

# **EXHIBIT 46**

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

- - -

ELON MUSK, et al.,	:	CASE NO.
	:	4:24-CV-04722-
Plaintiffs	:	YGR
	:	
v.	:	
	:	
SAMUEL ALTMAN, et al.,	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	

- HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL -

- ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY -

- - -

October 8, 2025

- - -

Videotaped hybrid deposition of  
HELEN TONER, taken pursuant to notice, was held at  
the law offices of 600 New Hampshire Avenue, NW,  
Washington, D.C., beginning at 11:11 a.m., on the  
above date, before Michelle L. Ridgway, a  
Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Court  
Reporter (NJ-CCR # XI02126), Certified Realtime  
Reporter, Certified Shorthand Reporter (CA-CSR  
# 14592), and Notary Public.

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<p>3</p> <p>1 APPEARANCES: (Cont'd.)</p> <p>2</p> <p>3 WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN &amp; KATZ</p> <p>4 BY: NATHANIEL D. CULLERTON, ESQ.</p> <p>5 BY: ADAM P. TANNE, ESQ.</p> <p>6 BY: ETHAN Z. COHEN, ESQ.</p> <p>7 (In person)</p> <p>8 51 West 52nd Street</p> <p>9 New York, New York 10019</p> <p>10 212.403.1000</p> <p>11 ndcullerton@wlrk.com</p> <p>12 aptanne@wlrk.com</p> <p>13 ezcohen@wlrk.com</p> <p>14 - and -</p> <p>15</p> <p>16 MORRISON &amp; FOERSTER</p> <p>17 BY: CAMILA A. TAPERNOUX, ESQ.</p> <p>18 (Zoom)</p> <p>19 425 Market Street</p> <p>20 San Francisco, California 94105</p> <p>21 415.268.7000</p> <p>22 ctapernoux@mofo.com</p> <p>23 Representing the Defendant, Samuel Altman</p> <p>24 and OpenAI</p> <p>25</p> <p>16 ELLIS GEORGE LLP</p> <p>17 BY: KATHERINE A. PETTI, ESQ.</p> <p>18 BY: CHRIS BERG, ESQ.</p> <p>19 (Via zoom)</p> <p>20 2121 Avenue of the Stars</p> <p>21 Suite 3000</p> <p>22 Los Angeles, California 90067</p> <p>23 310.274.7100</p> <p>24 kpetti@ellisgeorge.com</p> <p>25 cberg@ellisgeorge.com</p> <p>Representing the witness, Helen Toner</p> <p>16 COOLEY LLP</p> <p>17 BY: ANIKA HOLLAND, ESQ.</p> <p>18 (Zoom)</p> <p>19 3 Embarcadero Center</p> <p>20 San Francisco, California 94111</p> <p>21 415.693.2000</p> <p>22 Anika.holland@cooley.com</p> <p>23 Representing Ilya Sutskever</p>	<p>5</p> <p>1 - - -</p> <p>2 I N D E X</p> <p>3 - - -</p> <p>4</p> <p>5 Testimony of:</p> <p>6</p> <p>HELEN TONER</p> <p>7</p> <p>By Mr. Kry 12, 316, 344</p> <p>8</p> <p>By Mr. Cullerton 173, 319</p> <p>9</p> <p>By Ms. Beneze 331</p> <p>10</p> <p>11 - - -</p> <p>12</p> <p>13</p> <p>14</p> <p>15</p> <p>16</p> <p>17</p> <p>18</p> <p>19</p> <p>20</p> <p>21</p> <p>22</p> <p>23</p> <p>24</p> <p>25</p>

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1 practices?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And we'll get into specifics

4 momentarily.

5 But in general terms, did you feel

6 that Mr. Altman provided candid and complete

7 information to you about OpenAI's safety practices?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Do you recall an incident when

10 Mr. Altman told the OpenAI Board of Directors that

11 the joint safety board had approved three

12 enhancements to GPT-4 for release, when, in fact,

13 only one of the three had been approved?

14 MR. CULLERTON: Object to

15 the form. Leading.

16 THE WITNESS: I would amend

17 the question to say "three different ways

18 of releasing GPT-4." But otherwise, yes.

19 BY MR. KRY:

20 Q. When did that incident occur?

21 A. To the best of my recollection,

22 that was December of 2022.

23 Q. When you talk about three different

24 ways of releasing GPT-4, can you describe in more

25 detail what you mean?

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1 A. To the best of my recollection, the

2 three under consideration were the API, what they

3 called "super assistant," and fine tuning.

4 So an API release would be

5 comparable to how they had released many of their

6 previous models, GPT-3, GPT-3.5, where there is

7 a -- yeah, an API, application programming

8 interface, that other programmers can use to access

9 the model and build tools with it. That would be

10 the most straightforward option.

11 As I understand it, the idea of

12 "super assistant," I believe that essentially they

13 referred to something like ChatGPT as a product, so

14 a consumer-facing product. They may have meant

15 something more elaborate. I'm not 100 percent

16 sure.

17 And then fine-tuning would be

18 releasing the model in a way that allows outside

19 actors to fine-tune it. So that's technical jargon

20 for, essentially, sort of slightly modifying the

21 model to be more well suited to some tasks than

22 others. And at the time there was significant

23 uncertainty, from a safety perspective, about the

24 potential risks of, in particular, releasing the

25 fine-tuning capability.

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1 Because the safety case, the

2 argument for why it was safe to release, relied on

3 test results about things that the model could and

4 could not do. And once you can fine-tune a model,

5 that changes what it -- what it can and cannot do.

