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9
10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
11 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
12 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

13 AMAZON.COM SERVICES LLC, a Delaware
14 limited liability company,

15 Plaintiff,

16 v.

17 PERPLEXITY AI, INC., a Delaware
18 corporation.

19 Defendant.

Case No.:

COMPLAINT FOR:

**(1) VIOLATIONS OF THE
COMPUTER FRAUD AND
ABUSE ACT; AND**

**(2) VIOLATIONS OF THE
CALIFORNIA
COMPREHENSIVE COMPUTER
DATA ACCESS AND FRAUD
ACT**

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

1 Plaintiff Amazon.com Services LLC (“Amazon”) alleges as follows:

2 **INTRODUCTION**

3 1. Amazon brings this action to stop Perplexity AI, Inc.’s (“Perplexity” or
4 “Defendant”) persistent, covert, and unauthorized access into Amazon’s protected computer
5 systems in violation of federal and California computer fraud and abuse statutes. This case is not
6 about stifling innovation; it is about unauthorized access and trespass. It is about a company that,
7 after repeated notice, chose to disguise an automated “agentic” browser as a human user, to evade
8 Amazon’s technological barriers, and to access private customer accounts without Amazon’s
9 permission. Amazon’s request is straightforward: Perplexity must be transparent when deploying
10 its artificial intelligence (“AI”) agent on Amazon.com (the “Amazon Store”) and it must respect
11 Amazon’s right to limit the activity of Perplexity’s AI agent in private customer accounts. No
12 different than any other intruder, Perplexity is not allowed to go where it has been expressly told it
13 cannot; that Perplexity’s trespass involves code rather than a lockpick makes it no less unlawful.
14 Perplexity’s misconduct must end.

15 2. Amazon operates the Amazon Store, an online store serving hundreds of millions of
16 customers. The Amazon Store is more than a catalog of webpages: it is an integrated, dynamic
17 environment that provides Amazon customers with a secure, curated, and individualized shopping
18 experience. To enable Amazon to provide the best customer experience, Amazon customers must
19 register for an account using unique login credentials. After doing so, they can manage and track
20 their orders, review their order history, receive personalized recommendations, store credit cards
21 and delivery addresses, and process returns, among other things. To protect the Amazon Store and
22 its customers’ private information, and preserve customer trust, Amazon invests heavily in
23 technical and organizational safeguards including numerous cybersecurity measures.

24 3. Perplexity operates AI-based products and services, including an application called
25 Comet that includes “agentic AI” functionality. Unlike more familiar AI tools, which generate text
26 or provide information in response to prompts from users, AI agents can, among other things, plan
27 and carry out multi-step tasks for a user with little input. In practice, these AI tools can
28 independently interact with third-party websites, use stored credentials, and perform actions on the

1 users' behalf—executing sequences that resemble a human-controlled browser session even when
2 no human is actively clicking. Relevant here, Comet allows users to browse the internet and use
3 the Comet AI agent to independently perform actions on users' behalf, including interacting with
4 and placing orders in the Amazon Store through their private customer accounts.

5 4. Because agentic AI tools like Comet can act within protected computer systems,
6 including private customer accounts requiring a password, they present risks to Amazon's
7 customers and the Amazon Store. Amazon reasonably requires automated AI agents—that is, AI
8 tools (like Comet) that access Amazon's Store and private account information on behalf of
9 registered Amazon customers—to transparently identify themselves. This is necessary for Amazon
10 to, among other things, ensure the AI agents do not pose risks to Amazon's customers in the
11 Amazon Store. Amazon has communicated these requirements directly to companies operating AI
12 agents, including Perplexity. Such transparent identification of AI agents is also required under
13 Amazon's Conditions of Use, which are publicly available to everyone. These requirements protect
14 Amazon's right to know and control who is accessing its private servers and are integral to
15 Amazon's ability to protect its customer's data.

16 5. Rather than be transparent, Perplexity has purposely configured its Comet AI
17 software to not identify the Comet AI agent's activities in the Amazon Store: Perplexity falsely
18 identifies its Comet AI agent activity as coming from Google Chrome, which is a separate, widely
19 used web browser owned by Google. As a result, Perplexity's Comet AI agent covertly poses as a
20 human customer shopping in the Amazon Store on a Google Chrome browser.

