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24 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
25 **NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
26 **SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION**

27 DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

28 Plaintiffs,

v.

TWITTER, INC. et al.,

Defendants.

Case No: 21-cv-08378-JD

**PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RELIEF  
FROM JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO  
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(2) (NEWLY  
DISCOVERED EVIDENCE)**

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1       **I.       INTRODUCTION**

2           After the entry of this Court’s Judgment, on June 6, 2022 (the “Judgment”), J., 1. ECF  
3 168, two extraordinary events unearthed troves of new evidence supporting Plaintiffs’ claim for  
4 relief. Because much of this evidence comes from Defendants’ own files and was not otherwise  
5 available, its disclosure merits granting Plaintiffs relief from the Judgment pursuant to Rule  
6 60(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 60”).

7           First, Defendant Twitter was privately acquired by Elon Musk, who became its CEO.  
8 Musk granted unlimited access to Twitter’s internal files and authorized a series of exposés  
9 showing that, since 2016, Twitter maintained a cooperative (and at times compelled) relationship  
10 with the FBI, CIA, DHS, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (“ODNI”)  
11 (collectively, the United States Intelligence Community or “USIC”). These exposés, known as  
12 the Twitter Files, were published on Twitter in a series of installments beginning in December  
13 2022. The Twitter Files reveal that the USIC, along with members of Congress and congressional  
14 staffers, collaborated with, and sometimes bullied, Twitter into censoring content, regardless of  
15 whether it violated Twitter’s terms of service and, indeed, even when Twitter believed it was *not*  
16 violating its terms of service. This was pure censorship of viewpoints the government did not  
17 approve of—the most objectionable kind of censorship under long-established First Amendment  
18 law.

19           Second, in November of 2022, long after this Court entered its Judgment, the Attorneys  
20 General of Louisiana and Missouri deposed the FBI’s social media-industry liaison – Assistant  
21 Special Agent in Charge Elvis Chan. The deposition took place in an action brought by the  
22 Attorneys General in a lawsuit against 67 government defendants for coercing or colluding with  
23 social media platforms to suppress disfavored speakers and viewpoints. In this deposition, Chan  
24 further corroborates the heavy-handed influence of the USIC on Twitter’s content moderation  
25 decisions.

1 Both sets of disclosures confirm the state action allegations in Plaintiffs' Amended  
2 Complaint. The newly discovered evidence was unknown and unknowable to the Plaintiffs until  
3 after the Judgment was entered. Moreover, this evidence could and would have been discovered  
4 had this Court denied Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Rule 60 authorizes this Court to grant  
5 relief from a final judgment based on "newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,  
6 could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)." This new  
7 evidence was disclosed well after the 28-day window available for a Rule 59 new-trial motion.  
8 Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(b).

10 The Rule 60 motion speaks to key points addressed by the Court in its order granting the  
11 Motion to Dismiss ("Order"). For example, the Court held that the Plaintiffs had failed to plead  
12 sufficient facts supporting their allegations that the actions of the Defendants can be deemed  
13 actions of the government. Order, 3, Dkt. 165. The newly discovered evidence shows that  
14 members of the executive and legislative branches, working in cooperation with each other,  
15 pressured and urged the Defendants to censor disfavored speakers such as the Plaintiffs, and that  
16 as a result Plaintiffs' First Amendment rights were violated. If uncovered prior to the Judgment,  
17 the newly discovered evidence would have undoubtedly satisfied the Court's concerns about the  
18 sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' allegations. The newly discovered evidence, taken together with the  
19 allegations in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, and accepted as true for the purposes of a  
20 motion to dismiss, justifies relief from the Judgment. If the Court were to grant this Rule 60  
21 motion the Plaintiffs would seek leave to file a Second Amended Complaint incorporating these  
22 new facts.  
23  
24

## 25 **II. LEGAL STANDARD**

26 Under Rule 60(b)(2), a "court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final  
27 Judgment, order, or proceeding for . . . newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence,  
28 could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) . . . ." Fed. R.



1 Civ. P. 60(b)(2). The Ninth Circuit has extrapolated this into a three-part test:

2 Relief from Judgment on the basis of newly discovered evidence is warranted if (1)  
3 the moving party can show the evidence relied on in fact constitutes “newly  
4 discovered evidence” within the meaning of Rule 60(b); (2) the moving party  
5 exercised due diligence to discover the evidence; and (3) the newly discovered  
6 evidence must be of “such magnitude that production of it earlier would have been  
7 likely to change the disposition of the case.”

8 *Feature Realty, Inc. v. City of Spokane*, 331 F.3d 1082, 1093 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting *Coastal*  
9 *Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales*, 833 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir.1987)). A motion under Rule  
10 60(b) “must be made within a reasonable time and . . . no more than a year after the entry of the  
11 judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). *See also Nevitt v. U.S.*,  
12 886 F.2d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1989).

