

# Exhibit 1

**DISC LODGED SEPARATELY  
AND FILED UNDER SEAL**

# Exhibit 2

April 3, 2024

Dear Judge Wu,

Before my retirement several years ago I enjoyed a professional relationship with Truth Aquatics and Jerry Boylan. That relationship lasted over twenty years during which I had the privilege of working with Jerry on multiple occasions. Although we were both captains, the duration of our trips often required two and so I had the opportunity to work with Jerry.

I was always impressed with Jerry's paramount concern for the safety of the passengers, crew and the vessel. He showed this concern with his attention to the minutest detail. He would pick the dive sites based on weather, water conditions and the physical ability of the passengers on board. He shared his experience and his process with the crew and he expected them to perform their duties accordingly. Whether it was the number of wraps around the anchor winch, confirming the availability and condition of safety equipment or the direction a crewperson wrapped a line around a cleat, Jerry never missed a detail. He was so good at training his crew, I could tell who had been trained by Jerry when I worked with them on other boats.


I learned so much watching Jerry interact with people. He would listen to passenger's thoughts and attempted to address their every wish. He was never condescending and treated both passengers and crew with consideration and respect. He never allowed anyone to feel disenfranchised which is extremely important when managing the responsibilities of life on board.

In my forty years licensed as a captain I worked for Tidewater Inc. running boats to offshore oil platforms, I worked for L-3 Corporation operating a sonar research vessel as well as many others including Truth Aquatics. I can say, without reservation, Jerry is the most conscientious captain I have ever met. This fact makes the terrible tragedy aboard the Conception all the more horrifying. I still shutter to think about the fact that if this could happen with Jerry Boylan as captain, it could happen to any of us.

Not long ago, Jerry told me that he was glad that I wasn't operating the Conception on that fateful trip. Not having a family, Jerry knew that had it happened on my watch it would have devastated mine. I know he has been dealing with an incredible amount of guilt even though, in my opinion, he did all that he could given the circumstances. He has always and will always care for others over himself.

I would like to thank Your Honor for taking the time to read this letter. I hope the thoughts I have shared will help in making, what I believe must be, a very difficult determination.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Chris Spiros". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Chris Spiros

# Exhibit 3

April 9, 2024

Dear Judge Wu,

I'm writing you to share my thoughts on, and experience with, Jerry Boylan, someone I've had the honor of knowing for more than two decades, and who had a profound impact on my life.

Back in 2001, fresh out of college and grappling with the loss of my father to cancer, I found myself aboard the Conception, joining Jerry's crew. Despite my lack of experience in maritime work or cooking, Jerry took a chance on me, offering me the role of galley cook. Little did I know then, it would be the start of a transformative journey.

I worked aboard the Conception, and sometimes aboard other Truth boats, on and off for three years. I remember those years as though they were yesterday, as they were truly some of the most formative years of my life, and made me who I am today, personally and professionally.

Jerry wasn't just a boss; he was a coach, a mentor, and a father figure, all rolled into one. His leadership style was unique—a blend of nurturing support and an unwavering commitment to excellence. He demanded precision and accountability, instilling in me a sense of responsibility and professionalism that has resonated throughout my entire career. His dedication to ensuring the safety and well-being of both crew and passengers was unparalleled, and his meticulous approach left an indelible mark on my work ethic. His attention to detail was legendary, and he expected nothing less from his crew.

But Jerry wasn't all business. He had a soft side too, one that showed through in moments of tenderness and camaraderie. He treated his crew and his passengers like family, and that bond extended beyond the confines of the boat. He truly loved the boat life, and his passion and dedication to his crew and customers was felt by all who knew him.

Years later, in 2018, when I introduced him to my own children, he welcomed them with open arms, sharing stories of our time together aboard the Conception, and with excitement to teach them about the boat and life aboard.

The events of recent years have weighed heavily on Jerry and all who know him. The tragedy that unfolded was unimaginable, and the aftermath has been nothing short of heartbreaking. I have stayed in contact with him over the last few years, and it's clear that he lives in mourning for the losses endured in the horrible accident that was beyond his control. Knowing Jerry the way I do, I can imagine the weight of this tragedy on his heart and mind every second of every day. It absolutely breaks my heart to know what he has gone through these past years.

In closing, I can't speak highly enough of Jerry Boylan as a person. He's not just a highly competent and committed captain; he's a true beacon of integrity, compassion, and unwavering dedication. He has loved his crews and his passengers like close family. He taught me more than anyone else in my professional life about adhering to rules, attention to details, safety, organization, and dedication. I hope for a resolution that recognizes his true character and allows him to find peace in the days ahead.

If you need any further information or have questions, please feel free to reach out. Thank you for considering my testimony.

Warm regards,



Julie Frans | [REDACTED]

# Exhibit 4

April 11, 2024

Your Honor,

I am writing to share some of my experiences with Jerry Boylan over my lifetime of knowing him. Like many others, Jerry has had a profoundly positive impact on my life. I've known Jerry as a passenger, a crew member, and now, a dear friend. My relationship with Jerry began before I can remember. My parents owned a SCUBA diving business since the early 1970's. I was born in 1979 and was a passenger on the Conception from the time I was a toddler into adulthood. My dad was a charter master so my family and I were passengers, sleeping below deck in the bunkroom growing up. In my 20's I worked alongside Jerry as a crewmember. My parents have five children. At one time or another all but one of my siblings and I worked for Jerry, sleeping in the wheelhouse or bunkroom. I'm thankful and honored to know Jerry, a skilled and thoughtful captain, generous and kind person, and life long friend.

It's hard to put into words what Jerry means to me. I first joined Jerry's crew in the early 2000's while I was finishing my undergraduate studies in San Luis Obispo, later to return while I was in grad school. I saw first hand, as a passenger and then as crew, the meticulousness, rigor and care Jerry put into his work as a captain and steward of his crew, the passengers and the vessel. Jerry truly cared about his passengers and crew. They were his life. This was particularly evident in seeing Jerry work with my brothers, Nick (2 years my elder) and Branden (8 years younger). Jerry took great care to ensure that the boat ran smoothly and safely. He was detail oriented and extremely safety conscious. It was something I often commented on over the years. He operated with a safety first mindset, ensuring everything on the boat was buttoned up, in good working order, and running well. He kept safety top of mind, and reminded us all the time that this was our role as well. He ran and directed his crew to run safety briefings, ensuring all passengers were present for the briefings. He was always alert to the smallest noise or anything that was "off." He was knowledgeable and attuned to the conditions of the sea, what was happening on the boat and with the crew and passengers. I recall seeing Jerry guide the deck hands in lifting the anchor on rough days at sea, where the winds were high and the anchor was not coming up easily. Jerry was focused and advised with safety first, while the wind howled and rain was coming in sideways. I am a protective sister and a "worrier." I did not worry while with Jerry; I knew he was skilled, loved us, and would do anything he could to keep us safe. Diving and boating come with inherent risks. Jerry was attuned to those risks at all times and did everything within his power to keep his people safe.

Jerry was a mentor and while I have a great father, he was also a father figure to me. Many of us lovingly called Jerry "Papa Jer." His attention to detail and excellence were recognized by other captains and crew of the Truth Aquatics fleet. I appreciated this about Jerry. It instilled and resonated with values that continue to hold in my work ethic today. I watched Jerry with my brothers, both of whom started working with Jerry when they were going through difficult transition periods in their lives. Jerry taught them how to keep watchful ears/eyes out to what was happening on the boat, how to identify and fix things thoroughly and safely, and instilled a sense of confidence and resilience that lives with them to this day. My older brother has since worked in construction management and remodeled his entire family house on his own. My younger brother is an exceptional seaman and captain based out of Hawaii. He is also



April 11, 2024

extremely safety conscious and like Jerry, aware of the gravity and responsibility that comes with his job. I graciously attribute these qualities and their life paths to Jerry's influence.

Jerry is an honorable man and has lived an honorable life. He takes care of others and has an incredibly generous spirit. Jerry found his passion for the sea at a young age. Like my younger brother Branden, he was in his teens when he started helping out aboard the Truth Aquatics boats. Jerry comes from a humble upbringing and lived his life making an honest living doing what he loved. He was a loving son, helping take care of his mother until she passed. He had a sister, who passed away a few years ago. He loves sushi and going out to dinner with his friends and crew. He's lived a humble life, yet insists on treating for dinner or coffee. He helps people in need and aims to be of service. He asks for nothing in return and would give his friends, passengers and crew the shirt off his back. During the time I was working for Jerry, I was driving in Santa Barbara and my brakes went out. Jerry could fix anything. Before I started to panic, I called Jerry on my cell phone for help. Jerry was there for me. He calmly talked me through what to do, to slow the car down and stop it. Then he showed up and helped me figure out how to get the car fixed. I have also seen Jerry skillfully handle other emergency situations that inevitably come up when you are captaining a dive boat. There was one instance where a man had a heart attack while diving; we later learned that he had a pre-existing heart condition. Jerry and the crew immediately saw him floating at the top of the water. He was not breathing and foaming at the mouth. Jerry jumped into action directing and the crew who executed the life saving CPR bringing the man back to life. Jerry quickly sounded the underwater alarm for the divers, engaged with the coast guard, prepared, and moved the boat, so we could get the man air-lifted by the Coast Guard to a hospital immediately. Jerry was calm, knowledgeable and skilled. This man survived, thanks to the actions of Jerry.

Like many others, I have been profoundly impacted by this tragic fire. It's been one of the greatest sources of grief that I have ever experienced. It's been nothing short of traumatic. I have spoken to Jerry several times since this horrible accident and he has expressed similar grief and sorrow. The crew and passengers were not just crew and passengers, they were a community. They were Jerry's people, some of whom he had known since childhood, like me.

The Conception fire was and continues to be a horrific tragedy, and I pray that something good comes from all of this loss. Jerry is a good, honorable man, and was a safe, skilled and thoughtful captain. I trust him now as I've trusted him throughout my life. I now have two young daughters, ages 4 and 6. If Jerry was still able to captain boats I would 100% trust him with my family on board. I hope that everyone involved in this tragedy finds peace, Jerry included. I will continue to support Jerry in any way possible for the rest of his life. I hope to continue to have the opportunity to talk to him on the phone, text him, meet with him for coffee or lunch in Santa Barbara, and support him through to the next phase of his life. I hope he can meet my girls one day soon. I also truly hope to hear Jerry's laugh again. He has a great laugh and I miss it.

Thank you for your kind consideration.

Shawna Buchanan Hallenberger

 4/11/2024

# Exhibit 5



**KAIWI MAKAI MARINE INC.**

April 08, 2024

Dear Judge Wu,

[REDACTED]  
Kailua Kona, HI  
[REDACTED]

I am writing this letter to you on behalf of Jerry Boylan, whom I have know as a boss, teacher, mentor and friend for over 25 years. I first met Jerry working as a "Dead head" working aboard the *M/V Conception* during my senior year of college, when I was aspiring to learn how to operate boats and experience the Channel Islands that beckon from the coastline of the Santa Barbara area. I came out to work for free to learn, and decide if working as crew aboard the *Conception* was something that I wanted to pursue further.

The first thing that I noticed in working with Jerry during this time, was that he ran, as the saying goes, a VERY tight ship. The crew worked with absolute diligence under his command, in every aspect of the operation. From cleaning the heads to safely managing the days long dive trips, and ensuring the the vessel was always in top operating condition, Jerry kept a watchful eye over all aspects of the operation. He was quick to correct any transgression from regular, safe operating procedures and always aspired to make the systems we used better, safer and more efficient.

I count myself as incredibly fortunate to have ended up crewing on the *Conception* with Jerry for more than 4 years, eventually earning my USCG captains license and becoming capable of operating the vessels as master. Jerry inspired a confidence in me, and the crew members that I worked with, by teaching us the value of learning how to do things properly, and always maintaining the diligence that was necessary to keep the operation running safely, smoothly and efficiently. I can think of countless times when Jerry took me aside to show me the details of some aspect of the operation, or another nautical tidbit; how to ensure that a bowline in the anchor line was going to flow around the capstan properly while we recover an anchor, how to rebuild compressor air line relief valve, why we could anchor safely on the west end of Santa Cruz in certain coves when it was blowing 30 knots offshore.

Through these lessons, Jerry earned a great deal of respect from me, and any other crew member that was open to being taught and willing to learn. He was a hard-

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ass, no doubt, but because he was a wise mariner, experienced and ultimately, highly concerned about the safety of everyone on board. Some of my fondest memories of Jerry are from the times when Jerry was able to relax, because he know that he had done is job well. The crew was running the ship in the way that he saw fit, like a well oiled machine, navigating throughout the islands safely taking people out to have the adventures of a lifetime. I will forever have memories of him sitting on the back deck with us during a dive, having a plate of food joking around with the crew and passengers and taking an immense joy in seeing passengers come back from a dive with stories to tell.

When things inevitably went sideways, and we had to deal with damage from weather, or perhaps a dive incident; Jerry handled things with the utmost professionalism. I will never forget one incident in particular when we had a passenger come to the surface bleeding and foaming at he mouth; a worst nightmare for crew of a dive vessel. We sprung into action and go the passenger on board, immediately administering CPR and oxygen to try to resuscitate him. Jerry coordinated efforts seamlessly, and we had the passenger in stable condition with a USCG helicopter en-route within minutes. All remaining passengers were back on board, and we were promptly under way to rendezvous with the helicopter for a evacuation. The passenger was safely extricated from the vessel, flown back to the mainland and he survived the incident.

The reason that this man, and others who unfortunately suffered a dive accident, survived; was that because Jerry had taught us what to do, and how to do it. We trained, drilled and learned our jobs until our actions were as natural as walking. Without Jerry's thorough and professional character at the helm, this incident, and others that I experienced, could have turned out very differently.


It is painfully ironic to me that Jerry was the captain aboard the Conception during the fire that took so many lives. I have worked in the maritime industry as crew, captain and business owner ever since Jerry took me under his wing 25 years ago, and I have known many captains during this time. None of them compare to Jerry in the depth of knowledge, diligence and care for the safety of his crew, passengers, and vessel. He did everything in his power to do his job as master of the vessel to the absolute best of his abilities, which were nothing short of exceptional.

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I can only imagine the suffering that this event has caused Jerry, and can feel his pain in the analysis of what more could he have done to prevent such a horrible accident. I know this will haunt him forever, but I also know that Jerry has the support of many friends and others like myself who have learned from him, and have unfaltering respect and love for a man who taught many of us to become better versions of ourselves.

Sincerely,

E. Chris Willcox



Owner, Kaiwi Makai Marine Inc.

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# Exhibit 6

04/14/2024

Dear Judge Wu,

My name is Jessica Friedland. I worked with Jerry Boylan at Truth Aquatics on and off for over a decade, from 2006 to 2017, in every role on the vessel: from first and second galley, to deckhand, to second captain, and logged well over a 1200 days at sea on all three of the company's fleet of vessels: the Vision, the Truth, and the Conception. I have worked with many different captains and crew, but I primarily worked with Jerry on the Conception. I consider Jerry not only a close colleague but also a mentor and a friend.

Jerry was one of the most dedicated and safety-conscious captains that I ever worked for. He is not the type of man to spend a lot of time socializing or get overly friendly with the passengers and crew: he was always very focused on the job at hand, the operation of the vessel, and the wellbeing of both the passengers and crew. He grew up and spent his entire life on the water as the son of a lighthouse keeper and a sailor and has worked for many decades to help adventurers, divers, hikers, tourists, photographers, scientists, educators, and hunters explore the Channel Islands, our Western coastline and remote offshore reefs. We have taken biologists to study whales and marine life populations, scuba divers, filmmakers and National Geographic photographers to document kelp forests and reefs, and children and school groups to learn about the islands and the sea. We helped the Navy perform many tests and exercises and assisted in offshore commercial operations. Throughout it all, I watched Jerry expertly guide us through the inevitable challenges and perils we faced during our life at sea.

It's hard to convey to people who have not lived that life the daily obstacles we faced. The weather and sea conditions alone required constant expert attention and decision-making skills. An anchor could drag, a knot could fail, a storm could roll in, a shark could attack a diver, a passenger could have a heart attack underwater or be sick and require airlift by helicopter, equipment or machinery could break when we were 100 miles from shore. We often navigated through gale-force winds and massive seas to reach remote dive sites where we could find protection against the island in a leeward cove and move as the weather conditions dictated throughout the day, typically working from 4-6 AM to about 10-11 PM. Jerry would usually stay up many hours of the night and do much of the night and early morning piloting to take us to our anchorages, and I would oversee vessel operations during the first dive of the day so he could sleep. During the season we would work for months on end with very few days on land, usually going on 3-5 day trips and occasionally some longer extended trips as well. At the end of a trip we would disembark the passengers, clean the vessel from top to bottom, load fresh food, fresh water, new passengers, and be back out of the harbor breakwall by 4 in the morning, and in many instances leave by 10 O'clock the same night.

It was difficult to find qualified relief when crew needed time off, and we would have to spend many hours while at sea calling to find people to cover trips if someone got sick or needed to take leave. Inin these instances, we would usually have to provide on-the-job training Even if we could get crew that worked on one of the other Truth Aquatic vessels, they would need to be briefed on the captain's preferences and the equipment and emergency measures specific to our vessel.

Jerry did not like taking risks and was very conservative about choosing dive sites and anchorages compared to other captains. After many years of experiencing trials at sea, it is one of the reasons I liked to work for him: I felt safe. He had a very set way of running the vessel

04/14/2024

down to every detail, from who was qualified to perform which task down to which knot was used or how a bolt was closed. He taught me to tie knots behind my back with my eyes closed, so in the event of an emergency it would be like second nature to me. We would run safety drills as often as we could with our demanding schedule, testing the fire hoses and underwater recall, and practicing man-overboard drills. Jerry personally trained me many times on how to operate our fire hoses and emergency shut-off valves, where they were located, and when to use them, and I would train crew with him. We performed countless rescues over the years and often dealt with passengers who were either in poor health or had limited swimming ability that contributed to their accidents underwater. We faced many life-and-death emergencies and I would always fall back on my training, reporting to him while carrying out his orders, managing how the crew responded, administering CPR or medical aid, deploying a rescue swimmer or responding in our inflatable skiff while he operated the vessel, communicated with the Coast Guard and gave us precise instructions. He always kept a cool head under pressure, responding methodically and swiftly to whatever circumstances we faced, which ranged from injuries to illness to drownings. We would also respond to any distress calls and emergencies occurring on other vessels nearby, using our resources and equipment to help whoever was in need. He demanded that we take our jobs seriously, putting safety before the desires of the passengers, and was considered by most of the crew I worked with to be the strictest captain in the fleet.

