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8	RIVERSIDE; RIVERSIDE COUNTY
	SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; Correctional
9	Deputy R. TORRES; Correctional Deputy
	VILLALOBOS; Correctional Deputy M.
10	ELENES; Correctional Deputy MICHEL;
	Correctional Deputy ROSE; Correctional
11	Deputy SULTAN; Correctional Deputy M.
	ARREOLA; Correctional Deputy CASTRO
12	
	UNITED STATES DI

1 | Eugene P. Ramirez (State Bar No. 134865)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10	BROOKE EGGER,
16	Plaintiffs,
17	r famuris,
18	VS.
19	COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT;CITY OF
20	CATHEDRAL CITY; CATHEDRAL CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT;
21	Officer MARIO VALDEZ;
22	Correctional Deputy R. TORRES; Correctional Deputy VILLALOBOS; Correctional Deputy M. ELENES;
23	Correctional Deputy MICHEL;
24	Correctional Deputy ROSE; Correctional Deputy SULTAN; Correctional Deputy M. ARREOLA;
25	Correctional Deputy CASTRO and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
26	,
27	Defendants.

Case No.: 5:24-cv-1439
(State Court Case No. CVPS2403654)

NOTICE OF REMOVAL OF ACTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1441(a)

State Complaint Filed: 07/01/2024 Trial Date: 07/01/2024 Not Yet Set

TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that defendants COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; Correctional Deputy R. TORRES; Correctional Deputy VILLALOBOS; Correctional Deputy M. ELENES; Correctional Deputy MICHEL; Correctional Deputy ROSE; Correctional Deputy SULTAN; Correctional Deputy M. ARREOLA; Correctional Deputy CASTRO (hereinafter, "Defendants") hereby removes to this Court the state court action described below.

- 1. On June 3, 2022, an action was commenced in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Riverside, entitled *Brook Egger. v. County of Riverside, et al.*, as Case Number CVPS2403654 (the "Action"). Plaintiff served Defendants with the original Complaint and summons on or about July 1, 2024. A true and correct copy of the original Complaint and summons is attached hereto as Exhibit "A," as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446.
- 2. As the attached record demonstrates, the action pending in the state court is a civil action within the original federal question jurisdiction of the federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, in that it arises under the Fourth Amendment and/or 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Federal Civil Rights Act.
- 4. Because the state court action is one within the federal question jurisdiction of the federal district courts, the action is removable to federal court without regard to the citizenship of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and (c).
- 5. Removal to this District Court is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) because the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Riverside is geographically located within this District Court's jurisdiction.
- 6. Removal is timely under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(B) because this Notice of Removal has been filed within 30 days of the service of the Complaint stating a claim within federal jurisdiction.
 - 7. Removal is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A) because all named

- 1		
1	defendants who have been serve	ed have consented to the removal of this action to this
2	Court without opposition.	
3		
4	DATED: July 11, 2024	MANNING & KASS
5		ELLROD, RAMIREZ, TRESTER LLP
6		
7		By: /s/ Eugene P. Ramirez Eugene P. Ramirez
8		Kayleigh Andersen
9		Jessica L. Becerra Attorneys for Defendants, COUNTY OF
10		RIVERSIDE; RIVERSIDE COUNTY
11		SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT; Correctional Deputy R. TORRES; Correctional Deputy
12		VILLALOBOS; Correctional Deputy M.
13		ELENES; Correctional Deputy MICHEL; Correctional Deputy ROSE; Correctional
14		Deputy SULTAN; Correctional Deputy M.
15		ARREOLA; Correctional Deputy CASTRO
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EXHIBIT A

Case Number CVPS2403654 0000094916396 - Jason B. Galkin, Executive Officer/Clerk of the Court By Victoria Lopez, Clerk

SUMMONS (CITACION JUDICIAL)

COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE; RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF'S DE-

PARTMENT; CITY OF CATHEDRAL CITY; CATHEDRAL CITY PO-

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT: LICE DEPARTMENT; Officer MARIO VALDEZ; Correctional Deputy (AVISO AL DEMANDADO): R. TORRES; Correctional Deputy VILLALOBOS; Correctional Deputy

M. ELENES; Correctional Deputy MICHEL; Correctional Deputy ROSE; Correctional Deputy SULTAN; Correctional Deputy M. ARREOLA; Cor-

rectional Deputy CASTRO and DOES 1 through 100, inclusive

YOU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF: (LO ESTÁ DEMANDANDO EL DEMANDANTE):

