	Case 4:25-cv-00368-JSW	Document 1	Filed 01/10/25	Page 1 of 48
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8	ROBBINS GELLER RUDMA & DOWD LLP ERIC I. NIEHAUS (239023) 655 West Broadway, Suite 190 San Diego, CA 92101-8498 Telephone: 619/231-1058 ericn@rgrdlaw.com Attorneys for Plaintiff [Additional counsel appear on	00		
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10	ALISTER WATT, Individually) Case No. $3:2:$	5-cv-00368
11 12	of All Others Similarly Situate	Plaintiff,)) <u>CLASS ACTI(</u>)	ON
13	vs.	,,	/))	
14	OKCOIN USA INC., OKX GE EUROPE LTD., and AUX CA	ROUP, OKCOIN YES FINTECH) COMPLAINT	
15	CO. LTD.,)	
16	I	Defendants.))) <u>DEMAND FO</u>	R JURY TRIAL
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Plaintiff Alister Watt, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated ("Plaintiff"),
 by and through his undersigned attorneys, brings this action against defendants OKCoin USA Inc.
 ("OKX US"), OKX Group, OKCoin Europe Ltd. ("OKC EU"), and Aux Cayes FinTech Co. Ltd.
 ("Aux Cayes") (collectively, "OKX" or "Defendants"). Plaintiff alleges the following based upon
 his own knowledge, or where there is no personal knowledge, upon the investigation of counsel
 and/or upon information and belief.

7

NATURE OF THE ACTION

8 1. Defendant OKX Group, founded by Mingxing Xu aka Star Xu ("Star Xu") in 2013, is 9 a made up of a group of legal entities which created and operate one of the largest cryptocurrency 10 platforms in the world, where customers deposit, trade, and withdraw, hundreds of types of digital 11 assets, including cryptocurrencies and tokens (collectively, "cryptocurrency" aka "crypto"), such as 12 Bitcoin ("BTC"), Ethereum ("ETH") and others. OKX Group and its composite entities operate 13 cryptocurrency exchanges accessible at several websites, including OKCoin.com and OKX.com, as well as through smartphone apps and other services (collectively, the "OKX Platform" or "OKX"). 14 15 2. Star Xu and other senior officers of OKX, including Hong Fang and Jay Hao (the "OKX Officers"), managed and directed OKX's day-to-day affairs. The OKX Platform has earned 16 billions of dollars since its launch; and its growth was fueled in large part by OKX targeting the 17 18 large and lucrative U.S. crypto market. OKX's meteoric rise was achieved through willfully 19 violating numerous U.S. laws and regulations which were established to protect consumers, 20 investors, and American national security, which (if followed) would have limited OKX's access to the U.S. market and slowed its growth. 21

- 3. Specifically, Defendants knowingly failed to register its primary exchange at
 OKX.com (formerly OkEx.com) as a money transmitting business ("MTB"), willfully violated the
 Bank Secrecy Act ("BSA") by failing to implement and maintain an effective anti-money laundering
 ("AML") program, and disregarded crucial Know Your Customer ("KYC") rules all in a deliberate
 and calculated effort to profit from the U.S. market, without implementing controls required by
 U.S. law.
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4. 1 Defendants' willful disregard of these important laws and regulations turned the OKX Platform into a magnet and hub for criminals, users from sanctioned jurisdictions, terrorists, and 2 3 other bad actors - becoming a critical part of their efforts to launder crypto which was stolen or 4 obtained by other unlawful means. OKX became a preferred-choice as the "get-away driver" for a 5 large number of bad actors.

6

5. Under normal circumstances, a core attribute of cryptocurrency transactions is that 7 there is a permanent record of those transactions on the public blockchain; and the chain-of-title of 8 cryptocurrency is permanently and accurately traceable on the blockchain, which acts as a "ledger." 9 Therefore, without a place such as OKX.com to launder crypto, if a bad actor steals someone else's 10 crypto, there is a risk the authorities would eventually track down that bad actor by retracing his 11 steps on the blockchain; and he would need to constantly look over his proverbial shoulder. Because 12 OKX and the OKX Officers put growth and market share before the law, Defendants, through the 13 operation of OKX, offered bad actors a way to launder stolen assets – thus removing the connection 14 between the public ledger and their digital assets so the digital assets would no longer be traceable. 15 6. OKX US, one of OKX Group's entities, is based in the United States, obtained licenses in approximately 47 states to offer cryptocurrency services, and operates OKCoin.com. The 16 17 OKCoin.com exchange - operated by OKX US - offers far fewer tokens to customers and has 18 substantially less liquidity than OKX.com. To maximize growth and transaction volumes, OKX 19 offered U.S.-based customers services through OKX.com, even though it was not licensed in the 20 United States and did not have adequate protections in place to prevent the laundering of stolen 21 cryptocurrency. In connection with those efforts, Defendants held out OKX US's purported 22 compliance with U.S. laws and regulations as a distraction for U.S. regulators so that OKX.com 23 could target lucrative U.S.-based customers.

7. 24 OKX.com acted as a depository for millions of dollars of cryptocurrency removed from the digital wallets, accounts, or protocols of individuals and entities located in the United States 25 26 as a result of hacks, malware, theft, or ransomware, including Plaintiff and members of the Class. 27 Defendants acted together, along with the OKX Officers, in furtherance of a scheme to generate 28 transactions and increase market share for OKX.com from all sources, including U.S.-based users,

1 sanctioned users, criminals, crypto-thieves, and accounts previously identified as being connected to 2 illegal conduct. Defendants and the OKX Officers operated the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise 3 (defined below), which enabled bad actors to transfer assets generated through criminal activity to 4 OKX.com, exchange those assets for different assets on OKX.com's exchange, and then transfer 5 those newly "cleaned" assets out of OKX.com so the assets were no longer associated with the original assets or traceable on the ledger. Throughout the Class Period, the OKX Crypto-Wash 6 7 Enterprise became a leading conduit of stolen cryptocurrency, enabling bad actors to seamlessly 8 transfer stolen crypto around the United States and the world.

9 8. Plaintiff brings claims on behalf of himself and all persons or entities in the United
10 States whose cryptocurrency was removed from a non-OKX digital wallet, account, or protocol as a
11 result of a hack, ransomware, or theft and, between January 10, 2021 and the date of Judgment (the
12 "Class Period"), transferred to an OKX account, and who have not recovered all of their
13 cryptocurrency that was transferred to OKX (the "Class").

9. Plaintiff alleges claims for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §1962(c)-(d); conversion; and aiding and abetting
conversion.

17 10. In asserting the claims herein, Plaintiff is not relying on any contracts or agreements
18 entered into between OKX and any users of OKX to assert any claims alleged herein; and none of
19 Plaintiff's claims derive from the underlying terms of any such contracts or agreements. Plaintiff is
20 not relying on any actions Defendants have taken or could have taken, or benefits Defendants have
21 received or could have received, pursuant to the terms of any contracts or agreements with users of
22 OKX.

11. Plaintiff's claims are based on OKX violating federal statutory obligations and
engaging in the conversion of, and aiding and abetting the conversion of, cryptocurrency properly
belonging to Plaintiff and the members of the Class. Specifically, Defendants, *inter alia*:
(i) committed, and aided and abetted, acts constituting indictable offenses under 18 U.S.C. §1960
(relating to illegal money transmitters) and 18 U.S.C. §1961(1)(E) (act indictable under the Currency
and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act aka the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA); and (ii) aided and abetted

acts constituting indictable offenses under 18 U.S.C. §1956 (laundering of monetary instruments), 18
 U.S.C. §1957 (engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful
 activity), and 18 U.S.C. §2314 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property).

Plaintiff seeks damages and equitable relief on behalf of himself and the Class,
including, but not limited to: treble their monetary damages; injunctive relief; damages; costs and
expenses, including attorneys' and expert fees; interest; and any additional relief that this Court
determines to be necessary or appropriate to provide complete relief to Plaintiff and the Class.

8

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

9 13. This Court has original jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §1331, because Plaintiff's claims arise under the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. §1962. The RICO
Act provides for nationwide service of process, and Defendants conduct a substantial portion of their
business in the United States. This Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants pursuant to
18 U.S.C. §1965(b) and (d).

14 14. The Court also has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332(d),
15 because the members of the putative class are of diverse citizenship from Defendants, there are more
16 than 100 members of the putative class, and the aggregate amount in controversy exceeds
17 \$5,000,000, exclusive of costs and interest.

18 15. The Court has personal jurisdiction over OKX Group because it utilized a cloud computing platform and applications programming interface ("API") service owned by a technology 19 service provider with an Internet Protocol ("IP") location based in San Francisco, California that 20 21 hosted the www.okx.com website, stored OKX's data, and operated OKX.com's exchange platform or servers. The Court has personal jurisdiction over OKCoin USA because it maintains executive 22 23 offices in San Francisco, California; and the Court has personal jurisdiction over the OKX Group 24 because it operates the OKCoin.com website through its member entity OKCoin USA and utilized its control over OKCoin USA to engage in the wrongdoing alleged herein during the Class Period. 25 26 16. In addition, the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they: (i) transacted business in California; (ii) have substantial aggregate contacts with California; 27 28 (iii) engaged in and are engaging in conduct that has and had a direct, substantial, and reasonably

foreseeable and intended effect of causing injury to persons in California; and (iv) purposely availed
 themselves of the laws of California. This Court also has specific personal jurisdiction over OKX
 Group for the additional reason that it asserted substantial control over OKCoin USA, as described
 below.

5 17. Exercising jurisdiction over Defendants in this forum is reasonable and comports with
6 fair play and substantial justice.

7 18. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391 because OKCoin USA is
8 subject to the Court's personal jurisdiction in this District, and OKX Group, Aux Cayes FinTech Co.
9 Ltd., and OKCoin Europe Ltd., as foreign entities, may be sued in any judicial district. *See* 28
10 U.S.C. §1391(c)(3).

11

DIVISIONAL ASSIGNMENT

12 19. A substantial portion of the acts and transactions giving rise to the violations of law
13 alleged herein occurred in the City and County of San Francisco, and as such, this action may be
14 properly assigned to the San Francisco division of this Court.

15

PARTIES

16 Plaintiff

20. 17 Plaintiff Alister Watt is a citizen of the state of North Carolina who resides in 18 Charlotte, North Carolina. In 2023, a third party stole more than Seven Hundred Twenty-Five 19 Thousand Dollars (\$725,000.00 USD) worth of cryptocurrency (23.212 Bitcoin and 26.7 Ethereum) After extensive investigation, it was determined that a material portion of the 20 from him. 21 cryptocurrency stolen from Plaintiff Watt was sent to at least one account at OKX.com. At no time has Plaintiff Watt ever held an account with OKX.com or OKCoin.com, nor has Plaintiff Watt ever 22 23 agreed to any terms of use that OKX.com or OKCoin.com impose upon their accountholders.

24 21. Upon information and belief, OKX failed to apply KYC and AML procedures as
25 required by statutory law to detect the lawful ownership of the cryptocurrency properly belonging to
26 Plaintiff or members of the Class.

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1 Defendants

2 22. Defendant OKCoin USA Inc. ("OKX US") is a Delaware corporation with a principal
3 place of business in San Francisco, California. Defendant OKX US is a subsidiary of OKX Group
4 and during the Class Period operated the OKCoin.com exchange in the United States and serviced
5 customers based in the United States. OKX US is a licensed money transmitter in approximately 47
6 states.

7 23. Defendant OKX Group ("OKX Group") is made up of different legal entities around 8 the world which operate cryptocurrency exchanges and offer users the ability to open accounts and 9 trade a large number of cryptocurrencies and tokens. The entities which make up OKX Group 10 include, without limitation, Defendants OKCoin USA Inc., Aux Cayes FinTech Co. Ltd., and 11 OKCoin Europe Ltd., and others. OKX Group, through its subsidiaries, operates and controls the 12 cryptocurrency exchanges located at www.okx.com ("OKX.com") (formerly located at 13 www.okex.com) and www.okcoin.com ("OKCoin.com"), and operates and controls smartphone 14 apps connecting users to its exchanges and services. In January 2022, OKEx rebranded to OKX. 15 24. OKCoin Europe Ltd. ("OKC EU") is a Malta limited liability company which operates under the OKX brand and offers the OKX Platform to users in Europe. OKC EU is a 16 17 subsidiary of OKX Group.

