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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

ANTHROPIC PBC,  
  
Plaintiff,  
  
v.  
  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF WAR, et al.,  
  
Defendants.

Case No. 3:26-cv-01996

**DECLARATION OF THIYAGU  
RAMASAMY**

1 I, Thiyagu Ramasamy, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746, declare as follows:

2 1. I am the Head of Public Sector at Anthropic PBC. I have held that position since  
3 January 2025. Before joining Anthropic, I worked for Amazon Web Services, where I was a  
4 Principal Lead for Data, Analytics, and Artificial Intelligence/Machine Learning and was  
5 responsible for, among other things, the implementation of Anthropic’s AI models—called  
6 Claude—for public sector customers, and the deployment of Claude in classified federal  
7 government networks. My current duties and responsibilities at Anthropic include overseeing the  
8 team of employees that sell Claude to U.S. federal, state, and local government agencies.

9 2. As the Head of Public Sector for Anthropic, I have personal knowledge of the  
10 contents of this declaration, or have knowledge of the matters based on my review of information  
11 and records gathered by Anthropic personnel, and could testify thereto.

12 **Anthropic’s Positive Relationship With The U.S. Government**

13 3. Anthropic is a public benefit corporation whose mission is to ensure that the  
14 transition to powerful artificial intelligence (“AI”) benefits humanity. We view partnering with the  
15 U.S. government as an important way to achieve that mission. During my time at Anthropic, we  
16 have aggressively pursued opportunities to empower the U.S. government to use Claude. Our  
17 government customers include the Department of War (“DoW” or the “Department”) and agencies  
18 in the Intelligence Community.<sup>1</sup>

19 4. Anthropic began working with the U.S. government as early as 2024. In April 2024,  
20 Anthropic became the first frontier AI lab to collaborate with the Department of Energy (“DoE”)   
21 National Laboratories and the National Nuclear Security Administration to evaluate one of  
22 Anthropic’s models in a Top Secret classified environment to determine how large language  
23 models may contribute to or help to address national security risks in the nuclear domain.<sup>2</sup>

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>1</sup> The Intelligence Community comprises 18 organizations, including elements of the DoW (such  
26 as the National Security Agency) and other departments and agencies (such as the Department of  
27 Energy’s Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence) as well as independent agencies (such as  
the Central Intelligence Agency). *See Members of the IC*, Off. of Dir. of Nat’l Intel.,  
<https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic>.

28 <sup>2</sup> *See Anthropic partners with U.S. National Labs for first 1,000 Scientist AI Jam*, Anthropic (Feb.  
28, 2025), <https://www.anthropic.com/news/anthropic-partners-with-u-s-national-labs-for-first-1-000-scientist-ai-jam>.

1 Anthropic later expanded its partnership with the DoE National Laboratories by deploying Claude  
2 to 10,000 scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to help bolster research across  
3 nuclear deterrence, energy, materials science, and energy security.<sup>3</sup>

4 5. In November 2024, Anthropic expanded its relationship with the U.S. government  
5 via a partnership with the software company Palantir Technologies.<sup>4</sup> Anthropic and Palantir  
6 partnered to provide intelligence and defense capabilities to U.S. intelligence and defense  
7 agencies. That partnership has allowed Claude to be used to support government operations,  
8 including rapidly processing large datasets; autonomously completing complex software  
9 engineering projects related to offensive and defensive cyber operations and vulnerability  
10 detection; supporting military operations; performing intelligence analysis and threat assessments;  
11 and handling national security workflows and other mission-critical tasks integral to national  
12 security.