BROOKE EGGER

NOTICE! You have been sued. The court may decide against you without your being heard unless you respond within 30 days. Read the information

You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at this court and have a copy served on the plaintiff. A letter or phone call will not protect you. Your written response must be in proper legal form if you want the court to hear your case. There may be a court form that you can use for your response. You can find these court forms and more information at the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), your county law library, or the courthouse nearest you. If you cannot pay the filing fee, ask the court clerk for a fee waiver form. If you do not file your response on time, you may lose the case by default, and your wages, money, and property may be taken without further warning from the court.

There are other legal requirements. You may want to call an attorney right away. If you do not know an attorney, you may want to call an attorney referral service. If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible for free legal services from a nonprofit legal services program. You can locate these nonprofit groups at the California Legal Services Web site (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), or by contacting your local court or county bar association. NOTE: The court has a statutory lien for waived fees and costs on any settlement or arbitration award of \$10,000 or more in a civil case. The court's lien must be paid before the court will dismiss the case. ¡AVISO! Lo han demandado. Si no responde dentro de 30 días, la corte puede decidir en su contra sin escuchar su versión. Lea la información a continuación.

Tiene 30 DÍAS DE CALENDARIO después de que le entreguen esta citación y papeles legales para presentar una respuesta por escrito en esta corte y hacer que se entregue una copia al demandante. Una carta o una llamada telefónica no lo protegen. Su respuesta por escrito tiene que estar en formato legal correcto si desea que procesen su caso en la corte. Es posible que haya un formulario que usted pueda usar para su respuesta. Puede encontrar estos formularios de la corte y más información en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California (www.sucorte.ca.gov), en la biblioteca de leyes de su condado o en la corte que le quede más cerca. Si no puede pagar la cuota de presentación, pida al secretario de la corte que le dé un formulario de exención de pago de cuotas. Si no presenta su respuesta a tiempo, puede perder el caso por incumplimiento y la corte le podrá quitar su sueldo, dinero y bienes sin más advertencia.

Hay otros requisitos legales. Es recomendable que llame a un abogado inmediatamente. Si no conoce a un abogado, puede llamar a un servicio de remisión a abogados. Si no puede pagar a un abogado, es posible que cumpla con los requisitos para obtener servicios legales gratuitos de un programa de servicios legales sin fines de lucro. Puede encontrar estos grupos sin fines de lucro en el sitio web de California Legal Services, (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California, (www.sucorte.ca.gov) o poniéndose en contacto con la corte o el colegio de abogados locales. AVISO: Por ley, la corte tiene derecho a reclamar las cuotas y los costos exentos por imponer un gravamen sobre cualquier recuperación de \$10,000 ó más de valor recibida mediante un acuerdo o una concesión de arbitraje en un caso de derecho civil. Tiene que pagar el gravamen de la corte antes de que la corte pueda desechar el caso.

The name and address of the court is:

(El nombre y dirección de la corte es): Palm Springs Courthouse

3255 E. Tahquitz Canyon Way, Palm Springs, CA 92262

CASE NUMBER: Número del Caso):

CVPS2403654

(El nombre, la dirección y el nι	hone number of plaintiff's attorney, or plaintiff without an attorney, is: úmero de teléfono del abogado del demandante, o del demandante qu n & Glickman ALC, 15233 Ventura Blvd, Suite 400, Sherman Oaks CA	
DATE: 06/03/2024 (Fecha)	Clerk, by (Secretario)	, Deputy (Adjunto)
	mmons, use Proof of Service of Summons (form POS-010).) sta citatión use el formulario Proof of Service of Summons, (POS-010))).
QURTOR	NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are served	

Para prueba de entrega de es	sta citation use el formulario Proof of Service of Summons, (POS-010)).	
	NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are served	
OR COURT OF CALL	1. as an individual defendant.	
Elem 3	2. as the person sued under the fictitious name of (specify):	
	3. on behalf of (specify):	
(C) - ((b) (b) /	under: CCP 416.10 (corporation) CCP 416.60 (minor)	
	CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation) CCP 416.70 (conservatee)	
OUNTY OF RIVERSO	CCP 416.40 (association or partnership) CCP 416.90 (authorized pers	son)
	other (specify):	
GC68150(g)	4 by personal delivery on <i>(date)</i> :	
	F	Page 1 of 1

SUM-100

FOR COURT USE ONLY (SOLO PARA USO DE LA CORTE)

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COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

I. 1

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1. Plaintiff BROOKE EGGER (hereinafter "Plaintiff") is and at all times mentioned in this Complaint was a resident of the County of Riverside, State of California.

