

1 Robert C. Moest, Of Counsel, SBN 62166  
2 **THE BROWN LAW FIRM, P.C.**  
3 2530 Wilshire Boulevard, Second Floor  
4 Santa Monica, California 90403  
5 Telephone: (310) 915-6628  
6 Facsimile: (310) 915-9897  
7 Email: RMoest@aol.com

8 *Counsel for Plaintiff*

9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

RAK JOON CHOI, derivatively on behalf  
of CHEGG, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

DANIEL L. ROSENSWEIG, ANDREW.  
J. BROWN, NATHAN SCHULTZ,  
JOHN P. FILLMORE, ROBIN  
TOMASELLO, RICHARD SARNOFF,  
SARAH BOND, RENEE BUDIG, PAUL  
LeBLANC, MARNE LEVINE, TED  
SCHLEIN, MELANIE WHELAN, and  
JOHN YORK

Defendants,

and

CHEGG, INC.,

Nominal Defendant.

Case No.:

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

**VERIFIED SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE COMPLAINT**

## INTRODUCTION

1  
2  
3 Plaintiff Rak Joon Choi (“Plaintiff”), by Plaintiff’s undersigned attorneys,  
4 derivatively and on behalf of nominal defendant Chegg, Inc. (“Chegg” or the “Company”),  
5 files this Verified Shareholder Derivative Complaint against defendants Daniel L.  
6 Rosensweig (“Rosensweig”), Andrew. J. Brown (“Brown”), Nathan Schultz (“Schultz”),  
7 John P. Fillmore (“Fillmore”), Robin Tomasello (“Tomasello”), Richard Sarnoff  
8 (“Sarnoff”), Sarah Bond (“Bond”), Renee Budig (“Budig”), Paul LeBlanc (“LeBlanc”),  
9 Marne Levine (“Levine”), Ted Schlein (“Schlein”), Melanie Whelan (“Whelan”), and John  
10 York (“York”) (collectively, the “Individual Defendants,” and together with Chegg, the  
11 “Defendants”) for breaches of their fiduciary duties as directors and/or officers of Chegg,  
12 unjust enrichment, abuse of control, gross mismanagement, and waste of corporate assets,  
13 against Defendants Rosensweig, Sarnoff, Bond, Budig, LeBlanc, Levine, Schlein, Whelan,  
14 and York for violations of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the  
15 “Exchange Act”), and against Defendants Rosensweig, Brown, Schultz, Fillmore,  
16 Tomasello, and Sarnoff for contribution under Sections 10(b) and 21D of the Exchange  
17 Act. As for Plaintiff’s complaint against the Individual Defendants, Plaintiff alleges the  
18 following based upon personal knowledge as to Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s own acts, and  
19 information and belief as to all other matters, based upon, *inter alia*, the investigation  
20 conducted by and through Plaintiff’s attorneys, which included, among other things, a  
21 review of the Defendants’ public documents, conference calls and announcements made  
22 by Defendants, United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filings, wire  
23 and press releases published by and regarding Chegg, legal filings, news reports, securities  
24 analysts’ reports and advisories about the Company, and information readily obtainable on  
25 the Internet. Plaintiff believes that substantial evidentiary support will exist for the  
26 allegations set forth herein after a reasonable opportunity for discovery.

## NATURE OF THE ACTION

1           1. This is a shareholder derivative action that seeks to remedy wrongdoing  
2 committed by Chegg’s directors and officers from May 5, 2020 through November 1, 2021  
3 (the “Relevant Period”).

4           2. Chegg is a Delaware corporation based in California. Chegg provides online  
5 educational tools and services, such as tutoring and other digital learning tools, as well as  
6 physical educational resources, such as textbook rentals, to students who pay a subscription  
7 fee to the Company.

8           3. Beginning in 2020, due to the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic and temporary  
9 shift to nearly exclusive online learning in educational settings ranging from elementary  
10 school to graduate school, Chegg experienced a surge in subscribers, and thus revenue.

11           4. Chegg’s online platform was designed, *inter alia*, to help students cheat on  
12 exams and other assignments. The shift to online learning, including the online  
13 administration of exams and other assignments previously administered in person, created  
14 new opportunities for students using Chegg’s platform to cheat. During and prior to the  
15 Relevant Period, the Individual Defendants enabled the Company to monetize off its  
16 platform’s capacity to assist in academic cheating, including by providing Chegg users  
17 answer sets to copyrighted questions produced by textbook manufacturers, like Pearson  
18 Education, Inc. (“Pearson”), without permission (the “Copyright Infringement  
19 Misconduct”) (collectively, the “Cheating Misconduct”).

20           5. Despite the contextualized growth, Chegg did not acknowledge that the  
21 increase in subscribers and revenue was the result of the Cheating Misconduct coupled  
22 with the temporary prevalence of online learning caused by Covid-19. Relatedly, Chegg  
23 failed to acknowledge that once students returned to physical classrooms, and the  
24 opportunities to use Chegg’s services to cheat diminished, its subscribers and revenue  
25 would foreseeably decline.

26           6. Instead, throughout the Relevant Period, the Individual Defendants made,  
27 and/or caused the Company to make, false and misleading statements and omissions of  
28

1 material fact that attributed Chegg’s recent growth to other, less objectionable factors such  
2 as Chegg’s “strong brand and momentum” or its “unique position to impact the future of  
3 the higher education ecosystem.” The Individual Defendants caused Chegg to posture as if  
4 these factors, rather than its facilitation of cheating made even easier by Covid-19, would  
5 cause the Company “to continue to grow and take advantage of the ever-expanding  
6 opportunities in the learner economy.”

7 7. The truth began to emerge in December 2020, when multiple news outlets  
8 reported that officials at Texas A&M University (“Texas A&M”) discovered that students  
9 were using Chegg to cheat on their remote exams. This included copying and pasting  
10 answers made available to Chegg users from an online repository. Texas A&M officials  
11 found that, using Chegg, some students were able to complete exams so quickly that it was  
12 not possible for them to have been reading the questions.

13 8. The truth continued to emerge on September 13, 2021, when Pearson filed  
14 suit against Chegg in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (the  
15 “Pearson Action”), revealing that Chegg engaged in the Copyright Infringement  
16 Misconduct by making answer sets to Pearson’s copyrighted questions available to Chegg  
17 users.

18 9. The truth fully emerged on November 1, 2021, after the market had closed,  
19 when Chegg announced, in a press release and in a Form 10-Q filed with the SEC, its  
20 financial results for the quarter ended September 30, 2021—i.e., a period which included  
21 the start of the first academic semester since the onset of Covid-19 where remote learning  
22 had been significantly curtailed. Chegg revealed that it had fewer subscribers than  
23 expected, that key revenue metrics had decelerated their growth or even contracted, and  
24 that the Company would not be issuing guidance for the 2022 fiscal year. Moreover,  
25 Defendant Rosensweig acknowledged that this dramatic deceleration in the Company’s  
26 growth was known internally since at least September 2021.

27 10. On this news, the price of the Company’s common stock fell nearly 50%, from  
28

1 closing at \$62.76 per share on November 1, 2021, to close on November 2, 2021 at \$32.12  
2 per share.

3 11. During the Relevant Period, the Individual Defendants breached their  
4 fiduciary duties by causing or permitting the Company to engage in the Cheating  
5 Misconduct and the Copyright Infringement Misconduct.

6 12. Moreover, the Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by  
7 personally making and/or causing the Company to make to the investing public a series of  
8 materially false and misleading statements about Chegg's business, operations, and  
9 prospects. Specifically, the Individual Defendants willfully or recklessly made and/or  
10 caused the Company to make false and misleading statements to the investing public that  
11 failed to disclose, *inter alia*, that: (1) Chegg was engaged in the Cheating Misconduct and  
12 the Copyright Infringement Misconduct; (2) Chegg's facilitation of cheating made easier  
13 by remote learning caused the Company to experience an increase in subscribers and  
14 revenue, rather than the factors the Company publicly represented; (3) as such, once in-  
15 person learning returned, the Company would not continue to enjoy a surge in subscriptions  
16 and revenue; (4) due to the foregoing, the Company overstated its potential for growth  
17 throughout the Relevant Period; and (5) the Company failed to maintain internal controls.  
18 As a result of the foregoing, Chegg's public statements were materially false and  
19 misleading at all relevant times.

20 13. The Individual Defendants also breached their fiduciary duties by failing to  
21 correct and/or causing the Company to fail to correct these false and misleading statements  
22 and omissions of material fact to the investing public.

23 14. Additionally, in breach of their fiduciary duties, the Individual Defendants  
24 caused the Company to fail to maintain adequate internal controls.

25 15. Furthermore, during the Relevant Period, the Individual Defendants breached  
26 their fiduciary duties by causing the Company to undertake a secondary public offering of  
27 its common stock in February 2021, while the Company's stock was still trading at  
28

1 artificially inflated prices due to the false and misleading statements at issue. Chegg and  
2 Defendant Rosensweig sold shares for collective proceeds of over \$1 billion, subjecting  
3 the Company to liability for violations of the Exchange Act and enriching Defendant  
4 Rosensweig to the tune of approximately \$29.9 million.

5 16. Moreover, six of the Individual Defendants breached their fiduciary duties by  
6 engaging in lucrative insider sales of Company common stock at artificially inflated prices,  
7 obtaining collective proceeds of over \$91.8 million.

8 17. In light of the Individual Defendants' misconduct—which has subjected the  
9 Company, its Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"), its Chief Financial Officer ("CFO"), its  
10 President of Learning Services, its President of Chegg Skills, its former Principal  
11 Accounting Officer, and its Co-Chairperson to being named as defendants in a federal  
12 securities fraud class action lawsuit pending in the United States District Court for the  
13 Northern District of California (the "Securities Class Action"),<sup>1</sup> and has further subjected  
14 the Company to the Pearson Action, the need to remedy the Cheating Misconduct and the  
15 Copyright Infringement Misconduct, the need to undertake internal investigations, the need  
16 to implement adequate internal controls over its financial reporting, losses from the waste  
17 of corporate assets, and losses due to the unjust enrichment of the Individual Defendants  
18 who were improperly overcompensated by the Company and/or who benefitted from the  
19 wrongdoing alleged herein—the Company will have to expend many millions of dollars.

20 18. In light of the breaches of fiduciary duty engaged in by the Individual  
21 Defendants, most of whom are the Company's current directors, their collective  
22 engagement in fraud, the substantial likelihood of the directors' liability in this derivative  
23 action and Defendant Rosensweig's and Defendant Sarnoff's liability in the Securities  
24 Class Action, their being beholden to each other, their longstanding business and personal  
25 relationships with each other, and their not being disinterested and/or independent  
26

27 <sup>1</sup> Defendant Sarnoff, who serves as Chegg's Co-Chairperson, is named as a defendant in  
28 the Securities Class Action complaint's "Parties" section, though he is omitted from the  
complaint's caption.

1 directors, a majority of Chegg’s Board of Directors (the “Board”) cannot consider a  
2 demand to commence litigation against themselves and the other Individual Defendants on  
3 behalf of the Company with the requisite level of disinterestedness and independence.

4 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

5 19. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331  
6 because Plaintiff’s claims raise a federal question under Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act  
7 (15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1)), Rule 14a-9 of the Exchange Act (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9), Section  
8 10(b) of the Exchange Act (15. U.S.C. §§ 78j(b)), and Section 21D of the Exchange Act  
9 (15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f)).

10 20. Plaintiff’s claims also raise a federal question pertaining to the claims made  
11 in the Securities Class Action based on violations of the Exchange Act.

12 21. This Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims  
13 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

14 22. This derivative action is not a collusive action to confer jurisdiction on a court  
15 of the United States that it would not otherwise have.

16 23. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 and 1401  
17 because a substantial portion of the transactions and wrongs complained of herein occurred  
18 in this District, Defendants have conducted business in this District, Defendants’ actions  
19 have had an effect in this District, and Chegg is headquartered in this District.

20 **PARTIES**

21 **Plaintiff**

22 24. Plaintiff is a current shareholder of Chegg common stock. Plaintiff has  
23 continuously held Chegg common stock at all relevant times.

24 **Nominal Defendant Chegg**

25 25. Chegg is a Delaware corporation with its principal executive offices located  
26 at 3990 Freedom Circle, Santa Clara, CA 95054. Chegg’s shares trade on the New York  
27 Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) under the ticker symbol “CHGG.”  
28

1                   **Defendant Rosensweig**

2                   26. Defendant Rosensweig has served as the Company’s CEO and President since  
3 February 2010, and as Co-Chairperson since July 2018. Previously, from March 2010 to  
4 July 2018, Defendant Rosensweig served as Chairperson of the Board. According to the  
5 Company’s proxy statement filed on Schedule 14A with the SEC on April 16, 2021 (the  
6 “2021 Proxy Statement”), as April 5, 2021, Defendant Rosensweig beneficially owned  
7 1,477,605 shares of the Company’s common stock, representing 1.0% of the Company’s  
8 total outstanding common stock as of that date. Given that the price per share of the  
9 Company’s common stock at the close of trading on April 5, 2021 was \$89.02, Defendant  
10 Rosensweig beneficially owned approximately \$131.5 million worth of Chegg stock.

11                   27. For the fiscal year ended December 31, 2020 (the “2020 Fiscal Year”),  
12 Defendant Rosensweig received \$10,381,080 in total compensation from the Company.  
13 This included \$1,000,000 in salary, \$9,374,954 in stock awards, and \$6,126 in all other  
14 compensation.

15                   28. During the period when the Company materially misstated information to the  
16 investing public to keep the stock price inflated, and before the scheme was exposed,  
17 Defendant Rosensweig made the following sales of company stock at artificially inflated  
18 prices:

19

<b>Date</b>	<b>Shares Sold</b>	<b>Avg. Price Per Share</b>	<b>Proceeds</b>
May 14, 2020	28,000	\$63.81	\$1,786,680
June 29, 2020	28,000	\$64.84	\$1,815,520
July 7, 2020	28,000	\$70.83	\$1,983,240
August 5, 2020	28,000	\$84.61	\$2,369,080
September 22, 2020	28,000	\$66.26	\$1,855,280
October 12, 2020	28,000	\$82.24	\$2,302,720
November 19, 2020	28,000	\$70.64	\$1,977,920
December 11, 2020	28,000	\$81.33	\$2,277,240

20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

January 7, 2021	28,000	\$91.12	\$2,551,276
February 22, 2021	300,000	\$99.55	\$29,865,600

Thus, in total, before the fraud was exposed, he sold 552,000 shares of Company common stock at artificially inflated prices on inside information, for which he received approximately \$48.8 million. His insider sales made with knowledge of material nonpublic information before the material misstatements and omissions were exposed demonstrate his motive in facilitating and participating in the scheme.

