

**EXHIBIT 11**

# Report On The Investigation Into Russian Interference In The 2016 Presidential Election

Volume I of II

Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III

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***b. High-Level Encouragement of Contacts through Alternative Channels***

As Russian officials in the United States reached out to the President-Elect and his team, a number of Russian individuals working in the private sector began their own efforts to make contact. Petr Aven, a Russian national who heads Alfa-Bank, Russia's largest commercial bank, described to the Office interactions with Putin during this time period that might account for the flurry of Russian activity.<sup>976</sup>

Aven told the Office that he is one of approximately 50 wealthy Russian businessmen who regularly meet with Putin in the Kremlin; these 50 men are often referred to as "oligarchs."<sup>977</sup> Aven told the Office that he met on a quarterly basis with Putin, including in the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2016, shortly after the U.S. presidential election.<sup>978</sup> Aven said that he took these meetings seriously and understood that any suggestions or critiques that Putin made during these meetings were implicit directives, and that there would be consequences for Aven if he did not follow through.<sup>979</sup> As was typical, the 2016 Q4 meeting with Putin was preceded by a preparatory meeting with Putin's chief of staff, Anton Vaino.<sup>980</sup>

According to Aven, at his Q4 2016 one-on-one meeting with Putin,<sup>981</sup> Putin raised the prospect that the United States would impose additional sanctions on Russian interests, including sanctions against Aven and/or Alfa-Bank.<sup>982</sup> Putin suggested that Aven needed to take steps to protect himself and Alfa-Bank.<sup>983</sup> Aven also testified that Putin spoke of the difficulty faced by the Russian government in getting in touch with the incoming Trump Administration.<sup>984</sup> According to Aven, Putin indicated that he did not know with whom formally to speak and generally did not know the people around the President-Elect.<sup>985</sup>

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<sup>976</sup> Aven provided information to the Office in an interview and through an attorney proffer, [REDACTED]

**Grand Jury** [REDACTED]

<sup>977</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7.

<sup>978</sup> **Grand Jury** [REDACTED]

<sup>979</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 2-3.

<sup>980</sup> **Grand Jury** [REDACTED]

and interview with the Office, Aven referred to the high-ranking Russian government officials using numbers (*e.g.*, Official 1, Official 2). Aven separately confirmed through an attorney proffer that Official 1 was Putin and Official 2 was Putin's chief of staff, Vaino. *See* Affidavit of Ryan Junck (Aug. 2, 2018) (hard copy on file).

<sup>981</sup> At the time of his Q4 2016 meeting with Putin, Aven was generally aware of the press coverage about Russian interference in the U.S. election. According to Aven, he did not discuss that topic with Putin at any point, and Putin did not mention the rationale behind the threat of new sanctions. Aven 8/2/18 302, at 5-7.

<sup>982</sup> **Grand Jury** [REDACTED]

<sup>983</sup> **Grand Jury** [REDACTED]

<sup>984</sup> **Grand Jury** [REDACTED]

<sup>985</sup> **Grand Jury** [REDACTED]

Aven **Grand Jury** told Putin he would take steps to protect himself and the Alfa-Bank shareholders from potential sanctions, and one of those steps would be to try to reach out to the incoming Administration to establish a line of communication.<sup>986</sup> Aven described Putin responding with skepticism about Aven's prospect for success.<sup>987</sup> According to Aven, although Putin did not expressly direct him to reach out to the Trump Transition Team, Aven understood that Putin expected him to try to respond to the concerns he had raised.<sup>988</sup> Aven's efforts are described in Volume I, Section IV.B.5, *infra*.

## 2. Kirill Dmitriev's Transition-Era Outreach to the Incoming Administration

Aven's description of his interactions with Putin is consistent with the behavior of Kirill Dmitriev, a Russian national who heads Russia's sovereign wealth fund and is closely connected to Putin. Dmitriev undertook efforts to meet members of the incoming Trump Administration in the months after the election. Dmitriev asked a close business associate who worked for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) royal court, George Nader, to introduce him to Trump transition officials, and Nader eventually arranged a meeting in the Seychelles between Dmitriev and Erik Prince, a Trump Campaign supporter and an associate of Steve Bannon.<sup>989</sup> In addition, the UAE national security advisor introduced Dmitriev to a hedge fund manager and friend of Jared Kushner, Rick Gerson, in late November 2016. In December 2016 and January 2017, Dmitriev and Gerson worked on a proposal for reconciliation between the United States and Russia, which Dmitriev implied he cleared through Putin. Gerson provided that proposal to Kushner before the inauguration, and Kushner later gave copies to Bannon and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.