PARTIES

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Defendant COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE (hereinafter "County") is and at all times

herein mentioned was a governmental entity organized and existing under the laws of the State of

California, and assumes the liabilities for the RIVERSIDE COUNTY SHERIFF'S

DEPARTMENT. Defendant COUNTY is liable under Government Code sections 815.2 and 820

for the negligent acts of the COUNTY'S employees.

3. Defendant CITY OF CATHEDRAL CITY (hereinafter "Cathedral City") is and at all times herein mentioned was a governmental entity organized and existing under the laws of the State of California, and assumes the liabilities for the CATHEDRAL CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, and other Cathedral City entities, officials, and personnel.

- 4. Defendant Cathedral City Police Officer MARIO VALDEZ (#20221) at all times mentioned herein was a police officer employed by Defendant Cathedral City. Defendant VALDEZ was the police officer responsible for providing Plaintiff with medical care at the time of her arrest, and who should have directed that Plaintiff be transported to a hospital following her head-on automobile collision that left her face bloodied and bruised.
- 5. Defendant Correctional Deputy R. TORRES (#N6736) at all times mentioned herein was a deputy sheriff employed by Defendant County. Defendant TORRES was a booking officer at the John Benoit Detention Center, a jail operated by Defendant COUNTY (hereinafter referred to simply as the "jail"), when Plaintiff was booked into jail.
- 6. Defendant Correctional Deputy VILLALOBOS (#N6706) at all times mentioned herein was a deputy sheriff employed by Defendant COUNTY. Defendant VILLALOBOS was a booking officer when Plaintiff was booked into jail.
- 7. Defendant Correctional Deputy M. ELENES (#N6855) at all times mentioned herein was a deputy sheriff employed by Defendant COUNTY. Defendant ELENES was one of the deputies responsible for releasing Plaintiff from jail during the early morning hours of May 7,

2023.

- 8. Defendant Correctional Deputy MICHEL (#N8196) at all times mentioned herein was a deputy sheriff employed by Defendant COUNTY. Defendant MICHEL was one of the deputies responsible for releasing Plaintiff from jail during the early morning hours of May 7, 2023.
- 9. Defendant Correctional Deputy ROSE (#N5467) at all times mentioned herein was a deputy sheriff employed by Defendant COUNTY. Defendant ROSE was one of the deputies responsible for releasing Plaintiff from jail during the early morning hours of May 7, 2023.
- 10. Defendant Correctional Deputy SULTAN (#N4831) at all times mentioned herein was a deputy sheriff employed by Defendant COUNTY. Defendant SULTAN was one of the deputies responsible for releasing Plaintiff from jail during the early morning hours of May 7, 2023.
- 11. Defendant Correctional Deputy M. ARREOLA (#N6776) at all times mentioned herein was a deputy sheriff employed by Defendant COUNTY. Defendant ARREOLA was one of the deputies responsible for releasing Plaintiff from jail during the early morning hours of May 7, 2023.
- 12. Defendant Correctional Deputy CASTRO (#N7526) at all times mentioned herein was a deputy sheriff employed by Defendant COUNTY. Defendant CASTRO was one of the deputies responsible for releasing Plaintiff from jail during the early morning hours of May 7, 2023.
- 13. Defendant Deputy DOE 1, whose badge number is believed to #N7079, was at all times mentioned herein a deputy sheriff employed by Defendant COUNTY. Defendant DOE 1 was a witness to the filling out of Plaintiff's Medical History form at the jail, and is responsible in some manner for the failure to provide Plaintiff with medical treatment for her head injury/concussion.
- 14. The true names or capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise of defendants, DOES 1 through 100, inclusive, are unknown to Plaintiff, who therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that

involved in a head-on collision. As a result of the collision, Plaintiff sustained a head injury and concussion, and her face was bloodied and bruised.