6 Q. What did Mr. Altman tell the board

7 about the approval status of those three products

8 by the -- by the deployment safety board?

9 MR. CULLERTON: Object to

10 form.

11 THE WITNESS: To the best of

12 my recollection, he either directly said or

13 strongly implied that all three types of

14 release had been approved by the DSB.

15 BY MR. KRY:

16 Q. In what context did Mr. Altman

17 communicate that information?

18 A. At a in-person board meeting. We

19 called it an onsite. It was an all-day board

20 meeting at their offices.

21 Q. When did that board meeting occur?

22 A. To the best of my recollection, in

23 December 2022.

24 Q. Did you take steps to verify the

25 information that Mr. Altman had provided to the

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1 board?

2 A. Yes. I asked for the deployment

3 safety board materials to review what had been

4 approved and on what basis.

5 Q. To whom did you make that request?

6 A. I don't recall.

7 Q. Was it to Mr. Altman or was it to

8 somebody else in the company?

9 A. It would have been -- it would have

10 been either during the board meeting or in a

11 follow-up e-mail. And with the awareness -- with

12 Sam's awareness but perhaps for follow-up by Chris

13 Clark or another person who could carry out that

14 sort of simple task of sending some materials.

15 Q. Did you receive the materials you

16 had asked for?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. What did those materials show about

19 the approval status -- status of the three

20 variants?

21 A. To the best of my recollection, I

22 received materials showing that the API release had

23 been submitted to the deployment safety board and

24 approved.

25 I don't recall -- to the best of my

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1 recollection, I don't believe I received any  
2 materials about the other two, which -- and I drew  
3 the conclusion that they had not -- they had been  
4 neither submitted nor approved.

5 Q. Based on what happened in that  
6 board meeting and the materials you received in  
7 response to your inquiry, were you concerned that  
8 Mr. Altman had falsely represented the approval  
9 status of those three variants to the board?

10 MR. CULLERTON: Object to  
11 form. Leading.

12 THE WITNESS: Yes.

13 BY MR. KRY:

14 Q. Did that incident cause you to  
15 question Mr. Altman's truthfulness and candor to  
16 the board?

17 MR. CULLERTON: Object to  
18 form.

19 THE WITNESS: I would say  
20 that incident was -- was one case that  
21 contributed to my sense that Sam was not  
22 interested in the board being closely  
23 informed about the company's activities.

24 BY MR. KRY:

25 Q. Did that incident make it more

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1 difficult for the board to manage OpenAI safety  
2 risks?

3 MR. CULLERTON: Object to  
4 form.

5 THE WITNESS: Yes.

6 BY MR. KRY:

7 Q. And did that incident cause you  
8 concerns about the effectiveness of OpenAI's safety  
9 processes?

10 MR. CULLERTON: Object to  
11 form.

12 THE WITNESS: Yes.

13 BY MR. KRY:

14 Q. Do you recall another incident in  
15 which Microsoft launched a test of GPT-4 in India  
16 without deployment safety board approval?

17 MR. CULLERTON: Object to  
18 form.

19 THE WITNESS: Yes.

20 BY MR. KRY:

21 Q. When did that incident occur?

22 A. I'm not sure. I believe it was  
23 toward the end of 2022. I don't know the exact  
24 date.

25 Q. Do you know whether it was before

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1 or after the first incident you just described?

2 A. It must have been before, because  
3 we -- the release must have been before, because we  
4 found out about it the same day that the  
5 representations to us about DSB approvals were  
6 made.

7 Q. Do you know how long before that  
8 board meeting the Microsoft test launch occurred?

9 A. No. I'm not sure.

10 Q. Would you describe -- well, strike  
11 that.

12 How did you first learn about the  
13 fact that this launch of a test of GPT-4 by  
14 Microsoft had occurred?

15 A. We had adjourned for the day the  
16 meeting. I was in a break room, and Tasha McCauley  
17 came and found me in the break room and told me  
18 that she had had a conversation with an employee  
19 who had informed her about this release or who  
20 had -- I believe she had asked her if she knew  
21 about it, or asked her what she thought about it,  
22 something along those lines, and we did not know  
23 about it before then.

24 Q. Had Mr. Altman raised that topic  
25 with you at all during the board meeting that had

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1 just concluded?

2 A. No. Despite the fact that we had  
3 very actively discussed at the board meeting that  
4 oversight of the DSB and ensuring that it was  
5 functioning well was a core board responsibility.

6 Q. Can you describe in any more detail  
7 what Ms. McCauley said she had learned from this  
8 other employee about what had happened?

9 A. I don't recall the details. To the  
10 best of my recollection, she said that Microsoft  
11 had released a test version without DSB approval,  
12 when they should have had it. Or something along  
13 those lines.

14 Q. Was it your understanding when  
15 Ms. McCauley communicated this information to you  
16 that Mr. Altman would have been aware of it?