Jerry has been a shadow of a man since the accident. He was a boat captain in every sense of the title, and his entire life was on that boat. It was our whole world. We had known many of the passengers who passed away for many years and considered them to be our friends. I know in my heart that he did everything he could to save them, short of killing himself. He has severe [REDACTED] from the ordeal and cannot even sleep in his bedroom because of fear of fire, and sleeps by the front door. He doesn't go many places or see many people, and his house is filled with pictures of the boat. He thinks constantly about what happened every day and, while I know the loved ones of the people that died want justice and someone to pay for the tragic accident that stole them away, I know nothing anyone does to Jerry will be worse than the punishment he gives himself every single day. Please don't judge him based solely on the worst night of his life. He is a good man with a solitary nature who cares deeply for people and always took pride in his work, and tried to share his love of the sea and the islands with the rest of the world.

Thank you for your time.

Best Regards,

Jessica Friedland



# Exhibit 7

April 9, 2024

Dear Judge Wu:

I worked with Jerry Boylin on the M.V. Conception numerous times. I do not know much about his personal life.

MR. Boylin was a very approachable dive Captain, he had a particular laugh, a smile about him and listened intently to passengers and dive masters who chartered the vessel.

Jerry was constantly on deck with the rest of the crew intently observing helping with dives and their gear. He was observant as to see along with the rest of us the skill level of those on board. Some were neophyte and some with decades of experience.

The channel islands have their own distinct weather patterns that would change diving conditions in a heartbeat!

Captain Boylin was adroit in explaining the dive site in full detail, depth, currents, marine flora and fauna. He would make recommendations to those with underwater cameras.

Captain Boylin could read the weather, listen to the marine forecast and would think ahead as to make a decision as to where to park the boat for safe mooring!

Being a boat Captain was an extremely stressful job mentally, emotionally and physically. Jerry's utmost concern was for scuba diver safety. I feel that he was extremely competent and was exemplary and sterling as a Captain!

I have not spoken to him since the tragedy. All crew members worked very hard as a team to provide the safest dives possible with excellent customer service, call it "pride" in

#2 you work, you job! We were never directed by the owners or owner of Truth Aquatics for crew training. I have worked on all three vessels, Truth Conception and vision. We were never directed with safety procedures. Working on the ocean was a beautiful experience, our days began at 6AM and sometimes last until 11:30pm - 18+ hours. As crew we never had a relief crew after 8hrs of work. It was unfortunate for Mr. Boylin but since its inception we never ever had a standing watch, we were dead tired! Captain Boylin had this unfortunate pistaction amplified by the sensation of the news media. There was bad press and inaccurate statements by the media.

My heart goes out to the family members and the crew of the Conception especially Mr. Boylin. There are many factors that created this tragic situation. Mr. Boylin being the Captain he is responsible for the safety of the passengers. The design of Conception, Coast guard and other factors all add to this horrible equation of mainie tragedy. To be specific ask all the Captains past and present if they ever stood watch, even the owners! I write this from my heart, this tragedy goes beyond a moving watch! Thank you Judge Wu, if you have any further questions regarding the integrity of Mr. Boylin please contact me, via his attorney. This letter is written without malice, just from my heart, sincerely Christoph Shemet

# Exhibit 8

Deborah Buchanan

[REDACTED]  
Downey, CA [REDACTED]

April 11, 2024

Dear Judge Wu,

I have known Jerry Boylan for at least 47 years. As a local dive shop we chartered the Truth Aquatics boats and brought our customers for dive trips where Jerry was the captain. I consider him my friend. He was a reliable and fun captain. Jerry stood out as that captain who put safety first. If the conditions were not safe for a spot we wanted to dive, we went to an alternate spot. I remember many trips, but, one in particular, where the spearfishermen were adamant about wanting to dive at a certain spot. Jerry said no. The conditions were not good and it would not be safe. Jerry ran a tight ship, with the crew on deck to supervise, help divers, and maintain a safe environment at all times. He was on deck to greet people as they boarded. He cared and it showed.

Jerry talked about his sister and his mom a lot. They lived together in Lompoc and Jerry took care of things. Jerry's mom has since passed but I was always impressed by the way he spoke of his mom and his sister. He was devoted to both of them. He is a good family man.

I have 5 kids, 4 of whom worked on the boats with Jerry. It takes a village to raise a family, and I consider Jerry to be a very important part of this village. On the boats as crew, Jerry expected them to consider the divers and passengers first, and to work hard to ensure they had a good time in a safe environment. Safety was first, and they worked very hard to ensure that everyone enjoyed themselves. They kept account of the divers in the water and on the boat through a detailed roster system. They rose early, did dive briefings, cooked delicious meals, ran the boat, helped divers in and out of the water with their equipment, acted as safety divers, operated the skiff to pick up divers, monitored night dives, and performed rescues, all under the hands-on supervision of Jerry.

He taught them to do repairs in the engine room, boat repairs, and operate the winch to drop and pull the anchor. He held his crew accountable and had high expectations of a job well done.

There were rescues. The crew knew exactly what to do and they performed well with Jerry in charge. They administered CPR and helped with transport to the Coast Guard helicopter. Jerry reacted quickly and with authority. As the captain, he saved many lives.

I worked at Downey High School and chaperoned a trip with a group of students in the Eco club. Most were inexperienced around the water. Some students were immigrants who had not had the opportunity to go to the ocean or get on a boat. Jerry was great. He talked to the kids all about the ins and outs of being on a boat. Along with his regular safety briefing, he talked about things like what to do if you are feeling sick. He saw that some of them did not have warm enough clothes and allowed them to bring bunk room blankets outside which was typically not allowed. They had dinner planned but they switched the menu to burgers for the kids. He briefed them and the crew to help them with kayaks. He is kind and knowledgeable.

I entrusted the lives and safety of my family to him, from the time they were small until they worked on the boat. I owe Jerry a debt of gratitude for all he has done for me and my kids. He is an unselfish, good man who has a lot to offer others. We are his family and his job was his life.


I plan to support him however I can during the next part of his life. I will continue to write and visit. Of course this devastating accident has impacted him greatly. I thought he would be the last captain I know to have a tragedy like this happen, as he stood out among the other captains I worked with as most competent and safe.

Since the accident he has been isolated and does not go out much except to his close friends' in Santa Barbara. I grieve for the souls lost in the fire but also for Jerry. He is a good man who has suffered a great loss. He has so much to offer his community: his humor and love for others, expertise and knowledge, and work ethic and dedication to others. I love and respect him, both as a human being and a professional.

I appreciate the opportunity to speak on his behalf. It is my privilege to call Jerry my friend.

Thank you for your time.

Respectfully

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Deborah Buchanan".

Deborah Buchanan

# Exhibit 9



**April 2, 2024**

**To Whom It May Concern:**

**My name is Ed Stetson. I've been teaching scuba diving at the University of California , Santa Barbara and organizing dive charters for 45 years. I have organized hundreds of dive charters throughout the world. I have certified thousands of divers. I retired in 2014 as a Sergeant from the Santa Barbara Harbor Patrol after 30 years of service. I was twice named California Boating Officer of the Year by the California Boating Safety Officers Association. I was also a licensed captain with the U.S. Coast Guard with a 200-ton Master's license.**

**I have known Jerry Boylan for over 30 years, both as a charter boat captain and as a friend. Jerry was the captain aboard the Conception for several of my dive charters. He was extremely competent, professional and safety oriented aboard his vessels. Jerry and his crew were directly responsible for saving the lives of several people who either got into trouble or had medical emergencies while diving. He took his job as a captain very seriously. He's one of the best captains I've ever worked with.**

**Jerry was the captain aboard the Conception when the fire broke out and 34 people perished. Jerry was guilty of negligence for not having a roving watchman during the evening. I have been on hundreds of long range dive and fishing charters. Very, very few of these crews had a roving watchman at night. It's possible that perhaps none of them did. My point is not to justify Jerry's actions, but rather state that Jerry was doing what everybody else in the industry was doing. Unfortunately, it happened during his watch. He will be sentenced for his actions; the actions of an industry that has also been negligent for years. I am not trying to justify any form of negligence. Mistakes were made. We cannot bring these victims back, but we can all learn from these mistakes. When I go aboard charters today, there is now a roving watchman at night. To me, this is the only positive side to this tragedy.**

**Jerry is not a young man and it appears he has health issues. I ask the court to please be sympathetic and understanding when considering Jerry's sentence. This situation could have happened on any boat in the industry. Our entire industry has learned from Jerry's mistake, so hopefully this will save lives in the future.**

**Sincerely,**

***Edward J. Stetson***  
**Edward J. Stetson**



# Exhibit 10

Jacquelyn Sartorius

[REDACTED]  
Santa Fe, New Mexico [REDACTED]

4/15/24

Your Honor,

I am writing with regards to Jerry Boylan, whose upcoming sentencing I understand you will be presiding over. I worked for Truth Aquatics for about a year, from the spring of 2000 through the early winter of 2000, where I had the good fortune to work in the galley of the Conception with Jerry Boylan as my Captain. I was a sophomore student at UC Santa Barbara during the spring, then took the fall semester and summer off to work full time on the dive boats. I started off on the Conception where I learned the ropes, then spent the last few months working on the Vision, but my heart was always with the Conception.

For the last 24 years, I have recalled my time working on the Conception as some of my fondest memories, and Jerry has always been at the forefront of my reasons for valuing that time so dearly. Not only did I find him to be kind, compassionate, funny and an excellent boat captain and leader, but he changed the course of my life.

I was going through a turning point in life where I didn't know what direction to take, what career to pursue, or if I even wanted to return to university to complete my degree. My parents were living overseas at the time, and the crew on the Conception became my family. I have such respect for Jerry and loved being on the boats, and got the idea that I would like to leave university all together and pursue a career as a boat captain. One night after a trip, after

cleaning up the boat and getting everything ready for upcoming the trip the next day, the crew was relaxing in the main cabin and I had a chance to talk to Jerry about my plans. He listened, and without belittling my me or my ideas, he took the time to tell me about being a boat captain. He spoke with me about what he loved, but also what was challenging about it. The responsibility. The time away from family and friends and the difficulty of starting a family if the majority of your time is spent out at sea. These were the things he was giving up to a degree to pursue what he loved doing, but made clear that these sacrifices weren't for everyone, no matter how much you love the sea. He talked to me about how fortunate I was to have parents who were supporting me in obtaining a degree and the opportunities that my future would hold. And so Jerry Boylan convinced me to go back to university and complete my degree.

I am now working as a Physician Assistant in emergency medicine and am married to a wonderful man that I would not have met had I not returned to school. I still love the ocean and boats, but I am thankful that my life has followed the path that it has. Any occasion that my time working on the dive boats has come up with my parents over the past 20 odd years, they always bring up Jerry, and how thankful they are that he played the role in my life that he did.

Thank you for taking the time to read my letter, I hope you will keep in consideration all of the good and positive impacts Jerry has had on the people in his life over the years.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Jacquelyn Sartorius". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Jacquelyn Sartorius

10-Sept.-2019

Hey Jerry,  
Nugget here, just a quick note to say I'm thinking of you.  
I trusted my life with you when I worked on the Conception, and would do so again in a heartbeat. You are an excellent Captain, and have been a mentor and friend to so many people that had the good fortune to be part of your crew over the years. Myself included. My time on the boats shaped the person I became, and my memories from then are some of my most cherished.

I'm so sorry to hear about what happened, and can't fathom what you

must be going through. I know you have a long road ahead of you, but please know how much love and support you have from the Conception and Truth Aquatics community all around the world. We are all standing with you.

Much love & respect,

Jackie (Harris) Sartorius

aka Nug

Conception & Vision Crew

1999-2000

# Exhibit 11

Dear Judge Wu

My name is Dwight L. Willey, I am writing this letter on behalf of my friend Jerry Boylan. I have known Jerry for over 35 years. We shared a similar back ground starting our careers working for Truth Aquatics starting in the early 1980's. I went on to work for "Ocean Passages" and the National Park Service running their vessels for the next 35 yrs before retiring. I enjoyed working with Jerry and found him to be likable, fun and serious. I say serious because he did not take lightly in any way his job, his diving skills, crew and passenger safety. Safely navigating the waters in the Santa Barbara Channel requires someone like Jerry. Prior to this Horrific event, how many times did Jerry prevent catastrophe? I venture way more than once.

Now here we are. It is so very hard to convey to anyone not knowing Jerry how this tragedy weighs on his heart and in his mind as well as ours. It is immeasurable. Saddened and at a loss, words cannot convey the ache. Forever changed.

Jerry was professional, he was thoughtful, he is intelligent. Both on the water and at the dock. Jerry is highly respected by his peers.

A live aboard dive boat where you knowingly put 35 amateur divers in the water on multiple days is a tremendous responsibility. Jerry did this safely and consistently for over 35 years. One fateful night events conspired against him, his crew and 34 adventurous people. The most horrible thing that could ever happen to all these people and their families, happened.

It is so incredibly hard to imagine this happened at all, but Jerry, the "Conception" 34 beautiful people? Jerry cared, he cared deeply about people. He cared for the "Conception", and took pride in her and his job. Jerry cared deeply about "Truth Aquatics".

My time working with Jerry, my professional association with Jerry says he is a good man with the highest integrity who did his best, always. Sadly Jerry, nor anyone else could possibly see the events coming that has forever changed his life and the families of those lost.


I stand with Jerry. I would trust my life with him. He is a professional mariner. So what does that mean? A Captain that can assess risk, analyze weather, wind, swell, currents, safe diving conditions, navigate in bad weather, analyze crew strength and weaknesses, someone with with

"eyes in the back of their head", the list goes on and on and on. It does not take long to realize Jerry has all these skills on an upper scale. Jerry has done this for a very long time,

I know families, friends and many hearts are broken. Good lives lost, others changed forever, Nothing can change that.

Incarceration is not the answer...it solves nothing. Jerry did not act with malice. He is a good man. I am incredibly sorry for all involved, I truly am.

Sincerely, with deepest regards

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. J. Wiley". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, sweeping flourish at the end.

# Exhibit 12



I've known Jerry since the early 80s when he was working for the Santa Barbara sailing company. Jerry found me as a local dive instructor when he was interested in learning to scuba dive.

He graduated with a NAUI open water certification after a 100-hour dive class taught at Westmont College in Santa Barbara. His 12 ocean dives were conducted off the Conception dive boat at the local Channel Is near the coast of SB.

I got to know Jerry very well over time as a warm and kind person whose only interest was working around boats and on the sea. Upon my suggestion, he applied to Truth Aquatics as a deckhand with the aspirations of working his way up to a captain someday, which, of course, he did.

I chartered the Conception and Vision dozens of times over the many years I lived in SB. I taught all my open water/advanced scuba classes on board the highly acclaimed Truth boats out of SB. I also taught many of my photographic classes aboard these same boats.

Additionally, I've chartered dive boats all over the world during my 60-plus years of diving for photographic classes and for the TV productions I've worked on over these many years.

I am a certified NAUI diving instructor (National Assoc of Underwater Instructors) and CMAS (European underwater Instructor. I'm also a former Qualified US Navy Combat Diver who served 6 years with the USMC Special Forces Unit (Force Recon Co) in Vietnam during 1964-65.

Also, along with my ex-wife Cindy, we taught the first aid and CPR classes for Truth Aquatics that

were required by management for many years for all the crew members, including the Captain.

I've known Jerry and remained in contact with him for over 40 years. As a person, Jerry is a quiet unassuming person who knows his business as a Captain very well. He has always conducted himself professionally and with great pride in his position as the Captain of the dive boat, Conception.

I've never seen him take risks with the operation of his dive boat and he's always taken the safety of his diving passengers very seriously. I could personally give many examples of this behavior over the years I chartered the Truth boats.

I've only seen Jerry once since this tragedy occurred and I was shocked to see him as only a shell of the man he once was. The unimaginable stress and remorse he has suffered since that tragic night has left him with nothing left in his life. It has aged Jerry way beyond the person I once knew, which saddens me.

I simply could not imagine what price Jerry could pay beyond what he has endured over these past years and months. He's lost everything dear to him and none of that will ever come back. He's left with the forever nightmare of losing all those special people under his stewardship.

Best Regards,  
Tom

Tom Campbell's Productions

Montrose, CO

# Exhibit 13

Jim Knowlton

██████████ Ventura, CA ██████████

April 9<sup>th</sup>, 2024

Dear Judge Wu,

I appreciate this opportunity to speak highly of the character of Captain Jerry Boylan. I worked with Captain Jerry many years ago at Truth Aquatics and I know first-hand that Captain Jerry greatly valued the lives of the people on his boat and worked intensely to keep people safe.

I worked a trip with Captain Jerry Boylan on May 6<sup>th</sup>, 1989 when he captained the M/V Truth on a trip to San Miguel Island. We were at Lover's Cove when a passenger named William Jack had a diving emergency. He ran out of air, held his breath on the way to the surface which caused a pneumothorax in his lungs, and he then drowned as he hit the surface. His buddy waved for help and I jumped in the water with an innertube attached to a line. I was working as deckhand and safety diver.

When I reached Mr. Jack, he was unconscious and lying on his back. I wiped the froth from his mouth and gave him two breathes into his lungs using mouth to mouth resuscitation. I waved to the crew to begin pulling us back to the boat using the line I had brought with me. On the way I gave Mr. Jack additional breaths.

When we reached the boat the crew carefully lifted Mr. Jack onto the back of the boat where the crew began giving CPR. I remember Sarah and Scott helped perform CPR and Captain Jerry began contacting the Coast Guard to report the emergency and to prepare for a helivac of Mr. Jack. We were able to bring Mr. Jack back to consciousness. Captain Jerry moved the Truth off the Island and we prepared to receive a Coast Guard airman onto our deck that is lowered from a cable. He then placed Mr. Jack in a gurney and lifted him to the helicopter – all while the boat is motoring out to sea. The cable is then lowered again and the airman was brought back up to the helicopter. My understanding is the William Jack fully recovered and later returned to thank the crew although I was not there the day he returned.

This was the first of several instances I was involved in where people had medical emergencies while working on dive boats with Truth Aquatics. It's very intense and all the crew works together to do their best to help save lives. Truth Aquatics had safety procedures that were carefully followed to help prevent accidents and emergencies and to be able to respond to them when they happen. Being a part of medical emergencies on a boat brings a crew together because of the gravity of responsibility of keeping people safe and rescuing them once they are in an emergency. It's something you will *never* forget. Jerry was our Captain that day and he guided our successful saving of a life.

The occurrence of William Jack was particularly memorable for me because when we returned to the dock I was informed I needed to leave the boat immediately to deal with some family matters. Captain Jerry understood the reason better than I because he was told what I had not yet learned, that my brother had drowned earlier that day and had died.