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21. At the time of the collision, Plaintiff's blood alcohol level was above the legal

limit. Following the collision, Plaintiff was arrested by Defendant Officer VALDEZ from the Cathedral City Police Department. Officer VALDEZ cut his arm on the glass from the crashed car and, in an apparent attempt to 'punish' Plaintiff for his arm being cut, refused to take Plaintiff to a hospital. It was apparent from Plaintiff's totaled car and her injuries, including a bloodied and bruised face and a head injury, that Plaintiff needed to be taken to a hospital.

- 22. Although firefighters employed by Defendant CATHEDRAL CITY evaluated Plaintiff at the scene, she did not receive any medical treatment for her concussion/head injury, and the firefighters likewise did not take Plaintiff to the hospital for treatment of her concussion/head injury. Instead, Plaintiff was transported to a Cathedral City police station, where her blood was drawn as part of a DUI investigation.
- 23. After the blood draw, Plaintiff was transported to and booked at the Riverside County John Benoit Detention Center. She did not receive any medical care for her head injury or concussion at the jail. She also was not transported to a hospital after being booked by jail staff.
- 24. In the early morning hours of May 7, 2023, at or around 4:00 a.m., while it was still dark out, Plaintiff was released from jail by Riverside County Sheriff's Department personnel, including Defendants ELENES, MICHEL, ROSE, SULTAN, ARREOLA, and CASTRO, and DOES 1 through 100.
- 25. The area surrounding the jail is a high-crime, unsafe area at night. At the time of her release, Plaintiff was still inebriated and concussed. Plaintiff was released without her glasses and without a working mobile phone, such that she had no means of securing transportation.
- 26. Plaintiff sought help from the jail staff by knocking on the jail doors, but no one came to answer the door, which was locked. Plaintiff crossed Highway 111 to look for an open business, but everything was closed.
- 27. Plaintiff eventually came across a vehicle in the area with a paper Uber sign; the driver purported to be an Uber driver. Plaintiff requested a ride home and the driver agreed. Plaintiff got in the car. Instead of taking her home, the driver then took her to a nearby area and sexually assaulted her.
 - 28. As a result of this incident, Plaintiff experienced physical injuries as well as

extreme mental anguish and suffering. Plaintiff suffered injuries to Plaintiff's body, nervous system, and person and was caused to suffer general damages and will continue to suffer general damages in excess of the jurisdictional limits of this Court, in an amount to be specified in accordance with the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Section 425.10 and Section 425.11.

- 29. As a proximate result of the said conduct of the actions of defendants, and each of them, plaintiff was required to and did employ physicians and surgeons to examine, treat, and care for plaintiff, and did incur medical and incidental expenses. Plaintiff is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that there will be some additional medical expense, the exact amount of which is unknown. Leave of Court will be sought to amend the Complaint to set forth the correct amount of medical expense at such time as it is ascertained.
- 30. As a further proximate result of the said conduct of the defendants, and each of them, plaintiff was prevented from attending to plaintiff's usual occupation for a period of time; plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that plaintiff will be prevented from attending to said usual occupation for a period in the future and will sustain a further loss of earnings. Leave of Court will be sought to amend the Complaint to set forth the exact amount when the same is ascertained.

IV.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (14th AMENDMENT) – Deliberate Indifference to Medical Care

42 U.S.C. § 1983

By Plaintiff Against All Defendants

- 31. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-30, as set forth above.
- 32. In the pre-conviction context, the right to medical care derives from the due process clause, which "imposes, at a minimum, the same duty the Eighth Amendment poses: persons in custody have the established right to not have officials remain deliberately indifferent to their serious medical needs," including head injuries and concussions. *See Gibson v. County of Washoe*,

290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002).

- 33. A defendant is deliberately indifferent if he knows of and disregards an excessive risk to a detainee' health and safety. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825 (1970).
- 34. In doing the acts and omissions described above, including failing to transport Plaintiff to a hospital or by otherwise failing to provide Plaintiff with medical evaluation or treatment/medical care for her head injury/concussion, Defendants deprived Plaintiff of her right to medical care while in the custody of Defendants CATHEDRAL CITY and COUNTY.
- 35. It is apparent that Defendants should have known of the excessive risk to Plaintiff's safety if Plaintiff was not treated for a concussion/head injury after a serious car accident that left her face bloodied and totaled her car. The individual officers and deputies who interacted with Plaintiff actually knew of a risk to Plaintiff's health and safety because they knew she was in a head-on automobile collision.
- 36. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' acts and omissions as set forth above, which deprived Plaintiff of her clearly-established and well-settled constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Plaintiff sustained injuries and damages as set forth in this complaint.
- 37. In doing the foregoing wrongful acts, the individual Defendants, and each of them, acted in reckless and callous disregard of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff. The wrongful acts, and each of them, were willful, oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, and thus warrant an award of punitive damages against each individual defendant in an amount adequate to punish the wrongdoers and deter future misconduct.
- 38. The conduct of Defendants entitles Plaintiff to punitive damages (as to the individual defendants only) and penalties allowable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as reasonable costs and attorneys' fees.