### *a. Background*

Dmitriev is a Russian national who was appointed CEO of Russia's sovereign wealth fund, the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), when it was founded in 2011.<sup>990</sup> Dmitriev reported directly to Putin and frequently referred to Putin as his "boss."<sup>991</sup>

RDIF has co-invested in various projects with UAE sovereign wealth funds.<sup>992</sup> Dmitriev regularly interacted with Nader, a senior advisor to UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed

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<sup>986</sup> **Grand Jury**

<sup>987</sup> **Grand Jury** Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6.

<sup>988</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 4-8; **Grand Jury**

<sup>989</sup> Nader provided information to the Office in multiple interviews, all but one of which were conducted under a proffer agreement. **Grand Jury**. The investigators also interviewed Prince under a proffer agreement. Bannon was interviewed by the Office, **Grand Jury** under a proffer agreement.

<sup>990</sup> Kirill Dmitriev Biography, Russian Direct Investment Fund, *available at* [https://rdif.ru/Eng\\_person\\_dmitriev\\_kirill/](https://rdif.ru/Eng_person_dmitriev_kirill/). *See also* Overview, Russian Direct Investment Fund, *available at* [https://rdif.ru/Eng\\_About/](https://rdif.ru/Eng_About/).

<sup>991</sup> Gerson 6/15/18 302, at 1. *See also, e.g.*, 12/14/16 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson; 1/9/17 Text Message, Dmitriev to Gerson.

<sup>992</sup> **Grand Jury**

The investigation did not resolve the apparent conflict in the accounts of Kushner and Gorkov or determine whether the meeting was diplomatic in nature (as Kushner stated), focused on business (as VEB's public statement indicated), or whether it involved some combination of those matters or other matters. Regardless, the investigation did not identify evidence that Kushner and Gorkov engaged in any substantive follow-up after the meeting.

Rather, a few days after the meeting, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant, "Hi, please inform your side that the information about the meeting had a very positive response!"<sup>1163</sup> Over the following weeks, the two assistants exchanged a handful of additional cordial texts.<sup>1164</sup> On February 8, 2017, Gorkov's assistant texted Kushner's assistant (Berkowitz) to try to set up another meeting, and followed up by text at least twice in the days that followed.<sup>1165</sup> According to Berkowitz, he did not respond to the meeting request in light of the press coverage regarding the Russia investigation, and did not tell Kushner about the meeting request.<sup>1166</sup>

##### 5. Petr Aven's Outreach Efforts to the Transition Team

In December 2016, weeks after the one-on-one meeting with Putin described in Volume I, Section IV.B.1.b, *supra*, Petr Aven attended what he described as a separate "all-hands" oligarch meeting between Putin and Russia's most prominent businessmen.<sup>1167</sup> As in Aven's one-on-one meeting, a main topic of discussion at the oligarch meeting in December 2016 was the prospect of forthcoming U.S. economic sanctions.<sup>1168</sup>

After the December 2016 all-hands meeting, Aven tried to establish a connection to the Trump team. Aven instructed Richard Burt to make contact with the incoming Trump Administration. Burt was on the board of directors for LetterOne (L1), another company headed by Aven, and had done work for Alfa-Bank.<sup>1169</sup> Burt had previously served as U.S. ambassador to Germany and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, and one of his primary roles with Alfa-Bank and L1 was to facilitate introductions to business contacts in the United States and other Western countries.<sup>1170</sup>

While at a L1 board meeting held in Luxembourg in late December 2016, Aven pulled Burt aside and told him that he had spoken to someone high in the Russian government who expressed

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<sup>1163</sup> AKIN\_GUMP\_BERKOWITZ\_0000011 (12/19/16 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz (9:56 a.m.)).