18 25. Aux Cayes FinTech Co. Ltd. ("Aux Cayes") is a Seychelles registered company and
19 offers the OKX Platform for users outside the United States, including users not expressly covered
20 by one of the OKX Group legal entities. Aux Cayes is a subsidiary of OKX Group.

21 Key Non-Defendants

22 26. Mingxing Xu, also known as Star Xu ("Star Xu"), is a Chinese entrepreneur who
23 founded OKX Group (formerly OK Group), OKX (formerly OKEx), and OKCoin. Star Xu founded
24 OKX Group in 2013 and has served as its Chief Executive Officer ("CEO") since its founding. He
25 also served as the CEO of OKX during the Class Period. As CEO, he is responsible for overseeing
26 the company's strategy, vision, operations, and growth. Star Xu's responsibilities included oversight
27 of compliance policies and procedures, including KYC and AML measures.

27. Jay Hao ("Hao") served as the CEO of OKX from approximately November 2018
 until January 2023. As a CEO, Hao was responsible for overseeing the company's strategy,
 operations, and growth and would have had direct responsibility for ensuring proper compliance and
 risk management practices were in place, including with respect to KYC and AML policies and
 procedures.

6 28. Hong Fang ("Fang") serves as the President of OKX, occupying the role since
7 January 2023, and oversees the global branding and rebranding initiatives. She previously served as
8 CEO of OKCoin from March 2020 to December 2023, as OKCoin's Chairman of the Board from
9 July 2019 to 2020, and as COO. In these senior leadership roles, she had visibility into and influence
10 over compliance and risk management policies.

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29. Star Xu, Hao, and Fang are collectively referred to herein as the "OKX Officers."

30. The OKX Officers, as executives in charge of a major cryptocurrency exchange,
would have been responsible for implementing and overseeing KYC and AML procedures to prevent
illicit activity. This would have included: (i) establishing customer identification and verification
processes; (ii) implementing transaction monitoring systems; (iii) conducting due diligence on highrisk customers; (iv) setting policies around suspicious activity reporting; and (v) ensuring there was
adequate funding, staffing, and training of compliance personnel to ensure that any KYC or AML
policies and procedures were created and implemented.

19 31. As such, the OKX Officers would have been aware of the weaknesses and failures in
20 OKX's KYC and AML policies and procedures that enabled bad actors to use OKX's
21 cryptocurrency platforms for laundering cryptocurrency.

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COMMON FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

23 Background on Cryptocurrency Laundering

32. A cryptocurrency wallet is an application that functions as a wallet for
cryptocurrency. It is called a wallet because it is used similarly to a wallet that holds cash and credit
cards. Instead of holding these physical items, a cryptocurrency wallet stores the passkeys used to
sign for cryptocurrency transactions and provides the interface that lets users access crypto on the
blockchain, and interact with protocols, such decentralized exchanges ("DEX") and bridges enabling

1 users to send crypto across different blockchains. When someone sends their cryptocurrency to 2 another wallet on the blockchain or engages with a protocol, such as a DEX or bridge, a permanent 3 record is created on the ledger for the blockchain so all transactions on the blockchain are trackable. 4 33. Blockchain transactions are inherently immutable and transparent and recorded on 5 digital ledgers distributed across a decentralized network of nodes. These transactions, encompassing details such as sender and recipient addresses, transaction amounts, and timestamps, 6 7 are permanently recorded, ensuring the integrity and security of the data. If a bad actor removes 8 someone's crypto without their permission from their wallet or a protocol and then transfers the 9 crypto to the bad actor's own wallet or tries to withdraw the funds as fiat currency to a bank account, 10 the bad actor could potentially be caught; because experts can employ tools and services to trace the movement of stolen digital assets, facilitating potential recovery. Therefore, unlike cash or other 11 12 types of fungible property, cryptocurrency can be tracked after it is removed from the owner's wallet 13 or protocol. 14 34. A February 1, 2023 article published on a website of crypto-tracing analysis firm Chainalysis.com titled "2022 Biggest Year Ever For Crypto Hacking with \$3.8 Billion Stolen, 15 16 Primarily from DeFi Protocols and by North Korea-linked Attackers," discussed the tracking 17 benefits of the blockchain, stating in part: 18 When every transaction is recorded in a public ledger, it means that law enforcement always has a trail to follow, even years after the fact, which is invaluable as 19 investigative techniques improve over time. Their growing capabilities, combined with the efforts of agencies like OFAC to cut off hackers' preferred money 20 laundering services from the rest of the crypto ecosystem, means that these hacks will get harder and less fruitful with each passing year. 21 35. As such, the laundering of the crypto, *i.e.*, the removal of the ability for the stolen 22 cryptocurrency to be tracked on the ledger, is a key part of the theft of cryptocurrency. 23 36. The 2022 Crypto Crime Report by Chainalysis highlights the importance of crypto-24 laundering as part of the overall theft: 25 Cybercriminals dealing in cryptocurrency share one common goal: Move 26 their ill-gotten funds to a service where they can be kept safe from the authorities and eventually converted to cash. That's why money laundering underpins all other 27 forms of cryptocurrency-based crime. If there's no way to access the funds, there's no incentive to commit crimes involving cryptocurrency in the first place. 28 COMPLAINT - 8

1 OKX and Its Business

37. 2 In 2013, Star Xu, a Chinese entrepreneur with a technology background, founded 3 OKX Group (formerly OK Group) to develop blockchain and cryptocurrency-related businesses. As 4 part of this venture, Star Xu launched OKCoin in June 2013, which quickly became one of China's 5 largest Bitcoin exchanges. OKCoin initially focused on the Chinese market but expanded internationally in 2014, opening an office in Singapore. Star Xu, through OKX Group, launched 6 7 OKX (originally named OKEx) as a global cryptocurrency exchange to serve international markets 8 and offer a wider range of trading products. In 2017, due to regulatory changes in China, OKCoin 9 moved its headquarters to San Francisco, California. In early 2022, OKEx rebranded to OKX and 10 has since become one of the world's largest cryptocurrency exchanges by trading volume, expanding 11 its services to include spot trading, derivatives, DeFi, and NFTs, while establishing a corporate 12 presence in various countries and territories including Malta, Hong Kong, and the United States.

38. OKX offers crypto-related services and products to millions of users in over 100
countries. Customers access OKX's services through websites and apps, including OKX.com,
where they can deposit, trade, and exchange cryptocurrency. As of October 2024, OKX.com offered
more than 300 tokens and 739 pairs of tokens for exchange.

39. 17 OKX.com enables customers to open accounts and engage in cryptocurrency 18 transactions. When a user opens an account, OKX.com assigns them a custodial virtual currency 19 wallet -i.e., a wallet in OKX's custody, which enables the user to conduct various types of 20 transactions on the platform, such as swapping one crypto for another, transferring funds to other 21 OKX accounts, withdrawing crypto out of OKX.com, and sending the crypto to external virtual 22 currency wallets or fiat bank accounts. Generating a large number of trades and being highly liquid 23 is very important for a crypto-exchange. A highly liquid market is generally more desirable from the 24 end-user's perspective because the bid and ask spreads will typically be narrower and larger trades can be conducted more easily. A highly liquid exchange also makes it easier for bad actors to 25 26 exchange large amounts of stolen crypto.

40. Even though OKX.com was not licensed to do business in the United States, it
permitted U.S.-based users to open accounts and utilize its services. To access its services, a U.S.-

1 based user simply needed to access the exchange by using a virtual private network ("VPN") to
2 make it appear as if the user was logging in from outside the United States.

3 41. As discussed in more detail below, since OKX.com serves users in the United States, 4 it was inappropriately acting as an unlicensed money transmitter and money services business in 5 violation of U.S. laws and regulations. Because it acts as a money transmitter and money services business, OKX.com was required to comply with the BSA and create and implement KYC and AML 6 7 policies and procedures. OKX.com, however, failed to adequately create or implement KYC and 8 AML policies and procedures and violated the BSA. As a result of OKX.com's failure to adequately 9 implement KYC and AML policies and procedures, OKX.com became a magnet and a hub for bad 10 actors to launder stolen cryptocurrency.

42. In addition to offering customers from around the world access to OKX.com during 11 12 the Class Period, OKX provided access to a more limited cryptocurrency exchange and digital asset 13 trading platform at OKCoin.com, which was provided by OkCoin USA and under the OKX Group of companies. OKX US is a licensed money transmitter and money services business registered with 14 the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network ("FinCEN") of the U.S. Department of Treasury. As a 15 licensed money transmitter and money services business in approximately 47 states, OKX US was 16 17 required to comply with the BSA and create and implement adequate KYC and AML policies and 18 procedures. As alleged herein, even though OKX made it appear that it complied with KYC and 19 AML requirements with respect to U.S.-based customers, Defendants knowingly failed to dedicate 20 sufficient financial or staffing resources to ensure that any purported KYC or AML policies or procedures were effective. 21


43. Even though OKCoin.com and OKX.com were separate websites and exchanges, they
are both part of OKX Group and OKX, as described by OKX on its website:

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1Overview of Defendants' Scheme and
the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise

2 47. Defendants ran OKX Group and the OKX Platform with utter disregard for policies 3 and procedures that would prevent bad actors from laundering cryptocurrency through the OKX 4 Platform. For years after its launch, OKX.com allowed users to open accounts by simply providing 5 an email address and password and did not require customers to provide KYC information. Below is 6 an exchange on Reddit.com between OKX.com users based in the United States discussing that they 7 access OKX.com with a VPN and can utilize OKX.com's exchange without providing KYC 8 information: 9 10 r/everdome 🙁 Search in r/everdome =11 12 r/everdome • 3 yr. ago FrDiamondHands For anyone in the USA you can use a vpn to 13 purchase everdome when it comes out on okx 14 just set it out of your country 15 INFORMATION/NEWS 16 Share 分 3 分 \bigcirc 16 17 + Add a Comment 18 Sort by: Best ∨ Q Search Comments 19 20 Nikobono • 3y ago • 21 But do you still have to provide an ID? (-)↔ 3 ↔ Ø Reply A Share 22 Commercial-Mind-7598 • 3y ago • 23 no. use VPN, sign up with email not phone #. 24 分 5 分 Ω Reply ⇔ Share 25 48. Even though OKX.com may have modified its policies over time and established 26 verification tiers where personal information was purportedly required for enhanced services, such as 27

withdrawing up to 100 BTC per day, for years customers could access OKX.com, utilize its

cryptocurrency exchange, and withdraw substantial sums, such as up to approximately 10 BTC per
 day, or approximately \$50,000 per day, without providing required KYC information. Importantly,
 even when OKX began asking users to provide personal information, OKX failed to implement
 policies or procedures to adequately verify that information, which enabled bad actors to use fake
 identities on OKX's Platform.

6 49. Eventually, after receiving international regulatory pressure to collect KYC
7 information, OKX.com announced in May 2023 that it was purportedly increasing its KYC
8 requirements for those seeking to withdraw more than \$5,000 per day and that such information
9 needed to be provided by approximately September 2023. Those new purported KYC policies,
10 however, continued to be inadequate and failed to prevent bad actors from using OKC.com to
11 launder cryptocurrency, because OKX.com failed to properly dedicate sufficient financial or staffing
12 resources, verify customer information or monitor illicit wallets or suspicious transactions.

13 50. On February 1, 2024, the Malta Financial Services Authority ("MFSA") announced a settlement with OKX as a result of MFSA's investigation finding certain "failings" at OKCoin 14 15 Europe Ltd. "in respect of Article 41 of the Virtual Financial Assets Act." Among other things, the Virtual Financial Assets Act sets forth regulations, including regarding the collection of information 16 17 and "customer due diligence requirements provided for under the Prevention of Money Laundering 18 and Funding of Terrorism Regulations." The MFSA fined OKX 304,000 Euros and the MFSA and 19 OKX "agreed on a number of measures, including the appointment of an independent third-party 20 service provider, to *inter alia*, review the adequacy of the Company's governance arrangements."