V. 1 2 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 3 **VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (14th AMENDMENT) – State-Created Danger** 4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 5 **By Plaintiff Against All Defendants** 6 39. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-38, as set forth 7 above. 40. 8 Under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, an officer may be 9 held liable for failing to protect an individual where the state has placed that individual in danger 10 through its affirmative conduct. A person also has the constitutional right to be free from a government employee affirmatively placing that person in a situation of actual, particularized 11 12 danger that is more dangerous than the position that the person already faced if the government 13 employee acted with deliberate indifference to a known or obvious danger. 14 41. Here, Defendants knew and/or should have known of the obvious danger, and the excessive risk to Plaintiff's safety, of releasing Plaintiff, whom Defendants knew was inebriated 15 16 and had been injured in a head-on automobile accident, from jail at night, in an unsafe and high-17 crime area, without glasses or a working phone, without a means of transportation, while 18 inebriated and concussed. By doing so, Defendants placed Plaintiff in a situation of actual, 19 particularized danger. 42. 20 Defendants had a duty not to leave Plaintiff in a situation that was more dangerous 21 than the one they found her in, and breached that duty first by failing to have Plaintiff properly 22 evaluated and to administer medical aid for Plaintiff's concussion/head injury at the time of her 23 arrest and detention, and second by releasing Plaintiff in the early hours of the morning, in the 24 dark, without glasses, a working phone, or a means of transportation, in a dangerous and deserted 25 area. By these acts and omissions, Defendants placed Plaintiff in a situation that was more dangerous than the one they found her in. 26

circumstances, i.e., where a police officer ejected a woman from a vehicle in a high-crime area

Such a "state-created danger" exception has been found under similar

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where she was subsequently raped. See Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989).

- 44. By releasing Plaintiff into the area around the jail with an untreated head injury, without glasses or a working phone, while still inebriated, Defendants placed Plaintiff in a situation more dangerous than the one they found her in. Specifically, prior to Plaintiff's arrest, she had her phone and glasses, and was in a populated area of Cathedral City during daytime hours. By taking her to jail instead of to the hospital, Defendants intensified and worsened the situation that Plaintiff was in. By then releasing Plaintiff in the dark early morning hours of May 7, 2023, instead of keeping her inside the jail until it was light out, Defendants further intensified and worsened the situation that Plaintiff was in.
- 45. Defendants acted with deliberate indifference towards a known danger to Plaintiff, namely, that she had not been provided medical care, was inebriated, concussed, alone, unable to see well, without a means of contacting someone for transportation.
- 46. By arresting, detaining, and then releasing Plaintiff without conducting a proper medical evaluation of her head injury, Defendants put Plaintiff in a more dangerous state than she was in prior to arrest. Plaintiff's condition worsened while she was held in jail without being treated for her head injury. Defendants showed that they were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's wellbeing when they failed to take her to the hospital, failed to medically evaluate or treat her at the jail, released her in the dark early morning hours into a dangerous area without any means of transportation, and refused to come to the locked door or respond when Plaintiff tried to get their attention by knocking on the door of the jail.
- 47. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' acts and omissions as set forth above, which deprived Plaintiff of her clearly-established and well-settled constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Plaintiff sustained injuries and damages as set forth in this complaint.
- 48. In doing the foregoing wrongful acts, the individual Defendants, and each of them, acted in reckless and callous disregard of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff. The wrongful acts, and each of them, were willful, oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, and thus warrant an award of punitive damages against each individual defendant in an amount adequate to punish the

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wrongdoers and deter future misconduct.