<sup>1164</sup> AKIN\_GUMP\_BERKOWITZ\_0000011-15 (12/19/16 – 2/16/17 Text Messages, Ivanchenko & Berkowitz).

<sup>1165</sup> AKIN\_GUMP\_BERKOWITZ\_0000015 (2/8/17 Text Message, Ivanchenko to Berkowitz (10:41 a.m.)).

<sup>1166</sup> Berkowitz 3/22/18 302, at 4-5.

<sup>1167</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7; **Grand Jury**

<sup>1168</sup> **Grand Jury**

<sup>1169</sup> **Grand Jury** Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6.

<sup>1170</sup> **Grand Jury** Aven 8/2/18 302, at 6; Burt 2/9/18 302, at 2.

interest in establishing a communications channel between the Kremlin and the Trump Transition Team.<sup>1171</sup> Aven asked for Burt's help in contacting members of the Transition Team.<sup>1172</sup> Although Burt had been responsible for helping Aven build connections in the past, Burt viewed Aven's request as unusual and outside the normal realm of his dealings with Aven.<sup>1173</sup>

Burt, who is a member of the board of CNI (discussed at Volume I, Section IV.A.4, *supra*),<sup>1174</sup> decided to approach CNI president Dimitri Simes for help facilitating Aven's request, recalling that Simes had some relationship with Kushner.<sup>1175</sup> At the time, Simes was lobbying the Trump Transition Team, on Burt's behalf, to appoint Burt U.S. ambassador to Russia.<sup>1176</sup>

Burt contacted Simes by telephone and asked if he could arrange a meeting with Kushner to discuss setting up a high-level communications channel between Putin and the incoming Administration.<sup>1177</sup> Simes told the Office that he declined and stated to Burt that setting up such a channel was not a good idea in light of the media attention surrounding Russian influence in the U.S. presidential election.<sup>1178</sup> According to Simes, he understood that Burt was seeking a secret channel, and Simes did not want CNI to be seen as an intermediary between the Russian government and the incoming Administration.<sup>1179</sup> Based on what Simes had read in the media, he stated that he already had concerns that Trump's business connections could be exploited by Russia, and Simes said that he did not want CNI to have any involvement or apparent involvement in facilitating any connection.<sup>1180</sup>

In an email dated December 22, 2016, Burt recounted for Aven his conversation with Simes:

Through a trusted third party, I have reached out to the very influential person I mentioned in Luxembourg concerning Project A. There is an interest and an understanding for the need to establish such a channel. But the individual emphasized that at this moment, with so much intense interest in the Congress and the media over the question of cyber-hacking (and who ordered what), Project A was too explosive to discuss. The individual agreed to discuss it again after the New Year. I trust the individual's instincts on this.

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<sup>1171</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 2; **Grand Jury**

<sup>1172</sup> **Grand Jury**

<sup>1173</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 4.

<sup>1174</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 5.

<sup>1175</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3.

<sup>1176</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3.

<sup>1177</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 4.

<sup>1178</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3; Simes 3/27/18 302, at 4.

<sup>1179</sup> Simes 3/27/18 302, at 5.

<sup>1180</sup> Simes 3/27/18 302, at 5.

If this is unclear or you would like to discuss, don't hesitate to call.<sup>1181</sup>

According to Burt, the "very influential person" referenced in his email was Simes, and the reference to a "trusted third party" was a fabrication, as no such third party existed. "Project A" was a term that Burt created for Aven's effort to help establish a communications channel between Russia and the Trump team, which he used in light of the sensitivities surrounding what Aven was requesting, especially in light of the recent attention to Russia's influence in the U.S. presidential election.<sup>1182</sup> According to Burt, his report that there was "interest" in a communications channel reflected Simes's views, not necessarily those of the Transition Team, and in any event, Burt acknowledged that he added some "hype" to that sentence to make it sound like there was more interest from the Transition Team than may have actually existed.<sup>1183</sup>

Aven replied to Burt's email on the same day, saying "Thank you. All clear."<sup>1184</sup> According to Aven, this statement indicated that he did not want the outreach to continue.<sup>1185</sup> Burt spoke to Aven some time thereafter about his attempt to make contact with the Trump team, explaining to Aven that the current environment made it impossible, **Grand Jury** [REDACTED].<sup>1186</sup> Burt did not recall discussing Aven's request with Simes again, nor did he recall speaking to anyone else about the request.<sup>1187</sup>