13 6. We have only deepened our relationship with the DoW and the Intelligence  
14 Community since then. In June 2025, we announced a custom set of Claude models built  
15 exclusively for U.S. national security customers.<sup>5</sup> We developed these “Claude Gov” models  
16 based on direct feedback from our national security partners to address real-world needs. In  
17 particular, these models were fine-tuned so that they would not refuse requests that regular Claude  
18 models—those for civilian enterprise or consumer use—would refuse.<sup>6</sup> And as with all our other  
19 Claude models, we rigorously tested these models for safety. In July 2025, alongside other frontier  
20 AI labs including Google, OpenAI, and xAI, Anthropic was awarded a two-year, up to \$200  
21 million agreement by the DoW’s Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (“CDAO”), the  
22 primary office within the DoW responsible for integrating and optimizing AI capabilities across

23 \_\_\_\_\_  
24 <sup>3</sup> See *Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory expands Claude for Enterprise use to empower*  
25 *scientists and researchers*, Anthropic (July 9, 2025), <https://www.anthropic.com/news/lawrence-livermore-national-laboratory-expands-claude-for-enterprise-to-empower-scientists-and>.

26 <sup>4</sup> See *Anthropic and Palantir Partner to Bring Claude AI Models to AWS for U.S. Government*  
27 *Intelligence and Defense Operations*, Palantir: Investors (Nov. 7, 2024),  
<https://investors.palantir.com/news-details/2024/Anthropic-and-Palantir-Partner-to-Bring-Claude-AI-Models-to-AWS-for-U.S.-Government-Intelligence-and-Defense-Operations/>.

28 <sup>5</sup> See *Claude Gov models for U.S. national security customers*, Anthropic (June 6, 2025),  
<https://www.anthropic.com/news/claude-gov-models-for-u-s-national-security-customers>.

<sup>6</sup> See *id.*

1 the DoW.<sup>7</sup> As part of that agreement, we expanded our commitment to work with the DoW to  
2 explore and prototype frontier AI capabilities that advance U.S. national security. In announcing  
3 the award of these contracts to Anthropic and the other frontier AI labs, the CDAO emphasized  
4 that it was “leveraging commercially available solutions” to “accelerate the use of advanced AI”  
5 in service of the DoW’s mission.<sup>8</sup> Anthropic worked diligently under that agreement, scoping out  
6 potential ways that the Department could best be served by Claude and related Anthropic  
7 professional services. During this period, the Department conveyed to Anthropic that Claude was  
8 the best solution for some of the proposals.

9         7. We have also partnered with the General Services Administration (“GSA”), the  
10 civilian agency responsible for centralized procurement and shared services across the federal  
11 government. In August 2025, Anthropic and GSA announced a first-of-its-kind OneGov  
12 agreement to deliver Claude Gov to all three branches of the government—civilian executive,  
13 legislative, and judiciary—for a nominal fee of \$1 per agency. As GSA announced at the time,  
14 “This trailblazing partnership directly supports the White House’s *America’s AI Action Plan* and  
15 positions the United States as the global leader in government AI adoption, ensuring that the  
16 federal workforce can tap into the transformative power of AI to modernize operations, improve  
17 decision-making, and deliver better results for taxpayers.”<sup>9</sup>

18         8. Throughout, we have maintained our commitment to supporting the national  
19 security of the United States and its allies. I have a team of 15 individuals who manage  
20 relationships with our federal government customers, including national security customers. This  
21 team includes individuals with security clearances who drew on their past experience training AI  
22 models for the DoW and Intelligence Community to help lead the development of Anthropic’s  
23 Claude Gov models. My team partners closely with dozens of other Anthropic employees across

24 \_\_\_\_\_  
25 <sup>7</sup> See *CDAO Announces Partnerships with Frontier AI Companies to Address National Security*  
26 *Mission Areas*, CDAO (July 14, 2025), [https://www.ai.mil/latest/news-press/pr-](https://www.ai.mil/latest/news-press/pr-view/article/4242822/cdao-announces-partnerships-with-frontier-ai-companies-to-address-national-secu/)  
27 [view/article/4242822/cdao-announces-partnerships-with-frontier-ai-companies-to-address-](https://www.ai.mil/latest/news-press/pr-view/article/4242822/cdao-announces-partnerships-with-frontier-ai-companies-to-address-national-secu/)  
28 [national-secu/](https://www.ai.mil/latest/news-press/pr-view/article/4242822/cdao-announces-partnerships-with-frontier-ai-companies-to-address-national-secu/).