21 6. Perplexity creates considerable risks to Amazon's customers when it deploys its
22 unauthorized and covert AI agent into the Amazon Store's private customer accounts. As just one
23 example, Perplexity's Comet browser and AI agent are vulnerable to attacks from cyber criminals.
24 These cyber criminals can exploit Perplexity's cybersecurity failures and leverage the Comet AI
25 agent to compromise personal and private data from Amazon's customers who use the Comet AI
26 agent. It has been publicly reported that cyber criminals and other bad actors can “hijack[] the AI
27
28

1 assistant embedded in the browser to steal data.”¹ Comet’s vulnerabilities place the private data of
2 Amazon customers who use the Comet AI agent, and by extension, Amazon’s hard-won customer
3 trust, at risk.

4 7. Beyond security risks to Amazon’s customers, Perplexity’s Comet AI agent has
5 degraded Amazon customers’ shopping experience and interfered with Amazon’s ability to ensure
6 customers who use the Comet AI agent receive the benefits of the individualized shopping
7 experience that Amazon has spent decades curating.

8 8. Since November 19, 2024, Amazon has told Perplexity’s executives on at least five
9 separate occasions that its AI agents may not covertly access the Amazon Store. First Perplexity
10 agreed, then went back on its word. Next, after Amazon detected the Comet AI agent covertly
11 accessing private customer accounts and told Perplexity to stop, Perplexity claimed that Comet AI
12 was not agentic when its own marketing materials admit otherwise. Amazon then set up a
13 technological barrier to restrict the Comet AI agent from covertly accessing private customer
14 accounts. In response, Perplexity released a Comet software update specifically designed so that
15 the Comet AI agent could evade that technological barrier. And when Amazon again addressed
16 Perplexity’s unauthorized conduct with Perplexity on two separate occasions, Perplexity refused to
17 stop. Perplexity’s CEO understood that Perplexity was deliberately flouting Amazon’s rules, but
18 had no legitimate justification for why Perplexity would not act honestly and transparently. Finally,
19 on October 31, 2025, Amazon sent a cease-and-desist letter to Perplexity reiterating Amazon’s
20 prohibition against Perplexity using AI agents to covertly access Amazon’s private customer
21 accounts.

22 9. Perplexity’s pattern is clear: when confronted, it denies; when blocked, it evades;
23 and when warned, it persists. The law does not require Amazon to tolerate a concealed, automated
24 actor that refuses to identify itself, gains unauthorized access to private customer accounts, and
25 defeats access controls to continue to do so. Amazon, through this lawsuit, seeks to immediately
26 stop Perplexity from its continuing injurious actions, from which Amazon has suffered irreparable

27 ¹ Ex. 1, Ravie Lakshmanan, *CometJacking: One Click Can Turn Perplexity’s Comet AI Browser*
28 *Into a Data Thief*, The Hacker News (Oct. 4, 2025),
<https://thehackernews.com/2025/10/cometjacking-one-click-can-turn.html>.

1 harm, and which will continue unless Defendant is enjoined from further trespass into Amazon's
2 protected servers.

3 **PARTIES**

4 10. Plaintiff Amazon is a Delaware limited liability company.

5 11. Defendant Perplexity is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
6 in San Francisco, California.

7 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

8 12. This Court has federal question jurisdiction over the violation of the Computer Fraud
9 and Abuse Act (18 U.S.C. § 1030) alleged in this Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

10 13. The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the violation of the California
11 Comprehensive Computer Data Access and Fraud Act (California Penal Code § 502) pursuant to
12 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because this claim arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts as Amazon's
13 federal claim.

14 14. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant because Defendant's
15 headquarters and principal place of business are in San Francisco.

16 15. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1) because Defendant resides in San
17 Francisco. Venue is also proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because a substantial part of the
18 events giving rise to Amazon's claims occurred in San Francisco.

19 16. The California Penal Code § 502 creates a private civil cause of action. Jurisdiction
20 and venue are also proper in this Court under California Penal Code 502(j), which states: "For
21 purposes of bringing a civil or a criminal action under this section, a person who causes, by any
22 means, the access of a computer, computer system, or computer network in one jurisdiction from
23 another jurisdiction is deemed to have personally accessed the computer, computer system, or
24 computer network in each jurisdiction."