13 For evidence to be newly discovered within the meaning of Rule 60(b) it must “exist[] at  
14 the time of the trial,” *Jones v. Aero/Chem Corp.*, 921 F.2d 875, 878 (9th Cir.1990); *Simmons v.*  
15 *California*, No. 95-16954, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS at \*5 (9th Cir. Aug. 25, 1997); and it must be  
16 “discovered after trial” and neither “cumulative nor merely impeaching,” *Far Out Prods. v.*  
17 *Oskar*, 247 F.3d 986, 993 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing *Defenders of Wildlife v. Bernal*, 204 F.3d 920,  
18 929 (9th Cir. 2000)). The evidence cannot have been in the moving party’s possession or  
19 discoverable by it with due diligence. *Feature Realty*, 331 F.3d at 1093; *Wallis v. J.R. Simplot*  
20 *Co.*, 26 F.3d 885, 892 (9th Cir. 1994). Additionally, it must be “material to the issues at trial . . .  
21 .” *United States v. Harrington*, 410 F.3d 598, 601 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting *United States v.*  
22 *Kulczyk*, 931 F.2d 542, 548 (9th Cir. 1991)).

23 As the Judgment was entered in response to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss,  
24 materiality is determined under the motion-to-dismiss standard, where claims are evaluated by  
25 accepting the allegations as true. *See Bell Atl. Corp v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007);  
26 *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); *A.H. v. West Contra Costa Unified Sch. Dist.*, No.  
27 22-cv-03233, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 233744, at \*3-4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 30, 2022) (“A claim is  
28

1 plausible on its face if, accepting all the factual allegations as true and construing them in the  
2 light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court can reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for  
3 the misconduct alleged.”)

### 4 **III. ARGUMENT**

#### 5 **A. The Newly Discovered Evidence Shows That Defendants’ Content** 6 **Moderation Was Conducted Jointly with, and at Times Compelled by, the** 7 **Federal Government.**

##### 8 **1. The Nature of the Newly Discovered Evidence.**

###### 9 **(a) The Twitter Files.**

10 On or about October 27, 2022, Elon Musk officially acquired sole possession of Twitter,  
11 celebrating the event with a statement on the platform reading: “the bird is free.” (Declaration of  
12 Richard P. Lawson, dated April 28, 2023, (“Lawson Decl.”) annexed hereto as Exhibit A, ¶ 4).  
13 Musk has served as Twitter’s CEO since the acquisition. (*Id.* ¶ 5). In statements principally  
14 made through his personal Twitter account, Musk announced that a series of exposés he termed  
15 “The Twitter Files on free speech suppression” were “to be published on Twitter itself.” (*Id.* ¶ 6).

16 Each installment of the Twitter Files is presented as a series of posts (known as a thread)  
17 by a specific reporter. The first installment explained that the exposés were based on thousands  
18 of internal Twitter documents. (*Id.* ¶ 7). Since then, at least sixteen additional installments have  
19 been published. Of Twitter File materials cited herein, Musk has personally promoted or  
20 endorsed each of the Twitter File threads referenced in this motion through his personal Twitter  
21 account. (*Id.* ¶¶ 8-20, 70).

22 For example:

- 23 • The first installment detailed how Twitter “handled” tweets flagged for content  
24 moderation review “from the Biden team.” When a user commented on that  
25 portion of the Twitter Files, Musk replied: “If this isn’t a violation of the  
26 Constitution’s First Amendment, what is?” (*Id.* ¶ 21).

- 1 • After the conclusion of the first installment, Musk tweeted: “Tune in for Episode  
2 of the Twitter Files tomorrow!” (*Id.* ¶ 22).
- 3 • When a Twitter user referenced a post from a later installment of the Twitter Files,  
4 stating that the “the government was in constant contact” with Twitter and other  
5 social media platforms, Musk replied “. . . \*Every\* social media company is  
6 engaged in heavy censorship, with significant involvement of and, at time, explicit  
7 direction of the government . . . .” (*Id.* ¶23).
- 8 • Responding to a Twitter user’s tweet asking “[W]ere any political candidates—  
9 either in the US or elsewhere—**subject to shadowbanning** while they were  
10 running for office or seeking re-election?,” Musk tweeted “**Yes.**” (*Id.* ¶ 24)  
11 (emphasis added).
- 12 • Responding to a Twitter user’s tweet stating “Yoel Roth [Twitter’s Head of Trust  
13 & Safety], meeting with FBI weekly, and his little censorship minions absolutely  
14 degraded Twitter into little more than a full-on Democratic Party activist machine,  
15 all while lying to the public about its function,” Mr. Musk tweeted “**There is no**  
16 **question that Twitter operated as a Democratic Party activist machine.**” (*Id.* ¶  
17 25) (emphasis added).
- 18 • Responding to a Twitter user’s tweet stating “@Twitter Files show Twitter activist  
19 employees, without basis, suppressed and censored the President of the United  
20 States ... in the days before the 2020 election. **This is damning evidence of**  
21 **election interference,**” Mr. Musk tweeted, “**Unequivocally true. The evidence**  
22 **is clear and voluminous.**” (*Id.* ¶ 26) (emphasis added).