17 A. Yes.

18 MR. CULLERTON: Object to  
19 form.

20 BY MR. KRY:

21 Q. What's the -- what was the basis  
22 for that understanding?

23 A. To the best of my recollection, it  
24 sounded, from her description, like the employee  
25 who had informed her was assuming that we already

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1 knew and was treating it as a pretty big deal that  
2 the company leadership knew about.  
3 Q. Did you confront Mr. Altman about  
4 his failure to disclose that information?  
5 MR. CULLERTON: Object to  
6 form.  
7 THE WITNESS: No.  
8 BY MR. KRY:  
9 Q. Did Mr. Altman, at any subsequent  
10 point in time, disclose that information to you?  
11 A. Not directly.  
12 Q. Did Microsoft's release of a test  
13 product without joint safety board approval cause  
14 you concerns about OpenAI's safety processes?  
15 MR. CULLERTON: Objection.  
16 THE WITNESS: Yes. It  
17 caused me concern about how well those  
18 processes were working. Yes.  
19 BY MR. KRY:  
20 Q. Did Mr. Altman's failure to inform  
21 you about that safety breach cause you to question  
22 Mr. Altman's truthfulness and candor to the board?  
23 MR. CULLERTON: Object to  
24 the form.  
25 THE WITNESS: I would say it

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1 further led me to believe that he was not  
2 interested in the board being closely  
3 informed about the company's activities and  
4 able to perform an oversight role.  
5 BY MR. KRY:  
6 Q. And did the incident cause you  
7 concerns about the effectiveness of OpenAI's safety  
8 processes?  
9 A. I think that's essentially the same  
10 as your previous question, but yes.  
11 Q. And just to round out the record,  
12 how long was the board meeting that Mr. Altman did  
13 not disclose the safety breach?  
14 MR. CULLERTON: Object to  
15 form.  
16 THE WITNESS: All day.  
17 Multiple hours.  
18 BY MR. KRY:  
19 Q. And Mr. Altman was there for the  
20 entire meeting?  
21 A. To my recollection, yes.  
22 Q. And you were there for that entire  
23 meeting?  
24 A. To my recollection, yes.  
25 Q. And was Ms. McCauley there for the

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1 entire meeting?  
2 A. To my recollection, yes.  
3 Q. When OpenAI released ChatGPT in  
4 November '22, did it provide any advance notice to  
5 the OpenAI board?  
6 A. No.  
7 Q. How did you learn about ChatGPT?  
8 A. We started -- or I started seeing  
9 screen shots on Twitter.  
10 Q. And was that because you were  
11 looking for it specifically, or you just chanced to  
12 come across it?  
13 A. No, I have a -- my Twitter feed is  
14 AI heavy, I would say. So when there's AI news,  
15 usually it lands there.  
16 Q. Do you remember what the first  
17 Twitter post you saw concerning ChatGPT was?  
18 A. No. There were lots.  
19 Q. Was it a beneficial OpenAI  
20 publication or was it some secondary source?  
21 A. I don't recall.  
22 Q. When you saw that on Twitter, were  
23 you surprised that no one at OpenAI had given you  
24 any advanced notice about ChatGPT's release?  
25 MR. CULLERTON: Object to

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1 form.  
2 THE WITNESS: No, I was not  
3 surprised, because I was used to the board  
4 not being very informed about things.  
5 BY MR. KRY:  
6 Q. Okay. Did you think it was okay  
7 that no one at OpenAI had given you advanced notice  
8 about the release of this product?  
9 MR. CULLERTON: Object to  
10 form.  
11 THE WITNESS: I did not  
12 think it indicated that the board was  
13 functioning as it should be.  
14 BY MR. KRY:  
15 Q. And is the reason that it indicated  
16 that to you that it illustrated the failure of the  
17 company to provide the board with important  
18 information?  
19 MR. CULLERTON: Object to  
20 the form. Leading.  
21 THE WITNESS: I thought that  
22 it indicated that the board was often not  
23 looped in on things it should have been  
24 looped in on.  
25 I thought it also indicated

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1 that the company's process for making --  
2 processes for making decisions that could  
3 have material impact on the mission were  
4 inadequate.  
5 BY MR. KRY:  
6 Q. Did you believe at the time that  
7 Mr. Altman should have given you advanced notice  
8 that the company was launching ChatGPT before it  
9 did so?  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. Did this incident cause you to  
12 question Mr. Altman's candor to the board?  
13 A. Again, I will say it caused me to  
14 believe that he was not motivated to help the board  
15 perform the oversight role.  
16 Q. Did this incident make it more  
17 difficult for the board to manage OpenAI safety  
18 risks?  
19 A. It contributed to that, yes.  
20 Q. Did you learn about another  
21 incident in which Mr. Altman made a false statement  
22 about whether GPT-4 Turbo had to go through joint  
23 safety board review?  
24 MR. CULLERTON: Objection to  
25 the form.

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1 THE WITNESS: Yes.  
2 BY MR. KRY:  
3 Q. When did that incident occur?  
4 A. I'm not sure. I believe at some  
5 point during 2023.  
6 Q. How did you learn about the  
7 incident?  
8 A. I forget whether it was Ilya  
9 Sutskever or Mira Murati who first described it to  
10 me, but it was one of the two of them.  
11 Q. What did he or she describe to you?  
12 A. Actually, it's also possible that I  
13 heard about it secondhand from them via Adam  
14 D'Angelo or Tasha McCauley.  
15 I'm sorry. What was the question?  
16 Q. What was communicated to you about  
17 what had happened?  
18 MS. BENEZE: Object to form.  
19 THE WITNESS: That Sam had  
20 claimed that Jason Kwon said that GPT-4  
21 Turbo did not need DSB review. And that --  
22 Sam claimed to Mira that Jason said it  
23 didn't need DSB review.  
24 Mira then later checked with  
25 Jason and found that he had not said that,

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1 and Mira felt that Sam had -- had either  
2 misled her or lied to her.  
3 BY MR. KRY:  
4 Q. And at the time you learned about  
5 this incident, did you review any documentary  
6 record that reported on the issue?  
7 A. Within a few weeks -- I forget the  
8 exact sequencing -- but yes. In the period where  
9 we learned about this, we were -- we had -- we were  
10 given access to screen shots of a Slack exchange  
11 between Mira and Jason.  
12 Q. And what do you recall that Slack  
13 exchange showing?  
14 A. That Mira asked Jason if he had, in  
15 fact, said that GPT-4 Turbo didn't need DSB review,  
16 and Jason said he had said something different and  
17 also said he was confused how Sam got that  
18 impression.  
19 Q. And during what period of time did  
20 you learn about this incident and see these screen  
21 shots?  
22 A. This was in the fall of 2023.  
23 Q. Did Mr. Altman's false statement to  
24 Ms. Murati cause you to question Mr. Altman's  
25 truthfulness and candor?