25 **BACKGROUND**

26 **I. Background on the Amazon Store**

27 17. Amazon owns and operates the Amazon Store, which is an online store accessible
28 in the United States at www.amazon.com. Through the Amazon Store, customers can browse,

1 select, and purchase a wide variety of products and services. From its inception as an online
2 bookstore, the Amazon Store has built its business around a simple principle: putting customers
3 first. This customer-centric focus has allowed the Amazon Store to consistently deliver for its
4 customers.

5 18. Over decades, Amazon has developed a distinctive shopping experience in the
6 Amazon Store for each individual customer. That shopping experience is designed to help
7 customers find and discover products that cater to their needs based on key elements, including
8 reviews, price, availability, delivery speed, measures of post-purchase satisfaction like return rates,
9 and each customer’s browsing and shopping history.

10 19. To access that individualized shopping experience, customers must register a private
11 account in the Amazon Store secured with unique login credentials. Within each private account,
12 customers can, among other things, manage and track their orders; save items for later purchases;
13 receive personalized recommendations; store payment, personal address and contact information;
14 and receive updates regarding their purchases.

15 20. Amazon employs a range of cybersecurity measures—including encryption, multi-
16 factor authentication options, and suspicious activity monitoring—to protect the data in customers’
17 private accounts. These cybersecurity measures place Amazon among the best major providers at
18 protecting customer information.

19 **II. The Amazon Store’s Conditions of Use**

20 21. All activities in the Amazon Store and use of related Amazon services and products
21 are governed by the Amazon Store’s Conditions of Use.²

22 22. On May 30, 2025, Amazon updated the Amazon Store’s Conditions of Use to add
23 a dedicated section on AI Agents (“Agent Terms”). The Agent Terms require that AI agent
24 providers like Defendant clearly identify AI agents and refrain from any actions to conceal or
25 obscure agentic activities. They also explain that Amazon limits AI agents’ access to the Amazon
26 Store and requires AI agent providers to abide by such limits.

27 _____
28 ² Ex. 2, *Conditions of Use*, Amazon (May 30, 2025),
<https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=GLSBYFE9MGKKQXXM>.

1 and how Agents access, use, or interact with an
2 Amazon Service.

3 **III. Background on Defendant and the Comet Browser**

4 24. Defendant is a technology company founded in 2022.

5 25. Defendant develops and operates AI-based products and services, including a web
6 browser application called Comet that Defendant first released to paying subscribers on July 9,
7 2025. Comet allows users to browse the internet and use Defendant’s AI tools, including the Comet
8 AI agent. Comet users can ask the Comet AI agent to independently perform actions on users’
9 behalf, such as placing an order in the Amazon Store. On October 2, 2025, Defendant made the
10 Comet browser and agent widely available to the public for free.

11 **IV. Defendant’s Covert and Unauthorized Access into the Amazon Store**

12 26. Since at least November 2024, Defendant has repeatedly and deliberately gained
13 unauthorized access to the Amazon Store.

14 **A. Defendant Fraudulently Sets Up Amazon Prime Accounts to Facilitate its “Buy
15 with Pro” Feature**

16 27. In November 2024, Defendant launched its “Buy with Pro” feature, allowing its
17 paying subscribers to ask Defendant to make purchases on third-party websites on their behalf,
18 while promising to provide free shipping “as a thank-you for shopping with [Defendant].”³
19 Defendant marketed the “Buy with Pro” function as powered by agentic AI.

20 28. Defendant used Amazon accounts, including Amazon Prime accounts, to facilitate
21 “Buy with Pro.” When Defendant’s paying subscribers used the “Buy with Pro” feature in the
22 Amazon Store, Defendant would place orders using Defendant’s Amazon accounts, including its
23 Amazon Prime accounts, thereby allowing some of those subscribers to make purchases and receive
24 Prime benefits, such as free shipping, without having to create their own Amazon accounts or pay
25 for Prime.

26 29. Defendant’s “Buy with Pro” feature risked interfering with Amazon’s customer
27 relationships and potentially deprived Amazon of revenue by giving third parties Prime’s benefits

28 ³ Ex. 3, *Shop like a Pro: Perplexity’s new AI-powered shopping assistant*, Perplexity (Nov. 18, 2024), <https://www.perplexity.ai/hub/blog/shop-like-a-pro>.