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26 As Mr. Musk is Twitter’s owner and CEO, these statements are therefore binding on  
27 Twitter. “[A] statement made by a party's agent or servant may be introduced against that party if  
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1 it concerns a matter within the scope of the agency or employment and was made during the  
2 existence of the relationship.” *In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods.*  
3 *Antitrust Litig.*, 906 F.2d 432, 458 (9th Cir. 1990).

4 **(b) The Deposition of FBI Agent Elvis Chan.**

5 On November 29, 2022, the Attorneys General of Louisiana and Missouri deposed FBI  
6 Agent Elvis Chan. *See State of Missouri, et al., v. Joseph R. Biden, et al.*, No. 22-cv-1213-TAD-  
7 KDM (W.D. La.) 27, ECF 90 (Oct. 21, 2022). At all times relevant to Plaintiffs’ claim, Agent  
8 Chan was assigned to the FBI’s San Francisco field office and served as the FBI’s liaison to the  
9 social media industry, including Twitter. (*Id.* ¶ 27a). His sworn testimony reinforces the  
10 relationship between Twitter and the USIC described within the Twitter Files. He also explained  
11 that, in addition to the pressure placed on social media platforms during congressional hearings,  
12 congressional staff made numerous field visits to the companies.

13  
14 **2. The Newly Discovered Evidence Existed at the Time of the Judgment.**

15 While the publication of the Twitter Files and deposition of Elvis Chan occurred after the  
16 entry of the Judgment, they detail events and documents that predate the Judgment; all evidence  
17 referred herein describes events that took place on or before the entry of the Judgment on June 6,  
18 2022.

19  
20 **3. The Newly Discovered Evidence Is Relevant and Material.**

21 Insofar as Rule 60 requires the evidence presented to be admissible, *see Ping Shun Corp.*  
22 *v. Imperial Pac. Int’l Cnmi, LLC*, No. 21-15836, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 20051, at \*3 (9th Cir.  
23 July 20, 2022), the newly discovered evidence qualifies. The deposition of Agent Chan is sworn  
24 under penalty of perjury, while the Twitter Files have been endorsed, adopted, and promoted by  
25 Defendant Twitter’s CEO, Elon Musk, on his personal Twitter account. And the relevance of this  
26 evidence to the Plaintiffs’ allegations is manifest. It outlines the deeply rooted nature of  
27 collaboration and coercion exerted by the USIC and Congress on Twitter’s content moderation  
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1 decisions. This includes entrenched involvement in censorship decisions, deplatforming,  
2 blacklisting, shadow banning, content flagging and other censorship of Plaintiffs’ speech.

3 **4. The Newly Discovered Evidence Likely Would Have Changed the**  
4 **Judgment if Known Prior to Its Dispensation.**

5 The newly discovered evidence is of such an extraordinary character that it easily meets  
6 the threshold for leave to amend under Rule 15. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); *see also Herring*  
7 *Networks, Inc., v. Maddow*, 8 F.4th 1148, 1160-61 (9th Cir. 2021) (“Federal Rule of Civil  
8 Procedure 15(a)(2) provides that the district court should ‘freely give leave when justice so  
9 requires.’ We have previously ‘stated that “this policy is to be applied with extreme  
10 liberality.”’” *Owens v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, Inc.*, 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir.  
11 2001) (quoting *Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Rose*, 893 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir.  
12 1990))). The newly discovered evidence presents a fundamental change in circumstances:  
13 Defendant Twitter has publicly admitted through its owner-CEO that the USIC was deeply  
14 involved in the company’s content moderation scheme and has provided documentation of this  
15 conduct. The USIC promoted censorship of content like that posted by Plaintiffs. Importantly, as  
16 to Plaintiff Trump, the Twitter Files show his suspension was not made pursuant to Twitter’s  
17 Terms of Service, as Twitter falsely claimed. Unlike the situation in *O’Handley v. Weber*, No.  
18 22-15071, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 5729 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2023), where Twitter passively  
19 received information from California and acted on it at its discretion, the newly disclosed  
20 evidence shows that Twitter met with federal agents on a regular basis, Twitter reported back to  
21 its federal handlers as to what actions it had taken in response to the government’s censorship  
22 requests, the FBI paid Twitter millions of dollars for doing this work, the FBI offered Twitter  
23 executives security clearances, and the Biden White House was “very angry” that Twitter was not  
24 doing more to comply with the Administration’s censorship requests. *See infra* at 16. This  
25 significantly undermines Twitter’s defense that its actions against Plaintiffs were taken solely  
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1 pursuant to its content moderation policies.