After leaving work for a period to help bury my brother I returned to work with Captain Jerry and he told me he too had lost his older brother. He has a tattoo on his hand in remembrance of his brother. I remember that for me there was a bond with Jerry because we had both lost our brothers and I remember he was understanding of my loss.

One reason I want to speak up for Jerry is because I know firsthand that Captain Jerry knows the value of life and the weight of responsibility to keep people safe that are passengers on his boat. I remember Jerry as a very focused captain where boat safety was of the highest importance. In an industry where people can die under your command you do everything you can to be the best you can be.

Truth Aquatics dive boats were known as the best on the California coast because they were custom built for diving and were very well-maintained and clean. Jerry was one of the best captains ever at Truth Aquatics. People returned year after year on charter trips to dive on Truth Aquatics boats and for many divers Jerry was their favorite captain.

The burning of the Conception is an unimaginable tragedy that shocked everyone, and brought pain and suffering, especially to the families and friends of those lost, but also to everyone else, divers, non-divers, and to anyone who learns of the event. It's horrible. From my time working on the Truth Aquatics boats and working with Jerry, I know that the weight of this tragedy will weigh very heavily on him for the rest of his life.

In your sentencing, I hope you can take into consideration that he worked hard for decades to keep people safe and that many people wanted Jerry to be their captain. For me, saving the life of a drowning diver with Jerry Boylan on the same day that my brother died of drowning is a bond I will never forget.

Thank you for your consideration,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Jim Knowlton". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

# Exhibit 14



Dear Judge Wu,

I've known Jerry Boylan for over 17 years. When I was teaching the underwater photography course at Brooks Institute of Photography in Santa Barbara, he was the captain of the *Conception* which we chartered for our course field trips.

In a typical class I would take my 25 students out to the Channel Islands on the *Conception* for four separate trips, a total of about 15 days at sea. Students would spend the day diving and sleep aboard the vessel for several nights to complete their assignments. Over the course of 10 years, I and my students spent more than 104 days at sea with Captain Jerry Boylan on the *Conception*. There was not a single day I didn't feel that Jerry was making decisions that kept us safe and got us home. On several occasions I remember him saying to the students that his job was to ensure that everyone got back to Santa Barbara safely.

Over those 10 years we only had one incident on board. A student who was modeling underwater came to the surface and complained about a severe headache. Jerry and the crew immediately made her comfortable, checked her vitals, and decided to call a medical evac boat to come from Catalina and take her to the hospital for evaluation. They later found she was severely dehydrated, and the Captain had made the right choice to call for evacuation. She recovered completely. Jerry's pre-trip safety briefings to the students were thorough, and he and his crew reminded students frequently of proper protocols on the boat.

I have been diving all over the world on many live-aboard dive boats with many captains and I find his record of safety remarkable. I would go back out to sea with Captain Jerry without hesitation, knowing that his dedication to being a boat captain would ensure my safe return home.

Sincerely,

Ralph A. Clevenger



# Exhibit 15



To:

Jerry Boylan  
C/O Truth Aquatics

[REDACTED]  
Santa Barbara, CA [REDACTED]

To Jerry and whom it may concern,

I am writing this letter in support of Captain Jerry Boylan.

I have been a diver aboard the Conception and other Truth Aquatics vessels many times.

This can be verified by my local dive shop:

[REDACTED]  
Reseda, CA [REDACTED]

I am a Divemaster with the shop and have been on board with Jerry numerous times, as well as acting as Charter Master on at least one occasion.

Having just received my USCG OUPV Captain's License, I have some perspective on the operations of a dive boat.

Jerry always had the passenger's safety in mind, often taking extra time and fuel to move the boat because a particular area might not have been suitably safe for the skill level of divers aboard. He would always find a safe environment that would accommodate the passengers, allowing a safe, but still interesting and agreeable trip for all.

If Jerry thought conditions weren't safe, he did not hesitate to stop and make the changes necessary to be safe.

His knowledge of the boat and the islands that he usually made trips to was and is without parallel.

This was a tragic accident, and I feel I can safely say that no one feels the loss of the life as acutely as Jerry. But sadly, accidents happen and sometimes there is nothing that can be done in the moment that will create a different outcome. I firmly believe that Jerry did everything humanly possible to avert and avoid the crisis as it unfolded, and this tragedy will serve to create changes to avoid future accidents, but criminal charges against Jerry will serve no good.

Every accident is preventable in hindsight, occasionally bad things all come together to create a horrible circumstance.

I fully support Jerry, personally and professionally, and would not hesitate a single instant to be on a boat with Captain Jerry Boylan as passenger or crew.

Jerry, you have all the support that I and my family can give you, please don't hesitate to ask if there is ANYTHING we can do to help.

Sincerely,

Rick Willett

Divemaster and OUPV Captain

[REDACTED]  
Northdidge, CA [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

JB00001875

# Exhibit 16

March 31, 2024

Dear Judge Wu,

I served as a crew member for Truth Aquatics and worked with Jerry Boylan from 1989 to the mid 1990's. Jerry was the captain on many trips that I crewed on the all of the Truth Aquatics boats. As a younger crew member, Jerry made a point of helping me understand that while the work on the boat was fun, and being out at sea was beautiful, we could not forget that the passengers were depending on us. From my years of working with Jerry, I still hear his voice saying, 'check, and then double-check'. Whether it was a food order, counting the number of tanks before leaving the dock, securing the lines or setting the anchor, he would always say 'Did you check? Did you double-check?'. The repetition ensured so many things - underlying it all was our safety.

I would also be remiss if I didn't mention Jerry's role in an emergency situation where we had a passenger that needed to be brought back to back to the boat during a dive. Upon getting him back to the boat, Jerry met our safety diver and the passenger at the swim step, hoisted the passenger - nearly twice Jerry's size - up to the back deck and immediately started CPR. The man involuntarily vomited on Jerry twice during this effort. I took over CPR while Jerry called the Coast Guard. The rest of the crew members & I continued CPR, and the passenger regained his heartbeat, and eventually started breathing on his own. Shortly before the Coast Guard lift, he regained consciousness and eventually had a full recovery.

My point in telling that story is that Jerry acted swiftly, and with no hesitation - even when he had to spit out the man's vomit - he kept going. It is an example of selflessness that has never left me, even after 30 years.

Thank you for considering his attention to safety and his selflessness.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Sara Azat', written in a cursive style.

Sara Azat

# Exhibit 17

Dear Judge Wu


This letter is about my relationship with Jerry Boylan captain of truth aquatics boats. I have been in the recreation SCUBA diving business since 1965 have chartered many dive boats in Calif. Mexico, south Pacific, and the Caribbean. I first met Jerry sometime in 1977 or 78 as we chartered the Dive boat Conception for a new year's overnight trip to the northern Channel Islands. This was an all-new adventure for our customers diving the northern Channel Islands leaving out of Santa Barbara ca. The first thing I noticed when boarding was how the crew welcomed us. My wife and I brought our new son about six- or seven-months old. Jerry wanted every person on the register diving or not this was a surprise to me as other charter boats never required it. The dive briefing roll calls the movement of the boat from spot to spot was amazing to me. The safety concerns and communication were like no other that I experienced. Over the next 35 years we decided to use truth aquatics exclusive one thing my customers wanted to ask is Jerry going to be the skipper this was a challenge for my business but I asked why him and they said they felt the process and safety concerns were very outstanding sharing his knowledge calling people by their names not just a number on the sign in sheet making sure every person was onboard after every dive and the boat was going to move even when a person was sleeping Jerry was over the top when it came to safety wanted the person in sight which was one of many concerns he had his safety concerns were over the top. Our business and my family that is four of my five children worked for Jerry on the truth aquatics boats two of them have become skippers themselves and learned great work ethics, and safety habits and I attribute much of that to Jerry. I have not talked to Jerry since the fire on the Conception but one thing I know chartering boats with him as captain he was outstanding and very focused on the safety of each person on board, I have seen him handle medical emergencies rough weather crew training my kids talked nonstop all they learned from him as captain. I have since retired and do still like to snorkel. The skipper of choice and boats of choice would be truth aquatic and Jerry as our skipper.

Sincerely

Danny Buchanan

Downey Ca

April 12, 2024



# Exhibit 18

**BRUCE LUDMIR, Ph.D.**

[REDACTED]  
The Woodlands, TX [REDACTED]

March 28, 2024

Your Honor,

Aware of Jerry Boylan's upcoming appearance in Court for his sentencing I would be remiss if I did not take the opportunity to convey how sorry I am over the situation he currently is in.

As a seasoned SCUBA diver, I have known Jerry for over three decades, during which I took dozens of trips aboard his boat, the Conception.

I can attest to an occasion when a diver suffered an accidental embolism, and Jerry aptly assumed command of the situation, immediately summoned a helicopter and a Coast Guard rescue team, and ultimately ensured that the injured diver received the emergency medical care he needed. I can attest to an occasion when one of the passengers aboard the Conception was knowingly defying safety standards and was disregarding the welfare of others, and then Jerry openly and directly chastised him and informed him that such behaviors would not be tolerated aboard his ship. I can also attest to an occasion when I took my 7 year-old son aboard the Conception for a day-trip to the Channel Islands and, aware of how magical the experience must have been for him, Jerry kindly had a crew member give my son a short tour on a small skiff around Anacapa Island – an experience my son to this day recalls quite fondly.

I would hope you duly consider my sentiments when gauging Jerry's sentence.

As a diver, in general, and a psychologist, in particular, I have known Jerry Boylan to be a good person throughout, this, despite the tragedy that occurred at sea.

Respectfully,



Bruce Ludmir, Ph.D.

# Exhibit 19



Hello!

I worked for the Bamboo Reef chain in the Bay Area for many years. We chartered the Truth Aquatics vessels several times a year, every year. The Halloween trip every October is touted as being one of the longest running annual charters TA worked with. I remember the excitement of my first trip aboard the Conception and then again every time I stepped aboard. I had the pleasure of having Jerry as my captain several times. He was pleasant, fun, and everyone familiar with him was so excited to hear he would be our captain when finding out the details of the trip ahead. His reputation preceded him for bring able to put us on the best diving possible. His stories and tales of being at sea were revered.

I have been a dive master and deckhand in Southern CA for the past several years and my fiancé is a dive charter captain. I know very well the responsibility and stress this job can hold. I can only imagine the turmoil going on for the crew as they try to come to grips with this, especially Jerry. I know how seriously he takes his job, how safety is his paramount concern, and how much he loves the divers aboard his vessel each trip. I just wanted to pass along my support and love to Jerry, the crew, and the whole Truth Aquatics Family. You all have the support of the entire dive community.

Thank you so much!  
Pamela VanGuelpen



# Exhibit 20

Truth Aquatics

[REDACTED]  
Santa Barbara, CA [REDACTED]

Greetings.

I am writing this letter in support of Captain Jerry Boylan.

I have been a diver aboard the *Conception* and other *Truth Aquatics* vessels many times.

This can be verified by my local dive shop [REDACTED]

Reseda, CA 91335 - [REDACTED]

I have always found Captain Jerry to be very safety minded and thoughtful. He always made it clear that safety was his foremost concern. I have been on dive boats since 1977 and more than most, Captain Jerry impressed me with his comprehensive briefings.

Sincerely,



Stewart Deats [REDACTED] Woodland Hills, CA [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

JB00001876

# Exhibit 21

9-9-19

Dear Jerry,

I cannot put into words how much I admire and respect you as a captain and a person, and this tragedy will never change that. You are one of the reasons I love diving out at the islands so much! You, Davey, and Ian are the three best dive boat captains in California, ask anyone, they will agree. You did everything you could and we all know it. You have brought so much joy to the diving community over the years and incase you've forgotten I'd like to remind you of a few.

Do you remember all of the Scholastic Expedition trips you did with Nora and I? We brought 20 high school students on the Conception and taught them about the Channel Islands and marine science. We did a couple trips that summer and the kids had a blast on every trip! I recall one boy in particular after interviewing coming up and telling me, and I quote, "Emma! Did you know that Jerry is a badass! I didn't even know this was a job you could have! I am totally doing this when I grow up." I remember him saying that because I meant to tell you after and I don't think I ever did. And when the students didn't think the trip could get any better you blew their minds by taking them to the Painted Cave. And you didn't have to do that, you didn't have to let the crew give the kids skiff rides to the back of the cave, but you did and that was really awesome of you. Watching their faces as we went further and further into the cave is one of my favorite memories. Those kids would have probably never seen the Painted Cave if it wasn't for you. Hell, I probably never would have seen it if not for you and to this day it is one of the coolest things I have ever seen in my life, so thank you for that.

You gave these students and opportunity to explore the ocean and to me that is one of the most admirable things a captain can do. Never once did Nora, or I, or any of the SE instructors worry about anything because we knew you and your crew would handle any issue with professionalism and efficiency. I don't know if you remember these trips but they are some of *my* favorite memories ever. I want to remind you that you are responsible for bringing joy and beauty to thousands of people! Please, PLEASE don't forget that. The dive community loves you Jerry and we know what an amazing captain you are and we support you with all our hearts. Thank you for always bringing me joy.

With the utmost respect and adoration,  
Emma Horanic

Hi Jerry,

9.24.2019

It's Gabi Dunn writing from San Francisco. It's been a few years (5 years!) since my days at Sealanding, but my time spent there is still fresh in my mind & will always be close to my heart - in large part because of your kindness. As a newcomer to the community, I was a little intimidated by all of the crews - so tight knit, expert, & cool - but from the very beginning you made me feel like part of the team. Always coming in with a big smile & willing to chat or have a quick laugh, even on the quick check-in phone calls.

I will always be grateful for how welcoming, patient, and generous to answer questions, and warm you were to me. Thank you Jerry.

You and your crew unlocked and gave access to another world, for me & so many others. Away from the usual noise, chatter, and busy life, while being fully immersed in the present - in the most beautiful magical place - it's unlike anything else. It calls to so many people. It's true bliss. Thank you.

I want you to know that I'm thinking of you & that I'm here for you.

Sending a big hug,

Gabi



Howard Hall Productions

Del Mar, California

September 7, 2019

Dear Jerry-

You and the rest of your crew have constantly been in our thoughts these last days.

As you know, Howard and I have a long history with Truth Aquatics, and especially Conception. You've been an integral part of that history. When I think of the Conception, I think of your smiling face, and I hear your reassuring voice.

I can't guess at how many days and nights we've spent onboard, making television films, two IMAX movies, and just shooting stock footage for fun. The Truth boats are the only California liveboards that we have dived from in the last thirty years. We've always marveled at the skill and dedication of you and your crew. You simply represent the best in the business.

Many of the Truth Aquatics crew, including you, seem like family to us. Our hearts go out to you.

With warm regards, always,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Michele and Howard". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

Michele and Howard

Aloha Jerry,

I want to express the love I have for you and all you have done for Kelly and Mikey. I cannot thank you enough for the confidence you instilled in her to be a lead galley cook and then to have the trust in her in hiring Mikey. I know how much you appreciated having them as your crew even in the rough times. I am of course heart broken over the last few days and all that was lost. I am thankful that Mikey was there with you and that Kelly was not this week.....I know that all of your lives will never be the same. I hope you can find some solace soon and be able to one day be able to get back on a boat and do what you are so good at. My heart breaks for all of you.

Much Love and Aloha to you,

Michelle Taylor

Kelly's Mom, Mikey's Ex.



Dear Captain Jerry,

My heart is heavy for what you must be feeling.

I wanted to remind you of all the 1000's of dive trips that you safely commandeered. Especially all the trips where you kept our daughter, Erica Miller safe. She was a cook on the Conception after she graduated from College.

My husband and I have such a heartfelt gratitude for you. I know there are 1000's more parents who also feel that same gratitude for you.

I hope that God will bring good from this tragedy, helping people to come closer to him.

Please know that you have been and will be in our prayers.

Love Lynne Miller

Dear Jerry,

I just wanted to send you a note during this unimaginably difficult time. I have had great times with you on the Conception. I know you are an amazing captain and have always been 100% dedicated to your craft. I appreciate the way you always made me feel at home on the boat. When I came up to the wheel house that first time, you immediately made me feel like I was part of the "team".

Our shoot for National Geographic at the Cortes Bank was one I will always remember. You and the crew made sure that it would be successful! I am sending this because I want you to know that there are many people in the dive community who care about you and the crew at Truth Aquatics.

I am wishing you peace and strength during this incredibly difficult time.

Sincerely,



Jerry,

Condolences on the tragic accident and loss of the Conception. Please know that so many of us are thinking of you.



I often reminisce on memories of my season on the Conception with you, Russ, Gretchen, Emmett, and a handful of second galleys. It was full of great diving at almost all of the Channel Islands, never enough sleep, and plenty of hard work to ensure the passengers had amazing dive trips. That year was one of the most formative of my life, and I largely have you to thank for it. I know many others feel similarly about their time on the boats - you and Truth Aquatics have inspired many to pursue aquatic and maritime careers.


So thank you, for being the best Captain the Conception could have asked for, and for placing me on your crew back then.