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1 A. Yes.  
2 MS. BENEZE: Object.  
3 MR. CULLERTON: Objection to  
4 the form. Misstates testimony. Assumes  
5 facts.  
6 BY MR. KRY:  
7 Q. Did this incident cause you  
8 concerns about the effectiveness of OpenAI's safety  
9 processes?  
10 A. Yes.  
11 Q. Do you recall some long-running  
12 discussions on the board about whether to appoint  
13 another independent board member focused on AI  
14 safety?  
15 MR. CULLERTON: Object to  
16 the form. Leading.  
17 THE WITNESS: Yes.  
18 BY MR. KRY:  
19 Q. Over what time period did those  
20 discussions unfold?  
21 A. I would say much of 2023.  
22 Q. Did you favor adding another  
23 independent board member focused on AI safety?  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. Did you propose candidates?



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1 board for as long as possible and to return after  
2 he was done with his campaign. And Sam also  
3 suggested that he wanted to make a large, I  
4 believe, several-hundred-thousand-dollar campaign  
5 contribution to Will, while still expecting him to  
6 come back onto the board.  
7 He did not go ahead with this  
8 donation because Tasha, Adam, and I all said it  
9 seemed very inappropriate. But to me, the fact  
10 that he was considering that, the fact that he  
11 might have discussed it with Will in advance, the  
12 fact it was an option was just a sign of total  
13 disregard for the board's independence or ability  
14 to provide meaningful oversight of the company and  
15 the CEO.  
16 Q. And that  
17 several-hundred-thousand-dollar campaign  
18 contribution, was it -- did Mr. Altman discuss that  
19 that was going to come from him personally?  
20 A. Yes, to the best of my  
21 recollection.  
22 (Document marked for identification  
23 as Toner Exhibit 4.)  
24 BY MR. KRY:  
25 Q. So marking as Exhibit 4 the

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1 document Bates-stamped OPENAI\_MUSK00027400.  
2 THE WITNESS: Do you have  
3 it, Katherine?  
4 MR. KRY: Please let us know  
5 when that shows up.  
6 MS. PETTI: When Jacob gets  
7 the Bates, he can upload that Bates to the  
8 screen share.  
9 THE WITNESS: It's the board  
10 resolution removing Sam.  
11 MS. PETTI: I have it.  
12 MR. KRY: Great.  
13 BY MR. KRY:  
14 Q. This is a November 16, 2023,  
15 unanimous written consent signed by you and three  
16 other directors. And at -- as the witness noted,  
17 at the bottom of Page 1, the document states:  
18 "Now, therefore, be it resolved, that the Board  
19 hereby, effective immediately, terminates  
20 Mr. Altman's employment with the Corporation."  
21 Ms. Toner, is this the resolution  
22 by which the board formally removed Mr. Altman as  
23 CEO and board member of OpenAI?  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. Were you one of the board members

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1 who voted to remove Mr. Altman?  
2 A. Yes.  
3 Q. For how long before November 16,  
4 2023, had the board members been discussing the  
5 prospect of removing Mr. Altman?  
6 A. Several weeks.  
7 Q. Do you recall approximately when  
8 those discussions began?  
9 A. It's hard to say exactly what --  
10 what the starting point was. Early to mid-October.  
11 Q. How did those discussions of  
12 potentially removing Mr. Altman originate?  
13 A. I would say the starting point was  
14 Ilya Sutskever reaching out to me to ask to talk.  
15 We then had a first conversation which was very  
16 circuitous and confusing to me. Very clearly, Ilya  
17 had some very significant concern but told me that  
18 he couldn't tell me what his concern was,  
19 essentially.  
20 I would put that as the -- the  
21 starting point.  
22 Q. And did you subsequently have  
23 discussions with the other board members?  
24 A. Yes.  
25 Q. And over the course of those

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1 discussions, what were the grounds for removing  
2 Mr. Altman that the board members discussed?  
3 A. It was a number of things. A --  
4 the phrase we used was "a pattern of behavior." So  
5 no one single cause.  
6 The pattern of behavior related to  
7 his honesty and candor, his resistance of board  
8 oversight, as well as the concerns that two of his  
9 senior management team, Ilya Sutskever and Mira  
10 Murati, raised to the board about his management  
11 practices, his manipulation of board processes. A  
12 range of concerns in that vicinity.  
13 Q. So when you refer to his pattern of  
14 behavior related to honesty and candor, does that  
15 include all the incidents that we've discussed  
16 during your testimony this morning?  
17 A. Yes. I will say during the  
18 discussions -- I'll leave that.  
19 Yes.  
20 Q. Did those -- did those incidents  
21 reflecting negatively on Mr. Altman's honesty and  
22 candor also cause you to believe that Mr. Altman  
23 was not providing the board with the information it  
24 needed to manage OpenAI's AI safety processes?  
25 MR. CULLERTON: Object to



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1 the form. Leading.