29. The 2021 Proxy Statement stated the following regarding Defendant Rosensweig:

*Dan Rosensweig* has served as our President and Chief Executive Officer since February 2010, as Co-Chairperson of our Board of Directors since July 2018, and served as the Chairperson of our Board of Directors from March 2010 to July 2018. From 2009 to 2010, Mr. Rosensweig served as President and Chief Executive Officer of RedOctane, a business unit of Activision Publishing, Inc. and developer, publisher, and distributor of *Guitar Hero*. From 2007 to 2009, Mr. Rosensweig was an Operating Principal at the Quadrangle Group, a private investment firm. From 2002 to 2009, Mr. Rosensweig served as Chief Operating Officer of Yahoo! Inc., an internet content and service provider. Prior to serving at Yahoo!, Mr. Rosensweig served as the President of CNET Networks and prior to that as Chief Executive Officer and President of ZDNet, until it was acquired by CNET Networks. Mr. Rosensweig currently serves on the board of directors of Adobe Systems Incorporated. Mr. Rosensweig holds a B.A. in Political Science from Hobart and William Smith Colleges. We believe that Mr. Rosensweig should continue to serve on our Board of Directors due to the perspective and experience he brings as our Chief Executive Officer and his extensive experience with high-growth consumer internet and media companies.

**Defendant Brown**

30. Defendant Brown has served as the Company's CFO since October 2011. According to the 2021 Proxy Statement, as of April 5, 2021, Defendant Brown beneficially owned 48,736 shares of the Company's common stock. Given that the price per share of

1 the Company's common stock at the close of trading on April 5, 2021 was \$89.02,  
2 Defendant Brown owned approximately \$4.3 million worth of Chegg stock.

3 31. For the 2020 Fiscal Year, Defendant Brown received \$5,033,556 in total  
4 compensation from the Company. This included \$652,083 in salary, \$4,374,973 in stock  
5 awards, and \$6,500 in all other compensation.

6 32. The 2021 Proxy Statement stated the following about Defendant Brown:

7 *Andrew Brown* has served as our Chief Financial Officer since October 2011.  
8 From 2004 to 2009, Mr. Brown served as the Chief Financial Officer of Palm,  
9 Inc., a smartphone provider. Mr. Brown was semi-retired following his  
10 departure from Palm before he joined us. Prior to serving at Palm, Mr. Brown  
11 served as the Chief Financial Officer of Pillar Data Systems, Inc., a computer  
12 data storage company, Legato Systems, Inc., a storage management company  
13 subsequently acquired by Dell EMC (formerly EMC Corporation), and ADPT  
14 Corporation (formerly Adaptec, Inc.). Mr. Brown also serves on the business  
15 school advisory board at Eastern Illinois University. Mr. Brown holds a B.S.  
16 in accounting from Eastern Illinois University.

17 **Defendant Schultz**

18 33. Defendant Schultz has served as the Company's President of Learning  
19 Services since December 2018. Previously, Defendant Schultz served as the Company's  
20 Chief Learning Officer from June 2014 to December 2018, Chief Content Officer from  
21 May 2012 to June 2014, Vice President of Content Management from 2010 to May 2012,  
22 and as Director of Textbook Strategy from 2008 to 2010. According to the 2021 Proxy  
23 Statement, as April 5, 2021, Defendant Schultz beneficially owned 153,388 shares of the  
24 Company's common stock. Given that the price per share of the Company's common stock  
25 at the close of trading on April 5, 2021 was \$89.02, Defendant Schultz beneficially owned  
26 approximately \$13.7 million worth of Chegg stock.

27 34. For the 2020 Fiscal Year, Defendant Schultz received \$5,031,931 in total  
28 compensation from the Company. This included \$652,083 in salary, \$4,374,973 in stock  
awards, and \$4,875 in all other compensation.

1           35. During the period when the Company materially misstated information to the  
 2 investing public to keep the stock price inflated, and before the scheme was exposed,  
 3 Defendant Schultz made the following sales of company stock at artificially inflated prices:

Date	Shares Sold	Avg. Price Per Share	Proceeds
May 5, 2020	47,376	\$60.00	\$2,842,560
June 22, 2020	35,083	\$70.19	\$2,462,475
July 31, 2020	82,459	\$80.34	\$6,624,756
December 21, 2020	82,458	\$90.20	\$7,437,711
April 23, 2021	30,000	\$ 92.86	\$2,785,800
April 26, 2021	30,000	\$95.26	\$2,857,800

4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11 Thus, in total, before the fraud was exposed, he sold 307,376 shares of Company common  
12 stock at artificially inflated prices on inside information, for which he received  
13 approximately \$25.0 million. His insider sales made with knowledge of material nonpublic  
14 information before the material misstatements and omissions were exposed demonstrate  
15 his motive in facilitating and participating in the scheme.

16           36. The 2021 Proxy Statement stated the following regarding Defendant Schultz:

17  
18 *Nathan Schultz* has served as our President of Learning Services since  
19 December 2018 and previously served as our Chief Learning Officer from  
20 June 2014 until December 2018, our Chief Content Officer from May 2012  
21 until June 2014, our Vice President of Content Management from 2010 to  
22 May 2012 and our Director of Textbook Strategy from 2008 to 2010. Prior to  
23 joining us, Mr. Schultz served in various management positions at R.R.  
24 Bowker LLC, a provider of bibliographic information and management  
25 solutions; Monument Information Resource, a marketing intelligence  
26 resource acquired by R.R. Bowker; Pearson Education, an education  
27 publishing and assessment service; and Jones & Bartlett Learning LLC, a  
28 division of Ascend Learning Company and provider of education solutions.  
Mr. Schultz holds a B.A. in History from Elon University.

1                   **Defendant Fillmore**

2                   37. Defendant Fillmore has served as the President of Chegg Skills since  
3 September 2020. Previously, he served as the Company's Chief Business Officer from  
4 December 2018 to September 2020, its Chief of Business Operations from October 2015  
5 to December 2018, and as Chegg's Business Leader for Required Materials from June 2013  
6 to October 2015. According to the 2021 Proxy Statement, as of April 5, 2021, Defendant  
7 Fillmore beneficially owned 74,985 shares of Company common stock. Given that the  
8 price per share of the Company's common stock at the close of trading on April 5, 2021  
9 was \$89.02, Defendant Fillmore owned approximately \$6.7 million worth of Chegg stock.

10                   38. During the period when the Company materially misstated information to the  
11 investing public to keep the stock price inflated, and before the scheme was exposed,  
12 Defendant Fillmore made the following sales of company stock at artificially inflated  
13 prices:

14

<b>Date</b>	<b>Shares Sold</b>	<b>Avg. Price Per Share</b>	<b>Proceeds</b>
May 18, 2020	49,442	\$64.85	\$3,206,313
June 3, 2020	1,321	\$62.30	\$82,298
September 2, 2020	1,321	\$77.73	\$102,681
December 3, 2020	1,321	\$75.55	\$99,801
March 3, 2021	51,505	\$92.25	\$4,751,336
April 13, 2021	19,714	\$90.34	\$1,780,962

15                   Thus, in total, before the fraud was exposed, he sold 124,624 shares of Company common  
16 stock at artificially inflated prices on inside information, for which he received  
17 approximately \$10.0 million. His insider sales made with knowledge of material nonpublic  
18 information before the material misstatements and omissions were exposed demonstrate  
19 his motive in facilitating and participating in the scheme.  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

1           39. For the 2020 Fiscal Year, Defendant Fillmore received \$3,556,915 in total  
2 compensation from the Company. This included \$552,083 in salary, \$2,999,957 in stock  
3 awards, and \$4,875 in all other compensation.

4           40. The 2021 Proxy Statement stated the following about Defendant Fillmore:

5           *John Fillmore* has served as our President of Chegg Skills since September  
6 2020 and previously served as our Chief Business Officer from December  
7 2018 until September 2020, our Chief of Business Operations from October  
8 2015 to December 2018 and our Business Leader for Required Materials from  
9 June 2013 to October 2015. Prior to Chegg, Mr. Fillmore's experience  
10 included service at Bain & Company, a management consulting firm, and as  
11 Chief Deputy Director for the Office of Planning and Research under then-  
12 California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, where he focused on education  
and economic development. Mr. Fillmore holds a B.S. from the University of  
Oregon Robert D. Clark Honors College and an M.B.A. from Harvard  
Business School.

13           **Defendant Tomasello**

14           41. Defendant Tomasello served as the Company's Vice President, Corporate  
15 Controller, Assistant Treasurer, and Principal Accounting Officer from January 2012 until  
16 November 15, 2021, when she resigned.

17           42. During the period when the Company materially misstated information to the  
18 investing public to keep the stock price inflated, and before the scheme was exposed,  
19 Defendant Tomasello made the following sale of company stock at artificially inflated  
20 prices:

Date	Shares Sold	Avg. Price Per Share	Proceeds
November 20, 2020	32,016	\$71.45	\$2,287,543

21           Her insider sale made with knowledge of material nonpublic information before the  
22 material misstatements and omissions were exposed demonstrates her motive in facilitating  
23 and participating in the scheme.  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

**Defendant Sarnoff**

43. Defendant Sarnoff has served as Co-Chairperson of the Board since July 2018, and as a Company director since August 2012. He is also a member of the Audit Committee. According to the 2021 Proxy Statement, as of April 5, 2021, Defendant Sarnoff beneficially owned 202,700 shares of Company common stock. Given that the price per share of the Company's common stock at the close of trading on April 5, 2021 was \$89.02, Defendant Sarnoff owned approximately \$18.0 million worth of Chegg stock.

44. For the 2020 Fiscal Year, Defendant Sarnoff received \$399,919 in total compensation from the Company. This included \$50,000 in fees earned or paid in cash and \$349,919 in restricted stock unit ("RSU") awards.

45. During the period when the Company materially misstated information to the investing public to keep the stock price inflated, and before the scheme was exposed, Defendant Sarnoff made the following sale of company stock at artificially inflated prices:

<b>Date</b>	<b>Shares Sold</b>	<b>Avg. Price Per Share</b>	<b>Proceeds</b>
May 13, 2020	66,666	\$65.09	\$4,339,289

His insider sale made with knowledge of material nonpublic information before the material misstatements and omissions were exposed demonstrates his motive in facilitating and participating in the scheme.

46. The 2021 Proxy Statement stated the following about Defendant Sarnoff:

*Richard Sarnoff* has served on our Board of Directors since August 2012 and as a Co-Chairperson of our Board of Directors since July 2018. Since July 2014, Mr. Sarnoff has served as the Managing Director and Head of the Media & Communications industry team for the Private Equity platform of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P., a private equity firm, and since January 2018 has served as Partner and Chairman of that team. From 2012 to 2014, Mr. Sarnoff was a Senior Adviser to Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. L.P. Prior to that role, Mr. Sarnoff was employed by Bertelsmann AG, a diversified media and services company, where he served as the Co-Chairman of Bertelsmann, Inc., from 2008 to 2011, the President of Bertelsmann Digital Media Investments from 2006 to 2011, and the Executive Vice President and Chief Financial

1 Officer of Random House, a subsidiary of Bertelsmann, from 1998 to 2006.  
2 Mr. Sarnoff also served as a member of the supervisory board of Bertelsmann  
3 from 2002 to 2008 and served as a member of the Board of Directors of The  
4 Princeton Review from 2000 to 2009, of Audible Inc. from 2001 to 2008, and  
5 of Amdocs Limited from 2009 to 2011. Mr. Sarnoff currently serves on the  
6 Board of Directors of several privately held companies. Mr. Sarnoff holds a  
7 B.A. in Art and Archeology from Princeton University and an M.B.A. from  
8 Harvard Business School. We believe that Mr. Sarnoff should continue to  
9 serve on our Board of Directors due to his extensive experience serving in  
10 senior leadership roles in media and digital technology companies.

### **Defendant Bond**

11 47. Defendant Bond has served as a Company director since December 2020. She  
12 is also a member of the Compensation Committee. According to the 2021 Proxy Statement,  
13 as of April 5, 2021, Defendant Bond beneficially owned 203 shares of Company common  
14 stock. Given that the price per share of the Company's common stock at the close of trading  
15 on April 5, 2021 was \$89.02, Defendant Bond owned approximately \$18,000 worth of  
16 Chegg stock.

17 48. For the 2020 Fiscal Year, Defendant Bond received \$203,942 in total  
18 compensation from the Company. This included \$3,984 in fees earned or paid in cash and  
19 \$199,958 in RSU awards.

20 49. The 2021 Proxy Statement stated the following about Defendant Bond:

21 *Sarah Bond* has served on our Board of Directors since December 2020. Since  
22 June 2020, Ms. Bond has served as the Corporate Vice President, Gaming  
23 Ecosystem at Microsoft Corporation, a technology company, and from April  
24 2017 to June 2020 Ms. Bond served as the Corporate Vice President of  
25 Gaming Partnerships and Business Development. Previously, Ms. Bond  
26 served in several senior roles at T-Mobile USA Inc., a telecommunications  
27 company, including as Senior Vice President of Emerging Businesses from  
28 August 2013 to September 2015, and Chief of Staff to the CEO from March  
2011 to July 2013. Ms. Bond started her career as an Associate Partner at  
McKinsey & Company, a consulting firm. Ms. Bond currently serves on the  
Board of Directors of Zuora Inc. Ms. Bond holds a B.A. in economics from  
Yale University and an M.B.A. from Harvard Business School. We believe  
that Ms. Bond should continue to serve on our Board of Directors due to her  
extensive experience in leadership positions at technology companies.

**Defendant Budig**

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

50. Defendant Budig has served as a Company director since November 2015. She is also the Chair of the Audit Committee. According to the 2021 Proxy Statement, as of April 5, 2021, Defendant Budig beneficially owned 70,217 shares of Company common stock. Given that the price per share of the Company's common stock at the close of trading on April 5, 2021 was \$89.02, Defendant Budig owned approximately \$6.3 million worth of Chegg stock.

51. For the 2020 Fiscal Year, Defendant Budig received \$259,980 in total compensation from the Company. This included \$60,000 in fees earned or paid in cash and \$199,980 in RSU awards.