In the first quarter of 2017, Aven met again with Putin and other Russian officials.<sup>1188</sup> At that meeting, Putin asked about Aven's attempt to build relations with the Trump Administration, and Aven recounted his lack of success.<sup>1189</sup> **Grand Jury** [REDACTED].<sup>1190</sup> Putin continued to inquire about Aven's efforts to connect to the Trump Administration in several subsequent quarterly meetings.<sup>1191</sup>

Aven also told Putin's chief of staff that he had been subpoenaed by the FBI.<sup>1192</sup> As part of that conversation, he reported that he had been asked by the FBI about whether he had worked to create a back channel between the Russian government and the Trump Administration.<sup>1193</sup>

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<sup>1181</sup> 12/22/16 Email, Burt to Aven (7:23 p.m.).

<sup>1182</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3.

<sup>1183</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3-4.

<sup>1184</sup> 12/22/16 Email, Aven to Burt (4:58:22 p.m.).

<sup>1185</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7.

<sup>1186</sup> **Grand Jury** [REDACTED]

<sup>1187</sup> Burt 2/9/18 302, at 3-4.

<sup>1188</sup> **Grand Jury** [REDACTED]

<sup>1189</sup> **Grand Jury** [REDACTED] Aven 8/2/18 302, at 7.

<sup>1190</sup> **Grand Jury** [REDACTED]

<sup>1191</sup> **Grand Jury** [REDACTED]

<sup>1192</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8.

<sup>1193</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8; **Grand Jury** [REDACTED]

According to Aven, the official showed no emotion in response to this report and did not appear to care.<sup>1194</sup>

6. Carter Page Contact with Deputy Prime Minister Arkady Dvorkovich

In December 2016, more than two months after he was removed from the Trump Campaign, former Campaign foreign policy advisor Carter Page again visited Moscow in an attempt to pursue business opportunities.<sup>1195</sup> **Grand Jury**

**Grand Jury**<sup>1196</sup> According to Konstantin Kilimnik, Paul Manafort's associate, Page also gave some individuals in Russia the impression that he had maintained his connections to President-Elect Trump. In a December 8, 2016 email intended for Manafort, Kilimnik wrote, "Carter Page is in Moscow today, sending messages he is authorized to talk to Russia on behalf of DT on a range of issues of mutual interest, including Ukraine."<sup>1197</sup>

On December 9, 2016, Page went to dinner with NES employees Shlomo Weber and Andrej Krickovic.<sup>1198</sup> Weber had contacted Dvorkovich to let him know that Page was in town and to invite him to stop by the dinner if he wished to do so, and Dvorkovich came to the restaurant for a few minutes to meet with Page.<sup>1199</sup> Dvorkovich congratulated Page on Trump's election and expressed interest in starting a dialogue between the United States and Russia.<sup>1200</sup> Dvorkovich asked Page if he could facilitate connecting Dvorkovich with individuals involved in the transition to begin a discussion of future cooperation.<sup>1201</sup> **Grand Jury**

**Grand Jury**<sup>1202</sup>

**Grand Jury**<sup>1203</sup>

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<sup>1194</sup> Aven 8/2/18 302, at 8; **Grand Jury**

<sup>1195</sup> Page 3/10/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; **Grand Jury** Among other meetings, Page contacted Andrej Baranov, head of investor relations at Rosneft, and they discussed the sale of Rosneft and meetings Baranov had attended with Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin. **Grand Jury**

<sup>1196</sup> **Grand Jury**

<sup>1197</sup> **Investigative Technique**

<sup>1198</sup> Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; Page 3/30/17 302, at 8.

<sup>1199</sup> Weber 7/28/17 302, at 4; Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; **Grand Jury**

<sup>1200</sup> Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; **Grand Jury**

<sup>1201</sup> Page 3/16/17 302, at 3; **Grand Jury**

<sup>1202</sup> **Grand Jury**

<sup>1203</sup> **Grand Jury**