<sup>8</sup> See *id.*

<sup>9</sup> See Press Release, Gen. Servs. Admin, *GSA Strikes Another OneGov Deal with Anthropic to Offer Claude AI to all Branches of Gov for Just \$1*, (Aug. 12, 2025), <https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/newsroom/news-releases/gsa-strikes-onegov-deal-with-anthropic-08122025>.

1 other parts of the company, including Product, Applied AI, Legal, and Policy. And recently, to  
2 help the company identify and develop high-impact applications that strengthen U.S. and close  
3 allies' capabilities in areas like cybersecurity and intelligence analysis, on August 27, 2025, we  
4 introduced the Anthropic National Security and Public Sector Advisory Council, a group of  
5 leading bipartisan national security and public policy experts.

6 9. As one would expect, our many partnerships with the U.S. government have  
7 involved intense security reviews and thorough vetting. Last year, the DoW's Defense  
8 Counterintelligence and Security Agency granted Anthropic a Top Secret facility security  
9 clearance, after an 18-month vetting process, along with several personnel clearances for  
10 Anthropic employees and management, to enable continued support for classified national security  
11 projects.

12 10. In June 2025, GSA and the DoW granted Claude authorization through the Federal  
13 Risk and Authorization Management Program ("FedRAMP") for use with FedRAMP High and  
14 DoD Impact Level 4 and 5 workloads, representing the highest levels of cloud security  
15 certification for unclassified and controlled unclassified information.

16 11. To my knowledge, at no point in any of those processes did the DoW identify any  
17 potential supply chain risk posed by Anthropic, its employees, or its products and services.

18 12. In fact, to my knowledge, we have only ever received positive feedback about  
19 Claude's performance from our governmental customers. For example, a technology leader at a  
20 large civilian agency informed us that their agency had used Claude to resolve legacy system  
21 issues that had been stuck for years (with one five-year-old bug fixed within days), build internal  
22 tools within days rather than waiting through year-long procurement processes, and modernize  
23 applications that have not been updated since the 2000s to current technology stacks within hours.  
24 The leader of another organization shared that they named Claude their "top model" and planned  
25 to grow usage as quickly as possible: "We want to move as fast as possible with you guys."  
26 Similarly, senior leaders within a part of the Intelligence Community reported that they were  
27 "hammering away" at Claude once they obtained access to their networks.

**The Current Negotiations With The Department of War**

1  
2 13. In September 2025, Anthropic began negotiations with the DoW for a deployment  
3 on the DoW’s GenAI.mil AI platform. As part of those discussions, the DoW began to ask that  
4 Anthropic remove its Usage Policy as applicable to the DoW contracts and subcontracts.

5 14. Use of Claude is expressly subject to and conditioned upon compliance with  
6 Anthropic’s Terms of Service,<sup>10</sup> which incorporate our Usage Policy.<sup>11</sup> The Usage Policy is  
7 intended to help our users stay safe and promote the responsible use of our products and services.  
8 By establishing reasonable limitations on the appropriate uses for our products and services, the  
9 Usage Policy effectively defines Anthropic’s commercial offerings.

10 15. To be clear, Anthropic does not attempt—and has never attempted—to employ its  
11 Usage Policy to exert authority, control, or command over our customers, including the DoW and  
12 its military operations. Anthropic’s Usage Policy does not give it insight into how the DoW uses  
13 Claude. That said, if Anthropic’s Usage Policy restrictions do not meet the DoW’s needs, the  
14 DoW is of course able to use any other AI system that better meets its requirements.