Best,

Sarah Horwath

# Exhibit 22






# Exhibit 23

## TRIPS CAPTAINED BY JERRY BOYLAN

Rating	Staff Knowledge and Professionalism_JB Trips
5	160
4	29
3	13
2	0
1	0
<b>Total *</b>	<b>202</b>
<b>Average</b>	<b>4.73</b>

\* Totals exclude "Blank" entries






# CAPTAIN MANNER

## TRIPS CAPTAINED BY JERRY BOYLAN

Rating	Captain Manner_JB Trips
5	231
4	13
3	3
2	2
1	1
<b>Total *</b>	<b>250</b>
<b>Average</b>	<b>4.88</b>

\* Totals exclude "Blank" entries




# OVERALL TRIP EXPERIENCE

## TRIPS CAPTAINED BY JERRY BOYLAN

Rating	Overall Trip Experience_JB Trips
5	204
4	36
3	2
2	1
1	0
<b>Total *</b>	<b>243</b>
<b>Average</b>	<b>4.82</b>

\* Totals exclude "Blank" entries



# Exhibit 24



Jerry Boylan  
02/13/20

## FEDERAL TAX RETURN SUMMARY 2019

Income	Year 2019	Year 2018	Change(\$)
Wages, salaries, tips, etc.:	\$35,163	\$44,058	(\$8,895)
Interest income:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Ordinary dividend income:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Refunds of state and local taxes:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Business income or (loss) (Schedule C):	\$0	\$0	\$0
Capital gain or (loss) (Schedule D):	\$0	\$0	\$0
Other gains or (losses) (Form 4797):	\$0	\$0	\$0
IRA distributions and pension income:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Rental real estate, partnerships, estates, etc. (Schedule E):	\$0	\$0	\$0
Farm income or (loss) (Schedule F):	\$0	\$0	\$0
Unemployment compensation:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Taxable social security income:	\$2,862	\$0	\$2,862
Other income:	\$0	\$0	\$0
<b>Total income:</b>	<b>\$38,025</b>	<b>\$44,058</b>	<b>(\$6,033)</b>
<b>Adjustments</b>			
Student loan interest deduction:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Domestic production activities deduction:	\$0	\$0	\$0
IRA contributions:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Deductible part of self-employment tax:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Self-employed health insurance:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Self-employed SEP, SIMPLE, and qualified plans:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Other adjustments:	\$0	\$0	\$0
<b>Total Adjustments:</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$0</b>
<b>Adjusted Gross Income (AGI)</b>			
This is your total income less total adjustments:	\$38,025	\$44,058	(\$6,033)
<b>Deductions</b>			
Standard Deductions:	\$13,850	\$13,600	\$250
Medical and dental expenses:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Taxes paid:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Interest paid:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Gifts to charity:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Casualty and theft losses:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Job expenses and most miscellaneous deductions:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Other miscellaneous deductions:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Exemptions:	\$0	\$0	\$0
<b>Tax Computation</b>			
Taxable Income:	\$24,175	\$30,458	(\$6,283)
Income Tax:	\$2,707	\$3,467	(\$760)
Excess Advance Premium Tax Credit Repayment:	\$0	\$401	(\$401)
<b>Tax Before Credits:</b>	<b>\$2,707</b>	<b>\$3,868</b>	<b>(\$1,161)</b>
<b>Other Taxes</b>			
Self-employment tax:	\$0	\$0	\$0
Other Taxes:	\$0	\$0	\$0
<b>Total Taxes:</b>	<b>\$2,707</b>	<b>\$3,868</b>	<b>(\$1,161)</b>

We're Open All Year! Call 800-HRBLOCK 800-472-5625 or visit [hrblock.com](http://hrblock.com) to schedule an appointment.

The H&R Block Advantage document provides information that could help you improve your tax and financial situation, but your actual tax situation may change materially depending on future changes to the law and changes in your personal and financial circumstances. If your circumstances do change, we suggest that you review the change with your tax professional.

JB00009596

# Exhibit 25

This transcript was exported on Jun 29, 2022 - view latest version [here](#).

Brian Belitski: So we were kind of, I wouldn't say briefed, but yeah, in essence, we were briefed prior to boarding that vessel, that the captain of that vessel was indeed on the Coast Guard vessel as well.

Michael Hope: Okay.

Brian Belitski: But that was my first impression. I had looked at him and being in and around [00:11:00] boats for some time I looked, I said, "This is a very seasoned, he looks to be, he was exactly what you think of when you think of a boat captain." Let's put it that way.

Michael Hope: Did you have prior knowledge of him? Did you know him?

Brian Belitski: No. Not at all.

Michael Hope: From anything being a diver?

Brian Belitski: Absolutely not. No. Never seen him before in my life.

Michael Hope: You're getting on the boat with him and observing him, what was his demeanor like?

Brian Belitski: My observations is that he was extremely distraught. Without [00:11:30] a doubt, it was almost like a paradox. You have this guy who like I said, like almost like a hardened sailor who was just completely distraught at one point crying. I mean, a guy who's probably never gotten seasick in his life at one point was like dry heaving, vomiting. He was very emotional, let's put it that way.

Michael Hope: You actually talked to him at some point?

Brian Belitski: At the very, very end of the boat ride.

Michael Hope: Did you notice anything? [00:12:00] Did he seem to be under the influence of anything?

Brian Belitski: No.

Michael Hope: Did you smell anything consistent with things he might have [inaudible 00:12:05]

Brian Belitski: No. I was in very, very close proximity in contacting him. I never once did I ever even think or even suspect that he was under the influence.

Michael Hope: Cool.

Marie Kondzielski: What was he doing when you saw him?

This transcript was exported on Jun 29, 2022 - view latest version [here](#).

Brian Belitski: On the boat initially or throughout the course of the one-hour observation period?

Marie Kondzielski: Maybe initially.

Brian Belitski: Initially he was just kind of just towards the rear of the boat.

Marie Kondzielski: Standing?

Brian Belitski: Standing, just kind [00:12:30] of with his hands on the rail and really just kind of staring at the wreck.

Marie Kondzielski: Okay.

Brian Belitski: Just kind of shaking his head. He'd look down at the water, shake his head. He'd kind of like pick up and do like a small kind of circle. Just kind of with his eyes up. Nothing out of the ordinary for what a tragedy that was taking place and currently taking place, nothing seemed out of the ordinary. If anything, it seemed like, "Wow, this guy's really distraught." You know what I mean? He lost friends and the whole thing.

Michael Hope: Okay.

Marie Kondzielski: [00:13:00] And then as that time progressed, what else did you notice about him?

Brian Belitski: Really just more of the same, almost even more of like a spiral into it, if you will. Just like, as far as like, I wouldn't say depression, but just more of the levity of the situation was even getting more and more real. At one point, we had to name some crew members that were accounted for and not. Not myself, but another, but there were crew [00:13:30] members that, you know, one of the gals names got read and stuff, and you could just tell the weight of the situation was becoming increasingly heavy on this individual. This is a guy who, on a boat ride, like laid on the deck for a boat ride in the fetal position.

Michael Hope: He did that.

Brian Belitski: Yeah.

Michael Hope: On the way back from the scene?

Brian Belitski: Yeah. At one point he was standing, but I mean, at one point, [00:14:00] and for me, I'm just telling you it's odd having fishing boat experience and stuff to watch a grown man boat captain lay pretty much in the fetal position or very similar to it. Not kind of like arms clenched like this, but just kind of out and just laid on the deck just was, for me, I just thought like, "Wow, okay. This guy is ..."

This transcript was exported on Jun 29, 2022 - view latest version [here](#).

Marie Kondzielski: Curled up.

Brian Belitski: A little bit. Yeah. Obviously just really distraught.

Michael Hope: Do you recall what he was wearing?

Brian Belitski: Yeah, I actually do. He didn't have a shirt on [00:14:30] and I don't know if the Coast Guard gave him a jacket or not, but he was barefoot, pair of jeans, and a black zip up jacket, fleece lined. I didn't even catch the, but that he didn't have a shirt on or anything underneath it.

Michael Hope: Did you notice any injuries?

Brian Belitski: His hands. His hands looked either like, I don't [00:15:00] know if they're burned or just, they did his hands. He had like what I could tell, soft tissue injuries to his hands.

Michael Hope: What did it look like?

Brian Belitski: Like skin tears almost like on an elderly individual. I don't know if you guys know what those look like. We see them a lot through work.

Michael Hope: 20 years an EMT.

Brian Belitski: Yeah. So, whether it was skin tear, burn, abrasion, that kind of things. Like I said, no gross bleeding noted, but blood on the hands.

Michael Hope: Anything that was decidedly [00:15:30] a burn injury?

Brian Belitski: Decidedly. No, because I didn't treat him.

Michael Hope: I understand.

Brian Belitski: I didn't have any sort of contact with him as far as like EMT/provider. I was merely observation.

Michael Hope: He didn't ask for any help like that?

Brian Belitski: No. I couldn't speak to that.

Michael Hope: At any time during that he didn't go to you or ask you to look at him or anything.

Brian Belitski: Nope.

Michael Hope: To check him out for, for med. Other than his hands. Soot?

Brian Belitski: [00:16:00] Not that I recall.



# Exhibit 26




Title of Investigation: Conception Boat Fire	Investigation Number: 784020-19-0028	Report Number: 29
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**SUMMARY OF EVENT:**

**CONTACT INTERVIEW:** On September 12, 2019, at approximately 11:30 a.m., ATF Special Agent / Certified Fire Investigator (SA/CFI) Michael Hope and FBI SA Marie Kondzielski interviewed Ventura County Fire Department (VCFD) Firefighter (FF) Ian Hayward regarding the Conception boat fire.

**NARRATIVE:**

1. SA/CFI Hope and SA Kondzielski interviewed FF Hayward at the quarters of VCFD Engine 26 in Santa Paula, CA. FF Hayward is assigned to Engine 26, "A" shift as a firefighter. FF Hayward stated that he was working when the Conception boat fire occurred.
2. The interview was audio recorded. This Report of Investigation (ROI) serves as a summary of the content of the interview. The audio recording serves as the best evidence.
3. FF Hayward stated that his company was dispatched to assist with the fire aboard the Conception. Upon arriving at Ventura Harbor, FF Hayward and the other two firefighters from his engine (Captain Brian Belitski and Engineer Alejandro Garcia) boarded Ventura Harbor Boat 1 (Boat 1) with two members of the Harbor Patrol (Officer William Hummer and Officer Mark Findlay) and left the dock for the site of the Conception.
4. While en route to the site of the Conception, Boat 1 experienced mechanical problems and the operator had to shut down an engine. FF Hayward stated that the loss of the engine resulted in a greatly reduced speed.
5. FF Hayward stated that he observed extensive fire damage to the Conception when they arrived. FF Hayward stated that holes had been burned through the hull, with more damage to the rear of the boat than the bow. Most of the superstructure was missing. FF Hayward noted that the smoke was white in color, with the occasional darker smoke appearing when isolated areas of flames would reignite.
6. FF Hayward stated that he did not hear any sounds from the Conception, specifically including explosions, compressed air being released or sounds consistent with human activity.

Prepared by: Michael P. Hope	Title: Special Agent, Philadelphia II Field Office	Signature: 	Date: 9/17/19
Authorized by: Carmine N. Downey	Title: Resident Agent in Charge, Glendale II Field Office	Signature: 	Date: 9/17/19
Second level reviewer (optional): Carlos A. Canino	Title: Special Agent in Charge, Los Angeles Field Division	Signature: 	Date: 9/17/19

Title of Investigation: Conception Boat Fire	Investigation Number: 784020-19-0028	Report Number: 29
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7. FF Hayward stated that his boat did not engage in any firefighting activity, discharge any portable fire extinguishers, or participate in the recovery of debris or victims.
8. Due to the mechanical problems with Boat 1, FF Hayward stated that he and the other members of his company transferred to one of the Coast Guard vessels approximately 10 minutes after they arrived at the scene. As they boarded, the captain of VCFD Engine 53 informed FF Hayward that the captain of the Conception was also on board the same Coast Guard vessel.
9. After boarding the Coast Guard vessel, FF Hayward observed the Conception captain on the boat. FF Hayward noted that the captain appeared distraught. When asked to describe the physical signs and behavior that led him to that conclusion, FF Hayward stated that the captain was crying periodically, and not engaging anyone in conversation.
10. FF Hayward stated that the Conception captain appeared tired, and had burns on the back of his hands with peeling skin. The captain was wearing jeans and a black jacket, which did not appear to be his, and was barefoot. FF Hayward observed that the captain was sobbing and crying periodically, muttering to himself, and collapsed with emotion to the deck several times.
11. FF Hayward stated that the captain laid on the deck at the rear of the Coast Guard vessel on the return trip to Channel Islands Coast Guard Station, with his head on a water bottle. At one point, a Coast Guard member asked the captain if he wanted to sit in the wheelhouse, which the captain declined and said that he didn't want to be inside.
12. Upon returning to Channel Islands Harbor, FF Hayward observed a large media presence. FF Hayward stated that the captain also observed the media, and appeared to be scared and overwhelmed at the number of people there.
13. FF Hayward stated that the captain's speech was not slurred, and he did not observe any outward signs of intoxication. The captain did not make any comments about the fire, his escape from the Conception, or the other crewmembers.
14. FF Hayward stated he did not have any contact with the other crewmembers or anyone from the Grape Escape.
15. FF Hayward took one photograph of the incident. He agreed to provide the photo to SA/CFI Hope. SA/CFI Hope subsequently provided the photograph to FBI for inclusion with the case material.
16. The interview was concluded at 11:51 a.m., and the audio recording was discontinued. The audio recording was subsequently retained with file name 190912\_0011.

# Exhibit 27

**Report of Investigation**






Title of Investigation: Conception Boat Fire	Investigation Number: 784020-19-0028	Report Number: 2
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**SUMMARY OF EVENT:**

**CONTACT INTERVIEW:** Captain Paul BARERRA (Ventura County Fire - Engine 53)

**NARRATIVE:**

1. On September 8, 2019, Ventura County Fire Captain Paul BARERRA was interviewed by FBI SA P. Takora Taggart and the reporting agent at his duty station (304 North 2<sup>nd</sup> Street, Port Hueneme CA) regarding a fire reported on the dive boat CONCEPTION that he responded to in the early morning hours of September 2, 2019. The interview was audio recorded by SA Meeks and the following is a summary of information gathered during the recorded interview. This report is intended as a summary of the aforementioned interview and is not a verbatim reporting of said interview. The original recording has been preserved and has been placed into FBI custody.
2. BARERRA stated that on September 2, 2019, he was working his normal shift on Engine 53 when his unit was dispatched to a reported medical call. BARERRA stated that he was the officer in charge of an engine crew that included firefighter/paramedic Cleo 'CJ' ALLEN and Fire Engineer Delachone "Shaun" SHORT. Soon thereafter BARERRA learned that the previously reported medical incident was changed to a report of fire on a vessel located off the coast of Santa Barbara.
3. BARERRA stated that he and his crew boarded a boat commanded by USCG Petty Officer LIVINGSTONE and proceeded to the reported location of the vessel. BARERRA further stated that as his boat approached the vessel later identified as the dive boat CONCEPTION he could see that it was on fire from, "bow to stern, fully engulfed by fire" or words to that effect. Based on his visual observations of the CONCEPTION and his boats limited fire suppression equipment capabilities BARERRA stated that he decided to shift his focus from fire suppression to primarily search and rescue.
4. BARERRA stated that as they got closer to the vessel he became aware that a person located on another vessel that was later identified as the vessel GRAPE ESCAPE required medical attention. At this time BARERRA

Prepared by: Mark P. Meeks	Title: Special Agent, Albany Field Office	Signature: 	Date: 9/11/19
Authorized by: Carmine N. Downey	Title: Resident Agent in Charge, Glendale II Field Office	Signature: 	Date: 9/11/19
Second level reviewer (optional): 	Title: ASAC 	Signature: 	Date: 9/12/19

and his crew made their way to GRAPE ESCAPE to provide assistance. After rendezvousing with the GRAPE ESCAPE, Engine 53 personnel (ALLEN and SHORT) boarded the boat and began rendering medical aid to a male victim. BARERRA did not provide the name of the victim at the time of the interview.

5. BARRERRA stated that soon thereafter FF/PM ALLEN advised him the male victim has a leg injury but was stable enough to be transported back to port by the GRAPE ESCAPE. BARERRA stated that he and his crew wanted to remain on site so as to render aid to anyone who may have more severe injuries.
6. BARERRA stated that he then observed a small dinghy in the area with two men aboard. He stated that he learned that they were crewmembers from the CONCEPTION and were attempting to locate any survivors in the waters surrounding the boat. He further stated that they were speaking to another male who was on the GRAPE ESCAPE who was later identified as the Captain of the CONCEPTION. BARERRA did not provide his name to investigators at the time of the interview.
7. BARERRA stated that the Captain requested permission to come aboard (BARERRA'S boat) and then advised the two males in the dinghy to get aboard the GRAPE ESCAPE and get back to port. BARERRA stated the Captain told his crew that he wasn't their Captain anymore and that they should tell the authorities whatever they asked them or words to that effect. BARERRA stated that the all crewmembers and their Captain appeared to be emotionally distraught because of the fire and were crying.
8. BARERRA then stated that other U.S. Coast Guard and local fire boats arrived and were involved in fire suppression. He further stated that the fire on CONCEPTION was extinguished more than once but reignited. He then stated that sometime during the fire CONCEPTION broke from its anchor and went adrift. BARERRA stated that the CONCEPTION was then towed closer to shore but sank.
9. BARERRA stated that due to his emotional distress the Captain of CONCEPTION was observed by Engine 53 crewmembers as they made their way back to port. Upon arrival at port BARERRA stated that numerous news crews had arrived and were waiting for them as they docked their boat.
10. BARERRA stated that the Captain of Conception told him that he didn't want to get off the boat. BARERRA explained that he believed it was due to the large number of press that were present. BARERRA stated that soon after arriving at the port, USCG law enforcement personnel arrived and escorted the Captain of Conception off the boat to be debriefed.
11. BARERRA was asked if he spoke to the Captain about what happened on board CONCEPTION and he stated that the Captain told him that he was awakened to the report of fire on board. He stated that he made his way to CONCEPTIONS wheelhouse but could not stay there long because it had become filled with smoke. The Captain then stated that he and his crew abandoned the ship due to the deteriorating conditions aboard.
12. BARERRA did not have any additional information to report regarding any additional observations or statements made by the Captain and crew of the CONCEPTION. BARERRA stated that earlier in the day (September 8, 2019) he had been interviewed by members of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) about the aforementioned event.

13. BARERRA stated that during the incident he captured both still photos and video of the CONCEPTION on his cell phone and showed the content to SA Taggart and the reporting agent. BARERRA was advised by SA Taggart and the reporting agent to preserve the images and wait for further instructions from FBI personnel. No further information was obtained from BARERRA and the interview was concluded.


Attachments: Meeks interview notes dated 09/08/2019.

Audio recording of BARERRA interview dated 09/08/2019.

Cpt. Paul Barrera  
Ventura County EMI

9/8/19


SA Meeks  
SA Tassant (FBI)

- Petty Officer  
LIVINGSTON (USCG) + ~~EB~~  
2 crew members ~~USCG~~ (USCG)
- Boat - Coast Guard BOAT ~~AT~~ 1 deck gun  
4/8 1200 RPM FOJ  
50 gal Formin
- Bow to stern fully engulfed
- report crew survives on Grape escape  
4 crew
- DINGHY 2 crew members search for  
victims - returned on Grape escape.
- HAS PHOTOS ON PHONE
-  - station #
- NO BODIES RECOVERED - BY HIS BOAT.




# Exhibit 28











# Exhibit 29

## Josh Weiss

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**From:** Izbicki, Matthew J CIV  
**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020 2:19 PM  
**To:** Sheppard, Daniel J CIV; Pham, Claire Y LT  
**Subject:** FW: MBI Safety Concern Regarding CONCEPTION's Required Manning Level and D11 Field Unit Manning for Overnight Vessels in General  
**Attachments:** Overnight SPV Manning Analysis (Dive & Charter Fishing Boats) 03 Nov 20.xlsx; CONCEPTION COI-Amended 19Mar2019.pdf; LADY FRANCES COI (23Feb2017).pdf; TRUTH COI-Amended15Mar2019.pdf; Witness Interview - Conception - First Deckhand.pdf; SSD-DOM-03 Small Passenger Vessel Manning.pdf

Dan/Claire,

We are planning to meet with Sector SD CID on Monday to discuss our current SPV manning guidelines and to develop recommendations for District moving forward. Please review all the attached documents and be prepared to discuss this internally prior to the 14:00 meeting on Monday.