52. The 2021 Proxy Statement stated the following about Defendant Budig:

*Reneé Budig* has served on our Board of Directors since November 2015. From September 2012 to January 2021, Ms. Budig served as the Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of ViacomCBS Streaming, a division of ViacomCBS Inc. (formerly CBS Interactive, a division of CBS Inc.), an online content network for information and entertainment, and from 2010 to September 2012, Ms. Budig served as Chief Financial Officer of Hightail, Inc. (formerly branded YouSendIt and acquired by OpenText), a cloud service that allowed users to send, receive, digitally sign and synchronize files. From 2006 to 2010, Ms. Budig was the Vice President of Finance at Netflix, Inc., a multinational provider of on-demand Internet streaming media. Ms. Budig holds a B.S. in Business Administration from the University of California, Berkeley. We believe that Ms. Budig should continue to serve on our Board of Directors due to her extensive background in consumer technology companies and her financial expertise through her service as a Chief Financial Officer.

**Defendant LeBlanc**

53. Defendant LeBlanc has served as a Company director since July 2019. He also serves as a member of the Governance and Sustainability Committee. According to the 2021 Proxy Statement, as of April 5, 2021, Defendant LeBlanc beneficially owned 8,537 shares of Company common stock. Given that the price per share of the Company's

1 common stock at the close of trading on April 5, 2021 was \$89.02, Defendant LeBlanc  
2 owned approximately \$760,000 worth of Chegg stock.

3 54. For the 2020 Fiscal Year, Defendant LeBlanc received \$249,980 in total  
4 compensation from the Company. This included \$50,000 in fees earned or paid in cash and  
5 \$199,980 in RSU awards.

6 55. The 2021 Proxy Statement said the following about Defendant LeBlanc:

7 Paul LeBlanc has served on our Board of Directors since July 2019. Since  
8 2003, Mr. LeBlanc has served as the President of Southern New Hampshire  
9 University, a private non-profit university. From 1996 to 2003, Mr. LeBlanc  
10 served as the President of Marlboro College, a private liberal arts college.  
11 Prior to Marlboro College, Mr. LeBlanc served as Director of Sixth Floor  
12 Media, a division of Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Publishing Company. Mr.  
13 LeBlanc holds a B.A. in English from Framingham State University, a M.A.  
14 in English Language, Literature and Letters from Boston College, and a Ph.D.  
15 in Rhetoric, Composition and Technology from the University of  
16 Massachusetts, Amherst. We believe that Mr. LeBlanc should continue to  
17 serve on our Board of Directors due to his extensive experience in  
18 technological innovation in higher education.

19 **Defendant Levine**

20 56. Defendant Levine has served as a Company director since May 2013. She is  
21 also the Chair of the Governance and Sustainability Committee and a member of the  
22 Compensation Committee. According to the 2021 Proxy Statement, as of April 5, 2021,  
23 Defendant Levine beneficially owned 153,045 shares of Company common stock. Given  
24 that the price per share of the Company's common stock at the close of trading on April 5,  
25 2021 was \$89.02, Defendant Levine owned approximately \$13.6 million worth of Chegg  
26 stock.

27 57. For the 2020 Fiscal Year, Defendant Levine received \$269,980 in total  
28 compensation from the Company. This included \$70,000 in fees earned or paid in cash and  
\$199,980 in RSU awards.

58. The 2021 Proxy Statement stated the following about Defendant Levine:

1 *Marne Levine* has served on our Board of Directors since May 2013. Since  
2 February 2019, Ms. Levine served as the Vice President of Global  
3 Partnerships, Business and Corporate Development at Facebook, Inc., a social  
4 media company. From December 2014 to February 2019, Ms. Levine served  
5 as Chief Operating Officer of Instagram, a social media company and wholly  
6 owned subsidiary of Facebook, Inc. From 2010 to December 2014, Ms.  
7 Levine served as Vice President of Global Public Policy for Facebook, Inc.  
8 From 2009 to 2010, Ms. Levine served as Chief of Staff of the National  
9 Economic Council at the White House and Special Assistant to the President  
10 for Economic Policy. Ms. Levine holds a B.A. in Political Science and  
11 Communications from Miami University and an M.B.A. from Harvard  
12 Business School. We believe that Ms. Levine should continue to serve on our  
13 Board of Directors due to her extensive experience in the policy,  
14 communications and technology fields.

### **Defendant Schlein**

15 59. Defendant Schlein has served as a Company director since December 2008.  
16 He also serves as a member of both the Governance and Sustainability Committee and the  
17 Audit Committee. According to the 2021 Proxy Statement, as of April 5, 2021, Defendant  
18 Schlein beneficially owned 232,118 shares of Company common stock. Given that the  
19 price per share of the Company's common stock at the close of trading on April 5, 2021  
20 was \$89.02, Defendant Schlein owned approximately \$20.7 million worth of Chegg stock.

21 60. For the 2020 Fiscal Year, Defendant Schlein received \$259,980 in total  
22 compensation from the Company. This included \$60,000 in fees earned or paid in cash and  
23 \$199,980 in RSU awards.

24 61. The 2021 Proxy Statement said the following about Defendant Schlein:

25 *Ted Schlein* has served on our Board of Directors since December 2008. Mr.  
26 Schlein has served as a General Partner of Kleiner Perkins, a venture capital  
27 firm, since November 1996. From 1986 to 1996, Mr. Schlein served in various  
28 executive positions at Symantec Corporation, a provider of internet security  
technology and business management technology solutions, including as Vice  
President of Enterprise Products. Mr. Schlein currently serves on the boards  
of directors of a number of privately held companies. Mr. Schlein holds a B.A.  
in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania. We believe that Mr.  
Schlein should continue to serve on our Board of Directors due to his  
extensive experience working with technology companies.

**Defendant Whelan**

62. Defendant Whelan has served as a Company director since June 2019. She is also a member of the Compensation Committee. According to the 2021 Proxy Statement, as of April 5, 2021, Defendant Whelan beneficially owned 6,582 shares of Company common stock. Given that the price per share of the Company's common stock at the close of trading on April 5, 2021 was \$89.02, Defendant Whelan owned approximately \$586,000 worth of Chegg stock.

63. For the 2020 Fiscal Year, Defendant Whelan received \$249,980 in total compensation from the Company. This included \$50,000 in fees earned or paid in cash and \$199,980 in RSU awards.

64. The 2021 Proxy Statement stated the following about Defendant Whelan:

*Melanie Whelan* has served on our Board of Directors since June 2019. Ms. Whelan has served as a Managing Director at Summit Partners, a private equity investment firm, since June 2020 and served as an Executive in Residence from January 2020 to June 2020. Previously, Ms. Whelan served as Chief Executive Officer of SoulCycle Inc., an indoor cycling fitness company, from June 2015 to November 2019 and as Chief Operating Officer from April 2012 until May 2015. Prior to joining SoulCycle, Ms. Whelan was Vice President of Business Development at Equinox Holdings, Inc., a luxury fitness company, from January 2007 to April 2012. Prior to Equinox, she also held leadership positions with Virgin Management, where she was on the founding team of Virgin America, and with Starwood Hotels & Resorts, a hospitality company. Ms. Whelan holds a B.A. in Engineering and Economics from Brown University. We believe that Ms. Whelan should continue to serve on our Board of Directors due to her extensive experience in business operations, international growth, and consumer marketing.

**Defendant York**

65. Defendant York has served as a Company director since June 2013. He is also Chair of the Compensation Committee and a member of the Governance and Sustainability Committee. According to the 2021 Proxy Statement, as of April 5, 2021, Defendant York beneficially owned 105,748 shares of Company common stock. Given that the price per

1 share of the Company's common stock at the close of trading on April 5, 2021 was \$89.02,  
2 Defendant York owned approximately \$9.4 million worth of Chegg stock.

3 66. For the 2020 Fiscal Year, Defendant York received \$269,980 in total  
4 compensation from the Company. This included \$70,000 in fees earned or paid in cash and  
5 \$199,980 in RSU awards.

6 67. During the period when the Company materially misstated information to the  
7 investing public to keep the stock price inflated, and before the scheme was exposed,  
8 Defendant York made the following sales of company stock at artificially inflated prices:

Date	Shares Sold	Avg. Price Per Share	Proceeds
July 1, 2020	10,000	\$68.04	\$680,400
October 1, 2020	10,000	\$73.38	\$733,800

9  
10  
11  
12 Thus, in total, before the fraud was exposed, he sold 20,000 shares of Company common  
13 stock at artificially inflated prices on inside information, for which he received  
14 approximately \$1.4 million. His insider sales made with knowledge of material nonpublic  
15 information before the material misstatements and omissions were exposed demonstrate  
16 his motive in facilitating and participating in the scheme.

17 68. The 2021 Proxy Statement stated the following about Defendant York:

18 *John York* has served on our Board of Directors since June 2013. Since  
19 February 2012, Mr. York has served as the Chief Executive Officer of the San  
20 Francisco 49ers, a professional football team in the National Football League,  
21 where he previously served as Team President from 2008 to February 2012  
22 and as Vice President of Strategic Planning from 2005 to 2008. Prior to those  
23 roles, Mr. York served as a financial analyst at Guggenheim Partners. Mr.  
24 York holds a B.A. in Finance from the University of Notre Dame. We believe  
25 that Mr. York should continue to serve on our Board of Directors due to his  
26 extensive leadership experience and strong corporate development  
27 background.

### 28 **FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS**

69. By reason of their positions as officers, directors, and/or fiduciaries of Chegg  
and because of their ability to control the business and corporate affairs of Chegg, the

1 Individual Defendants owed Chegg and its shareholders fiduciary obligations of trust,  
2 loyalty, good faith, and due care, and were and are required to use their utmost ability to  
3 control and manage Chegg in a fair, just, honest, and equitable manner. The Individual  
4 Defendants were and are required to act in furtherance of the best interests of Chegg and  
5 its shareholders so as to benefit all shareholders equally.

6 70. Each director and officer of the Company owes to Chegg and its shareholders  
7 the fiduciary duty to exercise good faith and diligence in the administration of the Company  
8 and in the use and preservation of its property and assets and the highest obligations of fair  
9 dealing.

10 71. The Individual Defendants, because of their positions of control and authority  
11 as directors and/or officers of Chegg, were able to and did, directly and/or indirectly,  
12 exercise control over the wrongful acts complained of herein.

13 72. To discharge their duties, the officers and directors of Chegg were required to  
14 exercise reasonable and prudent supervision over the management, policies, controls, and  
15 operations of the Company.

16 73. Each Individual Defendant, by virtue of their position as a director and/or  
17 officer, owed to the Company and to its shareholders the highest fiduciary duties of loyalty,  
18 good faith, and the exercise of due care and diligence in the management and  
19 administration of the affairs of the Company, as well as in the use and preservation of its  
20 property and assets. The conduct of the Individual Defendants complained of herein  
21 involves a knowing and culpable violation of their obligations as directors and officers of  
22 Chegg, the absence of good faith on their part, or a reckless disregard for their duties to the  
23 Company and its shareholders that the Individual Defendants were aware or should have  
24 been aware posed a risk of serious injury to the Company. The conduct of the Individual  
25 Defendants who were also officers and directors of the Company has been ratified by the  
26 remaining Individual Defendants who collectively comprised Chegg's Board at all relevant  
27 times.  
28

1           74. As senior executive officers and directors of a publicly-traded company  
2 whose common stock was registered with the SEC pursuant to the Exchange Act and traded  
3 on the NYSE, the Individual Defendants, had a duty to prevent and not to effect the  
4 dissemination of inaccurate and untruthful information with respect to the Company's  
5 financial condition, performance, growth, operations, financial statements, business,  
6 products, management, earnings, internal controls, and present and future business  
7 prospects, and had a duty to cause the Company to disclose omissions of material fact in  
8 its regulatory filings with the SEC all those facts described in this Complaint that it failed  
9 to disclose, so that the market price of the Company's common stock would be based upon  
10 truthful and accurate information.

11           75. To discharge their duties, the officers and directors of Chegg were required to  
12 exercise reasonable and prudent supervision over the management, policies, practices, and  
13 internal controls of the Company. By virtue of such duties, the officers and directors of  
14 Chegg were required to, among other things:

15           (a) ensure that the Company was operated in a diligent, honest, and prudent  
16 manner in accordance with the laws and regulations of Delaware, California, and the  
17 United States, and pursuant to Chegg's own Code of Business Conduct and Ethics (the  
18 "Code of Conduct");

19           (b) conduct the affairs of the Company in an efficient, business-like manner  
20 so as to make it possible to provide the highest quality performance of its business, to avoid  
21 wasting the Company's assets, and to maximize the value of the Company's stock;

22           (c) remain informed as to how Chegg conducted its operations, and, upon  
23 receipt of notice or information of imprudent or unsound conditions or practices, such as  
24 the Cheating Misconduct and Copyright Infringement Misconduct, to make reasonable  
25 inquiry in connection therewith, and to take steps to correct such conditions or practices;

26           (d) establish and maintain systematic and accurate records and reports of  
27 the business and internal affairs of Chegg and procedures for the reporting of the business  
28

1 and internal affairs to the Board and to periodically investigate, or cause independent  
2 investigation to be made of, said reports and records;

3 (e) maintain and implement an adequate and functioning system of internal  
4 legal, financial, and management controls, such that Chegg's operations would comply  
5 with all applicable laws and Chegg's financial statements and regulatory filings filed with  
6 the SEC and disseminated to the public and the Company's shareholders would be  
7 accurate;

8 (f) exercise reasonable control and supervision over the public statements  
9 made by the Company's officers and employees and any other reports or information that  
10 the Company was required by law to disseminate;

11 (g) refrain from unduly benefiting themselves and other Company insiders  
12 at the expense of the Company; and

13 (h) examine and evaluate any reports of examinations, audits, or other  
14 financial information concerning the financial affairs of the Company and to make full and  
15 accurate disclosure of all material facts concerning, *inter alia*, each of the subjects and  
16 duties set forth above.

17 76. Each of the Individual Defendants further owed to Chegg and the shareholders  
18 the duty of loyalty requiring that each favor Chegg's interests and that of its shareholders  
19 over their own while conducting the affairs of the Company and refrain from using their  
20 position, influence, or knowledge of the affairs of the Company to gain personal advantage.

21 77. At all times relevant hereto, the Individual Defendants were the agents of each  
22 other and of Chegg and were at all times acting within the course and scope of such agency.

23 78. Because of their advisory, executive, managerial, and directorial positions  
24 with Chegg, each of the Individual Defendants had access to adverse, nonpublic  
25 information about the Company.

26 79. The Individual Defendants, because of their positions of control and authority,  
27 were able to and did, directly or indirectly, exercise control over the wrongful acts  
28

1 complained of herein, as well as the contents of the various public statements issued by  
2 Chegg.

3 **CONSPIRACY, AIDING AND ABETTING, AND CONCERTED ACTION**

4 80. In committing the wrongful acts alleged herein, the Individual Defendants  
5 have pursued, or joined in the pursuit of, a common course of conduct, and have acted in  
6 concert with and conspired with one another in furtherance of their wrongdoing. The  
7 Individual Defendants caused the Company to conceal the true facts as alleged herein. The  
8 Individual Defendants further aided and abetted and/or assisted each other in breaching  
9 their respective duties.