15 16. Over the past several months, Anthropic’s leadership has engaged in extensive  
16 discussions with the DoW leadership regarding the Usage Policy. Anthropic was willing to and  
17 did alter its Usage Policy to meet the specific needs of the DoW (for example, we have made clear  
18 that the Department can engage in offensive cyber operations). Although the DoW throughout that  
19 time demonstrated willingness to negotiate—leadership for both parties held in-person meetings  
20 and exchanged redlines and emails at a regular cadence—the DoW has more recently anchored on  
21 a demand that Anthropic must remove its Usage Policy and permit “all lawful uses” of Claude. I  
22 understand that the DoW has been or is exerting similar pressure on other leading AI labs to agree  
23 to similar demands, as reflected in Secretary Hegseth’s memorandum of January 9, 2026, directing  
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27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>10</sup>Available at <https://www.anthropic.com/legal/consumer-terms> (Consumer Terms of Service) and  
at <https://www.anthropic.com/legal/commercial-terms> (Commercial Terms of Service).

<sup>11</sup> Anthropic’s Usage Policy is available online at <https://www.anthropic.com/legal/aup>.

1 Department leadership to incorporate “any lawful use” language into DoW contracts for AI  
2 services.<sup>12</sup>

3 17. As negotiations began to break down over the last several weeks, the DoW began  
4 threatening to designate Anthropic a “supply chain risk.” Aside from the public and private threats  
5 from the DoW in the last two weeks, which contain no specifics and which I believe were  
6 delivered to increase leverage in negotiations with the company, no government customer—or  
7 commercial customer or any other person—ever informed me or, to my knowledge, anyone else at  
8 Anthropic, that they considered Anthropic or our AI models a supply chain risk or more generally  
9 a threat to safety or national security. Nor has any government or commercial customer or any  
10 other person ever informed me or, to my knowledge, anyone else at Anthropic, that there is any  
11 risk that an adversary to the United States may sabotage, maliciously introduce unwanted  
12 function, or otherwise subvert the design, integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution,  
13 installation, operation, or maintenance of a system into which Anthropic’s offerings are integrated,  
14 so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the function, use, or operation of such system.

#### 15 **The President’s And The DoW’s Orders**

16 18. On February 27, 2026, the President and the Secretary of War converted prior  
17 threats into directives designed to harm Anthropic’s business.

18 19. First, at 3:47 p.m. Eastern time, President Trump, on his Truth Social platform,  
19 “direct[ed] EVERY Federal Agency in the United States Government to IMMEDIATELY  
20 CEASE all use of Anthropic’s technology.”<sup>13</sup> The President also called Anthropic an “out-of-  
21 control” and “RADICAL LEFT, WOKE COMPANY” of “Leftwing nut jobs” who “have no idea  
22 what the real World is all about,” and cited the company’s “selfishness” and “DISASTROUS  
23 MISTAKE trying to STRONG-ARM the Department of War,” and threatened that “Anthropic  
24  
25  
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27 <sup>12</sup> See Memorandum from Sec’y of War, Artificial Intelligence Strategy for the Department of  
28 War 5 (Jan. 9, 2026).

<sup>13</sup> Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TruthSocial (Feb. 27, 2026, 3:47 PM ET),  
<https://truthsocial.com/@realDonaldTrump/posts/116144552969293195>.

1 better get their act together” or he would “use the Full Power of the Presidency to make them  
2 comply, with major civil and criminal consequences to follow.”<sup>14</sup>

3 20. Shortly thereafter, Secretary Hegseth, acting on “the President’s directive,”  
4 “direct[ed] the Department of War to designate Anthropic a Supply-Chain Risk to National  
5 Security.”<sup>15</sup> In his post, the Secretary denounced what he considered to be “Silicon Valley  
6 ideology,” “defective altruism,” and “corporate virtue-signaling,” and called Anthropic’s actions a  
7 “textbook case of how not to do business with the United States Government or the Pentagon.”<sup>16</sup>  
8 He concluded: “Effective immediately, no contractor, supplier, or partner that does business with  
9 the United States military may conduct any commercial activity with Anthropic.”<sup>17</sup> At the same  
10 time, he stated that he is requiring Anthropic to continue providing services to the DoW, for up to  
11 six months.<sup>18</sup>

12 21. I refer to these statements by the President and Secretary Hegseth as the  
13 “Government’s Actions.”