2 THE WITNESS: Yes.

3 BY MR. KRY:

4 Q. And the -- did you feel, as a

5 result of those incidents we've discussed this

6 morning, that Mr. Altman's conduct had made it more

7 difficult for you as a board member to manage

8 OpenAI's AI safety processes?

9 MR. CULLERTON: Object to

10 the form.

11 THE WITNESS: Yes.

12 BY MR. KRY:

13 Q. Without disclosing any

14 attorney-client privileged communications, during

15 these several weeks when you were discussing

16 removing Mr. Altman, did you communicate with legal

17 counsel?

18 A. We did.

19 Q. Approximately how many times?

20 A. I don't remember. A lot.

21 Q. What was the law firm?

22 A. Am I okay to name the firm?

23 My mind is going entirely blank.

24 Wow.

25 Q. Was it Arnold & Porter?

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1 A. It was Arnold & Porter. Thank you.

2 Q. At one point during those

3 discussions, did Mr. Sutskever send the other board

4 members a self-destructing e-mail that catalogued

5 examples of Mr. Altman's misconduct?

6 MR. CULLERTON: Object to

7 form.

8 THE WITNESS: Yes.

9 BY MR. KRY:

10 Q. And approximately when did

11 Mr. Sutskever send you that e-mail?

12 A. I believe early November.

13 Q. So that would have been how far

14 through the overall multi-week process of these

15 discussions?

16 A. Roughly halfway. Maybe towards the

17 end a little.

18 Q. Did you review the contents of that

19 e-mail?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did it, in fact, self-destruct

22 after you read it?

23 A. I believe it was on a timer. Maybe

24 24 hours.

25 Q. So you no longer have a copy of it?

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1 A. Correct.

2 Q. What types of misconduct did that

3 e-mail describe?

4 MR. CULLERTON: Object to

5 the form.

6 THE WITNESS: It

7 described -- I haven't seen it in two

8 years.

9 So to the best of my

10 recollection, it had various instances of

11 Sam making conflicting promises to team

12 members in ways that seemed very

13 misleading. Putting words in other

14 people's mouth.

15 So, for example, the GPT-4

16 Turbo DSB review with Mira and Jason was in

17 there. The Slack exchange between Mira and

18 Jason.

19 Yeah. Examples of -- many

20 examples, most of which were not glaring or

21 egregious on their own but which were

22 intended to, again, illustrate a pattern of

23 behavior.

24 BY MR. KRY:

25 Q. And did the contents of that e-mail

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1 include -- include multiple examples of the issues

2 that you testified about this morning?

3 MR. CULLERTON: Object to

4 the form of the question.

5 THE WITNESS: I would say

6 that Ilya's gloss on what types of behavior

7 Sam was exhibiting was somewhat different

8 to what we have discussed so far and would

9 relate -- yeah -- would cover some of the

10 same ground but also, perhaps, relate more

11 to making conflicting promises, talking out

12 both sides of his mouth, pitting team

13 members against each other. So not -- not

14 exactly the same as the conduct we've

15 discussed so far.

16 BY MR. KRY:

17 Q. Did Mr. Sutskever also send the

18 board members a second self-destructing e-mail that

19 concerned allegations about Mr. Brockman?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Did you read that second

22 self-destructing e-mail?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And did that e-mail, in fact,

25 destruct itself?

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1 reflect your views at the time?

2 A. I would say it is an accurate

3 statement and, again, is an incomplete

4 summarization that is for the purpose of this

5 message.

6 Q. And the behavior and lack of

7 transparency you're referencing there, is that the

8 same pattern of conduct that we discussed earlier

9 today?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. Did the OpenAI board ultimately

12 decide to reinstate Mr. Altman as a board member?

13 A. As CEO, but not as a board member.

14 But -- and then later, much later, the board

15 decided to reinstate him, yes. A different board.

16 Q. Correct. I'm sorry.

17 So the board --

18 Okay. When did the board decide to

19 reinstate Mr. Altman as CEO?

20 A. Tuesday night, the 21st of

21 November.

22 Q. How did that come about?

23 A. There had been, over the course of

24 the weekend, a lot of back-and-forth over different

25 possible futures of the company, with a recurring

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1 theme being employees threatening to leave if

2 certain demands were not met.

3 Over the course of the few days

4 following our firing, those demands became

5 gradually more reasonable and the threat of mass

6 resignations continued.

7 Q. Who were the demands being made by?

8 A. Some combination of Sam, Greg, the

9 executive team, typically conveyed to us via Mira.

10 And employees directly.

11 Q. And did you observe that Microsoft

12 was involved in those discussions at all?

13 A. Microsoft became clearly involved

14 on Sunday night when, after we announced that

15 Emmett would be interim CEO, Microsoft announced

16 that Sam and Greg would be joining Microsoft. And

17 over the subsequent hours -- I don't recall how I

18 came to learn this -- but over the subsequent hours

19 I came to the understanding that Microsoft was

20 offering to hire away the entire OpenAI team and

21 would have jobs for anyone who wanted them at

22 Microsoft.

23 Q. So what impact did Microsoft's

24 announcement that it was hiring Mr. Altman and

25 Mr. Brockman, an open offer to hire anyone from

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1 OpenAI that wanted to come over, impact the board's

2 ability to carry out its duties as the board of

3 OpenAI?

4 MS. BENEZE: Object to form.

5 THE WITNESS: It -- it

6 created a threat of Microsoft destroying

7 the company in a way that changed the

8 calculus for us about what the best way to

9 pursue the nonprofit mission was.