1 even though those third parties may not have had Prime memberships. In addition, because users
2 of Defendant’s “Buy with Pro” feature did not transact using their own Amazon accounts, this
3 created the risk that they would be unable to access all features of the Amazon Store. For example,
4 they may not have received Amazon’s timely updates about their orders and may have experienced
5 difficulties with returns and exchanges through Amazon because they were not interacting directly
6 with the Amazon Store.

7 30. On November 19, 2024, Amazon discovered Defendant’s misuse of Prime
8 memberships.

9 **B. Amazon Informs Defendant that Access to the Amazon Store through “Buy
10 with Pro” is Unauthorized**

11 31. On November 19, 2024, Amazon contacted and informed Defendant that its use of
12 Amazon Prime accounts violated the terms and conditions for Amazon Prime, which forbid Prime
13 members from “purchas[ing] products for the purpose of resale, rental, or to ship to their customers
14 or potential customers using Prime benefits.”⁴ Amazon also advised Defendant—given
15 Defendant’s advertising of “Buy with Pro” as an AI-powered shopping assistant—that it did not
16 have permission to deploy any AI agents in the Amazon Store. In response, Defendant agreed that
17 it would halt the deployment of AI agents in the Amazon Store unless Amazon and Defendant
18 reached mutually agreed-upon terms for such deployment.

19 **C. Defendant Deploys its AI Agent in the Amazon Store through Private
20 Customer Accounts**

21 32. On July 9, 2025, Defendant released Comet, a web browser application, to its paying
22 subscribers. Without prior notice to Amazon, and without authorization, Defendant deployed its
23 Comet AI agent in the Amazon Store through private Amazon customer accounts, in contravention
24 of Defendant’s prior agreement not to deploy AI agents in the Amazon Store without Amazon’s
25 consent to mutually-agreed terms.

26 33. Within a Comet browser session, the Comet AI agent can perform numerous tasks

27 _____
28 ⁴ Ex. 4, *Amazon Prime Terms & Conditions*, Amazon (May 11, 2021),
<https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=G2B9L3YR7LR8J4XP>.

1 in response to user prompts. To deploy the Comet AI agent to make purchases in the Amazon
2 Store, the Comet AI agent directs users to the Amazon Store’s sign-in page and instructs them to
3 log into their Amazon accounts (if the user has not already logged in). Once a user is logged in, no
4 further human action is required in the Amazon Store: the Comet AI agent has access to the user’s
5 private account information (that the Comet AI agent transmits back to Perplexity’s servers for
6 processing), the Comet AI agent will add items to the user’s shopping cart, make purchases, and
7 take other agentic actions in the Amazon Store on the user’s behalf, all without the user having to
8 make another click in the Amazon Store.

9 34. Defendant does not identify the Comet AI agent deployed in the Comet browser
10 sessions, but rather conceals its agentic activities. When the Comet AI agent accesses the Amazon
11 Store, it does not use a unique browser identifier and instead transmits the same “user-agent” string
12 that is used by Google Chrome. A “user-agent” string is a standard piece of information sent by a
13 web browser to identify itself to a third-party website.

14 35. It is considered responsible practice on the web to use a user-agent string that
15 distinguishes requests initiated by an AI agent from requests resulting directly from human action.
16 Unlike Comet, other web browsers with agentic AI capabilities use unique user-agent strings to
17 identify both the browser identity and whether browsing activity is being conducted by an AI agent.
18 Thus, by using the same user-agent string as Google Chrome, the Comet AI agent makes it
19 deceptively appear that a human user is visiting the Amazon Store using the Google Chrome
20 browser.

21 36. Defendant’s covert deployment of the Comet AI agent into the Amazon Store
22 through private customer accounts violates Amazon’s License and Access Terms, the Amazon
23 Software Terms, and the Agent Terms, as well as Amazon’s prior request, to which Defendant
24 agreed, that Defendant refrain from deploying covert AI agents in the Amazon Store.