#### 14 **Other Agencies’ Actions In Response To The Trump And Hegseth Directives**

15 22. Other agencies have also begun to take action in response to the Government’s  
16 Actions. On Friday, February 27, 2026, following the Government’s Actions, the GSA removed  
17 Anthropic from the agency’s AI platform USAi.gov, the primary centralized means for federal  
18 agencies to access and adopt AI tools, as well as from the agency’s Multiple Award Schedule  
19 contracts, through which Anthropic provided \$1 Claude subscriptions to the executive, legislative,  
20 and judicial branches of the Government as part of its “OneGov” agreement.<sup>19</sup> This decision cuts  
21 off sales opportunities for many federal agencies, including the U.S. Departments of Veterans  
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23

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24 <sup>14</sup> *Id.*

25 <sup>15</sup> Pete Hegseth (@SecWar), X (Feb. 27, 2026, 5:14 PM ET),  
<https://x.com/SecWar/status/2027507717469049070>.

26 <sup>16</sup> *Id.*

27 <sup>17</sup> *Id.*

28 <sup>18</sup> *Id.*

<sup>19</sup> Press Release, Gen. Servs. Admin, *GSA Stands with President Trump on National Security AI Directive*, (Feb. 27, 2026), <https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/newsroom/news-releases/gsa-stands-with-president-trump-on-national-security-ai-directive-02272026>.

1 Affairs, Health and Human Services (“HHS”), State, Labor, and Interior, in addition to the federal  
2 judiciary and many state and local governments that procure through the Multiple Award  
3 Schedules.

4 23. On Monday, March 2, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury and the Federal  
5 Housing Finance Agency (which oversees Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) announced they were  
6 terminating all use of Claude.<sup>20</sup>

7 24. A technology leader at a federal civilian agency has also informed me that the DoW  
8 advised his agency, and is advising all other civilian agencies, to stop using Claude.

9 25. We also understand that other agencies, including the Department of State and HHS,  
10 have issued internal statements saying they will follow the President’s directive.

11 26. The AI leadership of one portion of the Intelligence Community informed us that  
12 they were preparing for “complete detachment” from Claude based on the “directive” they had  
13 received.

14 27. The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, a nuclear weapons research and  
15 development center funded by the Department of Energy, also informed Anthropic that it was  
16 shutting down Claude.

17 28. Many of these customers—and others, particularly in the Intelligence Community—  
18 have continued to express how much they value their partnership with Anthropic and how harmful  
19 losing access to our models will be (setting back their work months or even years). They have also  
20 expressed, however, feeling like they have little choice in the matter.

### 21 **Irreparable Harm To Anthropic**

22 29. The Government’s Actions immediately and irreparably harm Anthropic. The  
23 designation also impugns Anthropic’s integrity and reputation as a trusted partner, having a real  
24 but incalculable effect on sales to non-governmental customers. All told, Anthropic will suffer  
25 considerable financial and reputational harm.

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27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>20</sup> Scott Bessent (@SecScottBessent), X (Mar. 2, 2026, 10:57 AM ET),  
<https://x.com/secscottbessent/status/2028499953283117283?s=46>; William Pulte (@pulte), X  
(Mar. 2, 2026, 11:12 AM ET), <https://x.com/pulte/status/2028503809299779866>.

1           30. Being labeled as a “supply chain risk” affects our ability to sell our products and  
2 services to our U.S. government customers and others. Even before the Government’s Actions, in  
3 response to the public threats from the DoW, Anthropic had already started receiving requests  
4 from government customers to provide new contractual terms allowing those customers to  
5 terminate if Anthropic received a supply chain risk designation. The DoW has now accelerated  
6 this process by issuing the Government’s Actions and directing firms to assess their reliance on  
7 Anthropic AI models.<sup>21</sup>

8           31. Anthropic maintains a sizable and accelerating public sector business, driven largely  
9 by fast adoption rates at the DoW and within the Intelligence Community. For example, from just  
10 December 2025 to the end of January 2026, we have experienced a fourfold increase in annual  
11 recurring revenue (“ARR”)<sup>22</sup> run rate from public sector customers. Before the year began, we  
12 projected several hundred million dollars in Public Sector ARR in 2026 and have since revised  
13 these projections upward based on the pace of growth in the first two months alone. Based on  
14 current adoption rates, we project our Public Sector business in the next five years could increase  
15 to multiple billions in ARR.