10 81. The purpose and effect of the conspiracy, common enterprise, and/or common  
11 course of conduct was, among other things, to facilitate and disguise the Individual  
12 Defendants' violations of law, including breaches of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment,  
13 abuse of control, gross mismanagement, waste of corporate assets, and violations of the  
14 Exchange Act.

15 82. The Individual Defendants accomplished their conspiracy, common  
16 enterprise, and/or common course of conduct by causing the Company purposefully,  
17 recklessly, or negligently to conceal material facts, fail to correct such misrepresentations,  
18 and violate applicable laws. In furtherance of this plan, conspiracy, and course of conduct,  
19 the Individual Defendants collectively and individually took the actions set forth herein.  
20 Because the actions described herein occurred under the authority of the Board, each of the  
21 Individual Defendants who was a director of Chegg was a direct, necessary, and substantial  
22 participant in the conspiracy, common enterprise, and/or common course of conduct  
23 complained of herein.

24 83. Each of the Individual Defendants aided and abetted and rendered substantial  
25 assistance in the wrongs complained of herein. In taking such actions to substantially assist  
26 the commission of the wrongdoing complained of herein, each of the Individual Defendants  
27 acted with actual or constructive knowledge of the primary wrongdoing, either took direct  
28

1 part in, or substantially assisted the accomplishment of that wrongdoing, and was or should  
2 have been aware of their overall contribution to and furtherance of the wrongdoing.

3 84. At all times relevant hereto, each of the Individual Defendants was the agent  
4 of each of the other Individual Defendants and of Chegg and was at all times acting within  
5 the course and scope of such agency.

6 **CHEGG’S CODE OF CONDUCT AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE**

7 ***Code of Conduct***

8 85. The introduction to Chegg’s Code of Conduct reads, in relevant part:

9 At Chegg, we are committed to the highest standards of business conduct in  
10 our relationships with one other, our student customers, our stockholders and  
11 our suppliers and partners. While we’ll always compete hard and do our best  
12 to protect Chegg’s interests, we won’t cut legal or ethical corners to meet a  
13 business objective. And protecting Chegg’s interests should never come at the  
14 expense of fairness to the students we serve nor to the companies with whom  
15 we do business. Integrity is at our core.

16 86. The Code of Conduct’s introduction continues by stating that it “applies to  
17 our Board of Directors, all Chegg employees and contractors with whom we do business.”

18 87. The Code of Conduct lists among the Company’s values: “Integrity – be  
19 transparent candid and authentic[.]”

20 88. The Code of Conduct instructs that Chegg personnel must “[a]void even the  
21 appearance of a conflict[.]” adding that:

22 A conflict of interest can occur when you are in a position at Chegg to  
23 influence some decision that could result in personal gain for you, your friends  
24 or your family, at the expense of Chegg, our investors or our community of  
25 users.

26 89. The Code of Conduct section on “Academic Integrity” reads:

27 We serve a diverse academic community that operates on honesty and  
28 integrity. We seek to strengthen our nation’s academic system by helping  
students learn, but we will not support or profit from unethical academic  
behavior. We will not promote plagiarism, sell pirated books, or provide  
materials designed to aid cheating. We do not condone piracy and will build  
systems to discourage our customers’ unauthorized use of protected materials.

1 Just as we strive to grow our business with integrity, we want to support the  
2 vast majority of our customers who only want to learn with integrity and  
3 compete fairly for grades.

4 90. In addition, the Code of Conduct states the following about using copyrighted  
5 material: “Chegg respects the valid intellectual property rights of other parties. Do not use,  
6 copy or distribute third party intellectual property without permission or arranging with the  
7 legal department to obtain the appropriate rights. The absence of a copyright notice does  
8 not mean that the materials are not copyrighted.”

9 91. Under the heading, “Obey the Law,” the Code of Conduct states, in relevant  
10 part:

11 Chegg takes its responsibility to comply with the law seriously, and all  
12 Chegg employees and Board members are expected to know the major  
13 laws and regulations that apply to their job, and follow all applicable  
14 legal requirements and prohibitions. This includes being familiar with  
15 Chegg’s Legal Compliance Policy and the subject matter specific  
16 policies that are a component of our Legal Compliance Policy. A few  
17 laws are worth calling out specifically.

- 18 • Insider trading: Insider trading is both unethical and illegal. Employees,  
19 directors and their family members are prohibited from using “inside”  
20 or material non-public information about the company, or about  
21 companies with which we do business, in connection with buying or  
22 selling Chegg stock or the stock of other companies. This prohibition  
23 includes including “tipping” others who might make an investment  
24 decision on the basis of this information. Chegg has an open culture and  
25 believes in being open and transparent with its team. Yet this openness  
26 carries with it responsibility – much of our information is confidential  
27 and cannot be shared outside the company. Using this information,  
28 including non-public information regarding our suppliers and business  
partners, to buy or sell stock, or passing it to others so that they can  
trade stock, violates not only this Code, but state and federal securities  
laws. It is your responsibility to familiarize yourself with Chegg’s  
Insider Trading Policy, which lays out the procedures that you and the  
company will follow to avoid even the appearance of such activity.

92. The Code of Conduct also contains a “Finance Code of Conduct” applicable  
to “the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, the controller, and any persons

1 performing similar functions.” The Finance Code of Conduct further provides, in relevant  
2 part:

3 • Honest and Ethical Conduct: Senior financial officers owe a duty to Chegg  
4 to act and perform their duties ethically and honestly and with the highest  
5 sense of integrity. This requires an officer to avoid actual or apparent conflicts  
6 of interest between personal and professional relationships, which requires  
7 observation of both the form and the spirit of technical and ethical accounting  
8 standards.

9 • Conflict of Interest: A “conflict of interest” occurs when an individual's  
10 private interest interferes or appears to interfere with the interests of the  
11 company. Conflicts of interest are prohibited as a matter of Chegg policy,  
12 unless they have been waived by the company. In particular, a senior financial  
13 officer must never use or attempt to use his or her position at the company to  
14 obtain any improper personal benefit for himself or herself, for his or her  
15 family, or for any other person. Any senior financial officer who is aware of  
16 a conflict of interest, or is concerned that a conflict might develop, is required  
17 to promptly discuss the matter with Audit Committee of the Board of  
18 Directors or the Chief Executive Officer and the General Counsel.

19 • Disclosure: Senior financial officers are responsible for ensuring that the  
20 disclosure in the reports and documents that Chegg files with, or submits to,  
21 the Securities and Exchange Commission and in other public communications  
22 made by Chegg is full, fair, accurate, timely and understandable. Therefore,  
23 senior financial officers are required to familiarize themselves with the  
24 disclosure requirements applicable to the company as well as the business and  
25 financial operations of the company.

26 In addition, in the performance of their duties, senior financial officers are  
27 prohibited from knowingly misrepresenting facts. A senior financial officer  
28 will be considered to have knowingly misrepresented facts if he or she  
knowingly (i) makes, or permits or directs another to make, materially false  
or misleading entries in an entity's financial statements or records; (ii) fails to  
correct materially false and misleading financial statements or records; (iii)  
signs, or permits another to sign, a document containing materially false and  
misleading information; or (iv) falsely responds, or fails to respond, to specific  
inquiries of the company's external accountant. Any senior financial officer  
who is aware of a material misrepresentation or omission in Chegg's financial  
disclosure is required to promptly report the matter to Audit Committee of the  
Board of Directors or the Chief Executive Officer and the General Counsel.

1 Senior financial officers are responsible for adequately supervising the  
2 preparation of the financial disclosure in all reports the company is required  
3 to file. Adequate supervision includes closely reviewing and critically  
4 analyzing the financial information to be disclosed.

5 • Compliance: It is Chegg’s policy to comply with all applicable laws, rules  
6 and regulations. It is the personal responsibility of each senior financial officer  
7 to adhere to the standards and restrictions imposed by those laws, rules and  
8 regulations, and in particular, those relating to accounting and auditing  
9 matters. Each senior financial officer is accountable for his or her compliance  
10 with this Finance Code of Conduct as well as all those under supervision to  
11 whom this Finance Code of Conduct applies.

12 Any senior financial officer must promptly report violations of the Finance  
13 Code of Conduct to the Audit Committee. If any senior financial officer is  
14 unsure whether a situation violates any applicable law, rule, regulation or  
15 company policy should discuss the situation with the General Counsel or the  
16 Chief Financial Officer to prevent possible problems at a later date. Failure to  
17 do so is itself a violation of this Code. To encourage officers to report any  
18 violations, Chegg will not allow retaliation for reports made in good faith.

19 93. Finally, the Code of Conduct provides that: “If you are aware of a suspected  
20 or actual violation of Code standards by others, you have a responsibility to report it.”

#### 21 *Audit Committee Charter*

22 94. The Charter of the Audit Committee of the Board of Directors of Chegg, Inc.  
23 (the “Audit Committee Charter”) defines the responsibilities of the Company’s Audit  
24 Committee.

25 95. Per the Audit Committee Charter, among the Audit Committee’s “principal  
26 functions” are to “assist the Board in overseeing the integrity of the financial statements  
27 and accounting and financial reporting processes of the Company . . . as well as the  
28 Company’s compliance with legal and regulatory requirements[.]”

96. An additional “principal function[.]” is to “oversee risk assessments and risk  
management pertaining to financial, accounting and tax matters of the Company.”

97. The Audit Committee Charter lists among the Audit Committee’s  
responsibilities:



1 Company complied with applicable laws, rules, and regulations, and failing to promptly  
2 report known violations of the Code of Conduct and the law.

3 99. Moreover, the Individual Defendants who served on the Company's Audit  
4 Committee during the Relevant Period violated the Audit Committee Charter by engaging  
5 in or permitting the Company to engage in the Cheating Misconduct and the Copyright  
6 Infringement Misconduct, issuing materially false and misleading statements to the  
7 investing public, and facilitating and disguising the Individual Defendants' violations of  
8 law, including breaches of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, abuse of control, gross  
9 mismanagement, waste of corporate assets, and violations of the Exchange Act. In addition  
10 the Individual Defendants who served on the Company's Audit Committee during the  
11 Relevant Period violated the Audit Committee Charter by failing to adequately oversee the  
12 integrity of the Company's financial disclosures, failing to adequately oversee the  
13 Company's compliance with legal and regulatory requirements, failing to adequately  
14 oversee the Company's risk assessments and risk management, failing to adequately  
15 discuss with management the Company's financial information prior to public distribution,  
16 and failing to adequately oversee the Company's disclosure controls and procedures.

### 17 **THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS' MISCONDUCT**

#### 18 **Background**

19 100. Chegg is a Delaware corporation based in California. Chegg offers an online  
20 learning platform, directed at high school and college students, that provides students with  
21 digital tools and other materials to assist them with their classes.

22 101. Chegg offers "Chegg Services," including "Chegg Study," "Chegg Math  
23 Solver," and "Chegg Writing" that assist students with different academic areas, in  
24 exchange for a subscription fee.

25 102. In the 2020 Fiscal Year, 81% of Chegg's revenue came from Chegg Services  
26 business segment and 19% came from Chegg's Required Materials business segment,  
27 which offers rental textbooks.  
28

1 103. Chegg’s online learning tools, particularly its online tutoring platform that  
2 enables students to ask experts for the answers to their homework questions, have been  
3 criticized as going beyond merely helping to students to instead facilitate cheating. For  
4 example, in 2019, Citron Research wrote a short report about Chegg titled: “The Poster  
5 Child for Institutionalized Cheating.”

6 104. With the arrival of Covid-19, and the transition to predominantly online  
7 learning, Chegg experienced a surge in its business. In its annual report for the 2020 Fiscal  
8 Year filed with the SEC on Form 10-K on February 22, 2021, the Company disclosed that  
9 revenue in the Chegg Services segment grew 57% year-over-year in 2020, compared with  
10 31% the prior year. Likewise, in the Required Materials segment, revenue grew 56% year-  
11 over-year in 2020, compared to 17% the prior year.

12 105. In terms of subscribers, Chegg had 6.6 million subscribers by the end of 2020,  
13 compared to 3.9 million at the end of 2019 and 3.1 million at the end of 2018.

14 106. This profitable surge in usage of Chegg’s services and products was driven by  
15 the new cheating opportunities available to students with the prevalence of remote learning.  
16 However, rather than disclose this distasteful truth, the Individual Defendants made and  
17 caused the Company to make false and misleading statements to the investing public  
18 attributing Chegg’s recent good fortunes to other, less objectionable causes.

### 19 **The Cheating Misconduct**

20 107. The Company’s post-Covid-19 surge in subscribers and revenue was  
21 attributable to the Company’s facilitation of cheating by students.

22 108. The mechanism of this cheating became clear when, no later than December  
23 16, 2020, multiple news outlets<sup>2</sup> reported that officials at Texas A&M had discovered that  
24

25 <sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Anna Gallegos, iHEART (Dec. 17, 2020), *Hundreds of Texas A&M Students*  
26 *Accused of Using Chegg to Cheat*, [https://www.iheart.com/content/2020-12-17-hundreds-](https://www.iheart.com/content/2020-12-17-hundreds-of-texas-am-students-accused-of-using-chegg-to-cheat/)  
27 *of-texas-am-students-accused-of-using-chegg-to-cheat/* (last visited Jan. 12, 2022);  
28 ShaCamree Gowdy, CHRON (Dec. 16, 2020), *Hundreds of Students Used Chegg to Cheat*  
*During Online Exam, Texas A&M Alleges*, [https://www.chron.com/news/houston-](https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/education/article/Chegg-Texas-A-M-students-cheating-virtual-classes-)

1 students were using Chegg to cheat on their remote exams—a cheating opportunity made  
2 plentiful by remote learning brought on by Covid-19.

3 109. Specifically, some students were copying and pasting answers into their  
4 online exams and other assignments from a repository made available to Chegg users.  
5 Other students, if they were not under pressing time constraints, were able to post questions  
6 on Chegg’s website and have a Chegg tutor answer the question, before passing off that  
7 answer as their own.

8 110. According to these news reports, in early December 2021, Texas A&M  
9 officials had emailed hundreds of students regarding the discovery of cheating “on a very  
10 large scale” after Texas A&M tracking software detected that some students, using Chegg,  
11 were completing exams so quickly that it was not possible for them to have been reading  
12 the questions. The *Texas Tribune* quoted the director of the Aggie Honor System Office at  
13 Texas A&M as stating that there were “hundreds of examples” of students doing this.<sup>3</sup> The  
14 same *Texas Tribune* article noted that students at Georgia Tech University and Boston  
15 University had also been caught cheating using Chegg.

16 111. Thus, the Individual Defendants knew, or should have known, that the surge  
17 in the Company’s subscribers and revenue that coincided with the onset of Covid-19 and  
18 remote learning was attributable to the Cheating Misconduct. Despite this, the Company  
19 did not reveal the extent to which its rosy financial picture depended on the Cheating  
20 Misconduct, and how the Company’s finances were certain to take a meaningful hit once  
21 remote learning, and the cheating opportunities it created, ceased.

### 22 **The Copyright Infringement Misconduct**

23  
24 15808790.php (last visited Jan. 12, 2022); Kate McGee, TEXAS TRIBUNE (Dec. 16, 2020),  
25 *Texas A&M Investigating “Large Scale” Cheating Case as Universities See More*  
26 *Academic Misconduct in Era of Online Classes*,  
27 <https://www.texastribune.org/2020/12/16/texas-am-chegg-cheating/> (last visited Jan. 12,  
28 2022).

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.texastribune.org/2020/12/16/texas-am-chegg-cheating/> (last visited Jan. 12,  
2022).

1           112. The Cheating Misconduct was made even worse by the fact that the Company  
2 was also engaged in copyright infringement in facilitating students' cheating.

3           113. This would later be revealed on September 13, 2021, when Pearson initiated  
4 the Pearson Action, captioned *Pearson Education, Inc. v. Chegg, Inc.*, Case No. 2:21-cv-  
5 16866-SDW-ESK (D.N.J.), revealing that Chegg engaged in the Copyright Infringement  
6 Misconduct by making available to Chegg subscribers answer sets to Pearson's  
7 copyrighted questions. Pearson attached as an exhibit to its complaint (Pearson Action,  
8 Document 1 & 1-1) a list of 150 of its textbooks for which Chegg was engaged in copyright  
9 infringement by providing answers to hundreds of thousands of questions contained  
10 therein. Pearson's complaint further noted that Chegg had answers for questions from  
11 approximately 9,000 textbooks, meaning that its potential liability for copyright  
12 infringement across all these titles was dramatically larger than just the 150 Pearson  
13 textbooks at issue in the Pearson Action.

14           114. Thus not only were Chegg's good financial fortunes following the onset of  
15 Covid-19 attributable to the Cheating Misconduct, but the Cheating Misconduct itself was  
16 in part predicated on the Company providing answers to copyrighted questions. By causing  
17 and/or permitting this, and failing to disclose it, the Individual Defendants damaged Chegg  
18 and exposed it to liability.

19           **False and Misleading Statements**

20           ***May 4, 2020 Press Release***

21           115. On May 4, 2020, the Company issued a press release, also attached to a Form  
22 8-K filed with the SEC the same day, announcing its financial results for the quarter ended  
23 March 31, 2020—the first quarter with Covid-19 present in the United States. The press  
24 release contained prepared remarks by Defendant Rosensweig, in which he stated, in  
25 relevant part:

26           Our belief is that, in every industry, ***a crisis often accelerates the inevitable***  
27 ***and that is what we are seeing happening now*** in higher education. The  
28 reality is students were already learning online, were under supported by their

1 schools who had diminishing budgets, so that the need for virtual learning  
2 support was already expanding. But, almost overnight, when schools around  
3 the world had to move 100% online, ***that trend accelerated and has revealed***  
4 ***the true potential and the value of what Chegg has to offer.*** The numbers  
5 say it best, and what they reflect is that ***students have an even greater need***  
6 ***for high-quality, low-cost, personalized, and adaptive online education*** to  
7 help them learn and master their curriculum. As we think about the lasting  
8 impact on the future of higher education globally, we see these trends  
9 continuing.

(Emphasis added.)

8 ***August 3, 2020 Press Release***

9 116. On August 3, 2020, the Company issued a press release, also attached to a  
10 From 8-K filed with the SEC the same day, announcing its financial results for the quarter  
11 ended June 30, 2020. The press release contained the following prepared remarks by  
12 Defendant Rosensweig, in which he stated, in relevant part:

13 ***While student's lives were disrupted, the one constant was that Chegg was***  
14 ***there to provide high-quality, expert, on-demand support from any device,***  
15 ***in any location, which resulted in accelerated growth across our services.***  
16 Students turned to Chegg in record numbers and we experienced  
17 unprecedented engagement, with subscriber growth of 67% year-over-year,  
18 including our new Mathway subscribers, reaching a record 3.7 million  
19 students. This yielded net revenue growth of 63%, year-over-year, in Q2  
20 alone. ***To put that in perspective, we had more subscribers in Q2 of this year***  
21 ***than we had in all of 2018.***

22 As schools and millions of students wrestle with how best to handle a return  
23 to campus, we know that some are supporting a full in-person return, while  
24 others are offering a fully online experience, and still others are planning a  
25 hybrid version of online and offline. ***Regardless of which experience a***  
26 ***student has, Chegg will be there to support students this fall and beyond. In***  
27 ***fact, students are increasingly turning to Chegg for support to navigate***  
28 ***these uncertain times and we expect this trend to continue post the***  
***pandemic,*** regardless of where or how someone learns, Chegg will be there  
for them. From day one, ***Chegg was built on the inevitability that people***  
***would need to learn more often, increasingly online, and need greater***  
***support.*** Long before the global pandemic, we believed the digital transition  
was coming and education would have to fundamentally change.

1 (Emphasis added.)

2 ***October 26, 2020 Press Release***

3 117. On October 26, 2020, the Company issued a press release announcing, also  
4 attached to a Form 8-K filed with the SEC the same day, its financial results for the quarter  
5 ended September 30, 2020. The press release contained the following prepared remarks by  
6 Defendant Rosensweig, in which he stated:

7 It has become apparent to us, that this terrible pandemic has only further  
8 highlighted the need for higher education to transition to a model that is more  
9 on-demand, student-centric, affordable, and does a much better job of  
10 leveraging technology to the advantage of the learner. As evident in our Q3  
11 results, students more than ever before are relying on Chegg as they navigate  
12 their semesters, whether they are back on campus or not. And while our  
13 business continues to have an extraordinary year, more importantly, we are  
14 helping millions of students get through these uncertain times. In Q3, we saw  
15 subscriber growth of 69% year-over-year, reaching 3.7 million students in the  
16 quarter. This yielded total net revenue growth of 64%, year-over-year. ***The***  
17 ***inevitable trend towards online learning, the clear need for high-quality***  
18 ***online support, and the momentum we are experiencing globally, gives us***  
19 ***the confidence to raise our guidance again for 2020 and provide our initial***  
20 ***outlook for 2021.*** Andy will walk you through all of these numbers shortly,  
21 but I would like to take a moment to share with you why we believe our results  
22 will continue to perform at such a high level.

23 ***Millions of students around the world are now asking for a better return for***  
24 ***their education and demanding a shift to the model we always knew it would***  
25 ***become: increasingly online, on-demand, adaptive, affordable,***  
26 ***personalized, and tailored to the modern learner.*** Chegg has been focused  
27 on these things for years so, we believe we are in the best position to not only  
28 expand academic support to students but also expand support to learners  
throughout their professional journey. We have tailored our efforts to reach  
students on different paths, including more at online schools and community  
colleges, and we are also seeing increasing demand for online learning support  
from students around the world.

Even before the global pandemic, there was a real question around the ROI of  
a college education and students are demanding the ability to learn faster, have  
their education directly connect to their career path, and accelerate their path

1 from learning to earning. We know that the modern student also looks very  
2 different than they once did. They are older, many have families, they are  
3 juggling work and school at the same time, so it comes as no surprise that they  
4 need more flexibility when it comes to their learning. More than ever before,  
5 like everything else in their lives - entertainment, dining, banking - they expect  
6 education to come to them, at the time that is most convenient for them, in the  
7 format that they want, at a price they can afford, and that provides a real ROI.  
8 ***Chegg's online learning support platform is designed to serve the students  
9 in just this way.***

8 \* \* \*

9 What this means for Chegg is there's an overwhelming need for the services  
10 we provide, and we see that in the increased demand and engagement across  
11 all our platforms, all over the world. ***And, as students rely on Chegg for more  
12 academic support, we continue to expand what we offer, more recently with  
13 the acquisition of Mathway. These expanded offerings will also increase the  
14 value proposition for Chegg Study Pack, which is why we are seeing higher  
15 than expected take rates for that offering, including internationally.***

15 \* \* \*

16 The other inevitable trend that we have identified is that students everywhere  
17 are seeking alternative, less expensive, pathways to pursue their careers. That  
18 is why we invested in Thinkful and in skills-based learning. We think our  
19 strategy of increasing the curriculum to match to the most in-demand jobs,  
20 lowering our prices, offering Income Sharing Agreements, and building in  
21 live chat support is a better model than anyone else has to offer.

22 And while we continue to navigate this complicated time in our history, while  
23 so many things have changed, some things remain the same. There will always  
24 be a need for students to learn new skills in order to improve their  
25 opportunities. There will always be institutional pathways, but they will now  
26 be both offline and online. There has always been a need to connect academic  
27 to professional pathways and we believe this moment in time will create a  
28 major acceleration of that trend. ***That is why we built Chegg, from day one,  
to be an advocate for this transition in higher education and why we  
continue to invest in supporting anyone on their learning journey. This is  
why we are reinventing the model of learning to earning, with lower priced,  
higher quality, human support, at scale - all exclusively online.***

1 (Emphasis added.)

2 **The Truth Begins Emerging While False and Misleading Statements Continue**

3 ***December 2020 Texas A&M Cheating Discovery***

4 118. The truth began emerging in December 2020 when, as described above,  
5 multiple news outlets reported that Texas A&M officials had discovered widespread  
6 cheating by students who were using Chegg.

7 119. Despite certain aspects of the Cheating Misconduct coming to light at this  
8 time, the full extent, including the Copyright Infringement Misconduct, and the degree to  
9 which the Company's short-term increase in revenue was a product of this misconduct  
10 remained undisclosed.

11 ***February 8, 2021 Press Release***

12 120. On February 8, 2021, the Company issued a press release, also attached to a  
13 Form 8-K filed with the SEC the same day, announcing its financial results for the quarter  
14 and full year ended December 31, 2020. The press release contained the following  
15 statement by Defendant Rosensweig, in relevant part:

16 We are incredibly grateful that, even in the midst of the many challenges of  
17 the past year, we outperformed all expectations and were able to continue to  
18 support students, in record numbers, around the world[.] . . . ***The transition to  
19 online and hybrid learning is inevitable and, with the accelerated trends that  
20 we are seeing, we have the confidence to raise our guidance for 2021.***

21 (Emphasis added.)

22 ***April 16, 2021 Proxy Statement***

23 121. On April 16, 2021, the Company filed the 2021 Proxy Statement with the  
24 SEC. Defendants Rosensweig, Sarnoff, Bond, Budig, LeBlanc, Levine, Schlein, Whelan  
25 and York solicited the 2021 Proxy Statement filed pursuant to Section 14(a) of the  
26 Exchange Act, which contained material misstatements and omissions.<sup>4</sup>

27 <sup>4</sup> Plaintiff's allegations with respect to the misleading statements in the 2021 Proxy  
28 Statement are based solely on negligence; they are not based on any allegation of reckless  
or knowing conduct by or on behalf of the Individual Defendants, and they do not allege,

1 122. The 2021 Proxy Statement called for Company shareholders to vote to, *inter*  
2 *alia*: (1) elect Defendants LeBlanc, Levine, and Sarnoff to the Board; (2) approve, via non-  
3 binding advisory vote, the 2020 Fiscal Year compensation of the Company's named  
4 executive officers, including Defendants Rosensweig, Brown, Schultz, and Fillmore; and  
5 (3) ratify the appointment of Deloitte & Touche LLP as the Company's independent  
6 registered public accounting firm for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2021.

7 123. The 2021 Proxy Statement stated the following regarding the performance-  
8 based portion of named executive officer compensation:

9 We grant PSUs [performance-based restricted stock units] because they are  
10 linked to stockholder value creation, like RSUs [here meaning time-based  
11 restricted stock units], but are also leveraged to our financial performance and  
12 allow us to set appropriate annual goals that we believe are critical to drive  
13 long-term success. On March 1, 2020, the Compensation Committee granted  
14 PSU awards to our NEOs subject to the achievement of certain financial  
15 performance goals and conditioned on the executive officer's service up to and  
16 through the applicable multi-year, time-based vesting dates.

17 *These PSUs will be earned and eligible to vest contingent on the*  
18 *achievement of two equally weighted performance metrics: (1) fiscal year*  
19 *2020 Chegg Services Revenue and (2) fiscal year 2020 adjusted EBITDA*  
20 *(both as defined below). These two metrics were selected because the*  
21 *Compensation Committee believes that Chegg Services Revenue growth and*  
22 *adjusted EBITDA, a non-GAAP measure of profitability, are the most*  
23 *important drivers of stockholder value for Chegg in 2020 as they are primary*  
24 *components of our overall revenue growth and profitability. The selection of*  
25 *these two measures as PSU metrics ensures our executive officers are*  
26 *incentivized in accordance with the long-term interests of our stockholders.*  
27 The performance metrics and their timing are synchronized with the board-  
28 approved corporate strategic plan and associated metrics and targets.

29 We currently use a one-year performance period (with a multi-year time-  
30 based vesting schedule) to allow us the flexibility to set appropriate annual  
31 goals to drive stockholder value given our high growth expectations and the

32 and do not sound in, fraud. Plaintiff specifically disclaims any allegations of, reliance upon  
33 any allegation of, or reference to any allegation of fraud, scienter, or recklessness with  
34 regard to these allegations and related claims.

1 rapidly changing nature of the industry in which we operate. Because of the  
2 potential risks to performance and motivation that are associated with  
3 improperly setting goals in a high-growth environment, the Compensation  
4 Committee has not adopted multi-year performance goals at this time but will  
continually monitor this topic.

5 (Emphasis added.)

6 124. With respect to the Company's Code of Conduct, the 2021 Proxy Statement  
7 stated that: "We have adopted a Code of Business Conduct and Ethics that applies to all of  
8 our directors, officers and employees. . . . To satisfy the disclosure requirement under Item  
9 5.05 of Form 8-K, any amendments or waivers of our Code of Business Conduct and Ethics  
10 pertaining to a member of our Board of Directors or one of our executive officers will be  
11 disclosed on our website[.]" The 2021 Proxy Statement also stated that: "Our employees  
12 are required to comply with our Code of Business Conduct and Ethics[.]"