Thanks,  
Matt

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Mowbray, Ryan W LCDR [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020 1:54 PM  
**To:** Izbicki, Matthew J CIV [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** Bor, Stephen LCDR [REDACTED]; Caputo, Ronald J CDR [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: MBI Safety Concern Regarding CONCEPTION's Required Manning Level and D11 Field Unit Manning for Overnight Vessels in General

Matt,  
Stephen wanted me to take a first crack at this issue while he was gone. Hopefully he filled you in, but if not please read the email string below + the 5 attachments and I can fill you in on the rest over the phone. I'm not sure what dpi's timeline is going to be for getting feedback from us, but I'd love to get your take on what I've got so far so we can have something ready for Stephen to look at when he gets back.

In looking through this issue I started by reviewing the SSD Manning policy (also attached - SSD-DOM-03 rev 2). The short version of our policy for sport fishing vessels and dive charters is 2 licensed mariners plus 2 deckhands for the first 25 passengers plus an additional deckhand for each additional 25 passengers. For voyages <12 hours, the minimum reduces to 1 master + 1 deckhand, plus an additional deckhand for each additional 25.

I talked with Claire Pham earlier and asked what the policy was for LA/LB sport fishing and Dive vessels. She told me that there's not necessarily a written policy for SPVs, but that manning determinations follow the guidance in MSM V3 and then get vetted up the chain.



I think Captain Neubauer raises some good points in his email and my intention moving forward is to work with you and Stephen to develop some recommendations for CDR Denny to propose to D11 as a standard which will apply across the entire district. With that in mind, can we schedule a time to talk about this early next week?

-Ryan

LCDR Ryan Mowbray, P.E.  
Chief of Inspections  
Coast Guard Sector San Diego

-----Original Message-----

From: Denny, Karen CDR [REDACTED]  
Sent: Wednesday, November 4, 2020 5:18 PM  
To: Caputo, Ronald J CDR [REDACTED]; Newberry, Marshall E CDR [REDACTED]; Rivera, Roberto CDR [REDACTED]  
Cc: Bor, Stephen LCDR [REDACTED]; Callaghan, Gregory A CDR [REDACTED]; Botti, John P LCDR [REDACTED]  
Subject: FW: MBI Safety Concern Regarding CONCEPTION's Required Manning Level and D11 Field Unit Manning for Overnight Vessels in General

Gentlemen,

We've talked briefly about some focused initiatives wrt the SPV fleet (and specifically the overnight accommodation vessels in D11's AOR). We got some insight from INV yesterday that may push up the prioritization level of certain areas of focus. Apparently, in the course of the CONCEPTION investigation they found that manning standards were not being applied consistently within the District. I think we need to talk out how each Sector is working through manning and validating whether there are inconsistencies. We can move forward from there....

How about making this a (or "the") topic for the DPI-CPREV huddle tomorrow?

Respectfully,  
Karen Denny

-----Original Message-----

From: Neubauer, Jason CAPT [REDACTED]  
Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 11:31 AM

To: Callaghan, Gregory A CDR [REDACTED]  
Cc: Danscuk, Stephen J CIV [REDACTED]; Arguin, Wayne R  
CAPT [REDACTED]; HQS-DG-1st-CG-INV-CONCEPTION-MBI  
[REDACTED]; Smoak, Baxter B CDR  
[REDACTED]; Edwards, Matt CAPT [REDACTED]  
Subject: MBI Safety Concern Regarding CONCEPTION's Required Manning Level  
and D11 Field Unit Manning for Overnight Vessels in General  
Importance: High

Good afternoon Greg,

I know D11 is currently considering potential SPV safety initiatives and I'm forwarding a safety concern that the CONCEPTION MBI has identified regarding the minimum safe manning level for the vessel at the time of the casualty, which also appear to be in place for many other D11 overnight SPVs. Specifically, the CONCEPTION was required to have a master, mate, and 2 deckhands for their typical voyages of 5 to 6-day dive excursions. For voyages less than 12-hours, the vessel was allowed to drop to 1 master and 2 deckhands, thus implying that the minimum crew needed to operate the vessel was 3 members. It's then surprising to me that the extended voyages of up to 6-days would only need one additional mate per the primary COI table. When considering CONCEPTION's operations, which included both day and night dives where the deckhands were serving in numerous dive related duties (filling dive tanks, outfitting divers, prepping the small boat, watching diver bubble trails) in addition to their shipboard engineering, hotel services (sewage pumping, cleaning), and navigation duties (lookout, anchoring ops), it seems that the crew was stretched very thin. The attached statement describes the lead deckhand's 2-day work schedule ahead of the CONCEPTION fire and it confirms that he and the other assigned deckhand were working more than 18-hours each day with very little sleep.

During the NTSB's recent CONCEPTION Board Meeting, they mentioned that drugs didn't play a factor in the incident because the master, mate, and 2 deckhands didn't test positive. That caught my attention because the food handlers on the CONCEPTION were using marijuana (one tested positive after the incident and the other stated he had recently used marijuana prior to the incident). I had been previously incorrectly assuming that those food handlers were deckhands or at least persons in addition to the crew, but neither of those designations were listed on the CONCEPTION's COI (however, food handlers are designated as Persons in Addition on the TRUTH's COI). I think that's a key point, as many outside observers to this casualty believe that one of the food handlers should have been standing the roving watch, when in fact they were prohibited from conducting safety sensitive positions because they weren't officially listed as deckhands and subject to drug testing.

After noting the CONCEPTION manning concern, I checked some other similar overnight SPVs with roughly the same total and overnight passenger counts. The attached COI from the Charter Fishing Vessel LADY FRANCES (Sec S New England COI) has a manning scale that I think is more appropriate for a 2-deck overnight SPV with 2 licensed personnel and 4 deckhands. There are then some reduced manning caveats in the operating conditions, but the main

manning block on the LADY FRANCES COI takes the most conservative manning position. On a side note, I also like the LADY FRANCES clause for the roving watch which clarifies that the duty must be performed by a deckhand. To check manning on additional overnight SPVs, I compiled the attached spreadsheet of SPVs similar to CONCEPTION (General, Charter Fishing and Diving Vessels) and then sorted them by overnight passenger accommodations in descending order. When listed in that way, it appears that D11 unit manning requirements are generally less than other CG units nationwide and Sector LA/LB often only requires 2 deckhands for the largest overnight T-boats.

When considering that the lack of a roving deckhand watch was likely a primary contributing factor to the CONCEPTION fire, I think this deckhand manning concern is something that should be addressed during the next wave of D11 SPV checks. Marine inspectors could dig into deckhand duties and determine work/rest schedules with an eye towards if the vessel has enough personnel for extended voyages.

Best regards,  
Jason

# Exhibit 30



**United States of America  
Department of Homeland Security  
United States Coast Guard**

Certification Date:	08 Feb 2018
Expiration Date:	08 Feb 2023

# Certificate of Inspection

For ships on international voyages this certificate fulfills the requirements of SOLAS 74 as amended, regulation V/14, for a SAFE MANNING DOCUMENT

Vessel Name	Official Number	IMO Number	Call Sign	Service
VISION	688431		WSF4969	Passenger (Inspected)

Hailing Port	Hull Material	Horsepower	Propulsion
SANTA BARBARA, CA	Wood	1050	Diesel Reduction
UNITED STATES			

Place Built	Delivery Date	Keel Laid Date	Gross Tons	Net Tons	DWT	Length
OXNARD CA	07Aug1985	20Jun1984	R-98	R-66		R-84.0
UNITED STATES						

Owner	Operator
GLEN RICHARD FRITZLER TRUSTEE UTA DTD 7/27/92 301 W. CABRILLO BLVD SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101-3886 UNITED STATES	GLEN RICHARD FRITZLER TRUSTEE UTA DTD 7/27/92 301 W. CABRILLO BLVD SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101-3886 UNITED STATES

This vessel must be manned with the following licensed and unlicensed Personnel. Included in which there must be 0 Certified Lifeboatmen, 0 Certified Tankermen, 0 HSC Type Rating, and 0 GMDSS Operators.

1 Masters	1 Licensed Mates	0 Chief Engineers	0 Oilers
0 Chief Mates	0 First Class Pilots	0 First Assistant Engineers	
0 Second Mates	0 Radio Officers	0 Second Assistant Engineers	
0 Third Mates	0 Able Seamen	0 Third Assistant Engineers	
0 Master First Class Pilot	0 Ordinary Seamen	0 Licensed Engineers	
0 Mate First Class Pilots	2 Deckhands	0 Qualified Member Engineer	

In addition, this vessel may carry 106 Passengers, 0 Other Persons in crew, 0 Persons in addition to crew, and no Others. Total Persons allowed: 110

**Route Permitted And Conditions Of Operation:**  
**---Oceans---**

PACIFIC OCEAN, NOT ON AN INTERNATIONAL VOYAGE, BETWEEN POINT ST. GEORGE, CALIFORNIA, AND 30°-11' NORTH LATITUDE, NOT MORE THAN 200 MILES FROM THE MAINLAND SHORE.

IF THE VESSEL IS AWAY FROM THE DOCK, OR PASSENGERS ARE ON BOARD OR HAVE ACCESS TO THE VESSEL FOR LESS THAN 12 HOURS IN ANY 24 HOUR PERIOD, THE CREW MAY BE REDUCED TO 1 MASTER AND 2 DECKHANDS. THE NUMBER OF PASSENGERS MAY BE INCREASED ACCORDINGLY SO THAT THE TOTAL PERSONS ALLOWED DOES NOT EXCEED 110.

AT ALL TIMES WHEN PASSENGERS ARE IN STATEROOMS LOCATED BELOW THE MAIN DECK, A DESIGNATED PATROLMAN IS REQUIRED FOR THESE AREAS.

**\*\*\*SEE NEXT PAGE FOR ADDITIONAL CERTIFICATE INFORMATION\*\*\***

With this inspection for Certification having been completed at Santa Barbara, CA, UNITED STATES, the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, Los Angeles - Long Beach certified the vessel, in all respects, is in conformity with the applicable vessel inspection laws and the rules and regulations prescribed thereunder.

Annual/Periodic/Re-Inspection				This certificate issued by  C. L. DOWNEY, CAPTAIN, U.S. Coast Guard Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection Los Angeles - Long Beach Inspection Zone
Date	Zone	A/P/R	Signature	

# Exhibit 31



**United States of America  
Department of Homeland Security  
United States Coast Guard**

Certification Date:	09 Jul 2021
Expiration Date:	09 Jul 2026

# Certificate of Inspection

For ships on international voyages this certificate fulfills the requirements of SOLAS 74 as amended, regulation V/14, for a SAFE MANNING DOCUMENT.

Vessel Name	Official Number	IMO Number	Call Sign	Service
VISION	688431		WDL9630	Passenger (Inspected)

Hailing Port	Hull Material	Horsepower	Propulsion
SANTA BARBARA, CA	Wood	1050	Diesel Reduction
UNITED STATES			

Place Built	Delivery Date	Keel Laid Date	Gross Tons	Net Tons	DWT	Length
OXNARD, CA	07Aug1985	20Jun1984	R-98	R-66		R-84.0
UNITED STATES			I-	I-		I-0

Owner	Operator
CHANNEL ISLANDS EXPEDITIONS INC 117-B HARBOR WAY SANTA BARBARA, CA 93109 UNITED STATES	CHANNEL ISLANDS EXPEDITIONS INC 117-B HARBOR WAY SANTA BARBARA, CA 93109 UNITED STATES

This vessel must be manned with the following licensed and unlicensed Personnel. Included in which there must be 0 Certified Lifeboatmen, 0 Certified Tankermen, 0 HSC Type Rating, and 0 GMDSS Operators.

1 Masters	1 Licensed Mates	0 Chief Engineers	0 Oilers
0 Chief Mates	0 First Class Pilots	0 First Assistant Engineers	
0 Second Mates	0 Radio Officers	0 Second Assistant Engineers	
0 Third Mates	0 Able Seamen	0 Third Assistant Engineers	
0 Master First Class Pilot	0 Ordinary Seamen	0 Licensed Engineers	
0 Mate First Class Pilots	3 Deckhands	0 Qualified Member Engineer	

In addition, this vessel may carry 33 Passengers, 3 Other Persons in crew, 0 Persons in addition to crew, and no Others. Total Persons allowed: 41

**Route Permitted And Conditions Of Operation:**  
**---Oceans---**

PACIFIC OCEAN, NOT ON AN INTERNATIONAL VOYAGE, BETWEEN POINT ST. GEORGE, CA. AND 30°-11' NORTH LATITUDE, NOT MORE THAN 100 MILES FROM THE MAINLAND SHORE.

AT ALL TIMES WHEN PASSENGERS ARE IN OVERNIGHT ACCOMODATIONS, A DESIGNATED WATCHMAN IS REQUIRED TO PATROL THESE AREAS, WHETHER OR NOT THE VESSEL IS UNDERWAY.

ESCAPE ROUTES MUST BE KEPT CLEAR AND FREE OF DIVE EQUIPMENT AND OTHER LUGGAGE AT ALL TIMES.

**\*\*\*SEE NEXT PAGE FOR ADDITIONAL CERTIFICATE INFORMATION\*\*\***

With this Inspection for Certification having been completed at Santa Barbara, CA, UNITED STATES, the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection, Los Angeles - Long Beach certified the vessel, in all respects, is in conformity with the applicable vessel inspection laws and the rules and regulations prescribed thereunder.

Annual/Periodic/Re-Inspection				This certificate issued by: <b>R. E. ORE, CAPTAIN, U.S. Coast Guard</b> <hr/> Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection <hr/> Los Angeles - Long Beach <hr/> Inspection Zone
Date	Zone	A/P/R	Signature	



**United States of America  
Department of Homeland Security  
United States Coast Guard**

Certification Date:	09 Jul 2021
Expiration Date:	09 Jul 2026

# Certificate of Inspection

Vessel Name: VISION

WHEN NOT OPERATING ON OVERNIGHT VOYAGES, THE PASSENGER LIMIT MAY BE INCREASED SO AS TO NOT EXCEED A TOTAL PERSONS ON BOARD OF 108 AND THE NUMBER OF DECKHANDS REQUIRED SHALL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BELOW TABLE:

	(LESS THAN 12 HR OPERATION)	(MORE THAN 12 HR OPERATION)
0-25 PASSENGERS:	1	2
26-50 PASSENGERS:	2	3
51-75 PASSENGERS:	3	4
76-100 PASSENGERS:	4	5
GREATER THAN 100 PASSENGERS:	5	-

IF THE VESSEL IS AWAY FROM THE DOCK OR PASSENGERS ARE ON BOARD OR HAVE ACCESS TO THE VESSEL FOR LESS THAN 12 HOURS IN ANY 24 HOUR PERIOD, THE MATE IS NOT REQUIRED.

IF ADDITIONAL DIVE EQUIPMENT IS CARRIED SUCH AS COMPRESSOR OR SHARK CAGES, THE NUMBER OF TOTAL PERSONS ALLOWED MUST BE REDUCED FROM 108 BY A FACTOR OF ONE PERSON PER 265 POUNDS OF EQUIPMENT OR ONE PERSON PER 10 SQUARE FEET OF DECK AREA OCCUPIED BY THE EQUIPMENT, WHICHEVER IS GREATER.

A CHILD SIZE LIFE JACKET SHALL BE PROVIDED FOR EACH PERSON WEIGHING LESS THAN 90 POUNDS.

Overnight accommodations for 33 passengers.

**---Hull Exams---**

Exam Type	Next Exam	Last Exam	Prior Exam
DryDock	31Jan2022	28Feb2020	31Jan2018

**---Stability---**

Type	Issued Date	Office
Letter	06Aug1985	11 MMT

**---Lifesaving Equipment---**

Total Equipment for 108 Persons

Primary Lifesaving Equipment	Quantity	Capacity	Required
Lifeboats (Total)	0	0	Life Preservers (Adult) 108
Lifeboats (Port)	0	0	Life Preservers (Child) 11
Lifeboats (Starboard)	0	0	Ring Buoys (Total) 3
Motor Lifeboats	0	0	With Lights 1
Lifeboats With Radio	0	0	With Line Attached 1
Rescue Boats/Platforms	0	0	Other 1
Inflatable Rafts	0	0	Immersion Suits 0
Life Floats/Buoyant App	8	108	Portable Lifeboat Radios 0
Inflatable Buoyant Apparatus (IBA)	0	0	Equipped With EPIRB? YES

**--- Fire Fighting Equipment ---**

Number of Fire Pumps - 1

**\*Hose Information\***

Location	Quantity	Diameter	Length
On Deck	2	1.5	50

**\*Fixed Extinguishing Systems\***

Location	Type	Capacity
ENGINE ROOM	Carbon Dioxide	150 Pound





United States of America  
Department of Homeland Security  
United States Coast Guard

Certification Date: 09 Jul 2021  
Expiration Date: 09 Jul 2026

# Certificate of Inspection

Vessel Name: VISION

**\*Fire Extinguishers - Hand portable and semi-portable\***

Quantity	Class Type
1	10-B:C
2	2-A
3	40-B:C

\*\*\*END\*\*\*

# Exhibit 32



## Activity Summary Report

MISLE Activity ID: 6804630  
 Activity Type: Vessel Inspection  
 Title/Description: VISION SPV Overnight Passenger Verification  
 Status: Closed - Agency Action Complete  
 Point Of Contact: Glen Fritzler @ 805-451-5151  
 Owning Unit: Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach  
 Originating Unit: Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara  
 Start Date/Time: 06SEP2019 23:00Z  
 Prompt Date:  
 Team Lead: SCHMITT, ANDREW R.