51. According to a February 7, 2024 article in CryptoNavigator.net titled "OKX's KYC:
Fake IDs Bypass Verification," OKX's customers were able to open accounts and trade
cryptocurrency with fake IDs. According to the article, "OKX finds itself under fire for allegedly
accepting fake IDs during its Know-Your-Customer (KYC) verification process" and that
"[j]ournalists successfully passed the verification process using a fake British passport, raising
concerns about the effectiveness of OKX's security measures." The article further stated, "[a]dding
fuel to the fire, an OKX customer support representative reportedly revealed that thorough

KYC/AML checks might not be conducted immediately upon account creation or crypto deposits,"
 which "potentially exposes a loophole, raising questions about user verification procedures."

52. According to a March 21, 2024 article on Cryptopolitan.com titled "India's crypto
regulations push OKX to cease local services," OKX announced it will halt its operations in India
due to "local regulatory hurdles." According to the article, "OKX's exit is seen as a direct response
to India's stringent regulatory environment" because India's Financial Intelligence Unit ("FIU") had
"issued notices to several foreign crypto exchanges, including OKX, under the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act of 2002" as part of "a broader effort to bring virtual digital asset service providers
under the Anti Money Laundering/Counter Financing of Terrorism (AML-CFT) framework."

10 53. Therefore, bad actors were able to open accounts, transfer cryptocurrency into OKX,
 11 trade that cryptocurrency on OKX's Platform, and withdraw the exchanged cryptocurrency without
 12 providing verifiable self-identifying information.

13 54. OKX.com's practice of permitting users to open accounts, conduct transactions, and
14 withdraw cryptocurrency without adequate verification violated U.S. laws and regulations.

15 55. Defendants knew the OKX Platforms were required to, but failed to, implement
adequate KYC and AML procedures.

17 56. Defendants willfully violated these important U.S. laws and regulations in order to18 grow the business and gain market share.

19 57. Even though a portion of OKX Group's users may have been legitimate, Defendants'
20 conduct turned the OKX Platform into a magnet and hub for bad actors to use OKX to launder stolen
21 cryptocurrency and this portion of OKX Group's business served as the OKX Crypto-Wash
22 Enterprise.

58. Defendants knew that OKX's failure to comply with KYC and AML laws and
regulations, such as the Bank Secrecy Act, enabled bad actors, including criminals, crypto-thieves,
and users located in sanctioned jurisdictions, to use the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise to launder
digital assets so the assets would not be trackable by the authorities.

27 59. The OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise provided an effective way for bad actors to steal
28 and launder crypto. Once someone steals crypto stored in a wallet or in a protocol, they would

1 deposit the stolen cryptocurrency into their OKX wallet. Next, they would engage in transactions 2 within the exchange, trading the stolen cryptocurrency for other cryptocurrencies or tokens offered 3 on the platform. Once the funds are sufficiently converted, the thief would withdraw them from the 4 exchange, potentially through multiple accounts or wallets, to further complicate tracing efforts. By 5 leveraging the anonymity and liquidity provided by the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise, individuals laundered cryptocurrency and evaded detection. 6

7 60. Defendants' refusal and failure to follow the law and implement AML and KYC 8 policies and protocols at OKX.com enabled bad actors to launder crypto at OKX.com. Had 9 Defendants complied with the law and ensured OKX implemented adequate AML and KYC 10 policies, OKX would have identified potential crypto laundering transactions on OKX.com, would 11 have reported them to the authorities, and would have prevented the crypto belonging to Plaintiff and 12 the members of the Class from being laundered and withdrawn from OKX.com.

13 61. A key reason for this is because a substantial portion of crypto laundered by bad 14 actors is transferred to OKX.com from crypto wallets previously identified as wallets associated with 15 illicit crypto activities. In fact, a January 18, 2024 Reuters article titled "Illicit crypto addresses received at least \$24.2 billion in 2023 – report," stated: "At least \$24.2 billion worth of crypto was 16 17 sent to illicit crypto wallet addresses in 2023, including addresses identified as sanctioned or linked 18 to terrorist financing and scams," according to crypto research firm Chainalysis.

19 62. During the Class Period, Defendants had access to tools, platforms, and services that 20 would have enabled them to easily identify if crypto was transferred to an OKX.com account from a 21 crypto wallet which had been identified as being associated with illicit activity. According to a 22 March 11, 2022 article on CoinDesk.com titled "How Authorities Track Criminal Crypto 23 Transactions," blockchain analytic firms like Chainalysis and CipherTrace have created tools that 24 identify wallets associated with illicit activities and that "it is possible to ascertain how many wallets a criminal controls from a single transaction that might've occurred after a hack, rug pull or any type 25 26 of unlawful cyber activity was perpetrated."

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1 OKX Was Subject to, and Violated, Important U.S. Laws and Regulations

63. Once OKX.com began conducting business in the United States, it became subject to
strict regulations aimed at, among other things, creating a protocol for identifying suspicious activity
that might indicate potential money laundering operations and other illegitimate activities by its
customers. In addition, OKX.com was required to have procedures in place for reporting illicit
activities to relevant authorities.

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64. Any purported KYC or AML policies or procedures which may have been set up by
OKX for either OKX.com or OKCoin.com were for appearances only, because Defendants' goal
was for clients to continue using the OKX Platform in violation of any purported safeguards for
regulatory compliance. Defendants, therefore, knew bad actors were using the OKX Platform for
illicit activities, such as laundering stolen cryptocurrency, and failed to take steps to stop them.

- 12 65. Specifically, OKX.com was a cryptocurrency exchange that did business wholly or in 13 substantial part within the United States, including by providing services to a substantial number of 14 U.S. customers. OKX.com was a "money transmitter," which is a type of money services business. 15 31 C.F.R. §1010.100(ff). As a cryptocurrency exchange, OKX.com was a money transmitter 16 because it was "[a] person that provides money transmission services," meaning "the acceptance of 17 currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency from one person and the transmission of 18 currency, funds, or other value that substitutes for currency to another location or person by any 19 means," including through "an electronic funds transfer network" or "an informal value transfer 20 system." 31 C.F.R. §1010.100(ff)(5).
- Money transmitters, such as OKX.com (and OKCoin.com), were required to register
 with FinCEN pursuant to 31 U.S.C. §5330 and 31 C.F.R. §1022.380 within 180 days of
 establishment or risk criminal penalties pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1960. OKX.com, as a money
 transmitter, was also required to comply with the BSA, 31 U.S.C. §5311 *et seq.*, for example, by
 filing reports of suspicious transactions that occurred in the United States, 31 U.S.C. §5318(g), 31
 C.F.R. §1022.320(a), and implementing an effective AML program "that [was] reasonably designed
- 28

1 to prevent the money services business from being used to facilitate money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities." 31 C.F.R. §1022.210. 2

3 67. An AML program was required, at a minimum and within 90 days of the business's establishment, to "[i]ncorporate policies, procedures, and internal controls reasonably designed to 4 5 assure compliance" with requirements that an MTB file reports, create and retain records, respond to law enforcement requests, and verify customer identification (KYC requirement). 31 C.F.R. 6 7 §1022.210(d)(1), (e).

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68. OKX.com failed to register with FinCEN or comply with the BSA as set forth above. 9 69. Additionally, IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. §1701 et seq., authorized the President of the United 10 States to impose economic sanctions on countries, groups, entities, and individuals in response to any unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the 11 12 United States when the President declared a national emergency with respect to that threat. Section 13 1705 provided, in part, that "[i]t shall be unlawful for a person to violate, attempt to violate, conspire to violate, or cause a violation of any license, order, regulation, or prohibition issued [pursuant to 14 15 IEEPA]." 50 U.S.C. §1705(a).

16 70. The U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administered and enforced economic sanctions programs established by executive orders issued by 17 18 the President pursuant to IEEPA. In particular, OFAC administered and enforced comprehensive 19 sanctions programs that, with limited exception, prohibited U.S. persons from engaging in transactions with a designated country or region, including Iran, the Democratic People's Republic 20 of Korea ("DPRK" or "North Korea"), Syria, and the Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions of 21 22 Ukraine, among others.

23 71. FinCEN's Final Rule on Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial 24 Institutions require that OKX.com establish and maintain written policies and procedures for AML 25 and KYC protocols. Specifically, FinCEN's customer identification rules require that OKX.com 26 maintain a written Customer Identification Program appropriate for its size and type of business that, 27 at a minimum, includes "risk-based procedures for verifying the identity of each customer" that

enable OKX.com to "form a reasonable belief that it knows the true identity of each customer."
 31 C.F.R. §1020.220(a)(1), (2).

3 72. The Bank Secrecy Anti-Money Laundering Manual promulgated by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council ("FFIEC Manual") also summarizes industry sound 4 5 practices and examination procedures for customer due diligence on accounts that present a higher risk for money laundering and terrorist financing. The FFIEC Manual sets forth a matrix for 6 7 identifying high risk accounts that require enhanced due diligence. Such accounts include those that 8 have "large and growing customer[s] base[d] in a wide and diverse geographic area"; or "[a] large 9 transfer number of noncustomer funds transactions and payable proper upon 10 identification . . . transactions"; and "[f]requent funds from personal or business accounts to or from higher-risk jurisdictions, and financial secrecy havens or jurisdictions," such as OKX.com's deposit 11 12 accounts.

73. OKX.com and OKCoin.com were required to comply with heightened due diligence
for deposit accounts. According to the FFIEC Manual, *OKX's due diligence was required to include assessments to determine the purpose of the account, ascertain the source and funding of the capital, identify account control persons and signatories, scrutinize the account holders' business operations, and obtain adequate explanations for account activities.*

74. OKX's general customer due diligence program was required to include protocols to
predict the types of transactions, dollar volume, and transaction volume each customer is likely to
conduct, and furnish a means for OKX.com to notice unusual or suspicious transactions for each
customer.

Furthermore, OKX's customer due diligence process must be able to identify any of a series of money laundering "red flags" as set forth in the FFIEC Manual, including: (i) frequent involvement of multiple jurisdictions or beneficiaries located in higher-risk offshore financial centers; (ii) repetitive or unusual funds transfer activity; (iii) funds transfers sent or received from the same person to or from different accounts; (iv) unusual funds transfers that occur among related accounts or among accounts that involve the same or related principals; (v) transactions inconsistent with the account holder's business; (vi) customer use of a personal account for business purposes; (vii) multiple accounts established in various corporate names that lack sufficient business purpose
 to justify the account complexities; and (viii) multiple high-value payments or transfers between
 shell companies without a legitimate business purpose. The due diligence process must also enable
 OKX.com to take appropriate action once such "red flags" are identified.

5 76. As alleged herein, Defendants willfully and flagrantly ignored these important U.S.
6 rules and regulations, which enabled the OKX Platform to become a central hub of crypto trading for
7 bad actors, including those who sought to utilize the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise.

8 Defendants' Failure to Implement KYC and AML Procedures Enabled Bad Actors to Launder 9 Crypto at the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise

10 77. Even though OKX operated in substantial part in the United States, OKX's KYC and
11 AML protocols, as required by the BSA, were inadequate and essentially nonexistent and failed to
12 come close to satisfying industry standards. Defendants' decision to prioritize growth over
13 compliance with U.S. legal requirements meant they facilitated billions of dollars of cryptocurrency
14 transactions on behalf of OKX's customers without implementing appropriate KYC procedures or
15 conducting adequate transaction monitoring.

- 16 78. Thieves laundered stolen cryptocurrency through OKX.com because OKX failed to
 17 implement security measures that would confirm its accountholders lawfully possessed the
 18 cryptocurrency deposited in OKX.com accounts, including the ones in which Plaintiff's stolen
 19 cryptocurrency were deposited.
- 79. A primary way that OKX.com facilitated transactions by bad actors was by permitting
 customers to open accounts, trade crypto on its exchange, and withdraw substantial amounts of
 cryptocurrency without OKX adequately verifying those customers. Unlike legitimate virtual
 currency exchanges, OKX.com did not require these users to validate their identity information by
 providing official identification documents or by verifying that the information was accurate and
 legitimate. Accounts were therefore easily opened by bad actors, including by users in the United
 States.
- 80. OKX's practices encouraged cryptocurrency hackers and thieves to steal
 cryptocurrency and launder it at OKX by depositing it at OKX.com, converting the illegally obtained

asset, and withdrawing it from OKX.com – all without providing verifiable identification. As a
 direct and proximate result of Defendants' and the OKX Officers' failure to comply with KYC and
 AML rules and regulations, Plaintiff and the Class had crypto stolen and laundered at the OKX
 Crypto-Wash Enterprise.

5 81. Due in part to OKX's failure to implement KYC and an effective AML program, bad
6 actors used OKX.com's exchange in various ways, including: (i) operating mixing services that
7 obfuscated the source and ownership of cryptocurrency; (ii) transacting illicit proceeds from
8 ransomware variants; and (iii) moving proceeds of darknet market transactions, exchange hacks, and
9 various internet-related scams.

10 82. Instead of preventing bad actors from using OKX.com as required under U.S. law,
11 Defendants took steps to ensure bad actors had access to the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise by
12 turning a blind eye to the wide variety of money and cryptocurrency laundering they knowingly
13 facilitated through OKX.com.

BSA, Defendants knew OKX.com's substantial U.S. user base required it to register with
BSA, Defendants – in furtherance of the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise – marketed OKCoin.com as
a U.S.-based exchange which would register with FinCEN and purportedly conduct KYC and
implement AML policies and procedures for U.S.-based users. OKCoin.com became licensed in
numerous U.S. jurisdictions and registered as a money services business ("MSB") with FinCEN.
OKCoin.com's U.S. operations was a subsidiary of OKX.

21 84. Even though OKX served U.S.-based users through OKCoin.com, Defendants knew 22 that many U.S.-based users preferred to use OKX.com because OKX.com offered substantially more 23 tokens on its exchange and offered much larger trading volume and liquidity. Accordingly, a 24 primary purpose of OKCoin.com's U.S. operations was to enable OKX.com to continue evading 25 U.S. legal and regulatory requirements and reduce regulatory pressure on OKX.com. Even though 26 OKX may have blocked some U.S. users who did not use a VPN on OKX.com and redirected them 27 to OKCoin.com, Defendants and the OKX Officers continued to allow U.S.-based users to use 28 OKX.com with a VPN.

1Plaintiff and the Class Suffered Financial Harm
from the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise2

85. As a result of OKX's conduct and systemic failures to require KYC and implement
AML, Plaintiff and Class members have been damaged.

4 86. For example, on or about April 12, 2023, digital assets (23.212 Bitcoin and 26.7
5 Ethereum) were stolen from accounts Plaintiff Watt maintained at two separate cryptocurrency
6 exchanges and in a private cryptocurrency wallet. The value of those assets at the time of theft was
7 approximately Seven Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars (\$725,000.00 USD).

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87. Following the theft of Plaintiff Watt's assets, a cryptographic tracing firm
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Wallets at OKX into which stolen funds were deposited:

BTC Addresses: 3C7USWmsGd4pnSiHYysU8RHnWyuRKAi54W 3AAJ8CgwoPxecTbWxmzGAqzKE8j799QdsQ 36gQg3DfZsJPdNxwXk8esBodR26tHeKpSR

ETH Addresses: 0xd49cd43230860f7A244D52FCD78a43CbE068e8Ff 0x7589A82F2e8A19b0E414Ba5215181dE8051e4e60

9	Date	Transaction ID	Source Address	Destination Address	Coin	Funds under claim (stated in cryptocurrency unit)
1	4/12/2023		60756de73ba7			
่า∥	[Watt's crypto		15e95c1c90b6			
2	exchange	60756de73ba715e95	82387cd45f86	3BCqTnJw4U	BTC	
3	account to	c1c90b682387cd45f	840a7c9134b1	DfTMFhrwhgj	DIC	
ןן י	Scammer's	86840a7c9134b1d4a	d4a82e76a96c	ezTbbJPHNgi		
ı ⊩	wallet]	82e76a96ce674	e674	do		0.321947
			119debb9c512			
;			d1011dc4400f			
'∥	4/16/2023	119debb9c512d101	8b7989191152	36gQg3DfZsJ	BTC	
5		1dc4400f8b7989191	9905e0239933	PdNxwXk8es	DIC	
′∥	[Scammer's	1529905e02399333	3557d2dac3f9	BodR26tHeK		
7 ╟	wallet to OKX]	557d2dac3f98958	8958	pSR		0.321947

COMPLAINT

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1 2	Date	Transaction ID	Source Address	Destination Address	Coin	Funds under claim (stated in cryptocurrency unit)
3	4/18/2023		cb9d0c6515e1			
4	[Watt's crypto		3ae3f17f4f47f			
-	exchange	cb9d0c6515e13ae3f	71d7dea67071	3BCqTnJw4U	BTC	
5	account to	17f4f47f71d7dea67	84ac33404de9	DfTMFhrwhgj	210	
6	Scammer's wallet]	07184ac33404de9dd	dd40a0dc087d	ezTbbJPHNgi		0.0005144
0	watterj	40a0dc087d098	098 b24adc29ac48	do		0.8085144
7			df21d053b2bc			
	4/19/2023	b24adc29ac48df21d	d59aaf02d3bc	3C7USWmsG	BTC	
8		053b2bcd59aaf02d3	522873fca5dc	d4pnSiHYysU	ыс	
9	[Scammer's wallet to OKX]	bc522873fca5dc69e	69e74ef549af1	8RHnWyuRK		0.0005144
9		74ef549af1104	104	Ai54W		0.8085144
0	4/20/2022		Γ	1		
	4/20/2023		0e1f9d3a15a8			
1	[Watt's crypto exchange		4d7c625b6494			
2	account to	0e1f9d3a15a84d7c6	fbbdd91aaf3b8	3BCqTnJw4U	BTC	
	Scammer's	25b6494fbbdd91aaf 3b8b8266b8857445	b8266b885744 59d8057eb1e1	DfTMFhrwhgj ezTbbJPHNgi		
3	wallet]	9d8057eb1e1a2e	a2e	do		0.8598781
	4/19/2023		a5761b99c11d			
4	[Watt's crypto		3d0004095169			
5	exchange	a5761b99c11d3d00	a0d9eee2f90a9	3BCqTnJw4U	BTC	
5	account to	04095169a0d9eee2f	a88677bda124	DfTMFhrwhgj	DIC	
6	Scammer's	90a9a88677bda1243	385c631310bc	ezTbbJPHNgi		
Ĭ	wallet]	85c631310bc9cb	9cb	do		0.2899216
7	4/21/2023					
0	[Watt's crypto exchange					
8	account to	5c74c59284ab188e2	36BnPEtTZxp	3BCqTnJw4U	BTC	
9	Scammer's	21cff7878e7543069 f97c7b79014f1d9c8	cE5gZ6yjJ7nh T8VFEqr5wg	DfTMFhrwhgj ezTbbJPHNgi		
-	wallet]	03cef93afb92b	T	do		0.7041402
0	4/21/2023	d2db35203e0c57a97	3BCqTnJw4U	36gQg3DfZsJ		
,		f118f4250aae1b1df2	DfTMFhrwhgj	PdNxwXk8es	BTC	
1	[Scammer's wallet to OKX]	72f8c684236a84191	ezTbbJPHNgi	BodR26tHeK		0.0500701
2	waller to OKAj	307eb4749f6e d2db35203e0c57a97	do 3BCqTnJw4U	pSR 36gQg3DfZsJ		0.8598781
-	4/21/2023	f118f4250aae1b1df2	DfTMFhrwhgj	PdNxwXk8es	_	
3	[Scammer's	72f8c684236a84191	ezTbbJPHNgi	BodR26tHeK	BTC	
	wallet to OKX]	307eb4749f6e	do	pSR		0.2899216
4	4/21/2023	ea5783709b9757c20	3BCqTnJw4U	3C7USWmsG		
5	[Scammer's	2605e6ebbc1e6cc8b	DfTMFhrwhgj	d4pnSiHYysU	BTC	
	wallet to OKX]	90728890cb149d68f 2178fdad59aba	ezTbbJPHNgi do	8RHnWyuRK Ai54W		0.7035402
6		21701uau39a0a	uo	A134 W		0.7033402
_ ŀ	4/26/2023	10016 15405005 -				
7		128d6ed74070897af	36BnPEtTZxp	3BCqTnJw4U	BTC	
8	[Watt's crypto exchange	097994a4ebd141fba 77a2c1f15e8034d63	cE5gZ6yjJ7nh T8VFEqr5wg	DfTMFhrwhgj ezTbbJPHNgi	DIC	2.2660199
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1 2	Date	Transaction ID	Source Address	Destination Address	Coin	Funds under claim (stated in cryptocurrency unit)
3	account to	ea31439b240ee	Т	do		
4	Scammer's wallet]	cas1+5902+0cc	1	uo		
5	4/26/2023	643754e93fdddef20	3BCqTnJw4U	3C7USWmsG		
6	[Scammer's	cdc8b14dd86f8be52 3963ca57fcca0ac88	DfTMFhrwhgj ezTbbJPHNgi	d4pnSiHYysU 8RHnWyuRK	BTC	
	wallet to OKX]	1191e47787a19	do	Ai54W		2.2660199
7	1/2 c/2022			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
8	4/26/2023 [Watt's crypto					
9	exchange	64963565d68e8251	36BnPEtTZxp	3BCqTnJw4U	BTC	
	account to Scammer's	11f59551fc8ab165c	cE5gZ6yjJ7nh	DfTMFhrwhgj	DIC	
10	wallet]	7e7db0c72fdcceaca 3d0952e75d8ef3	T8VFEqr5wg T	ezTbbJPHNgi do		0.8719901
11	4/26/2023	643754e93fdddef20	3BCqTnJw4U	3C7USWmsG		
12	[Scammer's	cdc8b14dd86f8be52 3963ca57fcca0ac88	DfTMFhrwhgj ezTbbJPHNgi	d4pnSiHYysU 8RHnWyuRK	BTC	
12	wallet to OKX]	1191e47787a19	do	Ai54W		0.8719901
13				·		
14	5/8/2023					
	[Watt's crypto exchange	665dac8f69975dd26	36BnPEtTZxp	34GQBn3KhU		
15	account to	2080614547464b7e	cE5gZ6yjJ7nh	MmxpcsDE6u	BTC	
16	Scammer's wallet]	d9315f186827f6950	T8VFEqr5wg	hZAzbBTeYV		0.1707070
17	5/11/2023	84073496afc737	Т	bLRY		0.1787068
	[Watt's crypto					
18	exchange	1d913f53d42eb61c1	36BnPEtTZxp	34GQBn3KhU	BTC	
19	account to Scammer's	0ee5333a7cc96f1d5 ccac6d5457f17cc1c	cE5gZ6yjJ7nh T8VFEqr5wg	MmxpcsDE6u hZAzbBTeYV		
20	wallet]	3d6769a76b836	Т	bLRY		0.5473373
20	5/11/2023	1c07dfba8859c0ce0 d50a229ad05868cc9	34GQBn3KhU MmxpcsDE6u	3AAJ8CgwoP xecTbWxmz		
21	[Scammer's	e185fff35fa724895f	hZAzbBTeYV	GAqzKE8j79	BTC	
22	wallet to OKX]	3f2e1ba8d0ff	bLRY	9QdsQ		0.1787068
	5/12/2023 [Watt's crypto					
23	exchange	9848fbc7f90c704ad	36BnPEtTZxp	33nisH8krWu	BTC	
24	account to	eb8eadd71534df358	cE5gZ6yjJ7nh	KLfRFgw3yb	DIC	
25	Scammer's wallet]	94d0a217870a5d33 983d139ab9fe6d	T8VFEqr5wg T	EQkABW6L W7GxH		3.7348998
23		aa9b57a25c980c37e	33nisH8krWu	3AAJ8CgwoP		5.75 4 0770
26	5/12/2023 [Scammer's	1dc24f085a07b430e	KLfRFgw3yb	xecTbWxmz	BTC	
27	wallet to OKX]	59e129237e78cb16b 406e4d436fd97	EQkABW6L W7GxH	GAqzKE8j79 9QdsQ		3.73399675
		1	1			