13 125. Regarding the "Board of Directors' Role in Risk Oversight," the 2021 Proxy  
14 statement said:

15 Our Board of Directors, as a whole, has responsibility for risk oversight,  
16 although the committees of our Board of Directors oversee and review risk  
17 areas which are particularly relevant to them. The risk oversight responsibility  
18 of our Board of Directors and its committees is supported by our management  
19 reporting processes, which are designed to provide visibility to the Board of  
20 Directors and to our personnel that are responsible for risk assessment and  
21 information management about the identification, assessment and  
22 management of critical risks and management's risk mitigation strategies.  
These areas of focus include, but are not limited to, competitive, economic,  
operational, financial (accounting, credit, liquidity and tax), legal, regulatory,  
compliance and reputational risks.

23  Each committee of the Board of Directors meets in executive session with key  
24 management personnel and representatives of outside advisers to oversee risks  
25 associated with their respective principal areas of focus. The Audit Committee  
26 reviews our major financial risk exposures and the steps management has  
27 taken to monitor and control such exposures, including our risk assessment  
28 and risk management policies and guidelines. The Governance and  
Sustainability Committee reviews our major legal compliance risk exposures  
and monitors the steps management has taken to mitigate these exposures,

1 including our legal risk assessment and legal risk management policies and  
2 guidelines. The Compensation Committee reviews our major compensation-  
3 related risk exposures, including consideration of whether compensation  
4 rewards and incentives encourage undue or inappropriate risk taking by our  
5 personnel, and the steps management has taken to monitor or mitigate such  
6 exposures.

7 126. Defendants Rosensweig, Sarnoff, Bond, Budig, LeBlanc, Levine, Schlein,  
8 Whelan and York caused the 2021 Proxy Statement to be false and misleading, with regard  
9 to the statements in ¶¶ 23–25 by failing to disclose that: (1) though the Company claimed  
10 that, in awarding performance-based compensation, it used certain metrics to  
11 “ensure[[Chegg’s] executive officers are incentivized in accordance with the long-term  
12 interests of our stockholders[,]” the selected metrics actually rewarded the Company’s  
13 officers for a short-term increase in revenue caused by a combination of the Covid-19  
14 pandemic and the Cheating Misconduct, and that these metrics would meaningfully decline  
15 once widespread remote learning ended; (2) though the Company claimed its directors and  
16 officers adhered to the Code of Conduct and that it would disclose waivers of the policy,  
17 the Individual Defendants violated the Code of Conduct either without waivers or without  
18 such waivers being disclosed; and (3) the Board, and its committees were not properly  
19 exercising their risk oversight functions, including their review of the risk exposures  
20 described, as evidenced by the occurrence of the wrongdoing alleged herein, which  
21 involved members of the Board.

22 127. In addition, the 2021 Proxy Statement was materially false and misleading,  
23 and failed to disclose material facts necessary to make the statement made not false and  
24 misleading, because the 2021 Proxy Statement failed to disclose, *inter alia*, that: (1) Chegg  
25 was engaged in the Cheating Misconduct and the Copyright Infringement Misconduct; (2)  
26 Chegg’s facilitation of cheating made easier by remote learning caused the Company to  
27 experience an increase in subscribers and revenue, rather than the factors the Company  
28 publicly represented; (3) as such, once in-person learning returned, the Company would  
not continue to enjoy a surge in subscriptions and revenue; (4) due to the foregoing, the

1 Company overstated its potential for growth throughout the Relevant Period; and (5) the  
2 Company failed to maintain internal controls.

3 128. As a result of Defendants Rosensweig, Sarnoff, Bond, Budig, LeBlanc,  
4 Levine, Schlein, Whelan and York causing the 2021 Proxy Statement to be false and  
5 misleading, Company shareholders voted, *inter alia*, to: (1) elect Defendants LeBlanc,  
6 Levine, and Sarnoff to the Board, allowing them to continue or being breaching their  
7 fiduciary duties to the Company and; (2) approve, via non-binding advisory vote, the  
8 compensation of the Company's named executive officers, including Defendants  
9 Rosensweig, Brown, Schultz, and Fillmore, who were breaching their fiduciary duties to  
10 the Company.

11 ***May 3, 2021 Press Release***

12 129. On May 3, 2021, the Company issued a press release, also attached to a From  
13 8-K filed with the SEC the same day, announcing its financial results for the quarter ended  
14 March 31, 2021. The press release contained the following statement by Defendant  
15 Rosensweig, in relevant part: "***We are in a unique position*** to impact the future of the  
16 higher education ecosystem[.] . . . ***Our strong brand and momentum will allow us to***  
17 ***continue to grow and take advantage of the ever-expanding opportunities*** in the learner  
18 economy." (Emphasis added.)

19 ***August 9, 2021 Press Release***

20 130. On August 9, 2021, the Company issued a press release, also attached to a  
21 From 8-K filed with the SEC the same day, announcing its financial results for the quarter  
22 ended June 30, 2021. The press release contained the following statement by Defendant  
23 Rosensweig, in relevant part: "It is clear, ***wherever students are learning, whether online,***  
24 ***in the classroom, or in a hybrid model, the value of Chegg is unquestionable[.]***"  
25 (Emphasis added.)

26 131. The statements identified in ¶¶ 115–17, 120, and 129–30 were materially false  
27 and misleading, and failed to disclose material facts necessary to make the statements made  
28

1 not false and misleading. Specifically, the Individual Defendants improperly failed to  
2 disclose, *inter alia*, that: (1) Chegg was engaged in the Cheating Misconduct and the  
3 Copyright Infringement Misconduct; (2) Chegg's facilitation of cheating made easier by  
4 remote learning caused the Company to experience an increase in subscribers and revenue,  
5 rather than the factors the Company publicly represented; (3) as such, once in-person  
6 learning returned, the Company would not continue to enjoy a surge in subscriptions and  
7 revenue; (4) due to the foregoing, the Company overstated its potential for growth  
8 throughout the Relevant Period; and (5) the Company failed to maintain internal controls.  
9 As a result of the foregoing, Chegg's public statements were materially false and  
10 misleading at all relevant times.

### 11 The Truth Fully Emerges

12 132. On September 13, 2021, Pearson initiated the Pearson Action, revealing that  
13 Chegg engaged in the Copyright Infringement Misconduct by making available to Chegg  
14 subscribers answer sets to Pearson's, and other companies', copyrighted questions.

15 133. The truth finally emerged on November 1, 2021, after the market had closed,  
16 when Chegg announced, in a press release and a Form 10-Q filed with the SEC, its financial  
17 results for the quarter ended September 30, 2021—i.e., a period that included the start of  
18 the first academic semester since the onset of Covid-19 where remote learning had been  
19 significantly curtailed. In the press release and the Form 10-Q, Chegg revealed that it had  
20 fewer subscribers than expected, that key revenue metrics had decelerated or contracted,  
21 and that the Company would not be issuing guidance for the 2022 fiscal year.

22 134. From the first quarter of 2021 to the second quarter of 2021, revenue growth  
23 in the Chegg Services segment declined year-over-year from 62% to 38%. In the Required  
24 Materials segment during this same time, revenue growth declined from 15% growth, year-  
25 over-year, in the first quarter 2021, to an 8% **contraction**, year-over-year, by the second  
26 quarter 2021. From the second quarter 2021 to the third quarter 2021, revenue growth in  
27 the Chegg Services segment declined further still from 38% to 23%, year-over-year.  
28

1 Likewise, in the Required Materials segment, revenue continued contracting year-over-  
2 year, dropping from an 8% contraction the second quarter 2021 to a 28% contraction in the  
3 third quarter 2021. In total, from the first quarter 2021, to the second quarter 2021, to the  
4 third quarter 2021, the Company's total revenue growth, year-over-year, fell from 51% to  
5 30% to 12%, respectively.

6 135. Moreover, Defendant Rosensweig acknowledged in prepared remarks  
7 contained in the November 1, 2021 press release that, "*in late September it became clear*  
8 *to us that the education industry is experiencing a slowdown[.]*" (Emphasis added.)

9 136. On this news, the price of the Company's common stock fell from \$62.76 per  
10 share at close on November 1, 2021, to close on November 2, 2021 at \$32.12 per share, a  
11 remarkable drop of \$30.64 per share or nearly 50%.

### 12 Secondary Public Offering

13 137. During the period in which the Company made false and misleading  
14 statements and/or omissions, causing its share price to be artificially inflated, the Individual  
15 Defendants caused the Company to offer over 11 million additional shares to investors  
16 through a secondary public offering.

17 138. According to a Form 8-K filed by the Company with the SEC on February 19,  
18 2021, a total of 11,274,600 shares were sold in the secondary public offering (300,000 of  
19 which were Defendant Rosensweig's shares) at a price of \$102.00 per share. The Company  
20 estimated that it would receive approximately \$1.09 billion in net proceeds as a result.

21 139. Defendant Rosensweig personally made \$29,865,600 by selling his 300,000  
22 shares in the secondary public offering at prices artificially inflated by his own false and  
23 misleading statements, demonstrating his motive for both making these statements and  
24 pursuing a secondary public offering which exposed the Company to liability for violations  
25 of the Exchange Act.

26 140. The Individual Defendants' actions, in causing the Company to engage in this  
27 secondary public offering while the price of its securities was artificially inflated due to the  
28

1 misconduct described herein, constituted a breach of their fiduciary duties to the Company  
2 that resulted in Defendant Rosensweig being personally enriched by the Individual  
3 Defendants', including his own, deceptions and the Company being subjected to costly  
4 litigation and potential liability in the Securities Class Action for the violations of the  
5 Exchange Act which the Individual Defendants caused it to undertake.

### 6 **Insider Sales**

7 141. Defendants Rosensweig, Schultz, Fillmore, Tomasello, Sarnoff, and York  
8 made insider sales, detailed above, at prices artificially inflated by the false and misleading  
9 statements at issue for collective proceeds of \$91.8 million.

10 142. Those sales that occurred shortly before or after the Individual Defendants  
11 caused the Company to issue false and misleading statement contribute to an inference that  
12 these Individual Defendants knew of the falsity of the statements and were cashing in while  
13 the Company's common stock continued to trade at artificially inflated prices.

14 143. For example, following the false and misleading statements issued in the May  
15 4, 2020 press release, Defendant Shultz sold 47,376 shares of Company common stock for  
16 proceeds of about \$3.2 million on May 5, 2020; Defendant Sarnoff sold 66,666 shares of  
17 Company common stock for proceeds of about \$4.3 million on May 13, 2020; Defendant  
18 Rosensweig sold 28,000 shares of Company common stock for proceeds of about \$1.8  
19 million on May 14, 2020, and Defendant Fillmore sold 49,442 shares of Company common  
20 stock for proceeds of about \$3.2 million on May 18, 2020.

21 144. Prior to the false and misleading statements issued in the August 3, 2020 press  
22 release, Defendant Schultz sold 82,459 shares of Company common stock for proceeds of  
23 about \$6.6 million on July 31, 2020. Following the false and misleading statements issued  
24 in the August 3, 2020 press release, Defendant Rosensweig sold 28,000 shares of Company  
25 common stock for proceeds of about \$2.4 million on August 5, 2020.

1 145. Prior to the false and misleading statements issued in the October 26, 2020  
2 press release, Defendant Rosensweig sold 28,000 shares of Company common stock for  
3 proceeds of about \$2.3 million on October 12, 2020.

4 146. As previously mentioned, following the false and misleading statements  
5 issued in the February 8, 2021 press release, Defendant Rosensweig sold 300,000 shares  
6 of Company common stock in the secondary public offering for proceeds of about \$29.9  
7 million on February 22, 2021. Shortly thereafter, on March 3, 2021, Defendant Fillmore  
8 sold 51,505 shares of Company common stock for proceeds of about \$4.8 million.

9 147. Just before the false and misleading statements contained in the 2021 Proxy  
10 Statement were filed with the SEC on April 16, 2021, Defendant Fillmore sold 19,174  
11 shares of Company common stock for proceeds of about \$1.8 million on April 13, 2021.  
12 Just afterwards, on April 23, 2021, Defendant Schultz sold 30,000 shares of Company  
13 common stock for proceeds of about \$2.8 million. Just three days later, on April 26, 2020,  
14 Defendant Schultz sold another 30,000 shares of Company common stock for proceeds of  
15 about \$2.9 million. Not only did these sales just after the Company made false and  
16 misleading statements that artificially inflated the price of the Company's common stock,  
17 they also occurred just before the Company made more false and misleading statements  
18 which would artificially inflate the price of the Company's common stock, in the May 3,  
19 2021 press release.

20 148. The timing and amounts of these insider sales, made while the price of the  
21 Company's common stock was artificially inflated, further demonstrate that the Individual  
22 Defendants, including those who served on the Board, knew of the falsity of the statements  
23 made and that those Individual Defendants who made insider sales were using this  
24 knowledge to enrich themselves while the Company's common stock remained inflated.

#### 25 **DAMAGES TO CHEGG**

26 149. As a direct and proximate result of the Individual Defendants' misconduct,  
27 Chegg has lost and expended, and will lose and expend, many millions of dollars.  
28





1           160. In complete abdication of their fiduciary duties, the Director-Defendants  
2 either knowingly or recklessly participated in causing or permitting the Company to engage  
3 in the Cheating Misconduct and the Copyright Infringement Misconduct and making  
4 and/or causing the Company to make the materially false and misleading statements  
5 alleged herein. The fraudulent scheme was, *inter alia*, intended to make the Company  
6 appear more profitable and attractive to investors. As a result of the foregoing, the Director-  
7 Defendants breached their fiduciary duties, face a substantial likelihood of liability, are not  
8 disinterested, and demand upon them is futile, and thus excused.

9           161. Additional reasons that demand on Defendant Rosensweig is futile follow.  
10 Defendant Rosensweig has served as the Company's CEO and President since February  
11 2010, as Chairperson of the Board from March 2010 to July 2018, and as Co-Chairperson  
12 of the Board since July 2018. As such, the Company provides Defendant Rosensweig with  
13 his principal occupation for which he receives lucrative compensation. Thus, as the  
14 Company admits, he is a non-independent director. As CEO and Co-Chairperson  
15 throughout the Relevant Period, Defendant Rosensweig was ultimately responsible for all  
16 of the false and misleading statements and omissions that were made by or on behalf of the  
17 Company, including, *inter alia*, those contained in the press releases, cited above, wherein  
18 he personally made the false and misleading statements at issue. In addition, he solicited  
19 the 2021 Proxy Statement which contained false and misleading elements that contributed,  
20 *inter alia*, to  shareholders approving, on an advisory basis, his unjust compensation. As the  
21 Company's highest officer and as a trusted Co-Chairperson, he conducted little, if any,  
22 oversight of the Company's engagement in the schemes to engage in the Cheating  
23 Misconduct, the Copyright Infringement Misconduct, and to make false and misleading  
24 statements; consciously disregarded his duties to monitor such controls over reporting and  
25 engagement in the schemes; and consciously disregarded his duties to protect corporate  
26 assets. His insider sales before the fraud was exposed, many of which coincided with him  
27 and the Company making false and misleading statements, yielded approximately \$48.8  
28

1 million in proceeds and demonstrate his motive in facilitating and participating in the fraud.  
2 Furthermore, Defendant Rosensweig is a defendant in the Securities Class Action. For  
3 these reasons, too, Defendant Rosensweig breached his fiduciary duties, faces a substantial  
4 likelihood of liability, is not independent or disinterested, and thus demand upon him is  
5 futile and, therefore, excused.