25 **D. Amazon Informs Defendant that Comet’s Agentic Access Is Unauthorized and**
26 **Implements a Technological Barrier, which Defendant Evades**

27 37. On August 4, 2025, shortly after Amazon detected Defendant’s renewed and
28 unauthorized deployment of the Comet AI agent in the Amazon Store, Amazon contacted

1 Defendant's CBO, Mr. Shevelenko, and explained that Amazon requires all AI agents to act
2 transparently in the Amazon Store and that Defendant was not permitted to deploy the Comet AI
3 agent in the Amazon Store. Mr. Shevelenko falsely asserted that Comet was not "agentic,"
4 contradicting Perplexity's public marketing materials touting Comet's agentic AI functions,
5 including the ability to "actively conduct[] entire browsing sessions," "book[ing] a meeting or
6 send[ing] an email," "buy[ing] something you forgot," and "execut[ing] complete workflows while
7 keeping perfect context." Ex. 5, Perplexity Team, *Introducing Comet*, Perplexity (July 9, 2025),
8 <https://www.perplexity.ai/hub/blog/introducing-comet>.

9 38. Following Defendant's covert and unauthorized access, numerous Amazon software
10 engineers and other highly skilled employees spent significant time conducting a forensic analysis
11 of network traffic and browser data to isolate the Comet AI agent's browser fingerprint from
12 ordinary customer activities. On August 19, 2025, after dedicating substantial resources to tracking
13 and identifying the activities of Defendant's covert AI agent in the Amazon Store and in Amazon's
14 servers, Amazon implemented a technological barrier to restrict the Comet AI agent's ability to
15 access Amazon's private customer accounts.

16 39. Within 24 hours of Amazon implementing a technological barrier to protect
17 Amazon's private customer accounts from Defendant's unauthorized access, Defendant released
18 an updated version of Comet designed to evade the barrier by altering Comet's behavior so that the
19 Comet AI agent no longer matched the digital fingerprint Amazon had developed to identify it.
20 This software update allowed Defendant to again obtain unauthorized agentic access to Amazon's
21 private customer accounts. Comet's bypassing of Amazon's technological barrier also
22 independently violates the Conditions of Use, which are published and available to everyone
23 accessing the Amazon Store.

24 **E. Amazon Again Informs Defendant that Comet's Agentic Access Is**
25 **Unauthorized, and Defendant Again Continued to Access Private Customer**
26 **Accounts in the Amazon Store Without Authorization**

27 40. After Defendant's swift evasion of Amazon's technological barrier, Amazon twice
28 confronted Defendant about its unauthorized access into the Amazon Store.

1 41. On September 12, 2025, Amazon contacted Defendant’s CEO, Mr. Srinivas, and
2 explained that the Comet AI agent is not authorized to access the Amazon Store. Amazon made it
3 clear that if Defendant continues to access the Amazon Store by not identifying the Comet AI agent,
4 legal action would likely follow. Mr. Srinivas did not deny that Comet AI was accessing the
5 Amazon Store without identifying itself.

6 42. And on September 29, 2025, Amazon contacted Defendant’s CEO, Mr. Srinivas, as
7 well as its CBO, Mr. Shevelenko, and explained that the Comet AI agent is not authorized to access
8 the Amazon Store without transparently identifying itself. Mr. Srinivas and Mr. Shevelenko offered
9 no legitimate justification for Defendant’s unauthorized conduct. After this call, Defendant’s
10 Comet AI agent continued to impersonate Google Chrome and fail to identify itself when accessing
11 the Amazon Store through private customer accounts.

12 43. On October 2, 2025, Defendant made Comet widely available to the public for free.⁵

13 **F. Amazon Sends a Cease-and-Desist Letter to Defendant, but Defendant Refuses**
14 **to Change Course**

15 44. On October 31, 2025, Amazon sent Defendant a cease-and-desist letter, reaffirming
16 that Defendant is not authorized to covertly deploy AI agents in the Amazon Store and that Amazon
17 would seek all available legal and equitable remedies if this conduct did not stop.⁶

18 **V. Defendant’s Conduct Has Caused Irreparable Harm to Amazon**

19 45. Amazon is entitled to control access to the Amazon Store’s private user accounts
20 and private customer data. Defendant’s continual covert and unauthorized access into the Amazon
21 Store through private customer accounts irreparably harms Amazon.

22 46. Under Amazon’s Conditions of Use, the License and Access Terms prohibit the
23 downloading, copying, or use of account information for a third party’s—like Perplexity’s—benefit
24 and the use of data mining, robots, or similar data gathering and extraction tools; the Amazon
25 Software Terms prohibit bypassing any technological measures associated with Amazon Software;
26 and the Agent Terms expressly require AI agents to transparently identify themselves when they

27 ⁵ Ex. 6, *The Internet is Better on Comet*, Perplexity (Oct. 2, 2025),
28 <https://www.perplexity.ai/hub/blog/comet-is-now-available-to-everyone-worldwide>.