### Vessel Information:

<b>Vessel Name:</b>	<b>Call Sign:</b>	<b>Current Flag / Flag At Time Of Activity:</b>
VISION	WDL9630	UNITED STATES / UNITED STATES
<b>Classification:</b>	<b>Primary VIN:</b>	<b>Length:</b>
Passenger Ship - Diving Vessel (Recreational) - General (More Than 6, Gross Tonnage < 100)	688431	84.0
<b>ITC/Convention (Subpart B):</b>	<b>Regulatory (Subpart C or D):</b>	<b>Year Completed:</b>
	98	1985
<b>Engine Compartment In An Open Space:</b>	<b>Fuel Compartment In An Open Space:</b>	<b>Vessel Constructed Of All Open Spaces:</b>
No	No	No
<b>Propulsion System Type:</b>		
Diesel Reduction		

### Vessel Associated Parties:

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Type:</b>	<b>Role:</b>
CHANNEL ISLANDS EXPEDITIONS INC	Organization	Managing Owner
<b>Address:</b>		
117-B HARBOR WAY SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA 93109		
<b>Name:</b>	<b>Type:</b>	<b>Role:</b>
CHANNEL ISLANDS EXPEDITIONS INC	Organization	Operator (managing)
<b>Address:</b>		
117-B HARBOR WAY SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA 93109		

### Inspection Results:

<b>System:</b>	<b>Inspection Results:</b>	<b>Date:</b>
01 - Certificates & Documentation	Partially Inspected – 50%	02OCT2019
02 - Structural Conditions	Inspected With Deficiencies Noted	02OCT2019
03 - Water/Weathertight Conditions	Inspected Satisfactory	02OCT2019
04 - Emergency Systems	Inspected With Deficiencies Noted	02OCT2019
05 - Radio Communications	Inspected Satisfactory	02OCT2019
07 - Fire Safety	Inspected With Deficiencies Noted	02OCT2019
08 - Alarms	Inspected With Deficiencies Noted	02OCT2019
09 - Working and Living Conditions	Inspected Satisfactory	02OCT2019
10 - Safety of Navigation	Inspected With Deficiencies Noted	02OCT2019
11 - Life Saving Appliances	Inspected With Deficiencies Noted	02OCT2019
13 - Propulsion and Auxiliary Machinery	Inspected With Deficiencies Noted	02OCT2019

14 - Pollution Prevention

Inspected Satisfactory

02OCT2019

**Deficiencies:**

<b>Item Number:</b> 1	<b>Due Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO <input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO <input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 13DEC2019		
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07115 - Fire-dampers	
<b>Action:</b> 60 - Rectify deficiencies prior to movement	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Provision must be made for closing all supply duct cowls or scoops and exhaust duct discharge openings for a space protected by a fixed gas extinguishing system. Damper located in the aft bulkhead of the engine room does not seal properly. Damper located on the port side main deck does not close properly and remains ajar. Prove proper operation of both dampers to the satisfaction of an attending marine inspector prior to getting underway.

**Resolution:**

Vessel repaired port side damper and added weights and gaskets to all fire dampers. Operation demonstrated satisfactorily to attending USCG marine inspectors.

<b>Item Number:</b> 11	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO <input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO <input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 13DEC2019		
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Electrical equipment on a vessel must be installed and maintained to protect passengers, crew, other persons, and the vessel from electrical hazards. The wiring run in the galley area was used as a storage place for cleaning supplies. Remove cleaning supplies from wire run and stow them in an approved location.

**Resolution:**

Vessel mounted rack for cleaning supplies and protected cabling.

<b>Item Number:</b> 12	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO <input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO <input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 13DEC2019		
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Electrical equipment on a vessel must be installed and maintained to protect passengers, crew, other persons, and the vessel from electrical hazards. The 120 VAC electrical receptacle behind the microwave in the galley was badly corroded and not grounded. Replace The 120 VAC electrical receptacle with new receptacle enclosure and ensure it is grounded.

**Resolution:**

Vessel replaced receptacle with new grounded one.

<b>Item Number:</b> 13	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 13DEC2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Twist-on type wire nuts are permitted only when the connections are made within an enclosure and the insulated cap of the connector is secured to prevent loosening due to vibration. The electrical wiring for the refrigeration unit in the salon area was connected using twist type connectors. Remove the twist type connectors and make all wiring connections using pressure type connectors.

**Resolution:**

Vessel removed twist type connectors and replaced with pressure type in an enclosure.

<b>Item Number:</b> 14	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 13DEC2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Electrical equipment on a vessel must be installed and maintained to protect passengers, crew, other persons, and the vessel from electrical hazards. Exposed wiring was found on the 120 VAC receptacles next to the salon bench. Receptacles need to be properly installed with no exposed wiring that presents an electrical hazard.

**Resolution:**

Vessel installed new receptacles.

<b>Item Number:</b> 15	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 13DEC2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Electrical equipment and installations must be suitable for the roll, pitch, and vibration of the vessel and suitable for the voltage and current utilized. Three unapproved power supply strips were found plugged into the 120 VAC receptacles in the salon area, one with visible evidence of overheating. Remove the power supply strips from the vessel.

**Resolution:**

Vessel removed power strips.

<b>Item Number:</b> 16	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 13DEC2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Electrical equipment exposed to the weather must be watertight. The wiring junction box cover for the electric windlass motor was loose and open to the weather. Properly secure the junction box cover and ensure the enclosure protects the wire connections from the weather.

**Resolution:**

USCG marine inspectors verified cover was replaced and was weathertight.

<b>Item Number:</b> 18	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 13DEC2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Electrical equipment on a vessel must be installed and maintained to minimize accidental personnel contact with energized parts. The AC electrical distribution panels in the engine room were not blanked off where no circuit breakers were installed creating an electrical shock hazard. Provide blanks in all distribution panels in slots that do not contain circuit breakers.

**Resolution:**

Vessel provided blanks covering spaces.

<b>Item Number:</b> 21	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 13DEC2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Each distribution panel or switchboard must be totally enclosed and of the dead front type. The door on the AC distribution panel on the starboard side of the engine room was modified and not working as designed. Provide drip-proof distribution panel which provides adequate protection from accidental shock.

**Resolution:**

Vessel provided a door which provided a dead front cover.

<b>Item Number:</b> 22	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 13DEC2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO <input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Electrical equipment on a vessel must be installed and maintained to minimize accidental personnel contact with energized parts. Several exposed dead end electrical wires were found in the engine room. Remove unused wires or properly terminate ends.

**Resolution:**

Vessel provided a protective enclosure in which they properly terminated ends.

<b>Item Number:</b> 23	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 19JUN2020		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO <input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Each propulsion, power, lighting or distribution system having a neutral bus or conductor must have the neutral grounded. The 120 VAC receptacle on the starboard side of the bridge was not grounded. Provide ground for the 120 VAC receptacle on the starboard side of the bridge.

**Resolution:**

Outlet properly grounded.

<b>Item Number:</b> 24	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 11DEC2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO <input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Electrical equipment on a vessel must be installed and maintained to minimize accidental personnel contact with energized parts. The 120 VAC receptacle on the port side of the crew bunk room was missing the protective cover. Install protective cover on the 120 VAC receptacle on the port side of the crew bunk room.

**Resolution:**

Vessel installed receptacle cover.

<b>Item Number:</b> 25	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 11DEC2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO <input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Electrical equipment on a vessel must be installed and maintained to minimize accidental personnel contact with energized parts. The protective cover on the 120 VAC receptacle on the starboard side of the crew bunk room was damaged. Repair or provide new protective cover on the 120 VAC receptacle on the starboard side of the crew bunk room.

**Resolution:**

Vessel provided new protective cover.

<b>Item Number:</b> 26	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 11DEC2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Cabling and wiring must be permanently installed and meet the requirements of 46 CFR 183.340. An extension cord was used as a permanent wiring installation in the starboard bridge console. Remove the extension cord and use appropriate sized approved wiring or cabling.

**Resolution:**

Vessel removed extension cord.

<b>Item Number:</b> 27	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 19JUN2020		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Electrical equipment on a vessel must be installed and maintained to minimize accidental personnel contact with energized parts. Several exposed dead end electrical wires were found in the starboard side bridge console. Remove unused wires or properly terminate ends.

**Resolution:**

Exposed wires were terminated in a junction box.

<b>Item Number:</b> 28	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 11DEC2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Electrical equipment on a vessel must be installed and maintained to protect passengers, crew, other persons, and the vessel from electrical hazards, including fire. The 120 VAC receptacle on starboard side bridge wing shows evidence of arcing and overheating. Inspect the wiring and repair as necessary. Provide a new 120 VAC receptacle.

**Resolution:**

Vessel provided new receptacle.



<b>Item Number:</b> 29	<b>Due Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 10JUN2021		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07120 - Means of escape	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 705 - Other - as specified	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Construction and arrangement shall allow free and unobstructed access to the bunks. Each bunk shall be immediately adjacent to an aisle leading to a means of escape from the lounge area. Double bunks do not allow for free and unobstructed escape for the inside occupant. All double bunks currently installed may only be occupied by one (01) person. Overnight capacity has been determined to be thirty-three (33).

**Resolution:**

Reduced overnight passenger count incorporated into COI amendment.

<b>Item Number:</b> 3	<b>Due Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b> 16JAN2020	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 19JUN2020		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 11 - Life Saving Appliances	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 11129 - Operational readiness of lifesaving appliances	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Each life float must be stowed so that in the event of the vessel sinking the life float floats free. One life float is stowed in a deck box on the starboard side of the upper deck. The edge of the box that houses the life float prevents the life float from floating free. Prove float free arrangement for starboard side life float to an attending marine inspector prior to getting underway.

**Resolution:**

Verified arrangements, all sat.

<b>Item Number:</b> 30	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 19JUN2020		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07110 - Fire fighting equipment and appliances	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Each fire hose nozzle must be of a type approved in accordance with 46 CFR 162.027 or be recognized by the Commandant as being equivalent in performance. The fire hose nozzle's on the vessel were not approved under 46 CFR 162.027 or be recognized by the Commandant as being equivalent in performance. Provide fire hose nozzle's that are approved under 46 CFR 162.027 or be recognized by the Commandant as being equivalent in performance.

**Resolution:**

Installed new approved fire hoses & nozzles.

<b>Item Number:</b> 31	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 19JUN2020		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 10 - Safety of Navigation	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 10113 - Automatic Identification System (AIS)	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

The following vessels must have on board a properly installed, operational Coast Guard Type-Approved AIS Class A device: A self propelled vessel of 65 feet or more in length in commercial service. The AIS was inoperable. Provide on board a properly installed, operational Coast Guard Type-Approved AIS Class A device.

**Resolution:**

AIS working properly.

<b>Item Number:</b> 32	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 08OCT2020		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07110 - Fire fighting equipment and appliances	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Each portable fire extinguisher on a vessel must be of an approved type. The installation must be acceptable to the OCMI. The portable fire extinguisher located in the shower room was severely corroded. Provide new portable fire extinguisher of appropriate size for this location.

**Resolution:**

PA system installed and working.

<b>Item Number:</b> 33	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 11DEC2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07120 - Means of escape	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

In a below deck passenger accommodation area where the length of the compartment is less than 12', one means of escape is acceptable if it does not lead to an area that contains a fire source such as a galley stove. The single means of escape from the below deck passenger shower room, lead to the galley which contains a galley stove. Provide a means of escape that leads to an area that does not contain any source of fire. - 46 CFR 177.15-1 (Old T)

**Resolution:**

Vessel extended protective bulkhead to allow for exit from the shower space while shielded from adjacent galley heating equipment.

**Item Number:** 34 **Due Date:** 01NOV2019 **Extended Due Date:**  Not Available For Inspection  
 Security Violation  
**Issued Date:** 02OCT2019 **Resolved Date:** 19JUN2020  Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX  
 SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO  
**System:** 07 - Fire Safety **Subsystem:** N/A - No Subsystem **Component:** 07101 - Fire prevention structural integrity  Self Reported  
 Reported Via PR17  
 Refer To ACS/RO/TPO  
**Action:** 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days **Action Code:** c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard **ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:**  ACS/RO/TPO Associated  
 Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Covered metal trash containers shall be provided in lounge areas. The trash containers in the lounge areas were not constructed of metal. Remove any non metal trash containers from the lounge areas and replace them with metal ones. - 46 CFR 177.30-7 (Old T)

**Resolution:**

Installed proper trash cans.

**Item Number:** 35 **Due Date:** 01NOV2019 **Extended Due Date:**  Not Available For Inspection  
 Security Violation  
**Issued Date:** 02OCT2019 **Resolved Date:** 08OCT2020  Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX  
 SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO  
**System:** 08 - Alarms **Subsystem:** N/A - No Subsystem **Component:** 08101 - General alarm  Self Reported  
 Reported Via PR17  
 Refer To ACS/RO/TPO  
**Action:** 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days **Action Code:** c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard **ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:**  ACS/RO/TPO Associated  
 Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

A vessel with overnight accommodations must have a public address system that is operable from the operating station. The public address speaker in the passenger overnight accommodation area was inoperable. Repair or renew the speaker.

**Resolution:**

PA system is working as designed.

**Item Number:** 36 **Due Date:** 01NOV2019 **Extended Due Date:**  Not Available For Inspection  
 Security Violation  
**Issued Date:** 02OCT2019 **Resolved Date:** 19JUN2020  Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX  
 SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO  
**System:** 04 - Emergency Systems **Subsystem:** N/A - No Subsystem **Component:** 04103 - Emergency, lighting, batteries and switches  Self Reported  
 Reported Via PR17  
 Refer To ACS/RO/TPO  
**Action:** 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days **Action Code:** c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard **ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:**  ACS/RO/TPO Associated  
 Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Vessels with lounge areas below the main deck shall be fitted with emergency lighting fitted along the line of escape. The emergency lighting in the below deck passenger overnight accommodations, did not illuminate the line of escape. Arrange emergency lighting to show line of escape. - 46 CFR 184.30-5 (Old T)

**Resolution:**

Emergency lighting

**Item Number:** 37 **Due Date:** 01NOV2019 **Extended Due Date:**  Not Available For Inspection  
 Security Violation  
**Issued Date:** 02OCT2019 **Resolved Date:** 23NOV2020  Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX  
 SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO  
**System:** 07 - Fire Safety **Subsystem:** N/A - No Subsystem **Component:** 07199 - Other (fire safety)  Self Reported  
 Reported Via PR17  
 Refer To ACS/RO/TPO  
**Action:** 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days **Action Code:** c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard **ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:**  ACS/RO/TPO Associated  
 Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Mattresses shall be covered with a material that has been treated to give it fire resistant properties. It was unknown if the mattress covers had been treated with a fire resistant material. Provide proof that mattresses were installed prior to March of 1996 and treat all mattress covers with a material to give them fire resistant properties, or install new mattresses that meet the requirements of 46 CFR 177.405(g) (1) or (g)(2). - 46 CFR 177.30-7 (Old T)

**Resolution:**

Received letter from O/O attesting to the age of the mattresses as well as them being coated in fire retardent spray.

<b>Item Number:</b> 39	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 19JUN2020		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO <input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07113 - Fire pumps and its pipes	
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Power driven fire pumps shall be fitted with a pressure gauge on the discharge side of the pump. The fire pump pressure gauge was not functioning correctly. Repair or renew the pressure gauge.

**Resolution:**

Pressure gauge installed and working properly.

<b>Item Number:</b> 4	<b>Due Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 17DEC2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO <input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>System:</b> 11 - Life Saving Appliances	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 11135 - Maintenance of Life Saving Appliances	
<b>Action:</b> 60 - Rectify deficiencies prior to movement	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Each survival craft on a vessel must be in good working order and ready for immediate use before the vessel leaves port and at all times when the vessel is underway. Life float located on the pilothouse has holes and tears in the body and is in disrepair. Replace or properly service life float and properly install to the satisfaction of an attending marine inspector prior to getting underway.

**Resolution:**

Vessel replaced life float. Installation verified satisfactorily by attending USCG marine inspectors.

<b>Item Number:</b> 40	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 19JUN2020		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO <input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>System:</b> 11 - Life Saving Appliances	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 11118 - Lifejackets incl. provision and disposition	
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Life preservers shall be distributed through the upper part of the vessel in protected places convenient to the persons on board. The life preservers were all stored in one location in a box with a heavy plywood lid that was difficult to open. Distribute life preservers throughout the upper part of the vessel and easily accessible stowage locations.

**Resolution:**

Life jackets are stored properly

<b>Item Number:</b> 41	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 19JUN2020		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 11 - Life Saving Appliances	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 11118 - Lifejackets incl. provision and disposition	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Placards containing instructions for the donning of life jackets must be posted in conspicuous places that are regularly accessible to the crew and passengers. There were no life jacket donning placards posted for the types of life jackets kept aboard the vessel. Post life jacket donning placards for each type of life jacket carried aboard the vessel.

**Resolution:**

Placards posted.

<b>Item Number:</b> 42	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 11DEC2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07101 - Fire prevention structural integrity	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Vertical or horizontal surfaces within 3' of cooking appliances must have an ASTM E-84 flame spread rating of not more than 75. The electric grill on the main deck is intalled within 3' of FRP and wood material that does not meet the ASTM E-84 flame spread rating. Remove grill, or move to a location that is more than 3' away from any material that does not meet the ASTM E-84 flame spread rating.

**Resolution:**

Vessel provided heat shielding around grill and demonstrated installation was existing under old "T" regulations.

<b>Item Number:</b> 43	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 10JUN2021		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 08 - Alarms	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 08103 - Fire alarm	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Use of non approved fire detection systems may be acceptable as excess equipment provided that installation conforms to requirements of 46 CFR Chapter I , Sub chapter J, Electrical Engineering. The heat detectors in the engine room and Lazarette were not securely fastened and hanging supported only by their wiring. Properly secure all heat detectors in accordance with manufactures instructions and 46 CFR Chapter I , Sub chapter J, Electrical Engineering.

**Resolution:**

Old heat detector system removed. Engine room fixed fire detection serviced and tested by servicing technician. Independent smoke detectors installed in galley, bunk rooms and pilot house.

<b>Item Number:</b> 44	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 19JUN2020		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 13 - Propulsion and Auxiliary Machinery	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 13101 - Propulsion main engine	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Propulsion machinery shall be suitable in type and design for propulsion requirements of the hull in which its installed. The main propulsion engine control on the port bridge wing was inoperable. Repair the main propulsion engine control on the port bridge wing.

**Resolution:**

Engines controls working properly.

<b>Item Number:</b> 45	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 19JUN2020		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07108 - Ready availability of fire fighting equipment	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Spanner wrenches must be provided where a 1.5" diameter fire hose is required. Existing vessels as of July 2016 have 180 days to comply with this requirement. There were no spanner wrenches provided on board the vessel. Provide a spanner wrench at each fire hydrant.

**Resolution:**

Spanner wrenches provided.