2 If the newly discovered evidence had been disclosed by Twitter prior to the Judgment,  
3 Plaintiffs would have moved for leave to amend the complaint. Combined with the allegations in  
4 the current First Amended Complaint, the newly discovered evidence would have presented  
5 sufficient allegations to survive Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

6 **B. First Amendment Limitations Apply to Private Actors Who Jointly Act with**  
7 **the Government or Act in Fear of the Government’s Coercive Authority.**

8 First Amendment limitations do not apply to private actors but, like other constitutional  
9 provisions, they can be asserted against private entities where “there is a sufficiently close nexus  
10 between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the action of the latter  
11 may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” *Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis*, 407 U.S. 163, 176  
12 (1972). The “sufficiently close nexus” is known as the “state actor” requirement. While several  
13 tests exist for meeting the state actor requirement, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “only  
14 by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in  
15 private conduct be attributed its true significance.” *Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.*, 457 U.S. 922,  
16 939 (1982) (quoting *Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority*, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961)).

17  
18 Notably, the state actor tests are disjunctive; where the elements of any test are satisfied,  
19 the private entities actions may be fairly attributed to the state and subject to constitutional  
20 limitations. *Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n*, 531 U.S. 288, 302 (2001)  
21 (explaining that a finding of state action under the “entwinement” test was “in no sense unsettled  
22 merely because other criteria of state action may not be satisfied by the same facts”). *See also*  
23 *Wilson R. Huhn, The State Action Doctrine and the Principle of Democratic Choice*, 34 Hofstra  
24 L. Rev. 1379, 1391-92 (2005). Here, the newly disclosed evidence satisfies both the Joint Action  
25 and State Compulsion tests.  
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1                                   **1. Joint Action Test.**

2                   The Joint Action Test asks whether the State has so far inserted itself into the conduct of a  
 3 private actor that there is interdependence between the two so that the state itself is a participant  
 4 in the activity. *See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.*, 398 U.S. 144 (1970); *Dennis v. Sparks*, 449 U.S.  
 5 24, 27 (1980); *Gorenc v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist.*, 869 F.2d 503,  
 6 507 (9th Cir. 1989). The test is satisfied when the State “significantly involves itself in the  
 7 private parties’ actions and decisionmaking” in a “complex and deeply intertwined process.”  
 8 *Rawson v. Recovery Innovations, Inc.*, 975 F.3d 742, 753 (9th Cir. 2020). It also occurs where  
 9 there is a “symbiotic relationship” between government and the private party, *Brunette v. Humane*  
 10 *Society*, 294 F.3d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 2002); the private entity is “entwined with governmental  
 11 policies,” *Brentwood*, 531 U.S. at 296; government has “authorized or approved the private  
 12 parties’ actions,” *Rawson*, 975 F.3d at 754-55; or the private action “received clear state  
 13 imprimatur.” *Id.*

14                                   **2. State Compulsion Test.**

15                   A private entity’s actions are subject to First Amendment limitations whenever those  
 16 actions are sufficiently compelled by a governmental body such that the actions may be properly  
 17 deemed to be actions of the state. This test is satisfied whenever a state “has exercised coercive  
 18 power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice  
 19 must in law be deemed to be that of the State.” *Rendell-Baker v. Kohn*, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982).  
 20 *See Blum v. Yaretsky*, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); *George v. Pac.-CSC Work Furlough*, 91 F.3d  
 21 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1996); *Gorenc*, 869 F.2d at 508.

22                                   **C. The Newly Disclosed Evidence Shows That Both the Joint Action and State**  
 23 **Compulsion Tests Are Satisfied.**

24                                   **1. Twitter’s Suppression of Plaintiffs’ Speech Satisfies the Joint Action**  
 25 **Test.**

26                   The joint-action test examines the degree of governmental participation in private action  
 27  
 28

1 and asks whether the state has so intertwined itself with the private entity that the state must be  
2 recognized as a joint participant in the private action. Here, the newly discovered evidence shows  
3 that (1) Twitter executives regularly met with, consulted with, and took direction from  
4 governmental entities in what Twitter executives described as a “partnership;” (2) Twitter  
5 executives were offered security clearances by FBI officials; (3) Twitter handled an incredible  
6 volume of USIC requests for censorship; (4) Twitter was paid millions of dollars for its efforts;  
7 and (5) when the Biden White house was not satisfied with Twitter’s compliance, it summoned  
8 Twitter’s Head of U.S. Public Policy to a meeting she described as “very angry in nature” to urge  
9 Twitter to do more censorship. *See infra* at 16.

## 11 2. Twitter’s Partnership with Governmental Entities.

12 The depth of Twitter’s relationship with the USIC is evinced by the frequency of meetings  
13 and communications between company executives and governmental entities. According to  
14 Chan’s Deposition, a unit of DHS, the Cybersecurity and Information Security Agency (“CISA”),  
15 invited him to participate in industry working group meetings. These meetings were attended by  
16 executives from Twitter and other social media companies, the FBI’s Foreign Influence Task  
17 Force (“FITF”), DHS’s Intelligence and Analysis department, and ODNI. (*Id.* ¶ 27b). In these  
18 meetings, government agents described what the USIC considered problematic content being  
19 distributed on social media platforms – preemptively flagging categories of state-disfavored  
20 speech. (*Id.* ¶ 27c).