10 BY MR. KRY:

11 Q. In what sense?

12 A. In the sense that it significantly

13 increased the credibility of employees' threats

14 that they would leave en masse and gave Sam

15 significantly more leverage to demand his own

16 reinstatement to avoid the company falling apart.

17 Q. What did the board do in response

18 to this change to the circumstances?

19 A. In response to the totality of the

20 circumstances on Tuesday, which includes

21 Microsoft's involvement, as well as other factors,

22 we were able to reach an agreement on Tuesday that

23 was amenable to all sides, which involved Sam being

24 reinstated as CEO but not reappointed to the board;

25 most of the existing board members resigning, but

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1 not all; and a thorough, independent investigation

2 being carried out into Sam's conduct in the events

3 of the previous few days.

4 Q. Were you one of the board members

5 that was removed as part of this deal?

6 MR. CULLERTON: Object to

7 the form.

8 THE WITNESS: Yes.

9 MR. CULLERTON: Removed.

10 THE WITNESS: Yes.

11 BY MR. KRY:

12 Q. And was Ms. McCauley one of the

13 board members that was removed pursuant to this

14 compromise?

15 MR. CULLERTON: Same

16 objection.

17 THE WITNESS: Yes.

18 BY MR. KRY:

19 Q. Did Mr. D'Angelo stay on the board

20 after this agreement?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Was an interim board appointed in

23 connection with this agreement?

24 MR. CULLERTON: Object to

25 the form and characterization, on board.

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1 THE WITNESS: I would not  
2 describe it as an interim board. I would  
3 say a -- two new board appointments were  
4 made, with the intention of making  
5 additional appointments in the future.  
6 BY MR. KRY:  
7 Q. Who were the two new appointments  
8 that were made?  
9 A. Larry Summers and Bret -- my mind  
10 is blank --  
11 Q. Taylor?  
12 A. Thank you. Bret Taylor.  
13 Q. What was your role in selecting  
14 Mr. Summers and Mr. Taylor for the board?  
15 A. There were many rounds of  
16 back-and-forth over the previous few days with  
17 potential names for a new board, attempting to find  
18 names that were acceptable both to Sam and to the  
19 existing board.  
20 And I was in close communication  
21 with Tasha and Adam about which names were  
22 acceptable to us as the existing board.  
23 Q. Who originally had proposed them,  
24 if you know?  
25 A. I don't know.

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1 Q. Do you know if Microsoft was  
2 involved in proposing those individuals as board  
3 members for OpenAI?  
4 A. I don't know.  
5 Q. Do you know whether Microsoft  
6 approved the slate of board members that were being  
7 put up as part of this deal?  
8 A. Implicitly, I believe they did,  
9 yes. I don't know what -- what exact approval  
10 process was involved.  
11 Q. Did WilmerHale ultimately conduct  
12 the investigation into the circumstances of  
13 Mr. Altman's removal?  
14 A. Yes.  
15 Q. Did you read OpenAI's summary of  
16 the results of that investigation?  
17 A. I did.  
18 Q. Did you agree with it?  
19 A. I'm not sure how to answer that  
20 question.  
21 Q. What do you understand OpenAI  
22 concluded?  
23 MR. CULLERTON: Object to  
24 the form.  
25 BY MR. KRY:

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1 Q. Yeah. So strike that.  
2 What do you -- what did Open -- how  
3 did OpenAI describe WilmerHale's conclusion?  
4 A. I recall that they said something  
5 along the lines of the board acted its -- in its  
6 best judgment, but Sam's conduct did not mandate  
7 removal, or something along those lines.  
8 Q. What was your reaction to the first  
9 half of that?  
10 A. I agree that the board acted  
11 according to its best judgment.  
12 Q. And what was your reaction to the  
13 second half?  
14 A. I think the standard of mandating  
15 removal is a strange one, and I didn't know how to  
16 interpret it, unless it meant that his conduct was  
17 not illegal. In which case I agree that, as far as  
18 I know, his conduct was not illegal, but that  
19 didn't seem like the right question.  
20 Q. In your judgment, did Mr. Altman's  
21 conduct warrant his removal as a board member of  
22 OpenAI?  
23 A. Yes.  
24 (Document marked for identification  
25 as Toner Exhibit 9.)

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1 BY MR. KRY:  
2 Q. This is a -- marked as Exhibit 9,  
3 document stamped MSFT\_MUSK 85635. It's a post on  
4 X, I gather, from you, that's captioned, "A  
5 statement from Helen Toner and Tasha McCauley."  
6 Do you remember publishing this  
7 post?  
8 A. Yes.  
9 Q. Did you co-author this post with  
10 Ms. McCauley?  
11 A. Yes.  
12 Q. Why did you decide to publish the  
13 post?  
14 A. We -- so this post was published  
15 shortly after, maybe the same day, maybe the day  
16 after, the OpenAI announcement of the findings of  
17 the WilmerHale investigation. And -- I believe it  
18 was the same day.  
19 And we wanted to -- we considered  
20 many potential things that we might say publicly in  
21 reaction to the OpenAI announcement, and this short  
22 statement is what we were able to agree on quickly.  
23 Q. The second paragraph, last  
24 sentence, you say: "As we told the investigators,  
25 deception, manipulation, and resistance to thorough

<p>170</p> <p>1 'summoning the demon.' 2 Do you agree with Mr. Thiel's 3 prediction that AI safety people would destroy 4 OpenAI? 5 MR. CULLERTON: Object to 6 form. No foundation. 7 THE WITNESS: No. 8 BY MR. KRY: 9 Q. And do you think many AI safety 10 people raised legitimate concerns about AI safety? 11 A. Yes. 12 Q. Do you think that you raised 13 legitimate AI concerns about AI safety while you 14 were at OpenAI? 15 A. Yes, though most of my concerns 16 were more about governance than about AI safety, 17 per se. 18 Q. What was the connection between the 19 governance concerns you raised and AI safety? 20 MR. CULLERTON: Object to 21 the form. 22 THE WITNESS: The -- it was 23 important that the company be governed well 24 in order to be able to manage increasingly 25 severe AI safety risks over time.</p>	<p>172</p> <p>1 A. Seemed unhelpfully extreme. 2 Q. Was there a kernel of truth to it? 3 A. I believed it was gesturing in a 4 direction that seemed right to me but phrased in a 5 way that would get a lot of people offside. 6 Q. Do you think it is a -- important 7 for warnings about AI safety be -- to be expressed 8 publicly by people that are in a position to 9 express them? 10 A. Yes. 11 Q. Do you think it's a positive 12 development for OpenAI that -- and AI safety that 13 Mr. Altman got rid of Elon? 14 MR. CULLERTON: Object to 15 the form. No foundation. 16 THE WITNESS: I don't know. 17 MR. KRY: We have no further 18 questions at this time, but we'll reserve 19 the balance for redirect. 20 MR. CULLERTON: Let's take 21 five minutes here. 22 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Off the 23 record at 3:10. 24 (Short break.) 25 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: On the</p>
<p>171</p> <p>1 BY MR. KRY: 2 Q. Do you believe that Mr. Altman 3 tried to remove you from the OpenAI board based, at 4 least in part, on your views related to AI safety? 5 MR. CULLERTON: Object to 6 the form. Basis of her knowledge, no 7 foundation. 8 THE WITNESS: Yes, to the 9 best of my understanding. 10 BY MR. KRY: 11 Q. To your knowledge, has Elon Musk 12 raised concerns about AI safety? 13 A. Yes. 14 Q. What concerns has Mr. Musk raised 15 that you're aware of? 16 A. He has referred to it as "summoning 17 the demon." 18 Q. Were you aware of that before you 19 read this article? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. When did he make that statement? 22 A. Somewhere in the 2015 to 2017 23 timeframe. 24 Q. How did that statement strike you 25 at the time?</p>	<p>173</p> <p>1 record at 3:26. 2 - - - 3 EXAMINATION 4 - - - 5 BY MR. CULLERTON: 6 Q. All right. Good afternoon, 7 Ms. Toner. 8 Since Mr. Altman was reinstated as 9 CEO, you have spoken to the press a number of times 10 about the events leading up to his termination, 11 correct? 12 A. Yes. 13 Q. Okay. You recall you did an 14 interview with the Wall Street Journal at the end 15 of December 2023? 16 A. Yes. 17 Q. Okay. And you wrote a piece in The 18 Economist with Ms. McCauley that we just looked at, 19 correct? 20 A. Yes. 21 Q. And you provided an interview on 22 the TED AI show -- or TED AI podcast that we looked 23 at briefly, correct? 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. And you spoke with Ms. Hagey for</p>

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1 because we were freaked out about the pace  
2 of AI development.  
3 But that is a more specific  
4 thing than to say that the decision had  
5 nothing to do with the pace of development.  
6 BY MR. CULLERTON:  
7 Q. Okay. But fair, then, that  
8 Mr. Altman was not removed because the board wanted  
9 to slow down the pace of AI development, right?  
10 A. Correct.  
11 Q. Okay. And Mr. Altman was not  
12 terminated because the board wanted to slow down  
13 OpenAI's pace of development, correct?  
14 A. Correct.  
15 Q. Did the board make any findings of  
16 any financial impropriety in advance of terminating  
17 Mr. Altman?  
18 A. I don't believe so, depending on  
19 what exactly counsel's financial -- to the best of  
20 my understanding, no.  
21 Q. And is it true that Mr. Altman's  
22 removal as CEO also was not about OpenAI's  
23 relationship with any of its investors?  
24 MR. KRY: Objection to form.  
25 THE WITNESS: I would say

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1 that the issues that we were concerned  
2 about -- some of the issues that  
3 contributed to our decision to fire Sam  
4 were exacerbated by relationships with  
5 investors.  
6 BY MR. CULLERTON:  
7 Q. In what way?  
8 A. Primarily, the extreme pressure for  
9 the company to release products rapidly and to  
10 prioritize public product releases over  
11 well-thought-through determinations of how given  
12 decisions affected the mission.  
13 Q. Okay. But to be very clear, and I  
14 believe you testified to this earlier, you don't  
15 believe, ultimately, that any of the products that  
16 had been released as of the date of this e-mail  
17 were unsafe to the public?  
18 A. Not in ways that give me  
19 significant concern, no.  
20 Q. You testified earlier about the  
21 hiring of Emmett Shear.  
22 Do you recall that?  
23 A. Yes.  
24 Q. Okay. And did you know Mr. Shear  
25 before hiring him?