<b>Item Number:</b> 5	<b>Due Date:</b> 10JUN2021	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 10JUN2021		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07109 - Fixed fire extinguishing installation	<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Action:</b> 705 - Other - as specified	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

A grease extraction hood required by 46 CFR 181.400 must meet UL 710 or other standard specified by the Commandant. A grease extraction hood must be equipped with a dry or wet chemical fire extinguishing system meeting the applicable sections of NFPA 17 or NFPA 17A or other standard specified by the Commandant. G-MSE-4 policy letter 1-99 allows for the use of the existing hood, but must meet the requirements: the vessel must establish a maintenance program for the existing hood, install a fire detection system for the galley, and add one additional 40-B:C fire extinguisher to the galley. Vessel's galley heat detector was not present and there is no maintenance program for the existing hood which was evident by the heavy accumulation of grease in the vent hood and in the vent above the ovens. Properly install heat detector and produce a maintenance program for the existing hood or properly install grease extraction hood to the satisfaction of an attending marine inspector prior to engrizing galley heating equipment.

**Resolution:**

Vessel installed smoke detector in lieu of heat detector.

<b>Item Number:</b> 6	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 10JUN2021		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07199 - Other (fire safety)	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 705 - Other - as specified	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Each overnight accommodation space on a vessel with overnight accommodations for passengers must be fitted with an independent modular smoke detection and alarm unit that must meet UL 217 and be listed as a "Single Station Smoke Detector - Also suitable for use in Recreational Vehicles," or other standard specified by the Commandant; Contain an independent power source; and Alarm on low power. Bunk room smoke detectors were removed during investigation. Install approved smoke detectors in the bunk room to the satisfaction of an attending marine inspector prior to carrying passengers overnight.

**Resolution:**

Vessel installed independent smoke detectors.

<b>Item Number:</b> 7	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 09JUL2021		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Repairs or alterations to the equipment that effect the safety of the vessel must not be made without the approval of the cognizant OCM, to include electrical wiring and power supply systems. Vessel was found with numerous added electrical loads, including a NITROX generating system in the lazarette, food freezers in the lazarette, electric clothes dryer in the lazarette, a shower/bilge drain pump in the lazarette, a new electric double oven in the galley, additional engine room ventilation fans, a salon ice maker, additional salon refrigerator, water heater in shower room, reverse osmosis unit in engine room, and an electric grill on the main deck. Provide plans for approval showing electrical generating and distribution system as installed, to include materials used, over current protection details, and electrical load analysis.

**Resolution:**

Vessel submitted plans to MSC and received an approval letter dated 09JUL21.

<b>Item Number:</b> 8	<b>Due Date:</b> 01NOV2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 10JUN2021		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 02 - Structural Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 02108 - Electrical installations in general	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Conductors in power and lighting circuits must be No. 14 American Wire Gauge (AWG) or larger. 16 AWG wiring was used to wire the circuit that supplies power to the passenger bunk lights. Remove power conducting conductors smaller than 14 AWG.

**Resolution:**

Vessel rewired bunk lights using 14AWG UL boat cable in accordance with submitted plans to MSC.

<b>Item Number:</b>	<b>Due Date:</b>	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
9	01NOV2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>Issued Date:</b>	<b>Resolved Date:</b>		<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
02OCT2019	08OCT2020		<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>System:</b>	<b>Subsystem:</b>	<b>Component:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
02 - Structural Conditions	N/A - No Subsystem	02108 - Electrical installations in general	<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
<b>Action:</b>	<b>Action Code:</b>	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
50 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 30 days	c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard		<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

All cable and wire must be installed with metal supports spaced not more than 24" apart, and in such a manner as to avoid chafing and other damage. Wiring throughout the engine room and lazarette was found supported with plastic wire ties. Provide metallic wire supports not more than 24" apart to secure all wire runs.

**Resolution:**

Metallic wire supports provided.

**Narrative:**

06SEP2019: COTP Order 2019-18 issued to vessel following a fire on the vessel CONCEPTION, owned and operated by the same company as the VISION.

02OCT2019: Vessel attended by inspectors from MSD Santa Barbara and Sector LA/LB to conduct an in-service inspection, Concentrated Inspection Campaign, and Overnight Passenger Verification of the vessel VISION at the Sea Landing in Santa Barbara Harbor. The inspections were initiated at the request of Truth Aquatics with respect to the requirement imposed by Sector LA/LB COTP Order 2019-018 which prohibits passenger vessel operations until the completion of a satisfactory safety inspection. In accordance with the COTP Order 2019-18, the inspection will concentrate on fire detection, firefighting equipment, means of escape, crew training (including roving patrol requirements), passenger safety orientation, and electrical installations. Inspectors were further guided by COMDTNOTE: SMALL PASSENGER VESSEL (SPV) INSPECTION DIRECTION 1, a Concentrated Inspection Campaign. The inspections were not conducted for any requirement other than the COTP Order 2019-18 and the COMDTNOTE, and do not count towards an annual or COI inspection.

This vessel was found to be not fit for the intended routes and service as specified on the COI and in accordance with the appropriate regulations, pending resolution of the identified deficiencies. Verification was completed in accordance with the SPV Inspection Direction message.

Vessel Particulars: O.N. 688431, Length 84 x 26.2 x 6 foot, plywood with FRP sheathing construction, twin diesel, Oceans route for 106 passengers, with a build date of 1985. In attendance was vessel owner Glen Fritzier and vessel master James Hrabak.

Pilot House: Access to the Pilot House is through a stern facing door on the upper deck. In addition to the center console operating station there is also one located on the port side. There are crew bunks and a shower located aft of the bridge.

Upper Deck: There are three large deck boxes, one port side, one starboard side and one on the center line which contain the vessel's life jackets as well as seven (07) life floats. An aft vessel operating station is located on the starboard aft corner of the upper deck. An additional life float is located on top of the pilot house.

Main Deck: The forepeak, salon, upper deck, engine room and lazarette are all accessed from the main deck. An approximately three foot wide dive platform runs athwart ships on the stern with a 12 foot rigid hull inflatable small boat used for dive passenger operations also stowed in this area. Two fire stations are located amidships on each side and are outfitted with 1 ½ in fire hoses. A remote start for the fire pump is located at the port side fire station. A large electric grill was located in the aft area of the main deck.

Accommodation Space – Salon: The salon area on the main deck includes a galley area at the forward end, which includes a double oven and electric griddle. The double oven is not original but replaced a previous double oven installation. The electric griddle utilizes a hood ventilation. The galley fire detection system was approved using G-MOC policy letter 4-98 by Sector LA-LB and requires a locally annunciating heat detector and a hood maintenance program to prevent grease build up. Both the primary and emergency escapes from the passenger bunkroom lead into this space. The primary stairways to the passenger bunkroom and shower room are located at the forward end of the space. The passenger bunkroom emergency exit is located aft.

Accommodation Space – Shower room: From the salon a set of stairs leads to the shower room, just forward of the bunk room. There are two showers and a sink area. Both showers drain into a sump located in the bilge. There is no other entry or exit to/from the shower room other than the stairway.

Accommodation Space – Passenger Bunk Room: Access to the bunk room is at the forward end of the salon via a stairwell. The passenger bunkroom is configured with port and starboard aisles running fore and aft with bunks on both sides of the aisle. There a mixture of double and single wide bunks. Smoke detector mountings were on the overhead of the port and starboard aisles, wired for electrical supply but not for common remote alarm. The emergency egress is 21 ¼ x 21 ½ in, and is directly above the centerline top bunks at the aft of the bunk room. The ventilation for the bunk room consisted of fan ducts with a HVAC system in the forward part of the bilge. A soda dispenser mechanism supplying the galley was installed with compressed CO2 gas and soda concentrate supplies in a locker on the port forward side of the space.

Machinery Space – Engine room: The engine room is accessed from the main deck via an inclined ladder leading athwartships from port



to starboard. The space is protected by an approved CO2 system which is located inside the space but can be activated externally from the starboard side of the superstructure on the main deck. In addition to two main diesel engines there is a diesel generator on the port and starboard side aft and the electrically powered dive air compressors on the either side. A fan, approximately 24 inches was installed in the upper aft transverse watertight bulkhead between engine room and lazarette.

Machinery Space – Lazarette: The lazarette is accessed via an inclined ladder leading from the stern. The lazarette was found to have a number of added equipment, including a NITROX system, clothes dryer, (03) food freezers, a NITROX dive compressor condensate water discharge pump, and the hydraulic system for the dive platform.

Thus far, the inspection team identified the following items on the VISION on 02 October:

#### 1. General Arrangements

- a. Reduction of overnight passengers from 49 to 31 due to bunk space limitations. Specifically, egress requirements for inside passengers in double bunks and emergency egress route infringement. Previously double bunks allowed two passengers, but due to limited egress from interior spaces only one overnight passenger will be allowed for each double bunk. Additionally, the configuration of the emergency escape requires climbing on to top bunks, and would be rendered impassable by an incapacitated passenger in the bunks.
- b. Egress through bunkroom emergency escape restricted by bunks. Vessel to provide path of unimpeded egress. Currently, passengers asleep or incapacitated in upper bunks will block egress.
- c. Shower room may need emergency egress – requires measurement.
- d. Emergency lighting inadequate. Emergency escape route is not illuminated.
- e. Demonstrate mattresses meet 46 CFR 177.405 or a previous standard in accordance with 46 CFR (10-1-95 edition) 177.30-7.
- f. Combustible trashcans.

#### 2. Lifesaving

- a. Life float located on top of pilot house found holed and in disrepair, with dry rotted pendants, painters and water light lanyard not attached around the body of the life float, missing vessel name and approval markings, improper retroreflective tape, a leaking water light battery, and a float free arrangement that relies on a hydrostatic release device with a missing expiration date.
- b. Distribute lifejackets in convenient locations throughout vessel.
- c. Painters for life floats located on upper deck not fixed around the body of the life floats.
- d. Vessel does not have lifejacket donning placards for all styles of lifejackets found on board.
- e. Starboard forward life float's float free arrangement impinged by lips on the storage box.
- f. Starboard forward life float found with torn grab line attachment point.

#### 3. Firefighting

- a. Remove grease build up in galley ventilation hoods. The ventilation ducts above both the griddle and the double oven were found to be coated with grease. Approved alternative to 46 CFR 181.425 issued by Sector LA/LB requires a maintenance plan to prevent grease build up.
- b. Heat detector missing from galley. Approved alternative to 46 CFR 181.425 issued by Sector LA/LB requires a heat detector to be installed.
- c. Portable fire extinguisher located in shower room found with significant visible corrosion around base.
- d. Heat detection missing from shower room.
- e. Smoke detectors missing from bunkroom
- f. Heat detectors in engine room and lazarette found hanging by their wiring. Demonstrate proper operation of heat detectors and properly install.
- g. Transverse bulkhead between engine room and lazarette contains a ventilation fan with a wooden drop down closure. Closure does not provide a positive vapor boundary for a CO2 protected space and may not provide watertight subdivision.
- h. Fire pump pressure gauge sticks at 40 PSI. Vessel to provide properly functioning pressure gauge at the discharge side of the fire pump.
- i. Electric grill on main deck presents fire hazard. Grill is surrounded by wood and FRP, and contains lava rocks.
- j. Provide fire hose nozzles complying with 46 CFR 162.027.
- k. Provide spanner wrenches at each fire station.

#### 4. Electrical

- a. Vessel to provide amendment to existing electrical plan and load analysis or provide new plan/analysis for review and approval in light of the following equipment not accounted for on approved plans:
  - i. NITROX system in lazarette,
  - ii. (02) freezers in lazarette,
  - iii. (01) clothes dryer in lazarette,
  - iv. Independent bilge pump in lazarette,
  - v. Independent bilge pump in shower room,
  - vi. (01) double oven in galley,
  - vii. (02) Additional fan units in engine room.
  - viii. Icemaker in salon
  - ix. Additional refrigerator in galley.
  - x. Electric grill on deck.
  - xi. Hot water heater in shower room.
  - xii. Reverse osmosis unit and water treatment system in engine room.
  - xiii. 16 AWG conductor found on bunk lights. Replace with 14AWG or greater.
  - xiv. Compressor motor controllers require additional fan installations to provide cooling. Provide motor controllers of a type appropriate for ambient temperature.
- b. Wire bundling and hangers found throughout lazarette and engine room with plastic wire ties. Provide metallic hangars spaced not more than 24 inches apart.
- c. Improper splicing found throughout vessel, to include the shower room independent electric bilge pump and bunkroom bilge high level alarm.
- d. Windlass wiring coiled in water. Properly size and ensure it is protected from wet environment.

- e. Cable run in galley improperly used as a storage place for cleaning supplies.
- f. Corroded receptacle behind microwave in galley. When tested, did not show proper grounding.
- g. Improper use of wire nuts in refrigeration unit at center of salon.
- h. Electrical receptacles in salon bench area were missing, and exposed wiring were present. Properly install receptacle boxes.
- i. (03) Electric power strips installed in salon, one with visible evidence of overheating. Remove power strips.
- j. Junction box cover loose on windlass motor.
- k. Lighting fixture in lazarette improper. Missing protective cover and not of a grounded type.
- l. Distribution panels in engine room missing blanks to protect from shock hazards.
- m. Starboard distribution in engine room panel door modified improperly. Provide unmodified distribution panel.
- n. Starboard distribution panel in engine room damaged. Provide new distribution panel and electrical one line drawings showing adequacy of overcurrent protection.
- o. Dead end wires were found port and starboard in the forward engine room.
- p. Starboard side receptacle on bridge not grounded.
- q. Port side crew bunkroom outlet needs cover.
- r. Starboard side crew bunkroom outlet cover cracked.
- s. Starboard bridge console found connected using extension cord.
- t. Starboard bridge console found with dead end wires.
- u. Starboard bridge wing receptacle appears burnt.

#### 5. Machinery

- a. Provide closure devices for forward engine room vents to main deck.
  - b. Electric submersible shower sump drain pump below shower room not secured in place.
  - c. Verify whether transverse bulkhead between engine room and lazarette, which contains a ventilation fan with a wooden drop down closure is required to be vapor tight.
  - d. Fire damper for forward port engine room vent does not close properly and does not provide a vapor tight seal.
- #### 6. Water/Weathertight Conditions – construction, watertight integrity, stability
- a. Engine room forward bulkhead pipe penetration at bilge level missing plug. Bulkhead is a required transverse watertight bulkhead and forms part of the vapor tight boundary for a CO2 protected space.
  - b. Insulation on the engine room overhead, port side, in disrepair.
  - c. Review whether new stability evaluation should be completed in light of additional equipment added since last stability letter was issued.

#### 7. Vessel Control/Miscellaneous Systems

- a. Public address / general alarm speaker missing from shower room and inoperable in bunkroom.
- b. Emergency lighting inadequate. Emergency escape route is not illuminated. (Old T)
- c. Port bridge wing throttle inoperable.
- d. Demonstrate proper operation of AIS.
- e. Shower drains currently set up for discharge over the side via independent pump.

The following items were not available due to factors including non-availability of records and lack of crew, but must be completed prior to completion of inspection and clearance of COTP order:

- 1. Provide FCC compliance documentation to include marine operators certificate, station license and safety radio certificate
- 2. Provide properly licensed and documented crew.
- 3. Provide Certificate of Documentation
- 4. Provide records of firefighting and lifesaving equipment servicing, as well as EPIRB testing and portable fire extinguisher monthly inspections.
- 5. Provide records of training and drills to include firefighting, man overboard and abandon ship.
- 6. Provide compliance documentation for DAPI/EAP program.
- 7. Provide waste management plan.
- 8. Provide process for crew and passenger manifests.
- 9. Provide process for voyage plan.
- 10. Demonstrate machinery shutdowns for CO2 system.
- 11. Demonstrate underway operation.
- 12. Conduct fire, man overboard and abandon ship drills in the presence of a USCG Marine Inspector.
- 13. Demonstrate passenger safety orientation by operating crew.
- 14. Provide current charts, light list, coast pilot, tides and currents.
- 15. Provide Navigation Rules and applicable regulations.
- 16. Demonstrate public address and general alarm systems.
- 17. Provide emergency instructions.
- 18. Demonstrate safety boat compliance with 46 CFR subchapter C as an uninspected passenger vessel.
- 19. Provide credentialed mariner to operate safety boat and demonstrate compliance with vessel manning and work rest rotation.

Inspection continues.

//s//

CWO3 Andrew Schmitt  
MSD Santa Barbara

12DEC19: Attended vessel to conduct deficiency check at the request of owner.

Recommending clearance of items 01, 02, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 38 and 42. Item 03 changed from code 60 to code 50 to allow vessel to get underway for crew training, and changing item 05 code 60 to code 705: Prior to energizing galley heating equipment. Vessel is still subject to COTP order prohibiting carriage of passengers. Vessel owner requested reconsideration of items 08 and 29. Request for reconsideration forwarded to Sector LA/LB OCMI. Item number 20, questioning suitability of the motor controller for the dive air compressor in the engine room, was deleted. Vessel owner demonstrated that engine room

ventilation arrangement sufficiently cooled motor controller and that a more suitable installation was not available.

Inspection continues.

//s//  
CWO3 Andrew Schmitt  
MSD Santa Barbara

17DEC2019: Attended vessel on 13DEC19 to observe life float installation for item 04. Vessel was still missing the battery for the life float. Vessel provided battery on 17DEC19. Observed satisfactory installation. Discussed above recommendations with Sector LA/LB and received concurrence. Items 01 and 04 cleared, item 02 removed, item 03 changed to code 50c, and item 05 changed to code 705c. Vessel passenger operation remain prohibited by COTP order. Vessel owner requested reconsideration of items #8 and #29 (wire sizing for LED bunk light installation and double bunk restriction). Requested owner provide supporting documentation for reconsideration request.

//s//  
CWO3 Andrew Schmitt  
MSD Santa Barbara

09JAN2020: Vessel owner provided supporting documentation for reconsideration requests. Forwarded to Sector LA/LB.

//s//  
CWO3 Andrew Schmitt  
MSD Santa Barbara

10FEB2020: Response letter for reconsideration sent to vessel owner. Letter attached to MISLE activity.

//s//  
CWO3 Andrew Schmitt  
MSD Santa Barbara

19JUN20:

LT Price Larson and CWO Twiddy attended vessel in Santa Barbara, to conduct a DFU inspection. Upon further discussion with O/O, unit removed def. #20 & #38, & cleared, #03,#23,#27,#30,#31,#34,#36,#39,#40,#41,#44,#45. Issued (00) CG-835V's, cleared (12) CG-835V's, & (10) CG-835V's remain outstanding. Inspection continues.

//s//  
CVWO4 Joseph Twiddy  
MSD Santa Barbara

06JUL2020: Due to length of time activity has been open, routing activity for closure. Vessel did not complete the overnight passenger verification due to remaining outstanding deficiencies, outstanding captain of the port order, and lack of crew to verify emergency procedures, training and manning. (10) CG-835s remain outstanding.

//s//  
CWO4 Andrew Schmitt  
MSD Santa Barbara

Second Level review has been completed on this vessel inspection activity in accordance with CVC-PR-009 and I have verified that the inspection was conducted in accordance with the appropriate job aid.