The conduct of Defendants entitles Plaintiff to punitive damages (as to the individual defendants only) and penalties allowable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as reasonable

VI.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (14th AMENDMENT) – Special Relationship with

Detainee

42 U.S.C. § 1983

By Plaintiff Against All Defendants

- 50. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-49, as set forth above.
- 51. In the alternative, an officer may also be liable for an omission "when a state takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will," including by incarceration. Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, Defendants' actions created and intensified the risk of harm to Plaintiff, with whom Defendants had a special relationship because she was a detainee. As set forth above, Plaintiff was bloodied and bruised after the head-on collision and should have been taken to a hospital. At the jail, her condition worsened as she received no medical evaluation or treatment for her concussion/head injury. Her situation further deteriorated when Defendants released her at night into a high-crime area with no working phone or glasses.
- 52. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' acts and omissions as set forth above, which deprived Plaintiff of her clearly-established and well-settled constitutional rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Plaintiff sustained injuries and damages as set forth in this complaint.
- 53. In doing the foregoing wrongful acts, the individual Defendants, and each of them, acted in reckless and callous disregard of the constitutional rights of Plaintiff. The wrongful acts, and each of them, were willful, oppressive, fraudulent, and malicious, and thus warrant an award of punitive damages against each individual defendant in an amount adequate to punish the

54. The conduct of Defendants entitles Plaintiff to punitive damages (as to the individual defendants only) and penalties allowable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as reasonable costs and attorneys' fees.

VII.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

VIOLATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (Monell) – 42 U.S.C. 1983

By Plaintiff Against Defendants COUNTY and CATHEDRAL CITY

- 55. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations in paragraphs 1-54, as set forth above.
- 56. Defendants COUNTY and CATHEDRAL CITY knowingly, with gross negligence, and in deliberate indifference to the Constitutional rights of Plaintiff and all citizens, maintain and permit an official policy and custom or permitting the occurrence of the types of wrongs set forth herein. These policies and customs include, but are not limited to, the deliberately indifferent training of its law enforcement officers in the evaluation and custodial control of arrestees with head injuries/concussions, and in the release of arrestees from jail under dangerous circumstances with clearly foreseeable risks of harm, including releasing concussed/intoxicated persons without glasses, a phone, or a means of transportation during the dark early morning hours into a high-crime area.
- 57. Defendants' failure to train their employees amounts to a deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom they come into contact. Upon information and belief, Defendants were on notice of crucial failures and the lack of appropriate and functional systems to ensure arrestees with head injuries were provided with medical care. Defendants lacked appropriate protocols with respect to releasing inmates and had no consideration for factors including, but not limited to, the time of day for the release.
- 58. The above-described policies and customs demonstrated a deliberate indifference on the part of Defendants to the constitutional rights of persons within their jurisdiction, and were the cause of the violations of Plaintiff's civil rights as alleged herein.

COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES

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Plaintiffs injuries.

66. The conduct of Defendants constituted interference with the exercise of enjoyment

the individual defendants and DOES 1 through 100, whose negligent conduct was the cause of

Government Code § 845.6 authorizes a cause of action against a public entity for its

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employees' failure to summon immediate medical care.

above, Plaintiff suffered pain, suffering, and physical injuries. Defendants' acts and omissions

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1 were substantial factors in causing Plaintiff's injuries. 2 80. As a direct and legal consequence of the aforesaid carelessness of Defendants, and 3 each of them, Plaintiff has sustained and incurred, and is certain to incur in the future, losses, 4 injuries, and damages. Plaintiff will request leave of Court to determine the total amount of 5 damages once the same as been ascertained. **PRAYER FOR RELIEF** 6 7 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as follows: 8 1. For general damages in an amount to be ascertained in accordance with Code of 9 Civil Procedure §§ 425.10 and 425.11; 10 2. For all medical and incidental expenses according to proof; 3. For all loss of earnings according to proof; 11 4. For exemplary and punitive damages against the individual defendants in an 12 13 amount according to proof; 14 5. For other losses in an amount according to proof; 6. For attorneys' fees under California Civil Code §§ 52 and 52.1, California Code of 15 Civil Procedure §1021.5, and/or any other applicable provision of law; 16 17 7. For costs of suit incurred herein; 18 8. For prejudgment interest and other interest as provided by law; and 19 9. For such other and further relief as the court shall deem just and proper. 20 JURY TRIAL DEMANDED 21 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff hereby demands trial by jury in the above-entitled action. 22 23 **DATED:** June 3, 2024 GLICKMAN & GLICKMAN, A LAW CORPORATION 24 25 By 26 NICOLE E. HOIKKA 27 Attorneys for Plaintiff BROOKE EGGER 28 COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES