation in the Bureau of Prisons Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.

You are further sentenced to serve a 24-month term of supervised release on each count, to run concurrently.

Within 72 hours of your release from custody you shall report in person to the probation office in the district to which you are released.

While on supervision you shall not possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon, you shall not use or posses an illegal controlled substance, and you shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime. You must also abide by the general conditions of supervision adopted by the U.S.

Probation Office, as well as the following special conditions:

First of all, according to 42 U.S. Code Section 14135a, as for all felony offenses, you must submit to the collection and use of DNA information while you're incarcerated at the Bureau of Prisons, or at the direction of the U.S. Probation Office.

You must submit to substance abuse testing within 15 days of placement on supervision, and periodically thereafter, including random testing, without notice to you, at the direction of the probation office. And if substance abuse treatment is indicated, you shall participate in any program approved and directed by the probation office.

You must complete 250 hours of hands-on community service. This obligation may not be satisfied with mere fundraising or advocacy, as laudable as they are, or with attendance at religious service, although the service may be in connection with your place of worship.

The probation office will supervise your completion of this condition by approving the program. You must provide written verification of completed hours to the probation office.

You must begin to make payments on the financial penalty within 60 days after you're released from imprisonment in the amount of at least \$1,000 per month. You must provide the probation office with access to any requested financial information, and authorize the release of any requested financial information, which the probation office may share with the U. S. Attorney's Office.

You shall provide the probation office with your income tax returns, authorization for release of credit information, and information about any business or finances in

which you have a control or interest until all -- until the penalty has been satisfied.

I'm going to transfer supervision of your supervised release to the Southern District of Florida, but not jurisdiction.

The U.S. Probation Office in that district must submit a progress report to the Court within 60 days of the commencement of supervision. Upon receipt of the progress report I'll determine if your appearance is required at a reentry progress hearing.

The probation office is directed to release the presentence report to all appropriate agencies in order to execute the sentence of the Court. Any treatment agencies must return it to the probation office upon the defendant's completion or termination from treatment.

Mr. Stone, you have a right to appeal your conviction and the sentence imposed by the Court. The rules require that if you choose to appeal, you must file any appeal within 14 days after the Court enters judgment. But, I will extend that time and order that you must file any appeal within 14 days after the Court has ruled on the pending motion for new trial.

If you're unable to afford the cost of appeal, you may request permission from the Court to file an appeal without cost to you.

Is there anything further I need to take up right now

1 on behalf of the United States? 2 MR. CRABB: No, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Anything further on behalf of the defendant? 4 5 MR. GINSBERG: Your Honor, if I understood -- is the 6 Court going to hold the judgment in abeyance, or is the Court 7 intending to file the judgment? 8 THE COURT: Well, the judgment -- I can simply not 9 sign the judgment. But, the judgment specifies that he cannot 10 be designated until two weeks after I have ruled on the motion. 11 So, I believe that there's no impediment to my entering the 12 judgment and having it be a matter of public record. 13 MR. GINSBERG: In an abundance of caution, it would 14 be our preference if the Court didn't enter the judgment until 15 after the new trial motion is decided, both for appellate 16 reasons -- but, I think Your Honor is correct, you've covered 17 us on that. But --18 THE COURT: Well, if I don't enter the judgment, then 19 I'm going to withdraw the language about when he can be 20 designated because at that point the judgment is not going to 21 be entered until after the order has been issued. 22 MR. GINSBERG: Well, that gets to my second concern, 23 which is, as I understood what the Court said, he does not have 24 to surrender until two weeks following the --25 THE COURT: No earlier than two weeks following.

```
1
                 MR. GINSBERG: So the Court would be amenable to
       extending the date of surrender until he's actually designated?
2
 3
                 THE COURT: Well, that's what voluntary surrender is.
                 MR. GINSBERG: Right. But sometimes the defendant's
 4
 5
       surrender date shows up -- appears before the designation
 6
       occurs, and then there are issues.
 7
                 THE COURT: All right. What I am going to order is
 8
       that he can voluntarily surrender. That's my order. Now, if I
 9
       don't sign this, then all that's going to be in the order is
10
       that he's entitled to voluntarily surrender, and they'll let
11
       him know where to go, and he has to go.
12
                 If we keep -- if I enter it today, then it has the
13
       language in there that he would not have to surrender until two
14
       weeks after, at the earliest, my order.
15
                 MR. GINSBERG: Right. I think Your Honor's
16
       suggestion is probably the better way to go.
17
                 May I confer with my counsel for one moment?
18
                 THE COURT: Yes.
19
                 (Off-the-record discussion between defense counsel.)
20
                 MR. GINSBERG: We'll go with the Court's approach.
21
                 THE COURT: All right.
22
                 MR. GINSBERG: Thank you, Your Honor.
23
                 THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.
24
25
```

1	
2	CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
3	
4	I, JANICE DICKMAN, do hereby certify that the above and
5	foregoing constitutes a true and accurate transcript of my
6	stenographic notes and is a full, true and complete transcript
7	of the proceedings to the best of my ability.
8	Dated this 20th day of February, 2019
9	
LO	
L1	
L2	Janice E. Dickman, CRR, CMR, CCR Official Court Reporter
L3	Room 6523 333 Constitution Avenue, N.W.
L 4	Washington, D.C. 20001
L5	
L 6	
L7	
L8	
L 9	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	