6 162. Additional reasons that demand on Defendant Sarnoff is futile follow.  
7 Defendant Sarnoff has served as Co-Chairperson of the Board since July 2018 and as a  
8 Company director since August 2012. He is also a member of the Audit Committee. As  
9 Co-Chairperson, he receives substantial compensation. In addition, Defendant Sarnoff  
10 solicited the 2021 Proxy Statement, which contained false and misleading elements that  
11 contributed, *inter alia*, to shareholders reelecting him to the Board. As the Company's  
12 trusted Co-Chairperson, he conducted little, if any, oversight of the Company's  
13 engagement in the schemes to engage in the Cheating Misconduct, the Copyright  
14 Infringement Misconduct, and to make false and misleading statements; consciously  
15 disregarded his duties to monitor such controls over reporting and engagement in the  
16 schemes; and consciously disregarded his duties to protect corporate assets. His insider sale  
17 before the fraud was exposed, which coincided with the Company making false and  
18 misleading statements, yielded approximately \$4.3 million in proceeds and demonstrates  
19 his motive in facilitating and participating in the fraud. Furthermore, Defendant Sarnoff is  
20 a defendant in the Securities Class Action.<sup>5</sup> For these reasons, too, Defendant Sarnoff  
21 breached his fiduciary duties, faces a substantial likelihood of liability, is not independent  
22 or disinterested, and thus demand upon him is futile and, therefore, excused.

23 163. Additional reasons that demand on Defendant Bond is futile follow.  
24 Defendant Bond has served as a Company director since December 2020, and she is a  
25 member of the Compensation Committee. Defendant Bond has received and continues to  
26

---

27 <sup>5</sup> As mentioned above, Defendant Sarnoff is named as a defendant in the Securities Class  
28 Action complaint's "Parties" section, though he is omitted from the complaint's caption.

1 receive significant compensation for her role as a director. In addition, she solicited the  
2 2021 Proxy Statement, which contained false and misleading elements that benefitted the  
3 other Individual Defendants. As a trusted Company director, she conducted little, if any,  
4 oversight of the Company's engagement in the schemes to engage in the Cheating  
5 Misconduct, the Copyright Infringement Misconduct, and to make false and misleading  
6 statements; consciously disregarded her duties to monitor such controls over reporting and  
7 engagement in the schemes; and consciously disregarded her duties to protect corporate  
8 assets. For these reasons, too, Defendant Bond breached her fiduciary duties, faces a  
9 substantial likelihood of liability, is not independent or disinterested, and thus demand  
10 upon her is futile and, therefore, excused.

11 164. Additional reasons that demand on Defendant Budig is futile follow.  
12 Defendant Budig has served as a Company director since November 2015. She also serves  
13 as Chair of the Audit Committee. Defendant Budig has received and continues to receive  
14 significant compensation for her role as a director. In addition, she solicited the 2021 Proxy  
15 Statement, which contained false and misleading elements that benefitted the other  
16 Individual Defendants. As a trusted Company director, she conducted little, if any,  
17 oversight of the Company's engagement in the schemes to engage in the Cheating  
18 Misconduct, the Copyright Infringement Misconduct, and to make false and misleading  
19 statements; consciously disregarded her duties to monitor such controls over reporting and  
20 engagement in the schemes; and consciously disregarded her duties to protect corporate  
21 assets. For these reasons, too, Defendant Budig breached her fiduciary duties, faces a  
22 substantial likelihood of liability, is not independent or disinterested, and thus demand  
23 upon her is futile and, therefore, excused.

24 165. Additional reasons that demand on Defendant LeBlanc is futile follow.  
25 Defendant LeBlanc has served as a Company director since July 2019, and he is a member  
26 of the Governance and Sustainability Committee. Defendant LeBlanc has received and  
27 continues to receive significant compensation for his role as a director. In addition, he  
28

1 solicited the 2021 Proxy Statement, which contained false and misleading elements that,  
2 *inter alia*, contributed to his reelection to the Board. As a trusted Company director, he  
3 conducted little, if any, oversight of the Company's engagement in the schemes to engage  
4 in the Cheating Misconduct, the Copyright Infringement Misconduct, and to make false  
5 and misleading statements; consciously disregarded his duties to monitor such controls  
6 over reporting and engagement in the schemes; and consciously disregarded his duties to  
7 protect corporate assets. For these reasons, too, Defendant LeBlanc breached his fiduciary  
8 duties, faces a substantial likelihood of liability, is not independent or disinterested, and  
9 thus demand upon him is futile and, therefore, excused.

10 166. Additional reasons that demand on Defendant Levine is futile follow.  
11 Defendant Levine has served as a Company director since May 2013. She also serves as  
12 Chair of the Governance and Sustainability Committee and as a member of the  
13 Compensation Committee. Defendant Levine has received and continues to receive  
14 significant compensation for her role as a director. In addition, she solicited the 2021 Proxy  
15 Statement, which contained false and misleading elements that, *inter alia*, contributed to  
16 her reelection to the Board. As a trusted Company director, she conducted little, if any,  
17 oversight of the Company's engagement in the scheme to engage in the Cheating  
18 Misconduct, the Copyright Infringement Misconduct, and to make false and misleading  
19 statements; consciously disregarded her duties to monitor such controls over reporting and  
20 engagement in the scheme; and consciously disregarded her duties to protect corporate  
21 assets. For these reasons, too, Defendant Levine breached her fiduciary duties, faces a  
22 substantial likelihood of liability, is not independent or disinterested, and thus demand  
23 upon her is futile and, therefore, excused.

24 167. Additional reasons that demand on Defendant Schlein is futile follow.  
25 Defendant Schlein has served as a Company director since December 2008, and he is a  
26 member of both the Governance and Sustainability Committee and the Audit Committee.  
27 Defendant Schlein has received and continues to receive significant compensation for his  
28

1 role as a director. In addition, he solicited the 2021 Proxy Statement, which contained false  
2 and misleading elements that benefitted the other Individual Defendants. As a trusted  
3 Company director, he conducted little, if any, oversight of the Company's engagement in  
4 the schemes to engage in the Cheating Misconduct, the Copyright Infringement  
5 Misconduct, and to make false and misleading statements; consciously disregarded his  
6 duties to monitor such controls over reporting and engagement in the schemes; and  
7 consciously disregarded his duties to protect corporate assets. For these reasons, too,  
8 Defendant Schlein breached his fiduciary duties, faces a substantial likelihood of liability,  
9 is not independent or disinterested, and thus demand upon him is futile and, therefore,  
10 excused.

11 168. Additional reasons that demand on Defendant Whelan is futile follow.  
12 Defendant Whelan has served as a Company director since June 2019. She also serves as  
13 a member of the Compensation Committee. Defendant Whelan has received and continues  
14 to receive significant compensation for her role as a director. In addition, she solicited the  
15 2021 Proxy Statement, which contained false and misleading elements that benefitted the  
16 other Individual Defendants. As a trusted Company director, she conducted little, if any,  
17 oversight of the Company's engagement in the schemes to engage in the Cheating  
18 Misconduct, the Copyright Infringement Misconduct, and to make false and misleading  
19 statements; consciously disregarded her duties to monitor such controls over reporting and  
20 engagement in the schemes; and consciously disregarded her duties to protect corporate  
21 assets. For these reasons, too, Defendant Whelan breached her fiduciary duties, faces a  
22 substantial likelihood of liability, is not independent or disinterested, and thus demand  
23 upon her is futile and, therefore, excused.

24 169. Additional reasons that demand on Defendant York is futile follow. Defendant  
25 York has served as a Company director since June 2013, and he is Chair of the  
26 Compensation Committee and a member of the Governance and Sustainability Committee.  
27 Defendant York has received and continues to receive significant compensation for his role  
28

1 as a director. In addition, he solicited the 2021 Proxy Statement, which contained false and  
2 misleading elements that benefitted the other Individual Defendants. As a trusted Company  
3 director, he conducted little, if any, oversight of the Company's engagement in the schemes  
4 to engage in the Cheating Misconduct, the Copyright Infringement Misconduct, and to  
5 make false and misleading statements; consciously disregarded his duties to monitor such  
6 controls over reporting and engagement in the schemes; and consciously disregarded his  
7 duties to protect corporate assets. His insider sales before the fraud was exposed, which  
8 yielded approximately \$1.4 million in proceeds, demonstrate his motive in facilitating and  
9 participating in the fraud. For these reasons, too, Defendant York breached his fiduciary  
10 duties, faces a substantial likelihood of liability, is not independent or disinterested, and  
11 thus demand upon him is futile and, therefore, excused.

12 170. Additional reasons that demand on the Board is futile follow.

13 171. Moreover, as described above, Defendants Rosensweig, Sarnoff, and York  
14 directly engaged in insider trading, in violation of federal law. While in possession of  
15 material non-public information, Defendants Rosensweig, Sarnoff, and York collectively  
16 received proceeds in excess of \$54.5 million as a result of insider transactions executed  
17 during the period when the Company's stock price was artificially inflated due to the false  
18 and misleading statements alleged herein. Defendant Rosensweig and Sarnoff, in  
19 particular, engaged in insider sales that seemingly coincided with the Company making  
20 false and misleading statements. Therefore, demand in this case is futile as to them, and  
21 further excused.

22 172. Further still, Defendants Rosensweig, Sarnoff, Bond, Budig, LeBlanc, Levine,  
23 Schlein, Whelan and York approved the Company's February 2021 secondary offering of  
24 its common stock to investors at prices artificially inflated by their own misconduct,  
25 enriching Defendant Rosensweig by \$29,865,600 at the expense of making the Company  
26 violate the Exchange Act. This breach of fiduciary duties has subjected the Company, and  
27  
28

1 certain of the Individual Defendants, to a substantial likelihood of liability in the Securities  
2 Class Action. Therefore, demand in this case is futile as to them, and further excused.

3 173. Additionally, the Director-Defendants have longstanding business and  
4 personal relationships with each other and the other Individual Defendants that preclude  
5 them from acting independently and in the best interests of the Company and the  
6 shareholders. Defendants Rosensweig, Brown, Schultz, Fillmore, and Sarnoff have worked  
7 at the Company together for approximately a decade, with Schultz—with the longest  
8 tenure—having joined in 2008, and Fillmore—the last of the five to join—having joined  
9 in 2013. Moreover, Defendants Bond and Levine were MBA students together at Harvard  
10 Business School in 2005. These conflicts of interest precluded the Director-Defendants  
11 from adequately monitoring the Company’s operations and internal controls and calling  
12 into question each other’s and the remaining Individual Defendants’ conduct. Thus, any  
13 demand on the Director-Defendants would be futile.

14 174. Defendants Budig (as Chair), Sarnoff, and Schultz (collectively, the “Audit  
15 Committee Defendants”), served on the Company’s Audit Committee during the Relevant  
16 Period. The Audit Committee Defendants violated the Audit Committee Charter by  
17 engaging in or permitting the scheme to cause the Company to engage in the Cheating  
18 Misconduct and the Copyright Infringement Misconduct, to issue materially false and  
19 misleading statements to the investing public, and to facilitate and disguise the Individual  
20 Defendants’ violations of law, including breaches of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment,  
21 abuse of control, gross mismanagement, waste of corporate assets, and violations of the  
22 Exchange Act. In addition the Audit Committee Defendants violated the Audit Committee  
23 Charter by failing to adequately oversee the integrity of the Company’s financial  
24 disclosures, failing to adequately oversee the Company’s compliance with legal and  
25 regulatory requirements, failing to adequately oversee the Company’s risk assessments and  
26 risk management, failing to adequately discuss with management the Company’s financial  
27 information prior to public distribution, and failing to adequately oversee the Company’s  
28

1 allowing them to continue or being breaching their fiduciary duties to the Company and  
2 (2) approve, via non-binding advisory vote, the compensation of the Company's named  
3 executive officers, including Defendants Rosensweig, Brown, Schultz, and Fillmore, who  
4 were breaching their fiduciary duties to the Company.

5 189. The Company was damaged as a result of Defendants Rosensweig, Sarnoff,  
6 Bond, Budig, LeBlanc, Levine, Schlein, Whelan and York's material misrepresentations  
7 and omissions in the 2021 Proxy Statement.

8 190. Plaintiff on behalf of Chegg has no adequate remedy at law.

9 **SECOND CLAIM**

10 **Against Individual Defendants for Breach of Fiduciary Duties**

11 191. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation set  
12 forth above, as though fully set forth herein.

13 192. Each Individual Defendant owed to the Company the duty to exercise candor,  
14 good faith, and loyalty in the management and administration of Chegg's business and  
15 affairs.

16 193. Each of the Individual Defendants violated and breached his or her fiduciary  
17 duties of candor, good faith, loyalty, reasonable inquiry, oversight, and supervision.

18 194. The Individual Defendants' conduct set forth herein was due to their  
19 intentional or reckless breach of the fiduciary duties they owed to the Company, as alleged  
20 herein. The Individual Defendants intentionally or recklessly breached or disregarded their  
21 fiduciary duties to protect the rights and interests of Chegg.

22 195. In breach of their fiduciary duties, the Individual Defendants caused or  
23 permitted the Company to engage in the Cheating Misconduct and the Copyright  
24 Infringement Misconduct.

25 196. In further breach of their fiduciary duties owed to Chegg, the Individual  
26 Defendants willfully or recklessly made and/or caused the Company to make false and  
27 misleading statements and omissions of material fact that failed to disclose, *inter alia*, that:  
28

1 disclosure controls and procedures. Thus, the Audit Committee Defendants breached their  
2 fiduciary duties, are not disinterested, and demand is excused as to them.