22 In the months preceding the 2020 election meetings between the FBI, the broader USIC,  
23 and Twitter executives occurred on a weekly basis. (*Id.* ¶¶ 27d, 28). Weekly meetings were not  
24 the full scope of this relationship. According to the Twitter Files, Twitter executives were also  
25 meeting with federal enforcement and intelligence agencies about moderation of election related  
26 content, (*id.* ¶ 29), and between “January 2020 and November 2022, there were over 150 emails  
27 between the FBI and former Twitter Trust and safety Chief Yoel Roth,” (*id.* ¶ 30). Twitter  
28



1 developed dedicated channels of communication between the USIG and its content moderation  
2 team. These emails contained numerous requests by the FBI for Twitter to act on election  
3 misinformation, even involving tweets from parody accounts with relatively low numbers of  
4 followers. (*Id.* ¶ 31).

5 Twitter executives were aware of the sensitive state-based nature of their dealings with the  
6 USIC. According to the Twitter Files, “Chan [FBI] & Roth [Twitter’s head of Trust and Safety]  
7 had set up an encrypted messaging network so employees from FBI & Twitter could  
8 communicate.” (*Id.* ¶ 32). Chan and Roth also worked together to “create a ‘virtual war room’  
9 for ‘all of the [Internet] industry plus FBI and ODNI.’” (*Id.* ¶ 32).

11 Twitter recognized its relationship with the federal government as a “partnership.” For  
12 example, a draft news release circulated within Twitter stated that it fights misinformation by  
13 engaging in “human review and \*\*partnerships with outside experts?\*,” (*Id.* ¶ 33), Commenting  
14 on the draft, Twitter Policy Director Nick Pickles asked “if they could ‘just say “partnerships”[’]”  
15 clarifying that he was “not sure we’d describe the FBI/DHS as experts, or some NGOs that aren’t  
16 academic,” (*Id.* ¶ 34).

18 **(a) Twitter Executives Received Security Clearance from FBI  
19 Officials.**

20 The USIC deepened its relationship with Twitter by offering its executives security  
21 clearances. According to the Twitter Files, in July 2020, Chan offered security clearances to  
22 Twitter executives so that the FBI could share information about threats to the upcoming  
23 elections. (*Id.* ¶ 35). In the lead up to the 2020 election Twitter’s legal executive Stacia Cardille  
24 held weekly meetings with the USIC, (*id.* ¶ 36), and informed Twitter’s management that the  
25 “FBI was adamant no impediments to sharing [classified data with Twitter] exist,” (*id.* ¶ 37).

26 The FBI also took advantage of its numerous alumni working at Twitter. Prior to joining  
27 Twitter as Deputy General Counsel in July 2020, Jim Baker served as the FBI’s General Counsel  
28

1 from 2014 to 2017. (*Id.* ¶ 38). In September 2020, the FBI requested the opportunity to provide  
2 “a classified briefing for Jim [Baker]” without the presence of other Twitter staff. (*Id.* ¶ 39). A  
3 month later, on the very day that the *New York Post* released its stories regarding the Hunter  
4 Biden Laptop, Baker, spoke with the FBI’s General Counsel’s Office. (*Id.* ¶ 40). Internally at  
5 Twitter, Baker urged suppression of the story. (*Id.* ¶ 41). Twitter staff, however, quickly began  
6 to question any basis for the suppression under Twitter’s policies. Twitter communications  
7 official Trenton Kennedy messaged Roth and General Counsel Gadde stating, “I’m  
8 struggling to understand the policy basis for marking this as unsafe.” (*Id.* ¶ 42).  
9  
10 Nevertheless, the story was banned from Twitter.

11 **(b) Twitter Handled an Incredible Volume of USIC Requests for**  
12 **Censorship.**

13 Twitter’s relationship with the FBI deepened as more and more members of the USIC  
14 attempted to influence the company’s practices. The intertwined nature grew so extensive that, in  
15 a rather unfortunate turn of phrase, the FBI offered to be the “belly button” for all of Twitter’s  
16 government interactions. (*Id.* ¶ 43). As the election approached in 2020, the FITF/FBI inundated  
17 Twitter with requests for content moderation containing lists of hundreds of flagged accounts.  
18 (*Id.* ¶ 44). For example, on November 3, 2020, Twitter’s legal executive Stacia Cardille sent an  
19 internal email disseminating a “report of 207 Tweets” flagged by the FBI for potential content  
20 moderation. (*Id.* ¶ 44). Twitter officials understood that the FBI had dedicated teams “in the  
21 Baltimore field office and at [FBI] HQ that are just doing keyword searches for violations [of the  
22 Twitter TOS].” (*Id.* ¶ 45).  
23

24 The quantity of USIC requests became so voluminous that Twitter staffers were obliged to  
25 develop internal processes to handle them. (*Id.* ¶ 47). In one email from an FBI representative to  
26 a Twitter employee, the FBI representative even expressed regret for the volume, saying: “I  
27 apologize in advance for adding to your workload.” (*Id.* ¶ 47). The FBI eventually resorted to  
28

1 paying Twitter millions of dollars for the staff Time Twitter expended in handling the  
2 government’s censorship requests. (*Id.* ¶ 48).

3 The requests came from many sectors of the USIC, and from other agencies such as the  
4 State Department, the Pentagon, and CIA. (*Id.* ¶ 49). Another particularly egregious offender  
5 was the Global Engagement Center, an arm of the State Department. (*Id.* ¶ 50). As Musk stated,  
6 this one “US govt agency demanded suspension of 250k accounts, including Journalists &  
7 Canadian officials.” (*Id.* ¶ 19)

8  
9 Twitter also took requests for content moderation from the Senate Intel Committee  
10 (“SSCI”), (*id.* ¶ 51), and began escalating content moderation requests from the Treasury  
11 Department, the National Security Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services, the  
12 Department of Homeland Security, and other federal agencies, (*id.* ¶ 52). And, unlike the  
13 situation in *O’Handley*, where Twitter maintained “an arm’s-length relationship” with California,  
14 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 5729, at \*20, the continuous stream of meetings, cascade of emails,  
15 impatient requests for immediate action, payment of large sums of money, “very angry” White  
16 House meetings and according security clearances to Twitter executives all document an  
17 undeniable collaborative relationship between the federal government and Twitter.  
18

19 **3. Twitter’s Suppression of Plaintiffs’ Speech Satisfies the Compelled**  
20 **Action Test.**

21 This Court granted Defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion in large part based on the facts that the  
22 evidence that Plaintiffs were unable to identify “a concrete and specific government action, or  
23 threatened action . . . .” Order, 11, Dkt. 165. Similarly, in *O’Handley*, the Ninth Circuit noted  
24 that the California agency that had flagged plaintiff’s tweets for censorship had “no enforcement  
25 power over Twitter2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 5729, at \*20. The new evidence disclosed since the  
26 Court’s ruling paints a far different picture. Importantly, the agency spearheading the  
27 government’s censorship effort was the FBI, working in close cooperation with other law  
28

1 enforcement agencies. The FBI’s mission is to investigate violations of federal law, which  
2 includes “[p]rotect[ing] the U.S. from terrorist attack,” “[c]ombat[ing] significant cyber-criminal  
3 activity” and “[c]ombat[ing] transnational criminal enterprises.” (*Id.* ¶ 53). A private party  
4 confronted with repeated, insistent and very specific requests from the federal government’s  
5 premier law enforcement agency would feel compelled to collaborate lest it be suspected and  
6 perhaps prosecuted for abetting the unlawful conduct the law enforcement agency was tasked  
7 with combatting. A suggestion from a state agency with no enforcement powers might  
8 reasonably be viewed as an arms-length request; an avalanche of requests from an agency with  
9 the power to make arrests would reasonably be viewed as commands. And, if that weren’t clear  
10 enough, being called on the White House carpet for “very angry” meetings for failing to be  
11 sufficiently compliant would have left no doubt that the government was making demands, not  
12 merely providing information.

13  
14 **(a) Twitter Was Financially Incentivized to Maintain its**  
15 **Relationship with the FBI.**

16 As mentioned above, Twitter handled incredible volumes of USIC censorship requests. In  
17 an internal communication immediately following the 2020 election, Twitter staff congratulated  
18 themselves on processing the workload, saying, “thank you all so much for your help. A  
19 monumental undertaking.” (*Id.* ¶ 54). The volume is also demonstrated by the FBI’s  
20 compensation of Twitter for responding to its requests. Between October 2019, and February  
21 2021, the FBI paid Twitter \$3,415,323.00 for its efforts. (*Id.* ¶ 45).

22  
23 **(b) Congressional Pressure.**

24 The newly discovered evidence provides crucial context for the congressional hearings  
25 alleged in the Amended Complaint. Twitter also faced field visits from the staff of congressional  
26 committees overseeing the social media industry. FBI Agent Chan testified that these meetings  
27 were very intense for social media staff: “[T]hey [social media personnel] would not reveal the  
28

1 types of discussions that they had with these House and Senate staffers, they would indicate that  
2 they had to prepare very thoroughly for these types of meetings and that it was - - they indicated  
3 that it felt like a lot of pressure.” (*Id.* ¶ 27e). This is in stark contrast to the passive transmission  
4 of information in *O’Handley* and reminiscent of what this Court characterized as “a state  
5 commission sending local police officers for drop-in visits” to booksellers in *Bantam Books, Inc.*  
6 *v. Sullivan*, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). Order, 11, Dkt. 165.

7  
8 This new evidence contradicts assertions by the Defendants before this Court. For  
9 example, in Defendants’ Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss, they reasserted a quote by  
10 Defendant Dorsey stating, “Twitter *does not coordinate* with other entities when making content  
11 moderation decisions.” Dkt. 147, pg. 10, ln. 7-9 (emphasis in the original). Yet, as disclosed  
12 above, Twitter regularly coordinated with multiple elements of the USIC in its content  
13 moderation process. From creating dedicated channels of communication with the FBI to  
14 handling personalized requests for censorship from members of Congress, to angry White House  
15 meetings, a significant portion of Twitter’s content moderation was indeed coordinating with,  
16 and sometimes knuckling under to pressure from, elements of the U.S. government.

17  
18 **(c) The Government Monitored Content Topics That Encompassed**  
19 **Plaintiffs’ Tweets.**

20 Plaintiffs Cuadros and Root had their Twitter accounts suspended or revoked due to  
21 Covid-19 content. J. at 6:22-27. As the Twitter Files show, the federal government maintained  
22 regular meetings with Twitter regarding Covid-19 during both the Trump and Biden  
23 administrations. (*Id.* ¶¶ 56, 57). After the transition of power, the Biden White House focused its  
24 attention on vaccine information and high-profile anti-vaccine accounts on Twitter. (*Id.* ¶ 57).  
25 The Biden administration meetings even went so far as to highlight particular users on Twitter’s  
26 platform that the government disfavored. (*Id.* ¶¶ 57, 58). Notably, one of these highlighted users  
27 had his account suspended from Twitter hours after President Biden blamed social media  
28

1 companies for “killing people” by allowing certain vaccine related posts on their platform. (*Id.* ¶  
2 59). In December 2022, Twitter’s Head of U.S. Public Policy drafted a summary of the  
3 company’s meetings with the Biden White House describing how “the Biden Team was not  
4 satisfied with Twitter’s enforcement approach, as they wanted Twitter to do more and to  
5 deplatform several accounts,” further describing the team as “very angry in nature.” (*Id.* ¶ 60,  
6 61). The Twitter Files also show that Twitter moderated content that conflicted with the official  
7 positions of the White House. (*Id.* ¶ 62).

8  
9 **4. The Newly Discovered Evidence Shows That Plaintiff Trump Was Not**  
10 **Removed Pursuant to a Terms of Service Violation as Alleged by**  
11 **Defendants.**

12 In their previous filings, Defendants repeatedly asserted that the removal of Plaintiff  
13 Trump was based solely on the violation of the company’s Terms of Service (the “Rules”). The  
14 very first line in Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss argument articulates the core of their argument,  
15 stating that, “Plaintiffs—like all Twitter account holders—agreed to abide by Twitter’s Rules, and  
16 yet proceed to repeatedly violate those rules.” Dkt. 138, pg. 6, ln. 11-12. Following on Twitter’s  
17 argument that its actions were guided by Twitter’s rules rather than government direction, the  
18 Court stated in its Order that Twitter’s “explanations indicate that Twitter acted in response to  
19 specific factors for each account, and not pursuant to a state rule of decision.” Dkt. 165, pg. 7, ln.  
20 1-2. Regarding Plaintiff Trump’s permanent suspension on January 8, 2021, following his two  
21 Tweets from that morning, the Motion to Dismiss continued: “After assessing the language in  
22 these Tweets against our Glorification of Violence policy, we have determined that these Tweets  
23 are in violation of the Glorification of Violence Policy and the user @realDonaldTrump should be  
24 immediately permanently suspended from the service.” Dkt. 138-12, pg. 2, Sprankling Decl. Ex.  
25 K. Defendants reasserted this argument in other filings as well. In their Opposition to Plaintiffs’  
26 Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Defendants argued that “Twitter decided to remove Mr.  
27 Trump’s account because it concluded that he had violated its own Rules . . . .” Dkt. 139, pg. 30,

1 ln. 1-2.

2 The Twitter Files reveal that Plaintiff Trump’s tweets, in fact, complied with Twitter’s  
 3 Rules. After the tweets were posted, they were reviewed by several members of Twitter’s content  
 4 moderation team who stated: (1) “As an FYI, safety has assessed the DJT Tweet above and  
 5 determined that there is no violation of our policies at this time,” (*id.* ¶¶ 63, 64); (2) “It’s a clear  
 6 no vio[lation]. It’s just to say he’s not attending the inauguration,” (*id.* ¶ 65); (3) “I think we’d  
 7 have a hard time saying this is incitement,” (*id.* ¶ 66); (4) “Don’t see an incitement angle here,”  
 8 (*id.* ¶ 67); (5) “I also am not seeing clear or coded incitement in the DJT tweet,” (*id.* ¶ 64); (6)  
 9 “It’s pretty clear he’s saying the ‘American Patriots’ are the ones who voted for him and not the  
 10 terrorists (we can call them that, right?) from Wednesday,” (*id.* ¶ 68). In short, the content  
 11 moderation team at Twitter acknowledged that Plaintiff Trump’s tweets that morning do not  
 12 violate Twitter’s Rules. Twitter was aware of these statements, as they come directly from its  
 13 files, but it did not disclose them to Plaintiffs or to this Court. Instead, it presented a false  
 14 declaration stating precisely the opposite. Because Plaintiffs were denied discovery, they had no  
 15 access to Twitter’s files, so had no way to contradict Twitter’s sworn statement. Defendants  
 16 should not be allowed to profit from their lack of candor.

19 **D. The Court Should Grant Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from**  
 20 **Judgment.**

21 **1. The Newly Discovered Evidence Is More Than Sufficient to Justify**  
 22 **Granting Plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Judgment.**

23 **(a) The Judgment Is Properly Subject to Motion to a Relief from**  
 24 **Judgment Under Rule 60.**

25 By its language, Rule 60 provides a mechanism for relief from a final judgment. Fed. R.  
 26 Civ. P. 60(b) (“Grounds for relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding”). Rule 54  
 27 provides that a “[j]udgment’ as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which  
 28 an appeal lies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a).

1                                   **(b) The Evidence Constitutes “Newly Discovered Evidence” Under**  
2                                   **Rule 60(b).**

3                                   The newly disclosed evidence presented herein is not merely impeaching or cumulative  
4 but is substantially material to Plaintiffs’ claims. Neither the Plaintiffs’ Complaint nor the First  
5 Amended Complaint reference the FBI; this agency’s (and other executive agencies’) role was  
6 simply unknown to Plaintiffs. *See* Compl., ECF 1; First Amend. Compl., ECF 21. The newly  
7 disclosed evidence reveals a deeply rooted relationship between the FBI and Twitter’s content  
8 moderation team, and reveals an entirely new facet of Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims.

9                                   **(c) No Degree of Plaintiffs’ Due Diligence Would Have Uncovered**  
10                                   **the Newly Discovered Evidence Prior to Entry of the Judgment.**

11                                   At no time did Plaintiff have any means or mechanism by which to uncover or discover  
12 any of the evidence revealed through the Twitter Files and Agent Chan’s deposition. By their  
13 own language, the Twitter Files are “based upon thousands of internal documents obtained by  
14 sources at Twitter.” (*Id.* ¶ 7). At the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff could not rely on  
15 compulsory discovery to uncover these internal documents. The documents came to light as a  
16 result of Mr. Musk’s unprecedented decision to open up Twitter’s internal files to the world.  
17 Likewise, Plaintiff had no means to compel FBI Agent Chan to testify or release any of the  
18 information provided in his deposition. Plaintiff exercised due diligence in drafting its complaint,  
19 alleging those facts available to it in articulating its state action theory. Only now is it obvious  
20 that a plethora of substantiating evidence existed in the exclusive control of Defendants and their  
21 partners within theUSIC.  
22

23                                   **(d) The Newly Discovered Evidence Likely Would Have Changed**  
24                                   **the Dispensation of the Judgment if It Had Been Presented**  
25                                   **Prior to the Judgment.**

26                                   The newly discovered evidence exhibits a foundational change in the nature of this case.  
27 Had these facts been known before the Judgment, Plaintiffs would have immediately moved for  
28 leave to amend their Amended Complaint under Rule 15(2). Defendant Dorsey has confirmed the



1 significance of this newly discovered evidence. After publication of the Twitter Files, Dorsey  
2 stated that social media companies must on principle, “be resilient to . . . government control,”  
3 and that, “Twitter when I led it . . . [did] not meet . . . [that] principle.” (*Id.* ¶ 69). If included  
4 within an amended complaint, the newly discovered evidence, including Mr. Dorsey’s own  
5 admission, undoubtedly would have caused this Court to deny Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.

6 **2. The Newly Discovered Material Could Not Have Been Discovered in**  
7 **Time to Move for a New Trial Under Rule 59(b).**

8 As explained above, Elon Musk acquired Twitter in late October 2022, and the first  
9 installment of Twitter Files was published on December 6, 2022. The Attorneys General of  
10 Louisiana and Missouri deposed Agent Chan on November 29, 2022. Rule 59 permits a motion  
11 for a new trial within 28 days after the entry of the Judgment, which in this case would have been  
12 July 5, 2022 (accounting for the federal holiday). As the newly discovered evidence presented  
13 herein was neither known nor knowable until well after July 5, 2022, Plaintiffs are not barred  
14 from presenting it here through a Rule 60 motion.

15  
16 **IV. CONCLUSION**

17 The newly discovered evidence constitutes an extraordinary circumstance warranting  
18 relief under Rule 60. Rare indeed is the factual scenario where a corporate defendant (1)  
19 successfully moves to dismiss a complaint, (2) is privately acquired, and (3) admits nearly every  
20 allegation of the dismissed complaint. Taken together with the factual assertions within  
21 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, and viewed under the *Twombly* and *Iqbal* standard, the newly  
22 discovered evidence justifies relief from the Judgment with direction to proceed to discovery. A  
23 Rule 60(b)(2) motion is an appropriate vehicle for this Court to address the extraordinary impact  
24 this newly discovered evidence has had on this case. Accordingly, for the reasons set out above,  
25 this Court should grant Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from Judgment.  
26  
27  
28

1 Dated: May 3, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

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