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1 2	Date	Transaction ID	Source Address	Destination Address	Coin	Funds under claim (stated in cryptocurrency unit)
3 4 5	5/12/2023 [Scammer's wallet to OKX]	29a802cdba34814e2 d052838e931ae9849 e9b6ac2d0608ffe36 73ad533f7f2ae	34GQBn3KhU MmxpcsDE6u hZAzbBTeYV bLRY	3AAJ8CgwoP xecTbWxmz GAqzKE8j79 9QdsQ	BTC	0.5467373
	5/18/2023					
6 7	5/18/2025 [Watt's crypto exchange	109e160e3c09b0add	36BnPEtTZxp	33nisH8krWu	DEC	
8	account to Scammer's	2dce981fa83fb308e e11df71292e6d954b	cE5gZ6yjJ7nh T8VFEqr5wg	KLfRFgw3yb EQkABW6L	BTC	
9	wallet]	96315423dce3f 7e41141402009638	T 33nisH8krWu	W7GxH 3AAJ8CgwoP		0.0729773
10	[Scammer's wallet to OKX]	348c5d64b11756d6 1bda33c6d0850d10 4ca46b4696d552be	KLfRFgw3yb EQkABW6L W7GxH	xecTbWxmz GAqzKE8j79 9QdsQ	BTC	0.0722236
11		+64+00+070435206	W/GAI) QuisQ		0.0122230
12 13	5/30/2023 [Watt's crypto					
14	exchange account to Scammer's	d2d64bf9fc833fb25 ae2c1b11b271139b1 7b0d3ce895809273	36BnPEtTZxp cE5gZ6yjJ7nh T8VFEqr5wg	33nisH8krWu KLfRFgw3yb EQkABW6L	BTC	
15	wallet]	922b275b4ee0c3 32dcef77592b189ba	T 33nisH8krWu	W7GxH 3AAJ8CgwoP		0.2303858
16	5/31/2023 [Scammer's wallet to OKX]	bd4aa7f5595014f33 f85435038398db4d5	KLfRFgw3yb EQkABW6L	xecTbWxmz GAqzKE8j79	BTC	0.000.0000
17		a257e36103d2e	W7GxH	9QdsQ		0.22969735
18	6/7/2023					
19	[Watt's crypto exchange account to	c7c55c9f398b03b1f	36BnPEtTZxp	3ADojAjZdTE	BTC	
20	Scammer's wallet]	c5c78e2c5e441fcf0b b8b03610cc9901e21 f59a85ed7df2	cE5gZ6yjJ7nh T8VFEqr5wg T	1ARQoNZ4xi ueQah5PXoPv 5g		0.0734197
21 22	6/12/2023	8a545a7e2679cee55 8eb52bf1ceaf191db	3ADojAjZdTE 1ARQoNZ4xi	3AAJ8CgwoP xecTbWxmz	BTC	
23	[Scammer's wallet to OKX]	ceb75fd8605c6115b c8b4ce25abd4c	ueQah5PXoPv 5g	GAqzKE8j79 9QdsQ	DIC	0.0734197
24	6/15/2023					
24	[Watt's crypto exchange	0cf3ee4cc4d56bbb7	36BnPEtTZxp	3BrrTzawFa6c	DTC	
26	account to Scammer's	044e9fb58a93a892d ccf21ddea5be2563b	cE5gZ6yjJ7nh T8VFEqr5wg	AqaRHA6Z8R daWxt2wHvH	BTC	
27	wallet]	6803b98e5a269	T	1t		5.5035119
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1 2	Date	Transaction ID	Source Address	Destination Address	Coin	Funds under claim (stated in cryptocurrency unit)
3 4 5	6/15/2023 [Scammer's wallet to OKX]	611ff021c4b1d05f7 dccf219e3138d3349 eb6b43b9a610b113c 03fef7dd89988	3BrrTzawFa6c AqaRHA6Z8R daWxt2wHvH 1t	3C7USWmsG d4pnSiHYysU 8RHnWyuRK Ai54W	BTC	5.5029119
6	6/21/2023					
7	[Watt's crypto exchange account to	22c179413a569b41 03a78ae7e8ff6f6271	36BnPEtTZxp cE5gZ6yjJ7nh	3BrrTzawFa6c AqaRHA6Z8R	BTC	
8	Scammer's wallet]	86d4d1e63688634a 5d58a294aaf391	T8VFEqr5wg	daWxt2wHvH 1t		2.4690143
9 10	6/21/2023 [Scammer's wallet to OKX]	bad99a2021ca9070a 577d0c2654732fce1 29614245211e9c5ff 1616e54e30e15	3BrrTzawFa6c AqaRHA6Z8R daWxt2wHvH 1t	3AAJ8CgwoP xecTbWxmz GAqzKE8j79 9QdsQ	BTC	2.46837225
11		1010034030015	It	JQusQ		2.40037223
12 13 14	7/17/2023 [Watt's crypto exchange account to Scammer's wallet]	57f954dc59ab73603 a742a57f37d3ed4bb b7d70bbe6eed5c369 35ec4cef86157	3LDt1mcUkyJ 7GBPTWHFz XMXyF6fLA2 vszT	3F3dbSqEmoZ 7qGdtscdskQc m5WHoBk8d8 b	BTC	0.01629
15 16 17	7/18/2023 [Scammer's wallet to OKX]	99ff15c7cc100851b b4285bf7f745caa82 78dc7c1a68f132f65 3aad2a6ef3ece	3F3dbSqEmoZ 7qGdtscdskQc m5WHoBk8d8 b	3C7USWmsG d4pnSiHYysU 8RHnWyuRK Ai54W	BTC	0.01629
18	7/18/2023		3LDt1mcUkyJ	3F3dbSqEmoZ		
19 20	[Watt's crypto exchange account to Scammer's	06f363813762ad3b6 e4276df5855ba679c 15294830bf1fc903b fa46363d866be	7GBPTWHFz XMXyF6fLA2 vszT	7qGdtscdskQc m5WHoBk8d8 b	BTC	1.85169
21 22	wallet] 7/18/2023 [Scammer's	c766e223b833953e4 81a80890e8bb9ba7e	3F3dbSqEmoZ 7qGdtscdskQc	3C7USWmsG d4pnSiHYysU	BTC	1.85169
22	wallet to OKX]	d6310370dba6e757 d60de9168c53a5	m5WHoBk8d8 b	8RHnWyuRK Ai54W		
23 24	7/27/2023 [Watt's crypto					
25 26	exchange account to Scammer's wallet]	0e652ec78e491a234 56f298beea5bf5520 0e0bde6aa7742cd49 e451bdfd7bf01	3LDt1mcUkyJ 7GBPTWHFz XMXyF6fLA2 vszT	3F3dbSqEmoZ 7qGdtscdskQc m5WHoBk8d8 b	BTC	1.72295
27 28	7/31/2023 [Scammer's	aedbfd4d12e363e45 f7f50d80726abe5cd daee34f37a061e5d0	3F3dbSqEmoZ 7qGdtscdskQc m5WHoBk8d8	3C7USWmsG d4pnSiHYysU 8RHnWyuRK	BTC	1.72573724
20				Samanityuni		

1 2	Date	Transaction ID	Source Address	Destination Address	Coin	Funds under claim (stated in cryptocurrency unit)
3	wallet to OKX]	87c917920f223	b	Ai54W		
4						
5						
6	8/25/2023 [Watt's crypto					
7	exchange account to	8face08868ff7c57e0	3LDt1mcUkyJ 7GBPTWHFz	3F3dbSqEmoZ	BTC	
8	Scammer's wallet]	38db03a0b5818f618 73378f1468cec46fd 253dd512a3a4	XMXyF6fLA2 vszT	7qGdtscdskQc m5WHoBk8d8 b		0.9099
9	8/25/2023	665cd6c23c625ff92	3F3dbSqEmoZ	3C7USWmsG		0.,,0,,,
10	[Scammer's wallet to OKX]	bc692d28340b1d33 d5a48e614ba0668f4 9f387d77b87c6d	7qGdtscdskQc m5WHoBk8d8 b	d4pnSiHYysU 8RHnWyuRK Ai54W	BTC	0.9099
11		91387077087c00	0	A134 W		0.9099
	2/14/2024					
12 13	[Watt's crypto exchange	0x3a838d1db2aad8f	0xa7E0236957	0xB1E7bAE33	ETH	
	account to Watt's private	75ed5f8077e73df9a be3c2d8be7bf90a1a	dA7E937D8bc 1b1D7c6E56E	5b167a861446 D83deA78752		
14	wallet]	8cae794cb43a56e	F7418bB8	C1A2aae0		8.73398
15 16	2/15/2024 [Watt's private	0.17500.1500.01006		0.101000475		8.7281 [These funds were later transferred to
17	wallet to Scammer's	0x175f3d582e81f0f e2daa2c5d782883ea 7536fe9188bdf6c5e	0xB1E7bAE33 5b167a861446 D83deA78752	0x1819D8A6F 747cC6708aBf 00d395c3Ea73	ETH	0x7589A82F2e8A19b0 E414Ba5215181dE805 1e4e60
18	wallet] 3/6/2024	0899e4dc341935a	C1A2aae0	fdBA9F0		at OKX.]
19	[Watt's crypto exchange	0xd4d0ede9b16fbb7	0xa7E0236957	0xB1E7bAE33		
20	account to Watt's private	79d83b52561b3036	dA7E937D8bc	5b167a861446	ETH	
21	wallet]	b0280ea5ef3735e41 6948354a6d58c39b	1b1D7c6E56E F7418bB8	D83deA78752 C1A2aae0		2.52591
22	3/6/2024					
	[Watt's private wallet to	0x40aca2836012fb6 40f5f64e276be1af9e	0xB1E7bAE33 5b167a861446	0x103645d89f 2a09d30fE4b0	ETH	
23	Scammer's wallet]	aef38546a5454b784 5b4af38039e4cc	D83deA78752 C1A2aae0	C60bF1A62F9 86b3fd5		2.5174
24	3/13/2024		C 11 124400			
25	[Watt's crypto exchange	0xe9c05dff857c6dd	0xa7E0236957	0xB1E7bAE33		
26	account to Watt's private	a02db98c5592b343f	dA7E937D8bc	5b167a861446		
27	wall s privale wallet]	980a3c148501fbc30 0ce11645f94992e	1b1D7c6E56E F7418bB8	D83deA78752 C1A2aae0	ETH	4.92249

28

1 2 3	Date	Transaction ID	Source Address	Destination Address	Coin	Funds under claim (stated in cryptocurrency unit)
5	3/13/2024					
4	[Watt's private wallet to	0x064bd37e2f4a8a8 1a46c8642511a94cc	0xB1E7bAE33 5b167a861446	0x103645d89f 2a09d30fE4b0		
5	Scammer's wallet]	f8eaafd301dc4e9e7f ddd7bbea685faa	D83deA78752 C1A2aae0	C60bF1A62F9 86b3fd5	ETH	4.9154
6	4/11/2024					
7	[Watt's crypto exchange	0x141cbd0676e1d1 9518e661e1997498	0xa7E0236957	0xB1E7bAE33		
8	account to Watt's private wallet]	033837a68c64944f9 4bb6e00b2137ddd0	dA7E937D8bc 1b1D7c6E56E	5b167a861446 D83deA78752		
9	4/11/2024	6	F7418bB8	C1A2aae0	ETH	7.94225
10	[Watt's private	0xff667d150fc72b7	0xB1E7bAE33	0x895105293F		
11	wallet to Scammer's	8eb86edacd93cb27d c2f9d12e9d016d46e	5b167a861446 D83deA78752	C70437fFa8d9 299Bd40458c		
12	wallet]	58f445eef08dcc9	C1A2aae0	C9BDB39	ETH	7.9414
12	4/12/2024	0x732570025346d9 5484f772d188ef9d9	0x895105293F C70437fFa8d9	0xd49cd43230 860f7A244D5		
13	[Scammer's wallet to OKX]	8535c4d014fd1c120 243a620fda075f8c	299Bd40458c C9BDB39	2FCD78a43C bE068e8Ff	ETH	16
14	4/25/2024	2154020144075100	()))	DEUUUCUII	LIII	10
15	[Watt's crypto exchange	0x9c76b24a754ba00	0xa7E0236957	0xB1E7bAE33		
16	account to Watt's private	4ccccfae06924209e	dA7E937D8bc	5b167a861446		
17	wallet]	c4443b3ea5398854b 3d077f3a8fbfd11	1b1D7c6E56E F7418bB8	D83deA78752 C1A2aae0	ETH	2.56939
17	4/25/2024					
18	[Watt's private wallet to	0xe56707014ea3b73 7b21b358e43f8282f	0xB1E7bAE33 5b167a861446	0x895105293F C70437fFa8d9		
19	Scammer's wallet]	40f64b0c4b8ec7a69 4abe00afddeaea5	D83deA78752 C1A2aae0	299Bd40458c C9BDB39	ETH	2.569
20	4/25/2024	0xf1d618c33c0c624	0x895105293F	0xd49cd43230	Em	2.309
21	[Scammer's	b14a79a4292ae5a9e 7e04a5eda6267ed0d	C70437fFa8d9 299Bd40458c	860f7A244D5 2FCD78a43C		
22	wallet to OKX]	c0ffe7023012955	C9BDB39	bE068e8Ff	ETH	12.9
23	88. 7	The cryptocurrency	taken from the	other members	s of the C	Class and transferred to
24	OKX followed	similar types of path	s as those descr	ribed above. Pla	aintiff and	d members of the Class
25	had their crypto	currency forcibly rea	moved from the	ir cryptocurrenc	y exchang	ge accounts, and wallets

26 as a result of a hack, ransomware, or theft and ultimately laundered at OKX.

- 27
- 28

1 89. As a direct and proximate result of OKX's policies and failures described herein,
 2 Plaintiff and all Class members suffered financial harm when their digital assets were taken and
 3 laundered through OKX.

4 90. As of the date of this filing, Plaintiff and Class members have not recovered their
5 stolen cryptocurrency from OKX.

6

RICO ALLEGATIONS

91. Defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme, common course of conduct, and
conspiracy to generate transactions on its exchange and gain market share for OKX by enabling bad
actors to launder stolen cryptocurrency through the OKX Platform.

92. To achieve these goals, Defendants set up and managed the OKX Platform, including
OKX.com and OKCoin.com, in a manner that willfully violated U.S. laws and regulations requiring
adequate KYC or AML policies so that bad actors and U.S. sanctioned entities could create
accounts, engage in cryptocurrency transactions, and deposit and withdraw cryptocurrency.

As a direct result of their conspiracy and fraudulent scheme, bad actors laundered
cryptocurrency through the OKX Platform which was taken from Plaintiff and the Class as a result
of hacks, ransomware, and theft.

17 || The OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise

18 94. OKX Group was formed in 2013 and since that time has operated cryptocurrency 19 trading platforms, including the platforms located at OKX.com and OKCoin.com. OKX.com is one 20 of the most active cryptocurrency exchanges in the world. Star Xu founded OKX Group, 21 OKCoin.com and OKX.com and, prior to and during the Class Period, served as CEO of OKX 22 Group and made the strategic decisions for OKX Group and the OKX Platform, and exercised day-23 to-day control over its operations and finances. Star Xu oversaw OKX's compliance policies and 24 procedures, including KYC and AML policies. Hao served as CEO of OKX from approximately November 2018 until January 2023, where he oversaw OKX's strategy, operations, growth, and 25 26 compliance and risk management practices, including with respect to KYC and AML policies and 27 procedures. Fang serves as the President of OKX, occupying the role since January 2023, and 28 previously served as the CEO of OKCoin from March 2020 to December 2023, where she oversaw

global branding and compliance and risk policies, including with respect to KYC and AML policies
 and procedures. Star Xu, Hao, and Fang oversaw and directed OKX.com's strategy of willfully
 disregarding KYC and AML laws and regulations so that customers could use OKX.com
 anonymously from the United States and from sanctioned jurisdictions.

5 95. Defendant OKX Group is made up of numerous different legal entities around the 6 world, including OKCoin USA Inc., Aux Cayes FinTech Co. Ltd., OKCoin Europe Ltd., and many 7 others. OKCoin USA is a subsidiary of OKX Group and serves users in the United States through 8 the OKX Platform, including the OKCoin.com exchange. OKCoin Europe Ltd. is a Malta limited 9 liability company which operates under the OKX brand for users who are residents of operating 10 locations within the European Economic Area. OKCoin USA Inc. is a Delaware corporation which operates under the OKX brand and oversees the OKCoin.com website for users in the United States 11 12 and its territories. Aux Cayes FinTech Co. Ltd. is a Seychelles registered company for all users of 13 OKX's services who are not specifically covered by one of OKX Group's other subsidiaries.

14 96. Star Xu, Hao, and Fang, along with a core senior management group, made the
15 strategic decisions for OKX, OKX.com, OKCoin.com, and the OKX Platform, and exercised day-to16 day control over their operations and finances.

17 97. The OKX Officers and OKX Group, OKC EU, Aux Cayes, OKX US, OKX.com,
18 OKCoin.com, and other OKX Group subsidiaries not named as defendants, constituted an
19 "enterprise" (the "OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise") within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(4) since
20 the start of the Class Period, through which the OKX Officers and OKX Group Defendants
21 conducted the pattern of racketeering activity described herein.

98. Alternatively, OKX US and the OKCoin.com platform were associated-in-fact with
OKX Group, OKC EU, Aux Cayes, and OKX.com for a number of common and ongoing purposes,
including executing and perpetrating the scheme alleged herein, and constituted an "enterprise"
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(4), the activities of which affected interstate commerce,
because they involved commercial and financial activities across state lines, including through the
operation of websites over the Internet and the transmission of cryptocurrency.

1	99. Therefore, the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise operated the OKX.com and
2	OKCoin.com exchanges since before the start of the Class Period. Star Xu has directly or indirectly
3	owned OKX Group and the various entities that collectively operate the OKX Platform. The OKX
4	Crypto-Wash Enterprise engaged in, and its activities affected, interstate commerce, including
5	through the operation of websites over the Internet and through the transmission of cryptocurrency.
6	100. Star Xu has directly or indirectly owned the various entities that collectively operate
7	the OKX Platform, including each of the OKX Defendants. Star Xu, along with Hao and Fang,
8	made the strategic decisions for OKX Group, OKC EU, Aux Cayes, OKX US, and the OKX
9	Platforms and exercised day-to-day control over their operations and finances.
10	101. Star Xu exercised substantial control over the affairs of the OKX Crypto-Wash
11	Enterprise, through, among other methods and means, the following:
12	(a) Providing the initial operating capital and holding most of the shares of OKX
13	Group;
14	(b) Devising the strategy to maximize transaction volume on the OKX exchange
15	and gain market share by violating the BSA by willfully causing OKX.com to fail to implement and
16	maintain the necessary KYC requirements or an effective AML program;
17	(c) Communicating to OKX's employees his overall strategy of not requiring the
18	collection of the necessary KYC information and thereby willfully violating KYC and AML laws;
19	and
20	(d) Managing the day-to-day affairs of OKX.com and OKCoin.com with the
21	purpose of ensuring OKX's most valuable customers, including bad actors, could continue using the
22	OKX Platform.
23	102. Defendants and the OKX Officers exercised control over and directed the affairs of
24	the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise through, among other things, using OKX's core senior
25	management group to direct critical aspects of the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise operations.
26	103. The OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise was an ongoing and continuing organization
27	consisting of legal entities, such as a corporation and limited liability company, as well as
28	individuals associated for the common or shared purpose of ensuring that OKX did not implement
	COMPLAINT

adequate KYC or AML policies so that OKX.com could maximize transaction volume on the OKX
 exchange and increase market share, in violation of the law.

104. Many OKX customers were not bad actors and used the OKX Platform for legitimate
purposes. However, Defendants and the OKX Officers, through the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise,
have engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity which also enabled bad actors to use the OKX
Platform to launder stolen cryptocurrency so that it could not be tracked or recovered.

7 105. The OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise engages in and affects interstate commerce
8 because it involves commercial and financial activities across state boundaries, such as through the
9 operation of the OKX.com and OKCoin.com platforms over the Internet and through the
10 transmission of cryptocurrency into and out of OKX.com, and over OKX.com's exchange.

11 106. At all relevant times herein, each participant in the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise was
12 aware of the scheme.

13 107. Defendants were each knowing and willing participants in the scheme and reaped14 financial benefits therefrom.

15 108. The OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise has an ascertainable structure separate and apart
16 from the pattern of racketeering activity in which Defendants engaged. The OKX Crypto-Wash
17 Enterprise is separate and distinct from each of the Defendants.

18 **RICO Conspiracy**

19 109. Defendants have not undertaken the practices described herein in isolation, but as part
20 of a common scheme and conspiracy.

21 110. Defendants have engaged in a conspiracy to maximize transaction volume on the
22 OKX exchange and/or market share for Defendants and their unnamed co-conspirators through the
23 scheme alleged herein.

24 111. The objectives of the conspiracy include: (i) executing the scheme; and (ii) enabling
25 customers to use OKX.com without OKX.com requiring adequate KYC or implementing adequate
26 AML policies, including U.S.-based users and users from sanctioned jurisdictions.

27 112. To achieve these goals, Defendants willfully disregarded U.S. laws and regulations
28 and encouraged bad actors to launder crypto at OKX.com. Defendants have also agreed to

participate in other illicit and fraudulent practices, all in exchange for agreement to, and participation
 in, the conspiracy.

3 113. Each Defendant and member of the conspiracy, with knowledge and intent, has
4 agreed to the overall objectives of the conspiracy and participated in the common course of conduct
5 to enable U.S.-based users and sanctioned users to launder crypto at OKX.com.

6 114. As a result of Defendants' illegal scheme and conspiracy, Plaintiff and the Class had
7 crypto taken from them through hacks, ransomware, or theft and laundered at OKX.com. But for
8 Defendants' scheme, Plaintiff and the Class would not have had their crypto stolen and then
9 laundered at OKX.com so that the crypto was no longer traceable on the blockchain. Therefore, the
10 damages that Defendants caused Plaintiff and the Class may be measured, at a minimum, by the
11 dollar value of the cryptocurrency taken from Plaintiff and the Class as the result of illegal conduct,
12 such as hacks, ransomware, or theft, which was laundered through OKX.com.

13 **Pattern of Racketeering Activity**

14 115. Defendants, each of whom is a person associated-in-fact with the OKX Crypto-Wash
15 Enterprise, knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully conducted or participated, directly or indirectly, in
16 the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity within the meaning of 18
17 U.S.C. §§1961(1), 1961(5), and 1962(c). The racketeering activity was made possible by
18 Defendants' regular and repeated use of the facilities, services, distribution channels, and employees
19 of the OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise.

20 116. Defendants each committed multiple "Racketeering Acts," as described below,
21 including aiding and abetting such acts.

117. The Racketeering Acts were not isolated, but rather were related in that they had the
same or similar purposes and results, participants, victims, and methods of commission. Further, the
Racketeering Acts were continuous, occurring on a regular, and often daily, basis beginning before
the start of the Class Period and continuing until today, and the harm of those Racketeering Acts
continue to today.

27 118. Defendants participated in the operation and management of the OKX Crypto-Wash
28 Enterprise by directing its affairs, as described above.

1 119. In devising and executing the scheme to enable OKX.com to be used by U.S.-based 2 customers and sanctioned users, including bad actors laundering cryptocurrency, Defendants, *inter* 3 alia: (i) committed, and aided and abetted, acts constituting indictable offenses under 18 U.S.C. 4 \$1960 (relating to illegal money transmitters) and 18 U.S.C. \$1961(1)(E) (act indictable under the 5 Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act aka the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA); and (ii) aided and abetted acts constituting indictable offenses under 18 U.S.C. §1956 (laundering of monetary 6 7 instruments), 18 U.S.C. §1957 (engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified 8 unlawful activity), and 18 U.S.C. §2314 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property). For 9 the purpose of executing the scheme to maximize transaction volume on the OKX exchange and 10 market share for OKX.com in violation of KYC and AML rules and regulations, Defendants committed these Racketeering Acts, which number in the millions, intentionally, and knowingly, 11 12 with the specific intent to advance the illegal scheme.

13

120. Defendants committed, and aided and abetted, acts constituting indictable offences under 18 U.S.C. §1960 (relating to illegal money transmitters) and the BSA as follows: 14

15 (a) Defendants and the OKX Officers understood that because OKX.com served a substantial number of U.S. users, it was required to register with FinCEN as a money transmitting 16 business ("MTB") and therefore required under the BSA to implement an effective AML program. 17 18 Nevertheless, OKX.com did not register with FinCEN as an MTB or implement an effective AML 19 program. In fact, Defendants willfully violated the BSA by enabling and causing OKX.com to have 20 an ineffective AML program, including a failure to collect or verify KYC information from a large share of its users. 21

22 (b) Defendants OKX Group, Aux Cayes, and OKC EU, aided and abetted by 23 Defendant OKX US, conducted, and conspired to conduct, OKX.com as an unlicensed MTB from 24 before the start of the Class Period to at least the date of this Complaint in violation of 18 U.S.C. 25 \$1960(a) and (b)(1)(B), and failed to maintain an effective AML program, in violation of the BSA, including, 31 U.S.C. §§5318(h) and 5322. 26

27 (c) OKX Group, Aux Cayes, and OKC EU were required to develop, implement, 28 and maintain an effective AML program that was reasonably designed to prevent OKX.com from

being used to facilitate money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities, and Defendants
 OKX Group, Aux Cayes, and OKC EU willfully failed to do so in violation of 31 U.S.C.
 §5318(h)(1) and 31 C.F.R. §1022.210. Additionally, OKX.com was required to accurately and
 timely report suspicious transactions to FinCEN; and Defendants OKX Group, Aux Cayes, and OKC
 EU willfully failed to do so in violation of 31 U.S.C. §5318(g) and 31 C.F.R. §1022.320.

- (d) Defendant OKX US aided and abetted the conduct of OKX.com as an 6 7 unlicensed MTB in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1960(a), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(2), in that OKCoin.com was 8 used to distract U.S. regulators from focusing on OKX.com's violations of the law which enabled 9 OKX.com to act as an unlicensed MTB without adequate KYC or AML policies and serve U.S.-10 based bad actors and customers from sanctioned jurisdictions. As alleged above, Defendants OKX 11 US used OKCoin.com to distract regulators to enable OKX.com to continue doing business with 12 U.S.-based customers and customers located in sanctioned jurisdictions, including bad actors who 13 used OKX.com to launder cryptocurrency taken from Plaintiff and the Class a result of hacks, ransomware, or theft. 14
- 15 121. These Racketeering Acts were not isolated, but rather were related in that they had the
 16 same or similar purposes and results, participants, victims, and methods of commission. For
 17 example, during the Class Period numerous U.S. retail users from around the nation conducted
 18 deposit and withdrawal transactions on OKX.com.
- 19 122. As a result of Defendants' failure to implement adequate controls requiring KYC and
 20 AML policies and blocking illegal transactions with sanctioned users and bad actors, Defendants
 21 willfully enabled bad actors to launder cryptocurrency at OKX.com.
- 123. Additionally, Defendants aided and abetted acts constituting indictable offenses under
 18 U.S.C. §1956 (laundering of monetary instruments), 18 U.S.C. §1957 (engaging in monetary
 transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity), and 18 U.S.C. §2314 (relating to
 interstate transportation of stolen property) as follows:
- 26 (a) Defendants' scheme of failing to implement adequate KYC and AML
 27 procedures for OKX.com turned OKX.com into a hub and magnet for criminals and other bad actors
- 28

to launder cryptocurrency. The operation of OKX.com as a means to launder crypto aided and
 abetted the laundering of the crypto by bad actors.

3 (b) Since before the start of the Class Period, OKX.com processed transactions by bad actors who took cryptocurrency from Plaintiff and the Class as a result of hacks, ransomware, or 4 5 theft and utilized OKX.com to launder the crypto and/or to transfer the crypto through their OKX.com accounts and out of OKX.com in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1956 (laundering of monetary 6 7 instruments) and 18 U.S.C. §1957 (engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from 8 specified unlawful activity). Additionally, the illegally obtained cryptocurrency was transported, 9 transmitted, or transferred in interstate or foreign commerce to or from OKX.com in violation of 18 10 U.S.C. §2314 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property). Defendants aided and abetted those actions constituting indictable offenses. 11

12 (c) These Racketeering Acts were not isolated, but rather were related in that they
13 had the same or similar purposes and results, participants, victims, and methods of commission.

14 (d) Furthermore, to this day, bad actors continue to attempt to use OKX.com as a
15 means to launder crypto.

16 124. Defendants and third parties have exclusive custody or control over the records reflecting the precise dates, amounts, locations, and details of the transactions at OKX.com in 17 18 commission of the Racketeering Acts in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1960 (relating to illegal money 19 transmitters), 18 U.S.C. §1961(1)(E) (act indictable under th Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act aka the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), 18 U.S.C. §1956 (laundering of monetary 20 21 instruments), 18 U.S.C. §1957 (engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified 22 unlawful activity), and 18 U.S.C. §2314 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property). 23 **CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS** 24 125. Plaintiff brings this action individually and as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule

- 25 of Civil Procedure 23 on behalf of the following Class:
 - All persons or entities in the United States whose cryptocurrency was removed from a non-OKX digital wallet, account, or protocol as a result of a hack, ransomware, or theft and, between January 10, 2021 and the date of Judgment (the "Class Period"),
- 28

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1 2 was transferred to an OKX.com account, and who have not recovered all of their cryptocurrency that was transferred to OKX.com (the "Class").

Excluded from the proposed Class are Defendants and the OKX Officers, and their 126. 3 officers, directors, agents, trustees, parents, corporations, trusts, representatives, employees, 4 principals, partners, joint ventures, and entities controlled by Defendants; their heirs, successors, 5 assigns, or other persons or entities related to, or affiliated with, Defendants; and the Judge(s) 6 assigned to this action; and any member of their immediate families. Also excluded from the 7 proposed Class are any persons or entities that engaged in the hack, ransomware, or theft that 8 resulted in the removal of the Class members' cryptocurrency or any persons or entities which 9 transferred the crypto to OKX.com. Further excluded from the proposed Class are any persons or 10 entities who, at the time relevant hereto, held an account with the OKX Platform, including 11 OKX.com or OKCoin.com, and agreed to any terms of use that OKX imposes upon its 12 accountholders.

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 127. Subject to additional information obtained through further investigation and
 discovery, the foregoing definition of the Class may be expanded or narrowed by amendment,
 amended complaint, or at class certification proceedings.

128. **Numerosity:** Class members are so numerous that joinder of all individual members 17 is impracticable. While the exact number and identities of the Class members are unknown to 18 Plaintiff at this time and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, Plaintiff alleges that 19 the Class is comprised of thousands of individual members geographically disbursed throughout the 20United States. The number of Class members and their geographical disbursement renders joinder of 21 all individual members impracticable if not impossible. Upon information and belief, OKX and 22 third parties, including firms such as Chainalysis, possess lists of wallet addresses which would 23 enable Plaintiff to identify crypto which has been taken from Plaintiff and members of the Class as a 24 result of a hack, ransomware, or theft and transferred to OKX.com by bad actors. 25

129. Existence and Predominance of Common Questions: There are questions of fact
 and law common to Plaintiff and the Class members that predominate over any questions affecting
 solely individual members including, *inter alia*, the following:

Whether OKX.com knowingly failed to implement or maintain adequate KYC 1 (a) 2 and AML policies; 3 (b) Whether OKX encouraged U.S.-based customers to use OKX.com; Whether Defendants used OKCoin.com as a distraction for regulators so 4 (c) 5 OKX.com could continue doing business with U.S.-based users and sanctioned users; (d) Whether Defendants committed civil RICO violations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 6 7 §1962(c)-(d); 8 (e) Whether Defendants aided and abetted the conversion of cryptocurrency 9 stolen from Plaintiff and Class members; 10 (f) Whether Plaintiff and Class members have been harmed and the proper measure of relief; 11 12 Whether Defendants' actions proximately caused harm to Plaintiff and Class (g) 13 members; 14 (h) Whether Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to an award of damages, treble damages, attorneys' fees, and expenses; and 15 16 (i) Whether Plaintiff and the Class members are entitled to equitable relief, and if 17 so, the nature of such relief. 18 130. **Typicality:** Plaintiff's claims are typical of the claims of the members of the proposed 19 Class. Plaintiff and Class members have been injured by the same wrongful practices of Defendants. 20 Plaintiff's claims arise from the same practices and conduct that give rise to the claims of all Class 21 members and are based on the same legal theories. 22 Adequacy: Plaintiff will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class. 131. 23 Plaintiff's claims are coextensive with, and not antagonistic to, the claims of other Class members. 24 Plaintiff is willing and able to vigorously prosecute this action on behalf of the Class, and Plaintiff 25 has retained competent counsel experienced in litigation of this nature. 26 132. **Superiority**: A class action is superior to all other available means for the fair and 27 efficient adjudication of this controversy. The damages or other financial detriment suffered by 28 individual Class members is relatively small compared to the burden and expense that would be II

1	entailed by individual litigation of their claims against Defendants. It would thus be virtually					
2	impossible for Class members, on an individual basis, to obtain effective redress for the wrongs done					
3	to them. Furthermore, even if Class members could afford such individualized litigation, the court					
4	system could not. Individualized litigation would create the danger of inconsistent or contradictory					
5	judgments arising from the same set of facts. Individualized litigation would also increase the delay					
6	and expense to all parties and the court system from the issues raised by this action. By contrast, the					
7	class action device provides the benefits of adjudication of these issues in a single proceeding,					
8	economies of scale, and comprehensive supervision by a single court, and presents no unusual					
9	management difficulties under the circumstances here.					
10	133. Adequate notice can be given to Class members directly using information					
11	maintained in Defendants' and/or third-party records or through notice by publication.					
12	COUNT I					
13	Violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,					
14	18 U.S.C. §1962(c)-(d) (Against All Defendants)					
15	134. Plaintiff re-alleges and adopts by reference the allegations above contained in ¶¶1-					
16	133, as if fully set forth herein.					
17	135. This Count I is brought against Defendants OKX Group, OKC EU, Aux Cayes, and					
18	OKX US.					
19	136. Plaintiff is not relying on any contracts or agreements entered into between OKX,					
20	OKX.com, or OKCoin.com and any users of OKX.com or OKCoin.com to assert any claims alleged					
21	in this Count I and none of Plaintiff's claims in this Count I derive from the underlying terms of any					
22	such contracts or agreements.					
23	137. This claim arises under 18 U.S.C. §1962(c) and (d), which provide in relevant part:					
24	(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign					
25	(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the					
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27	provisions of subsection (c) of this section.					
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	COMPLAINT - 38 -					

1 138. At all relevant times, Defendants were "persons" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
 2 §1961(3), because each Defendant was an individual or "capable of holding a legal or beneficial
 3 interest in property." Defendants were associated with an illegal enterprise, as described below, and
 4 conducted and participated in that enterprise's affairs though a pattern of racketeering activity, as
 5 defined by 18 U.S.C. §1961(5), consisting of numerous and repeated uses of the interstate wire
 6 communications to execute a scheme to operate OKX.com in violation of the law in violation of
 7 18 U.S.C. §1962(c).

8 139. The OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise was created and/or used as a tool to carry out the
9 elements of Defendants' illicit scheme and pattern of racketeering activity. The OKX Crypto-Wash
10 Enterprise has ascertainable structures and purposes beyond the scope and commission of
11 Defendants' predicate acts and conspiracy to commit such acts. The enterprise is separate and
12 distinct from Defendants.

13 140. The members of the RICO enterprise all had the common purpose to maximize
14 transaction volume on the OKX exchange and market share by running OKX.com as a crypto
15 exchange with virtually non-existent KYC or AML policies to serve U.S.-based customers and
16 customers from sanctioned jurisdictions, including bad actors who engaged in the laundering of
17 cryptocurrency obtained as the result of hacks, ransomware, and theft.

18 141. The OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise has engaged in, and its activities affected,
19 interstate and foreign commerce by operating two websites on the Internet (OKX.com and
20 OKCoin.com) which served customers located throughout the United States, and received and sent
21 cryptocurrency throughout the United States and the world and operated cryptocurrency exchanges
22 facilitating the exchange of cryptocurrency between users in the United States and around the world.

142. The OKX Crypto-Wash Enterprise actively disguised the nature of Defendants'
wrongdoing and concealed or misrepresented Defendants' participation in the conduct of the OKX
Crypto-Wash Enterprise to maximize transaction volume on the OKX exchange and market share
while minimizing their exposure to criminal and civil penalties.

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1 143. Each of the Defendants exerted substantial control over the OKX Crypto-Wash
 2 Enterprise, and participated in the operation and managed the affairs of the enterprise as described
 3 herein.

4 144. Defendants have committed or aided and abetted the commission of at least two acts
5 of racketeering activity, *i.e.*, indictable violations of 18 U.S.C. §§1960, 1961(1)(E), 1956, 1957, and
6 2314, within the past ten years. The multiple acts of racketeering activity which Defendants
7 committed and/or conspired to, or aided and abetted in the commission of, were related to each
8 other, began before the start of the Class Period and are continuing and therefore constitute a
9 "pattern of racketeering activity."

10 145. Defendants' predicate acts of racketeering within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. §1961(1)
11 include, but are not limited to:

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(a) **Operating an Unlicensed MTB and Violating the BSA**: Defendants OKX Group, OKC EU, and Aux Cayes, aided and abetted by Defendant OKX US, conducted, and conspired to conduct, OKX.com as an unlicensed MTB since before the start of the Class Period in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1960(a) and (b)(1)(B), and failed to maintain an effective AML program, in violation of the BSA, including, 31 U.S.C. §§5318(h) and 5322. Defendants willfully violated the BSA by causing OKX.com to have an ineffective AML program, including a failure to collect or verify KYC information from a large portion of its users.

(b) Defendant OKX US aided and abetted the conducting of OKX.com as an
unlicensed MTB in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1960(a), (b)(1)(B), and (b)(2), in that OKCoin.com was
used to distract U.S. regulators from focusing on OKX's violations of the law which enabled
OKX.com to act as an unlicensed MTB without adequate KYC or AML policies and serve U.S.based bad actors and customers from sanctioned jurisdictions. Defendants' failure to implement
KYC or AML policies and targeting of U.S.-based users turned OKX.com into a magnet and hub for
illicit cryptocurrency transactions.

146. Monetary Laundering and Transportation of Stolen Property: OKX.com
 processed a substantial number of transactions by bad actors who took cryptocurrency from Plaintiff
 and the Class through hacks, ransomware, theft, and/or deceptive conduct and utilized OKX.com to

remove the ability to track the crypto and/or to transfer the crypto through their OKX.com accounts
and/or out of OKX.com in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1956 (laundering of monetary instruments) and
18 U.S.C. §1957 (engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful
activity). Additionally, the illegally obtained cryptocurrency was transported, transmitted, or
transferred in interstate or foreign commerce to or from OKX.com in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2314
(relating to interstate transportation of stolen property). Defendants aided and abetted those
violations as alleged above.

8 147. Many of the precise dates and details of the use of OKX.com to launder and transfer 9 cryptocurrency cannot be alleged without access to Defendants' books and records. Indeed, the 10 success of Defendants' scheme depended upon secrecy, and Defendants have withheld details of the 11 scheme from Plaintiff and Class members. Generally, however, Plaintiff has described occasions on 12 which the predicate acts alleged herein would have occurred. They include the transfer of millions 13 of dollars in cryptocurrency over several years.

14 148. Defendants have obtained money and property belonging to Plaintiff and the Class as
15 a result of these statutory violations. Plaintiff and Class members have been injured in their business
16 or property by Defendants' overt acts, and by their aiding and abetting the acts of others.

17 149. In violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(d), Defendants conspired to violate 18 U.S.C.
18 §1962(c), as alleged herein. Various other persons, firms, and corporations, not named as defendants
19 in this Complaint, have participated as co-conspirators with Defendants in these offenses and have
20 performed acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

21 150. Each Defendant aided and abetted violations of the above laws, thereby rendering
22 them indictable as a principal in the 18 U.S.C. §§1960, 1961(1)(E), 1956, 1957, and 2314 offenses
23 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2.

Plaintiff and the Class have been injured in their property by reason of Defendants'
violations of 18 U.S.C. §1962(c) and (d), including the value of their cryptocurrency taken by bad
actors which was transferred to OKX.com. In the absence of Defendants' violations of 18 U.S.C.
§1962(c) and (d), Plaintiff and the Class would not have had their crypto taken and laundered
through OKX.com.

152. Plaintiff's and the Class's injuries were directly and proximately caused by 1 2 Defendants' racketeering activity. 3 153. Defendants willfully violated the laws requiring KYC and AML policies and knew 4 that bad actors were transferring crypto to and from OKX.com, and exchanging that crypto on 5 OKX.com's exchange, and that, as a result, the crypto would no longer be trackable on the public blockchain. 6 7 154. Under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §1964(c), Plaintiff is entitled to bring this action 8 and to recover treble damages, the costs of bringing this suit, and reasonable attorneys' fees. 9 Defendants are accordingly liable to Plaintiff and the Class for three times their actual damages as 10 proven at trial plus interest and attorneys' fees. **COUNT II** 11 12 Conversion (Against Defendants OKX Group, OKC EU, and Aux Cayes) 13 155. Plaintiff re-alleges and adopts by reference the allegations above contained in ¶1-90 14 and 125-133, as if fully set forth herein. 15 156. This Count II is brought against Defendants OKX Group, OKC EU, and Aux Cayes 16 (the "Count II Defendants"). 17 Plaintiff is not relying on any contracts or agreements entered into between OKX, 157. 18 OKX.com, or OKCoin.com and any users of OKX.com or OKCoin.com to assert any claims alleged 19 in this Count II and none of Plaintiff's claims in this Count II derive from the underlying terms of 20 any such contracts or agreements. 21 158. At the time his cryptocurrency was taken by bad actors by hacks, ransomware, or 22 theft, Plaintiff owned and had the right to immediately possess the cryptocurrency in his respective 23 private cryptocurrency wallets, protocols, and/or accounts at cryptocurrency exchanges other than 24 OKX.com or OKCoin.com, not just a mere right to payment for the value of that cryptocurrency. 25 159. Class members also owned and had the right to immediately possess their stolen 26 cryptocurrency that was later deposited into OKX.com addresses. 27 28 COMPLAINT - 42

1 160. As can be done with Plaintiff's specific, identifiable cryptocurrency, Class members'
 2 cryptocurrency assets at issue are specific, identifiable property and can be traced to and from
 3 OKX.com accounts.

4 161. At all relevant times, the Count II Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge
5 that cryptocurrency stolen from Plaintiff and Class members had been transferred to accounts on
6 OKX.com's exchange.

7 162. Notwithstanding the knowledge of the custody of stolen assets in an OKX.com
8 account, OKX Group wrongfully exercised dominion over Plaintiff's and Class members'
9 cryptocurrency, thereby converting Plaintiff's and Class members' cryptocurrency.

10 163. The Count II Defendants knowingly maintained inadequate KYC and AML policies
11 at OKX.com which enabled cryptocurrency hackers and thieves to launder cryptocurrency through
12 the OKX.com ecosystem without providing valid or sufficient personal identification and proof of
13 lawful possession of the cryptocurrency.

14 164. The Count II Defendants knew OKX.com KYC and AML policies and procedures,
15 including any tracing analysis of where funds originated, were nonexistent or inadequate.
16 Nevertheless, those inadequacies were ignored, and no effort was taken to utilize reasonable
17 measures to remedy those dangerous shortcomings.

18 165. Furthermore, the Count II Defendants knew that cryptocurrency was transferred to
19 OKX.com from previously identified illicit wallets, or refused to determine whether cryptocurrency
20 was transferred to OKX.com from previously identified illicit wallets, even though that information
21 was either already in the Count II Defendants' possession or readily available, and nevertheless
22 wrongfully exercised dominion over that cryptocurrency.

23 166. As a result of the knowingly inadequate KYC and AML policies, the Count II
24 Defendants were able to, *inter alia*, wrongfully exercise dominion or retain possession of stolen
25 cryptocurrency.

26 167. Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to the value of their stolen cryptocurrency
27 placed in OKX.com addresses and an amount of damages to be proven at trial, plus interest.

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1	COUNT III							
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	Aiding and Abetting Conversion (Against All Defendants)							
3	168. Plaintiff re-alleges and adopts by reference the allegations above contained in \P 1-90							
4 5	and 125-133 as if fully set forth herein.							
	169. This Count III is brought against Defendants OKX Group, OKC EU, Aux Cayes, and							
5	OKX US.							
7 8	170. Plaintiff is not relying on any contracts or agreements entered into between OKX							
> -	Group, OKX.com, or OKCoin.com and any users of OKX.com or OKCoin.com to assert any claims							
)	alleged in this Count III and none of Plaintiff's claims in this Count III derive from the underlying							
,	terms of any such contracts or agreements.							
	171. At the time their cryptocurrency was taken by bad actors by hacks, ransomware, or							
	theft, Plaintiff owned and had the right to immediately possess the cryptocurrency in his respective							
	private cryptocurrency wallets, protocols, and/or accounts at cryptocurrency exchanges other than							
	OKX.com, not just a mere right to payment for the value of that cryptocurrency.							
	172. As can be done with Plaintiff's specific, identifiable cryptocurrency, Class members'							
	cryptocurrency assets at issue are specific, identifiable property and can be traced to and from							
	OKX.com accounts.							
	173. At all relevant times, Defendants had actual knowledge that cryptocurrency taken							
	from Plaintiff and Class members had been transferred to accounts on OKX.com's exchange.							
	Furthermore, Defendants knew that the cryptocurrency was taken from Plaintiff and Class members							
	because the cryptocurrency was transferred to OKX.com from previously identified illicit wallets, or							
22 Defendants refused to determine whether the cryptocurrency was transferred to OKX.								
	previously identified illicit wallets as required by law even though that information was either							
	already in OKX's possession or readily available.							
	174. Notwithstanding Defendants' actual knowledge of the custody of stolen assets in a							
5	OKX.com address, bad actors absconded with, and converted for their own benefit, Plaintiff's and							
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	COMPLAINT							

other Class members' property. Defendants substantially assisted and enabled bad actors to
 complete the conversion of the cryptocurrency assets.

3 175. Defendants rendered knowing and substantial assistance to cryptocurrency bad actors
4 and thieves in their commission of conversion through which they obtained Plaintiff's and other
5 Class members' cryptocurrency, such that they culpably participated in the conversion.

6 176. Defendants ignored the law and knowingly maintained inadequate KYC and AML
7 policies which enable cryptocurrency hackers and thieves to launder cryptocurrency through the
8 OKX ecosystem without providing valid or sufficient personal identification and proof of lawful
9 possession of the cryptocurrency.

- 10 177. Defendants knew that the OKX.com KYC and AML policies and procedures,
 11 including any tracing analysis of where funds originated, were nonexistent or inadequate.
 12 Nevertheless, they ignored those inadequacies and made no effort to utilize reasonable measures to
 13 remedy those dangerous shortcomings. This amounts to "driving the getaway car" for the
 14 cryptocurrency thieves with full awareness of the harm being committed.
- 15 178. In effect, Defendants were consciously participating in the conversion of Plaintiff's
 and Class members' cryptocurrency such that their assistance in the conversion was pervasive,
 systemic, and culpable.
- 18 179. Defendants knew that OKCoin.com was being used as a distraction for regulators so
 19 that OKX.com could continue serving U.S.-based customers and users from sanctioned entities and
 20 that OKX.com had become a magnet and hub for bad actors to launder cryptocurrency.
- 21 180. Plaintiff and Class members are entitled to the value of their stolen cryptocurrency
 22 placed in OKX.com addresses and an amount of damages to be proven at trial, plus interest.
- 23

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

- WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
 respectfully prays for relief as follows:
- A. Declaring that this action is properly maintainable as a class action and certifying
 Plaintiff as the Class representative and his counsel as Class counsel;
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1	В.	Declaring that Defendants committed civil RICO violations pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
2	§1962(c)-(d);	

C. Declaring that Defendants' actions, as set forth above, converted Plaintiff's and Class
members' cryptocurrency, or alternatively, aided and abetted conversion of that cryptocurrency,
where they knowingly failed to follow KYC or AML policies;

6 D. Awarding Plaintiff and the Class actual, compensatory, and treble damages as
7 allowed by applicable law;

8 E. Enjoining Defendants from continuing to commit the violations alleged herein,
9 freezing all cryptocurrency in Defendants' possession which belongs to Plaintiff and the Class,
10 ordering the return of cryptocurrency taken from Plaintiff and the Class, and ordering other
11 necessary injunctive relief;

F. Awarding pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the highest rate allowed by law;
 G. Awarding costs, including experts' fees, and attorneys' fees and expenses, and the
 costs of prosecuting this action; and

H. Granting such other and further relief as this Court may deem just and proper.

JURY DEMAND

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury, pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, on all issues so triable

18 Procedure, on all issues so triable.

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> s/ Eric I. Niehaus ERIC I. NIEHAUS

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