3 175. In violation of the Code of Conduct, the Director-Defendants engaged in or  
4 permitted the scheme to cause the Company to engage in the Cheating Misconduct and the  
5 Copyright Infringement Misconduct, to issue materially false and misleading statements to  
6 the investing public, and to facilitate and disguise the Individual Defendants' violations of  
7 law, including breaches of fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, abuse of control, gross  
8 mismanagement, waste of corporate assets, and violations of the Exchange Act. In addition,  
9 the Individual Defendants violated the Code of Conduct by failing to act with integrity,  
10 supporting and profiting from unethical academic behavior, failing to avoid conflicts of  
11 interest, failing to respect the intellectual property rights of others, engaging in insider  
12 trading, failing to ensure the Company's disclosures were accurate, failing to ensure the  
13 Company complied with applicable laws, rules, and regulations, and failing to promptly  
14 report known violations of the Code of Conduct and the law. Thus the Director-Defendants  
15 breached the Company's own Code of Conduct, are not disinterested, and demand is  
16 excused as to them.

17 176. Chegg has been and will continue to be exposed to significant losses due to  
18 the wrongdoing complained of herein, yet the Directors have not filed any lawsuits against  
19 the Director-Defendants or any others who were responsible for that wrongful conduct to  
20 attempt to recover for Chegg any part of the damages Chegg suffered and will continue to  
21 suffer thereby. Thus, any demand upon the Directors would be futile.

22 177. The acts complained of herein constitute violations of fiduciary duties owed  
23 by Chegg's officers and directors, and these acts are incapable of ratification.

24 178. The Director-Defendants may also be protected against personal liability for  
25 their acts of mismanagement and breaches of fiduciary duty alleged herein by directors'  
26 and officers' liability insurance if they caused the Company to purchase it for their  
27 protection with corporate funds, i.e., monies belonging to the stockholders of Chegg. If  
28

1 there is a directors' and officers' liability insurance policy covering the Director-  
2 Defendants, it may contain provisions that eliminate coverage for any action brought  
3 directly by the Company against the Director-Defendants, known as, *inter alia*, the  
4 "insured-versus-insured exclusion." As a result, if the Director-Defendants were to sue  
5 themselves or certain of the officers of Chegg, there would be no directors' and officers'  
6 insurance protection. Accordingly, the Director-Defendants cannot be expected to bring  
7 such a suit. On the other hand, if the suit is brought derivatively, as this action is brought,  
8 such insurance coverage, if such an insurance policy exists, will provide a basis for the  
9 Company to effectuate a recovery. Thus, demand on the Director-Defendants is futile and,  
10 therefore, excused.

11 179. The Individual Defendants' conduct described herein and summarized above  
12 could not have been the product of legitimate business judgment as it was based on bad  
13 faith and intentional, reckless, or disloyal misconduct. Thus, none of the Director-  
14 Defendants can claim exculpation from their violations of duty pursuant to the Company's  
15 charter (to the extent such a provision exists). As all of the Director-Defendants, and if not  
16 all at least a majority of the Directors, face a substantial likelihood of liability, they are  
17 self-interested in the transactions challenged herein and cannot be presumed to be capable  
18 of exercising independent and disinterested judgment about whether to pursue this action  
19 on behalf of the shareholders of the Company. Accordingly, demand is excused as being  
20 futile.

21 180. If there is no directors' and officers' liability insurance, then the Director-  
22 Defendants will not cause Chegg to sue the Individual Defendants named herein, since, if  
23 they did, they would face a large uninsured individual liability. Accordingly, demand is  
24 futile in that event, as well.

25 181. Thus, for all of the reasons set forth above, all of the Director-Defendants,  
26 and, if not all of them, at least five of the Directors, cannot consider a demand with  
27  
28

1 disinterestedness and independence. Consequently, a demand upon the Board is excused  
2 as futile.

### 3 FIRST CLAIM

#### 4 **Against Defendants Rosensweig, Sarnoff, Bond, Budig, LeBlanc, Levine, Schlein,** 5 **Whelan and York for Violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act**

6 182. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation set  
7 forth above, as though fully set forth herein.

8 183. Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(1), provides that “[i]t  
9 shall be unlawful for any person, by use of the mails or by any means or instrumentality of  
10 interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, in  
11 contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary or  
12 appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors, to solicit or to permit  
13 the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or authorization in respect of any security  
14 (other than an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 12 of this title [15 U.S.C.  
15 § 781].”

16 184. Rule 14a-9, promulgated pursuant to § 14(a) of the Exchange Act, provides  
17 that no proxy statement shall contain “any statement which, at the time and in the light of  
18 the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material  
19 fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements  
20 therein not false or misleading.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9.

21 185. Under the direction and watch of the Defendants Rosensweig, Sarnoff, Bond,  
22 Budig, LeBlanc, Levine, Schlein, Whelan and York, the 2021 Proxy Statement failed to  
23 disclose that: (1) Chegg was engaged in the Cheating Misconduct and the Copyright  
24 Infringement Misconduct; (2) Chegg’s facilitation of cheating made easier by remote  
25 learning caused the Company to experience an increase in subscribers and revenue, rather  
26 than the factors the Company publicly represented; (3) as such, once in-person learning  
27 returned, the Company would not continue to enjoy a surge in subscriptions and revenue;  
28

1 (4) due to the foregoing, the Company overstated its potential for growth throughout the  
2 Relevant Period; and (5) the Company failed to maintain internal controls. As a result of  
3 the foregoing, the Company's public statements were materially false and misleading at all  
4 relevant times.

5 186. Defendants Rosensweig, Sarnoff, Bond, Budig, LeBlanc, Levine, Schlein,  
6 Whelan and York also caused the 2021 Proxy Statement to be false and misleading by  
7 failing to disclose that: (1) though the Company claimed that, in awarding performance-  
8 based compensation, it used certain metrics to ensure Chegg's "executive officers are  
9 incentivized in accordance with the long-term interests of our stockholders[,]” the selected  
10 metrics actually rewarded the Company's officers for a short-term increase in revenue  
11 caused by a combination of the Covid-19 pandemic and the Cheating Misconduct, and that  
12 these metrics would meaningfully decline once widespread remote learning ended; (2)  
13 though the Company claimed its directors and officers adhered to the Code of Conduct and  
14 that it would disclose waivers of the policy, the Individual Defendants violated the Code  
15 of Conduct either without waivers or without such waivers being disclosed; and (3) the  
16 Board's, and its committees', risk oversight functions were not properly being exercised,  
17 as evidenced by the occurrence of the wrongdoing alleged herein, which involved members  
18 of the Board.

19 187. In the exercise of reasonable care, Defendants Rosensweig, Sarnoff, Bond,  
20 Budig, LeBlanc, Levine, Schlein, Whelan and York should have known that by  
21 misrepresenting or failing to disclose the foregoing material facts, the statements contained  
22 in the 2021 Proxy Statement were materially false and misleading. The misrepresentations  
23 and omissions were material to Plaintiff in voting on the matters set forth for shareholder  
24 determination in the 2021 Proxy Statement, including but not limited to, the election of  
25 directors.

26 188. The false and misleading elements of the 2021 Proxy Statement, led Company  
27 shareholders to, *inter alia*: (1) elect Defendants LeBlanc, Levine, and Sarnoff to the Board,  
28

1 (1) Chegg was engaged in the Cheating Misconduct and the Copyright Infringement  
2 Misconduct; (2) Chegg's facilitation of cheating made easier by remote learning caused  
3 the Company to experience an increase in subscribers and revenue, rather than the factors  
4 the Company publicly represented; (3) as such, once in-person learning returned, the  
5 Company would not continue to enjoy a surge in subscriptions and revenue; (4) due to the  
6 foregoing, the Company overstated its potential for growth throughout the Relevant Period;  
7 and (5) the Company failed to maintain internal controls. As a result of the foregoing,  
8 Chegg's public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

9 197. The Individual Defendants failed to correct and caused the Company to fail to  
10 rectify any of the wrongs described herein or correct the false and misleading statements  
11 and omissions of material fact referenced herein, rendering them personally liable to the  
12 Company for breaching their fiduciary duties.

13 198. Also in breach of their fiduciary duties, the Individual Defendants failed to  
14 maintain an adequate system of oversight, disclosure controls and procedures, and internal  
15 controls.

16 199. In yet further breach of their fiduciary duties, during the Relevant Period, six  
17 of the Individual Defendants engaged in lucrative insider sales, netting proceeds of  
18 approximately \$91.8 million, while the price of the Company's common stock was  
19 artificially inflated due to the false and misleading statements of material fact discussed  
20 herein.

21 200. The Individual Defendants had actual or constructive knowledge that the  
22 Company issued materially false and misleading statements, and they failed to correct the  
23 Company's public statements. The Individual Defendants had actual knowledge of the  
24 misrepresentations and omissions of material facts set forth herein, or acted with reckless  
25 disregard for the truth, in that they failed to ascertain and to disclose such facts, even though  
26 such facts were available to them. Such material misrepresentations and omissions were  
27  
28





1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

**FIFTH CLAIM**

**Against the Individual Defendants for Gross Mismanagement**

214. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth herein.

215. By their actions alleged herein, the Individual Defendants, either directly or through aiding and abetting, abandoned and abdicated their responsibilities and fiduciary duties with regard to prudently managing the assets and business of Chegg in a manner consistent with the operations of a publicly-held corporation.

216. As a direct and proximate result of the Individual Defendants' gross mismanagement and breaches of duty alleged herein, Chegg has sustained and will continue to sustain significant damages.

217. As a result of the misconduct and breaches of duty alleged herein, the Individual Defendants are liable to the Company.

218. Plaintiff on behalf of Chegg has no adequate remedy at law.

**SIXTH CLAIM**

**Against Individual Defendants for Waste of Corporate Assets**

219. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth herein.

220. As a further result of the foregoing, the Company will incur many millions of dollars of legal liability and/or costs to defend unlawful actions (as evidenced, for example, by the Securities Class Action and the Pearson Action), to engage in internal investigations, and to lose financing from investors and business from future customers who no longer trust the Company and its products.

221. As a result of the waste of corporate assets, the Individual Defendants are each liable to the Company.

222. Plaintiff on behalf of Chegg has no adequate remedy at law.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

**SEVENTH CLAIM**

**Against Defendants Rosensweig, Brown, Schultz, Fillmore, Tomasello, and Sarnoff  
for Contribution Under Sections 10(b) and 21D of the Exchange Act**

223. Plaintiff incorporates by reference and realleges each and every allegation set forth above, as though fully set forth herein.

224. Chegg, along with Defendants Rosensweig, Brown, Schultz, Fillmore, Tomasello, and Sarnoff, are named as defendants in the Securities Class Action, which asserts claims under the federal securities laws for violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act, and SEC Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. If and when the Company is found liable in the Securities Class Action for these violations of the federal securities laws, the Company's liability will be in whole or in part due to Defendants Rosensweig's, Brown's, Schultz's, Fillmore's, Tomasello's, and Sarnoff's willful and/or reckless violations of their obligations as officers and/or director of Chegg.

225. Defendants Rosensweig, Brown, Schultz, Fillmore, Tomasello, and Sarnoff, because of their positions of control and authority as officers and/or director of Chegg, were able to and did, directly and/or indirectly, exercise control over the business and corporate affairs of Chegg, including the wrongful acts complained of herein and in the Securities Class Action.

226. Accordingly, Defendants Rosensweig, Brown, Schultz, Fillmore, Tomasello, and Sarnoff are liable under 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), which creates a private right of action for contribution, and Section 21D of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(f), which governs the application of a private right of action for contribution arising out of violations of the Exchange Act.

227. As such, Chegg is entitled to receive all appropriate contribution or indemnification from Defendants Rosensweig, Brown, Schultz, Fillmore, Tomasello, and Sarnoff.

**PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

1 FOR THESE REASONS, Plaintiff demands judgment in the Company's favor  
2 against all Individual Defendants as follows:

3 (a) Declaring that Plaintiff may maintain this action on behalf of Chegg,  
4 and that Plaintiff is an adequate representative of the Company;

5 (b) Declaring that the Individual Defendants have breached and/or aided  
6 and abetted the breach of their fiduciary duties to Chegg;

7 (c) Determining and awarding to Chegg the damages sustained by it as a  
8 result of the violations set forth above from each of the Individual Defendants, jointly and  
9 severally, together with pre-judgment and post-judgment interest thereon;

10 (d) Directing Chegg and the Individual Defendants to take all necessary  
11 actions to reform and improve its corporate governance and internal procedures to comply  
12 with applicable laws and to protect Chegg and its shareholders from a repeat of the  
13 damaging events described herein, including, but not limited to, putting forward for  
14 shareholder vote the following resolutions for amendments to the Company's Bylaws  
15 and/or Certificate of Incorporation and the following actions as may be necessary to ensure  
16 proper corporate governance policies:

17 1. a proposal to strengthen the Board's supervision of operations and  
18 develop and implement procedures for greater shareholder input into the policies  
19 and guidelines of the Board;

20 2. a provision to permit the shareholders of Chegg to nominate at least  
21 five candidates for election to the Board; and

22 3. a proposal to ensure the establishment of effective oversight of  
23 compliance with applicable laws, rules, and regulations.

24 (e) Awarding Chegg restitution from the Individual Defendants, and each  
25 of them;

26 (f) Awarding Plaintiff the costs and disbursements of this action, including  
27 reasonable attorneys' and experts' fees, costs, and expenses; and  
28

1 (g) Granting such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and  
2 proper.

3 **JURY TRIAL DEMANDED**

4 Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury.

5 Dated: January 12, 2022

6 Respectfully submitted,

7 **THE BROWN LAW FIRM, P.C.**

8 /s/ Robert C. Moest

9 Robert C. Moest, Of Counsel, SBN 62166

10 2530 Wilshire Boulevard, Second Floor

11 Santa Monica, California 90403

12 Telephone: (310) 915-6628

13 Facsimile: (310) 915-9897

14 Email: RMoest@aol.com

15 **THE BROWN LAW FIRM, P.C.**

16 Timothy Brown

17 767 Third Avenue, Suite 2501

18 New York, NY 10017

19 Telephone: (516) 922-5427

20 Facsimile: (516) 344-6204

21 Email: tbrown@thebrownlawfirm.net

22 *Counsel for Plaintiff*

**VERIFICATION**

I, Rak Joon Choi a plaintiff in the within action. I have reviewed the allegations made in this shareholder derivative complaint, know the contents thereof, and authorize its filing. To those allegations of which I have personal knowledge, I believe those allegations to be true. As to those allegations of which I do not have personal knowledge, I rely upon my counsel and their investigation and believe them to be true.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed this 1<sup>st</sup> day of 1/12/2022, 2022.

DocuSigned by:  
*Rak Joon Choi*  
AC7A14597FD8404...  
Rak Joon Choi