⁶ Ex. 7, Amazon’s Cease and Desist Letter to Perplexity (Oct. 31, 2025).

1 operate within the Amazon Store and to comply with any request by Amazon that they refrain from
2 accessing the Store. The Agent Terms also prohibit AI agents from circumventing any measure
3 intended to block, limit, or control whether and how they access the Store. Amazon has expressly
4 and repeatedly put Defendant on notice of all these Conditions of Use.

5 47. Amazon has directly asked Defendant on at least four separate occasions—on
6 November 19, 2024, August 4, 2025, September 12, 2025, and September 29, 2025—to stop its
7 covert and unauthorized access into Amazon’s Store. Yet Defendant has not ceased its illegal
8 conduct.

9 48. In response to Defendant’s refusal to comply with Amazon’s requests that it not
10 trespass into Amazon’s protected computers, Amazon implemented a technological barrier on
11 August 19, 2025 to restrict Comet’s agentic access to the Amazon Store through private customer
12 accounts. But Defendant evaded Amazon’s technological barrier to continue accessing the Amazon
13 Store through private customer accounts without identifying its browser or agentic activity.

14 49. Amazon also sent a cease-and-desist letter on October 31, 2025, unequivocally
15 revoking Defendant’s access to the Amazon Store when using covert AI agents, and threatening
16 legal action.

17 50. To date, Defendant has not heeded any of Amazon’s attempts to maintain control of
18 the Amazon Store and its private customer accounts. Rather, Defendant has continually and
19 without authorization obtained access to all data available in the private Amazon Store accounts of
20 Amazon customers who use the Comet AI agent in the Amazon Store, including those users’
21 account details, shopping history, billing information, and other personal and financial data.
22 Defendant’s continuous bad-faith conduct indicates that its violations will stop only when a Court
23 intervenes and enjoins Defendant from further unauthorized access to the Amazon Store through
24 private customer accounts.

25 51. Amazon’s harms are increased by Comet’s well-documented security vulnerabilities
26 and the danger those vulnerabilities create for Amazon customers who use the Comet AI agent to
27 access their private accounts in the Amazon Store. Defendant’s Terms of Use and Privacy Notice
28 grant it sweeping rights to collect passwords, security keys, payment methods, shopping histories,

1 and other sensitive data from customers when they use Comet to access the Amazon Store or other
2 third-party websites, while at the same time disclaiming any responsibility for data security.⁷

3 52. This is troubling because Comet is reported to be uniquely vulnerable to security
4 attacks, including the ability for malicious attackers to use the Comet AI agent to “siphon sensitive
5 data . . . from connected services” like the Amazon Store.⁸ Indeed, Defendant’s Comet browser is
6 vulnerable to “even the oldest tricks in the scammer’s playbook,” including “scan[ning] an obvious
7 phishing email, visit[ing] the malicious website, and prompt[ing] its user for their banking account
8 credentials without any indication that something might be amiss.”⁹

9 53. Defendant’s unauthorized access and illegal conduct increase the risk that the
10 private account data of Amazon customers who use the Comet AI agent to access the Amazon Store
11 will be targeted for data theft and stolen by cyber criminals. This is particularly concerning because
12 Defendant is intentionally evading Amazon’s identification of the Comet AI agent when it accesses
13 the Amazon Store through private customer accounts, and thereby directly interfering with
14 Amazon’s ability to protect the data of Amazon’s customers who use the Comet AI agent to access
15 the Amazon Store.

16 54. After an Amazon customer experiences fraud or a takeover issue with their account,
17 it is too late. Amazon will also suffer great reputational harm, a loss of customers as well as
18 customer trust, and a loss of goodwill regardless of the fact that any such customer harm will be
19 entirely attributable to the illegal conduct of Defendant and its refusal to heed Amazon’s repeated
20 requests that it conduct agentic AI activities with transparency.

21 55. Lastly, Defendant’s misconduct further harms Amazon’s reputation and goodwill

22 ⁷ See Ex. 8, *Comet Privacy Notice*, Perplexity (Jul. 8, 2025),
23 <https://www.perplexity.ai/hub/legal/comet-privacy-notice>; Ex. 9, *Perplexity’s Privacy Policy*,
Perplexity (Feb. 2, 2025), <https://www.perplexity.ai/hub/legal/privacy-policy>.

24 ⁸ Ex. 1, Ravie Lakshmanan, *CometJacking: One Click Can Turn Perplexity’s Comet AI Browser*
25 *Into a Data Thief*, The Hacker News (Oct. 4, 2025),
<https://thehackernews.com/2025/10/cometjacking-one-click-can-turn.html>.

26 ⁹ Ex. 10, Nathaniel Mott, *Perplexity’s AI-Powered Comet Browser Leaves Users Vulnerable to*
27 *Phishing Scams and Malicious Code Injection — Brave and Guardio’s Security Audits Call Out*
28 *Paid AI Browser*, Tom’s Hardware (Aug. 25, 2025), <https://www.tomshardware.com/tech-industry/cyber-security/perplexitys-ai-powered-comet-browser-leaves-users-vulnerable-to-phishing-scams-and-malicious-code-injection-brave-and-guardios-security-audits-call-out-paid-ai-browser>.

1 by misappropriating Amazon's services, degrading the shopping experience on the Amazon Store,
2 and disrupting Amazon's customer relationships. Amazon has invested decades of time and
3 resources into creating a curated, individualized shopping experience on the Amazon Store. The
4 Comet AI agent prevents Amazon from controlling access to the Amazon Store and, therefore, the
5 quality of the Amazon shopping experience for its customers. When the Comet AI agent shops and
6 makes purchases from the Amazon Store through private customer accounts, it may not select the
7 best price, delivery method, or product for the customer. The Comet AI agent also may not add
8 products to existing deliveries to meet minimum free-shipping thresholds, which, if done, could
9 result in cheaper and/or faster delivery options for customers. Thus, Defendant's agentic activity
10 within the Amazon Store harms Amazon's business reputation and customer goodwill.

11 56. When customers who use the Comet AI agent cannot trust that their personal
12 account information is secure, or when they suffer from a degraded shopping experience, their
13 confidence in the Amazon brand is diminished. Perplexity's interference with Amazon's ability to
14 offer a secure and positive customer experience, and the corresponding erosion in customer trust,
15 is a quintessential irreparable harm.

16 **VI. Defendant's Covert and Unauthorized Access into the Amazon Store Has Caused**
17 **Significant Economic and Technological Harm to Amazon**

18 57. Amazon has also suffered economic and technological damages well in excess of
19 \$260,000, including expenditure of effort and resources used to investigate and combat Defendant's
20 unauthorized and covert deployment of the Comet AI agent into the Amazon Store.

21 58. Since July 2025, eight members of Amazon's Traffic Engineering team have spent
22 hundreds of full workdays investigating, monitoring, and remediating Comet's agentic activity
23 within the Amazon Store.

24 59. These Traffic Engineering team members have also worked to devise a
25 technological barrier to prevent Defendant's Comet AI agent from covertly accessing the Amazon
26 Store through private customer accounts. And Defendant has already evaded that technological
27 barrier within 24 hours of its deployment.

28 60. The agentic traffic coming from the Comet AI agent has also disrupted and caused

1 damage to Amazon's technology and automated computer systems in at least two ways.

2 61. First, traffic from automated agents, such as that from the Comet AI agent, imposes
3 operational burdens and costs on Amazon's advertising systems. Amazon's advertisers pay for
4 their ads to be shown to humans, with billing based on valid ad impressions. When automated
5 agents, such as the Comet AI agent, generate ad traffic, Amazon must invest engineering resources
6 to detect and filter out these non-human impressions before billing advertisers. This requires
7 modifications to Amazon's advertising systems, including developing new detection mechanisms
8 to identify and exclude automated traffic. These system adaptations are necessary to maintain
9 contractual obligations with advertisers who pay only for legitimate human impressions.

10 62. Second, Perplexity has damaged the Amazon accounts of Amazon customers who
11 also use the Comet AI agent to access the Amazon Store. When Amazon customers access the
12 Amazon Store through Comet's AI agent, Amazon has previously had to block those customers'
13 accounts after Amazon identified Comet's agentic activity. Once this happened, these users could
14 not access the Amazon Store through Comet. As a result, Amazon had to repair and unblock these
15 accounts when these customers wanted to re-access their Amazon accounts through non-agentic
16 browsing. This imposed operational burdens and costs on Amazon that would likely have been
17 unnecessary if the Comet AI agent identified itself through its user-agent string when accessing the
18 Amazon Store because that would allow Amazon to block traffic associated with just the Comet AI
19 agent, instead of blocking a customer account.