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1 A. I had had conversations with him  
2 before hiring him.  
3 Q. Did you trust his judgment?  
4 A. I believe he was the best candidate  
5 for interim CEO that we had available.  
6 Q. Did you trust his judgment?  
7 A. I don't really know what that  
8 means.  
9 Q. Did you trust -- did you believe  
10 him to be a person of integrity?  
11 A. To my best judgment, based on  
12 limited interactions, yes.  
13 MR. CULLERTON: Tab 43.  
14 (Document marked for identification  
15 as Toner Exhibit 15.)  
16 BY MR. CULLERTON:  
17 Q. I'm showing you what's been marked  
18 as Exhibit 15, the document Bates-numbered  
19 2024MUSK0014175, which is a tweet from Mr. Shear,  
20 posted on November 20, 2023.  
21 Do you recognize this, Ms. Toner?  
22 A. Yes.  
23 Q. Okay. And this was a tweet from  
24 Mr. Shear the day -- on his first day as interim  
25 CEO of OpenAI, right?

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1 A. I believe so.  
2 Q. And this was the first public  
3 statement that Mr. Shear made as OpenAI's new  
4 interim CEO?  
5 A. I believe so.  
6 Q. And if you look down at  
7 Paragraph 2, he writes, "OpenAI's employees are  
8 extremely impressive, as you might have guessed,  
9 and mission-driven in the extreme."  
10 Do you see that?  
11 A. Yes.  
12 Q. Do you agree with Mr. Shear's  
13 characterization of OpenAI's employees?  
14 A. There are a large number of  
15 employees. It's difficult to characterize all of  
16 them at once.  
17 Q. Okay. He goes on to write: "It's  
18 clear that the process and communications around  
19 Sam's removal has been handled very badly, which  
20 has seriously damaged our trust."  
21 Do you see that?  
22 A. Yes.  
23 Q. And did you understand Mr. Shear to  
24 be referring to the process by which the board had  
25 removed Mr. Altman?

<p style="text-align: right;">318</p> <p>1 significant concerns about the safety review 2 processes at OpenAI and how they were being 3 handled?</p> <p>4 A. I would say that it primarily 5 served to me as a further example cementing the 6 perception that we discussed at the board level, 7 that Sam had a habit of putting words in other 8 people's mouths to get people where he wanted them 9 to go, which was of concern for many reasons, 10 including the integrity of OpenAI's safety review 11 processes but also more generally.</p> <p>12 Q. And I think you testified earlier 13 that you took some screen shots of these particular 14 screen shots in the document?</p> <p>15 A. That's right.</p> <p>16 Q. Why was that?</p> <p>17 A. This seemed like a particularly 18 important and clear example of a pattern we were 19 concerned about.</p> <p>20 MR. KRY: Great. I don't 21 have any further questions on this 22 document.</p> <p>23 MR. CULLERTON: Just 24 following up on that. And, Anika -- well, 25 one second.</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">320</p> <p>1 communications with him other than what was 2 reflected in the text message.</p> <p>3 Are you aware of anyone else on the 4 board having any communications with Mr. Musk 5 during the time period in which -- you know, these 6 events that we've been discussing?</p> <p>7 A. I'm pretty sure Ilya did. I'm not 8 sure about others.</p> <p>9 Q. Okay. Did Ilya ever tell you what 10 he and Mr. Musk discussed?</p> <p>11 A. I don't recall.</p> <p>12 Q. Okay. So other than the 13 communication or the conversation that you think 14 Ilya may have had with Mr. Musk, you are not aware 15 of any other communications or conversations 16 involving anyone else on the board and Mr. Musk; is 17 that correct?</p> <p>18 A. Not that I recall.</p> <p>19 Q. Do you recall anyone suggesting 20 that Mr. Musk was trying to become CEO of OpenAI 21 during that time?</p> <p>22 A. That sounds vaguely familiar.</p> <p>23 Q. Do you recall where you heard that 24 suggestion?</p> <p>25 A. No.</p>
<p style="text-align: right;">319</p> <p>1 - - - 2 EXAMINATION 3 - - -</p> <p>4 BY MR. CULLERTON:</p> <p>5 Q. I think we already established 6 this, but you didn't ask Mr. Altman what had 7 happened in this interaction with Mr. Kwon and Ms. 8 Murati, correct?</p> <p>9 A. Correct.</p> <p>10 MR. CULLERTON: I think 11 that's it.</p> <p>12 You could -- Anika, thank 13 you.</p> <p>14 THE WITNESS: I'm going to 15 take this home and get it framed. Famous 16 document.</p> <p>17 MR. KRY: Pretty sure that's 18 not allowed in the stipulation.</p> <p>19 THE WITNESS: I know. I 20 know.</p> <p>21 BY MR. CULLERTON:</p> <p>22 Q. So turning back to your 23 interactions with Mr. Musk.</p> <p>24 Are you aware -- and I know you 25 testified that you couldn't recall any other</p>	<p style="text-align: right;">321</p> <p>1 Q. It's not something you discussed 2 with Mr. Musk?</p> <p>3 A. No.</p> <p>4 Q. Are you aware of whether anyone on 5 the board discussed that with Mr. Musk?</p> <p>6 A. I'm not sure.</p> <p>7 Q. Okay. We were talking about the 8 DSB review process relating to the test release of 9 GPT-4 in India.</p> <p>10 Do you recall that?</p> <p>11 And I believe that you testified 12 that Tasha had found out about that from an 13 employee following a board meeting.</p> <p>14 Do I have that correct?</p> <p>15 A. Yes.</p> <p>16 Q. Okay. Who was that employee?</p> <p>17 A. Jan Leike.</p> <p>18 Q. Okay. You also testified earlier 19 regarding the board service and ultimate departure 20 from the board of Shimon Zilis.</p> <p>21 You remember that?</p> <p>22 A. Yes.</p> <p>23 Q. And I think you said that 24 statements that Mr. Altman had made during the 25 deliberations around whether Ms. Zilis should leave</p>