16           32. The Government’s Actions are an existential threat to all of this. By expressly  
17 excluding Anthropic from sales directly to the DoW or through its contractors, we estimate the  
18 immediate loss of more than \$150 million ARR in existing and expected DoW contracts. That  
19 includes the \$200 million CDAO agreement, under which we anticipated over \$50 million ARR  
20 this year. It also includes Anthropic’s substantial sales to the DoW through contractors, resellers,  
21 and systems integrators, which comprise a sizable portion of our Public Sector sales revenue.

22           33. Although I understand that there is no legal authority for the scope of the  
23 Government’s Actions, we have seen, and expect to continue to see, the effects of these directives  
24 spread to the Intelligence Community and other U.S. federal agencies. Harm is already occurring.  
25 The dispute with the DoW has caused significant delays or pauses in six national security  
26

27 <sup>21</sup> Dave Lawler et al., *Scoop: Pentagon takes first step toward blacklisting Anthropic*, Axios (Feb.  
28 25, 2026), <https://www.axios.com/2026/02/25/anthropic-pentagon-blacklist-claude>.

<sup>22</sup> ARR is the predictable yearly revenue associated with subscription-based software fees under active contracts.

1 contracts or contract pipelines. In at least one instance, a customer at a strategic command center  
 2 directed a partner to work with xAI or Google instead of Anthropic. These impacts are real and  
 3 ongoing. In a sector where counterparties are risk-averse and dependent on government  
 4 contracting, even the appearance of regulatory or political disfavor can be enough to cause  
 5 disengagement. Defense contractors performing work under government contracts are assessing—  
 6 and in many cases looking to terminate—their reliance on Anthropic, effectively eliminating an  
 7 important market.<sup>23</sup> If that happens, we estimate Anthropic’s more than half-a-billion dollar  
 8 expected Public Sector ARR in 2026 to shrink substantially or disappear altogether. That loss of  
 9 revenue includes the OneGov GSA agreement, which we anticipated generating close to \$100  
 10 million in ARR this year. And it likely includes not only federal agencies, but state and local  
 11 government customers as well, some of which also purchase through the GSA agreement, and  
 12 others of which will reconsider purchasing Anthropic products after the company has been  
 13 blacklisted as a purported “supply chain risk” by the federal government.

14 34. For similar reasons, the Government’s Actions will also irreparably harm  
 15 Anthropic’s ability to forge new business partnerships and attract new customers in the future.

16 \* \* \*

17 I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct to the best of my  
 18 knowledge.

19 Executed on March 9, 2026.

/s/ Thiyagu Ramasamy

Thiyagu Ramasamy  
 Head of Public Sector, Anthropic

25 <sup>23</sup> See Lora Kolodny, Ari Levy, Samantha Subin, *Defense tech companies are dropping Claude*  
 26 *after Pentagon’s Anthropic blacklist* (Mar. 4, 2026) (quoting the managing partner for a  
 27 government and defense-focused venture capital firm as saying their portfolio companies involved  
 28 in defense contracts “are very strict in their interpretation of the requirements” and “have backed  
 off their use of Claude for defense use cases and are in active processes to replace the service with  
 another one”), available at  
<https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/04/pentagon-blacklist-anthropic-defense-tech-claude.html>.

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**ATTESTATION PURSUANT TO CIVIL LOCAL RULE 5-1(i)(3)**

Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 5-1(i)(3), I attest that concurrence in the filing of this document has been obtained from the other signatories.

By: /s/ Michael J. Mongan  
Michael J. Mongan