20 63. The economic burden on Amazon to investigate and remediate Defendant's conduct
21 is exacerbated because the Traffic Engineering team members working on this effort have diverted
22 their attention away from their regular tasks of operating and maintaining Amazon's servers to
23 ensure reliable customer satisfaction across Amazon's many services.

24 **COUNT ONE**

25 **Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, et seq.**

26 64. Amazon repeats and re-alleges every allegation contained above as if set forth fully
27 herein.

28 65. Defendant violated 18 U.S.C. § 1030.

1 herein.

2 73. Defendant violated California Penal Code § 502.

3 74. Defendant knowingly accessed and without permission took, copied, and/or used
4 data from Amazon's computers, computer systems, and/or computer network in violation of
5 California Penal Code § 502(c)(2).

6 75. Defendant knowingly and without permission used or caused to be used Amazon's
7 computer services in violation of California Penal Code § 502(c)(3).

8 76. Defendant knowingly and without permission accessed and added and altered data
9 to Amazon's computer, computer systems, and/or computer network, including by creating
10 browsing and shopping history data while logged into customer accounts, in violation of California
11 Penal Code § 502(c)(4).

12 77. Defendant knowingly and without permission accessed or caused to be accessed
13 Amazon's computers, computer systems, and/or computer network in violation of California Penal
14 Code § 502(c)(7).

15 78. Amazon suffered and continues to suffer damages as a result of Defendant's
16 violations of the California Penal Code § 502 identified above.

17 79. Defendant's conduct also caused irreparable and incalculable harm and injuries to
18 Amazon, and, unless enjoined, will cause further irreparable and incalculable injury, for which
19 Amazon has no adequate remedy at law.

20 80. Defendant willfully violated California Penal Code § 502 in disregard and
21 derogation of Amazon's rights, and Defendant's actions, as alleged above, were carried out with
22 oppression, fraud, or malice.

23 81. Pursuant to California Penal Code § 502(e), Amazon is entitled to injunctive relief,
24 compensatory damages, punitive or exemplary damages, attorneys' fees, costs, and other equitable
25 relief.

26 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

27 82. Amazon respectfully requests that judgment be entered in its favor and against
28 Defendant on all counts.

1 83. Amazon requests that the Court issue preliminary, interim, and permanent injunctive
2 relief, enjoining and restraining Defendant and its agents, employees, successors, and assigns, and
3 all other persons acting in concert with or in conspiracy with or affiliated with Defendant, from:

- 4 a. Accessing, attempting to access, or assisting, instructing, or providing a means
5 for others to access or attempt to access Amazon’s protected computer systems
6 using AI agents;
- 7 b. Using any accounts, creating any new accounts, or taking over any existing
8 accounts, on Amazon’s websites, for the purpose of allowing Perplexity’s AI
9 agents to access Amazon’s protected computer systems;
- 10 c. Accessing, attempting to access, or assisting, instructing, or providing a means
11 for others to access Amazon’s protected computer systems in excess of
12 Amazon’s authorization; and
- 13 d. Violating or evading any restrictions Amazon puts on the use of AI agents or
14 other agentic activity on Amazon’s protected computer systems.

15 84. Amazon further requests that the Court order the following additional nonmonetary
16 relief:

- 17 a. Destruction of all copies of Amazon’s data, including customer data,
18 unlawfully obtained by Perplexity, whether in the custody or control of
19 Perplexity or its employees, agents, assigns, or the third-party service providers
20 (including, without limitation, web hosts, proxy servers, privacy services, and
21 domain registrars);
- 22 b. Identification of each and every Amazon account ever accessed, used, or
23 controlled through or by Perplexity, or any of its employees, agents, and
24 assigns, to engage in the complained-of conduct; and
- 25 c. That Defendant certify and confirm, in writing and under oath, within thirty
26 (30) days of the issuance of any order of the Court providing a remedy to
27 Amazon, that Defendant has complied fully and completely with all
28 requirements of such order.