M. Izbicki, GS-13

**Inspection Details**

<b>Inspection Type:</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>Unit:</b>
Administrative Inspection	06SEP2019	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara
<b>Inspection Type:</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>Unit:</b>
In-Service Inspection	02OCT2019	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara
<b>Inspection Type:</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>Unit:</b>
Deficiency Check	11DEC2019	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara
<b>Inspection Type:</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>Unit:</b>
Deficiency Check	19JUN2020	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara
<b>Inspection Type:</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>Unit:</b>
Deficiency Check	18DEC2019	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara

**Streamlined Inspection Program (SIP) Summary:**

**Vessel Name:** VISION  
**Company Name:**

**PHASE I**

Inspector Comments:

**PHASE II**

Inspector Comments:

**PHASE III**

Inspector Comments:

**PHASE IV**

Inspector Comments:

**Location(s):**

Latitude:	Longitude:	Recorded Date/Time:	Description:
34°24.5 N	119°41.5 W	06SEP2019 23:00Z	Sea Landing, Santa Barbara, CA

Associated Parties: (None)

**TWIC Details:**

Worker Type:	Checked:	Compliant:	Noncompliant:	Remarks:
Licensed Mariner	1	1	0	

**Radiation Details:**

Radiation:	No Radiation Detected
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**Operational Controls:**

Category Type:	Reason:	Control Type:
Safety	Identified Hazardous/Unsafe Condition	COTP Order (Restriction of Operations)
Agency Jurisdiction:	Date Imposed:	Date Removed:
US Coast Guard	06SEP2019	09JUL2021
Restriction:	Description:	
Passenger Carriage Prohibition	Vessel ordered to cease all passenger vessel operations until the vessels TRUTH (O.N. 556419) & VISION (O.N. 688431) undergo a satisfactory safety inspection by a USCG marine inspector. Based on our assessment of the VISION earlier this week & information gathered through interviews with crewmembers, the insp will concentrate on fire detection, firefighting equipment, means of escape, crew training (incl. roving patrol requirements), passenger safety orientation, and electrical installations.	

**Log:**

Effective Date:	Description/New Value:	Logged By Unit:	Logged By:
27JUL2020	Closed Date: 7/27/2020 6:52:07 PM	Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach	Izbicki, Matthew J
17DEC2019	Extended Date: 01/16/2020	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R
09SEP2019	Imposed Date: 9/6/2019 11:00:00 PM	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R
18OCT2019	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: No	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R
18OCT2019	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: No	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R
06JUL2020	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: No	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R
05SEP2019	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: No	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R
05SEP2019	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: Yes	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R
05SEP2019	Owning Unit: Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R

24JUL2020	Owning Unit: Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach	Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach	Pricelarsen, Joe W
05SEP2019	Point Of Contact: Glen Fritzler @ 805-451-5151	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R
05SEP2019	Start Date: 9/5/2019 6:00:00 PM	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R
09SEP2019	Start Date: 9/6/2019 11:00:00 PM	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R
27JUL2020	Status/Subtype: Closed/Agency Action Complete	Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach	Izbicki, Matthew J
05SEP2019	Status/Subtype: Open/In Progress	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R
24JUL2020	Status/Subtype: Open/Submitted for Review	Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach	Pricelarsen, Joe W
05SEP2019	Title: VISION In Service Inspection	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R
08NOV2019	Title: VISION SPV Overnight Passenger Verification	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R
24JUL2020	Transfer Reason: Completion	Sector Los Angeles/Long Beach	Pricelarsen, Joe W
05SEP2019	Vessel: VISION	Marine Safety Detachment Santa Barbara	Schmitt, Andrew R

**Documents:**

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Type:</b>	<b>Description:</b>
LED Lighting and Wire Sizing - MSC Email 12NOV19	Other	Email from MSC to MSD Santa Barbara providing recommendations on reconsideration of bunk area wiring size requirements.
ReconsiderationRequestReply.VISION	Other	Reply from Sector LA/LB for request for reconsideration of wire sizing and double bunk arrangement.
TRUTH AQUATICS COTP ORDER 2019-018	Other	TRUTH AQUATICS COTP ORDER 2019-018 following fire on CONCEPTION.
VISION Appeal 09DEC2019	Appeal Letter to OCMI	Request for reconsideration and appeal for deficiency items 08 and 29 (wire sizing for the bunk lighting and reduction of overnight accommodations due to removal of double occupancy in bunks), as well as the attending marine inspector's recommendation.

Certificates: (None)

# Exhibit 33



## Activity Summary Report

MISLE Activity ID: 6815167  
 Activity Type: Vessel Inspection  
 Title/Description: SPV Overnight Passenger Verification  
 Status: Closed - Approved Inspection  
 Point Of Contact: Mr. Dan McKenzie 973-796-4201  
 Owing Unit: Sector Long Island Sound  
 Originating Unit: Sector Long Island Sound  
 Start Date/Time: 01OCT2019 16:20Z  
 Prompt Date:  
 Team Lead: THORESEN, SCOTT K.

### Vessel Information:

<b>Vessel Name:</b>	<b>Call Sign:</b>	<b>Current Flag / Flag At Time Of Activity:</b>
BRILLIANT	WE8546	UNITED STATES / UNITED STATES
<b>Classification:</b>	<b>Primary VIN:</b>	<b>Length:</b>
School Ship - Sailing School - General	231472	61.5
<b>ITC/Convention (Subpart B):</b>	<b>Regulatory (Subpart C or D):</b>	<b>Year Completed:</b>
	30	1932
<b>Engine Compartment In An Open Space:</b>	<b>Fuel Compartment In An Open Space:</b>	<b>Vessel Constructed Of All Open Spaces:</b>
No	No	No

**Propulsion System Type:**

Auxiliary Sail

### Vessel Associated Parties:

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Type:</b>	<b>Role:</b>
MYSTIC SEAPORT MUSEUM INC	Organization	Managing Owner
<b>Address:</b>		
75 GREENMANVILLE AVE MYSTIC, CONNECTICUT 06355		
<b>Name:</b>	<b>Type:</b>	<b>Role:</b>
MYSTIC SEAPORT MUSEUM, INC.	Organization	Operator (managing)
<b>Address:</b>		
75 GREENMANVILLE AVENUE MYSTIC, CONNECTICUT 06355		

### Inspection Results:

<b>System:</b>	<b>Inspection Results:</b>	<b>Date:</b>
01 - Certificates & Documentation	Inspected Satisfactory	01OCT2019
07 - Fire Safety	Inspected Satisfactory	01OCT2019
08 - Alarms	Inspected Satisfactory	01OCT2019
09 - Working and Living Conditions	Inspected With Deficiencies Noted	01OCT2019
10 - Safety of Navigation	Inspected With Deficiencies Noted	01OCT2019

**Deficiencies:**

<b>Item Number:</b> 2	<b>Due Date:</b> 01OCT2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 01OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 01OCT2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 10 - Safety of Navigation	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 10133 - Bridge operation	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 17 - Rectify deficiencies prior to departure	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

2- Provide documentation of crew watch schedule for trips exceeding 12 hours or carrying overnight passengers.

**Resolution:**

Recieved email from vessel master identifying established watch schedule.

**Narrative:**

18Sept2019: Updating COI with Overnight watchmen clause per CVC. Scheduled attendance on vessel to verify Overnight accommodation on 01Oct2019. -LM

01OCT19- Attended vessel to conduct SPV overnight passenger verification iaw CVC direction from message R132000Z SEP 19. Met with vessel master Mr. Dan McKenzie to discuss scope of the inspection. MI explained the requirement from CVC to complete additional verification of SPV's with overnight passengers. Conducted an inspection passenger accommodations and firefighting based off the guidance found in the message. Identified 02 deficiencies and issued the following CG-835's:

- 1- Provide documentation that mattresses comply with 46CFR177.405(g).
- 2- Provide documentation of crew watch schedule for trips exceeding 12 hours or carrying overnight passengers.

During the inspection it was identified that the master and the crew were confused about an endorsement on their COI for reduced manning. The captain thought that while the vessel was anchored it did not count as underway therefore he was not meeting the 24 hour watch requirements assigned on his COI. The master was informed of the regulations as well as the vessel management. Later in the day the master provided a watch schedule via email for the upcoming overnight trips identifying the fully manned vessel and watch rotation. Cleared CG-835 #2.

This vessel was found to be fit for the intended routes and service as specified on the COI and in accordance with the appropriate regulations. Verification was completed in accordance with the SPV Inspection Direction message. Issued 02 CG835v, cleared 01 and 01 remain outstanding. Amended COI routes and conditions to reflect the required statement for overnight passenger found in CVC message and clarified routes and conditions for when operating as a sailing school vessel. Inspection complete.

//s//  
Scott K. Thoresen, CWO4

31OCT19- Vessel master submitted documentation for mattress material. The documentation stated that the foam meets CAL 117 standard. Sector LIS CID requested through the USCG MSC an equivalency determination to identify if the CAL 117 standard is equivalent to 46CFR177.405.

13NOV19- Activity submitted for review.

//s//  
Scott K. Thoresen, CWO4

13Nov19: Reviewed and approved activity. Activity closed.  
CWO JL

**Inspection Details**

<b>Inspection Type:</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>Unit:</b>
In-Service Inspection	01OCT2019	Sector Long Island Sound
<b>Inspection Type:</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>Unit:</b>
Administrative Inspection	01OCT2019	Sector Long Island Sound

**Streamlined Inspection Program (SIP) Summary:**

**Vessel Name:** BRILLIANT

**Company Name:**

**PHASE I**



Inspector Comments:

**PHASE II**

Inspector Comments:

**PHASE III**

Inspector Comments:

**PHASE IV**

Inspector Comments:

**Location(s):**

Latitude:	Longitude:	Recorded Date/Time:	Description:
41°21.7 N	071°58.0 W	01OCT2019 18:38Z	Mystic Seaport

Associated Parties: (None)

**TWIC Details:**

Worker Type:	Checked:	Compliant:	Noncompliant:	Remarks:
Other	0	0	0	

**Radiation Details:**

<b>Radiation:</b>	No Radiation Detected
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Operational Controls: (None)

**Log:**

Effective Date:	Description/New Value:	Logged By Unit:	Logged By:
09OCT2019	Closed Date:	Sector Long Island Sound	Linnick, James D
09OCT2019	Closed Date:	Sector Long Island Sound	Linnick, James D
07JUL2021	Closed Date:	Sector Long Island Sound	Thoresen, Scott K
07OCT2019	Closed Date: 10/7/2019 5:55:34 PM	Sector Long Island Sound	Linnick, James D
09OCT2019	Closed Date: 10/9/2019 12:32:15 PM	Sector Long Island Sound	Linnick, James D
13NOV2019	Closed Date: 11/13/2019 5:31:04 PM	Sector Long Island Sound	Linnick, James D
07JUL2021	Closed Date: 7/7/2021 5:02:03 PM	Sector Long Island Sound	Thoresen, Scott K
02OCT2019	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: No	Sector Long Island Sound	Thoresen, Scott K
18SEP2019	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: No	Sector Long Island Sound	Madsen, Lacy C
18SEP2019	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: No	Sector Long Island Sound	Madsen, Lacy C
02OCT2019	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: No	Sector Long Island Sound	Thoresen, Scott K
18SEP2019	Owning Unit: Sector Long Island Sound	Sector Long Island Sound	Madsen, Lacy C
02OCT2019	Point Of Contact: Mr. Dan McKenzie 973-796-4201	Sector Long Island Sound	Thoresen, Scott K
18SEP2019	Point Of Contact: SLIS	Sector Long Island Sound	Madsen, Lacy C
02OCT2019	Start Date: 10/1/2019 4:20:16 PM	Sector Long Island Sound	Thoresen, Scott K
18SEP2019	Start Date: 9/18/2019 6:38:16 PM	Sector Long Island Sound	Madsen, Lacy C
07JUL2021	Status/Subtype: Closed/Approved Inspection	Sector Long Island Sound	Thoresen, Scott K
09OCT2019	Status/Subtype: Closed/Approved Inspection	Sector Long Island Sound	Linnick, James D
07OCT2019	Status/Subtype: Closed/Approved Inspection	Sector Long Island Sound	Linnick, James D
13NOV2019	Status/Subtype: Closed/Approved Inspection	Sector Long Island Sound	Linnick, James D
18SEP2019	Status/Subtype: Open/In Progress	Sector Long Island Sound	Madsen, Lacy C
07JUL2021	Status/Subtype: Open/In Progress	Sector Long Island Sound	Thoresen, Scott K
09OCT2019	Status/Subtype: Open/In Progress	Sector Long Island Sound	Linnick, James D
09OCT2019	Status/Subtype: Open/In Progress	Sector Long Island Sound	Linnick, James D
03OCT2019	Status/Subtype: Open/Submitted for Review	Sector Long Island Sound	Thoresen, Scott K
13NOV2019	Status/Subtype: Open/Submitted for Review	Sector Long Island Sound	Thoresen, Scott K

18SEP2019	Title: SPV Overnight Passenger Verification	Sector Long Island Sound	Madsen, Lacy C
18SEP2019	Vessel: BRILLIANT	Sector Long Island Sound	Madsen, Lacy C

Documents: (None)

**Certificates:**

---

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Type:</b>	<b>Description:</b>	
COI - Amended 13Nov2019	Certificate of Inspection - Amended		
<b>Owning Unit:</b>	<b>Status:</b>	<b>Issued Date:</b>	<b>Expired Date:</b>
Sector Long Island Sound	EXPIRED	06MAY2019	06MAY2024



## Activity Summary Report

MISLE Activity ID: 6816006  
 Activity Type: Vessel Inspection  
 Title/Description: SPV Overnight Passenger Verification  
 Status: Closed - Approved Inspection  
 Point Of Contact: Ray Williamson; 542-4083  
 Owning Unit: Marine Safety Detachment Belfast  
 Originating Unit: Marine Safety Detachment Belfast  
 Start Date/Time: 19SEP2019 18:23Z  
 Prompt Date:  
 Team Lead: WHARFE, DAVID R.

### Vessel Information:

<b>Vessel Name:</b>	<b>Call Sign:</b>	<b>Current Flag / Flag At Time Of Activity:</b>
MERCANTILE	WTZ8898	UNITED STATES / UNITED STATES
<b>Classification:</b>	<b>Primary VIN:</b>	<b>Length:</b>
Passenger Ship - Sailing Vessel - General (More Than 6, Gross Tonnage < 100)	214388	71.0
<b>ITC/Convention (Subpart B):</b>	<b>Regulatory (Subpart C or D):</b>	<b>Year Completed:</b>
	47	1916
<b>Engine Compartment In An Open Space:</b>	<b>Fuel Compartment In An Open Space:</b>	<b>Vessel Constructed Of All Open Spaces:</b>
Not Applicable	Not Applicable	Not Applicable
<b>Propulsion System Type:</b>		
Sail		

### Vessel Associated Parties:

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Type:</b>	<b>Role:</b>
MAINE WINDJAMMER CRUISES	Organization	Operator (managing)
<b>Address:</b>		
BOX 617 CAMDEN, MAINE 04843		
<b>Name:</b>	<b>Type:</b>	<b>Role:</b>
SCHOONER MERCANTILE INC.	Organization	Managing Owner
<b>Address:</b>		
46 JOHN STREET PO BOX 617 CAMDEN, MAINE 04843		

### Inspection Results:

<b>System:</b>	<b>Inspection Results:</b>	<b>Date:</b>
01 - Certificates & Documentation	Partially Inspected – 25%	19SEP2019
02 - Structural Conditions	Partially Inspected – 25%	19SEP2019
03 - Water/Weathertight Conditions	Partially Inspected – 25%	19SEP2019
04 - Emergency Systems	Partially Inspected – 25%	19SEP2019
07 - Fire Safety	Partially Inspected – 50%	19SEP2019
09 - Working and Living Conditions	Inspected With Deficiencies Noted	19SEP2019
11 - Life Saving Appliances	Partially Inspected – 50%	19SEP2019

**Deficiencies:**

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<b>Item Number:</b> 1	<b>Due Date:</b>	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 16APR2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 29JUL2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 03 - Water/Weathertight Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 03199 - Other (load lines)	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 701 - Prior to carriage of passengers/cargo	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Description:</b> Vsl to be checked for watertight integrity of the hull and bilges following the hull exam and repairs; PCP.			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
<b>Resolution:</b> All SAT.			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

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<b>Item Number:</b> 1	<b>Due Date:</b>	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 19SEP2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 20SEP2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 09 - Working and Living Conditions	<b>Subsystem:</b> 091 - Living Conditions	<b>Component:</b> 09114 - Sleeping room	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 17 - Rectify deficiencies prior to departure	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Description:</b> Mark the port/fwd galley escape ladder with "Emergency Exit, Keep Clear," as per CVC msg & 46 CFR 185.30-15(a)(old T).			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
<b>Resolution:</b> Fwd Galley companioway marked.			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Narrative:**

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19 SEP 19: Attended vsl at Camden Harbor, ME to conduct Overnight Passenger Verification exam mandated by CVC iaw message DTG R132000ZSEP19. Met with the O/O listed above. No requirements were outstanding.

MERCANTILE: Built 1916, 71', 47 GRT, wood, double masted, traditional sailing schooner. Vsl authorized for overnight 29 overnight pax.

Drills, training, and safety equipment checks were being done, but improvement could be made on logging the details. Safety orientation is conducted prior to departure with pax, including a demonstration of lifejacket donning by a crewmember. The Mate was interviewed for the purpose of this exam.

Examined fire safety equipment. Vsl has 4 portable fire extinguishers, 3 fire buckets, and a small portable internal combustion pump that can be utilized as a fire pump or for dewatering. All fire fighting equipment was SAT. The fire detection was comprised of small individual battery operated smoke detectors. Noted the smoke detector fwd of galley on the messdeck was missing, issued 01 WL item, detector was found and installed with a new battery prior to conclusion of exam. Cleared WL item.

Reviewed COI with POC; noted the following corrections to be made: Added Aux Sailing endorsement on COI per SNNE policy, Added 01 rescue boat for 6 persons to lifesaving area iaw 180.200(b), based on the yawl boat's capability, and SNNE long standing tradition to treat self propelled yawl boats as rescue platforms for emergencies (MOB recovery). The COI already approved the yawl boat for the carriage of 6 pax (plus 2 crew) in the R&C, see SNNE policy letter on yawl boat certification dated 07 NOV 2017.

Lifesaving equipment was examined. Vsl has 03 Life floats & 01 BA installed on the fwd cabin top, aft of the foremast. Lifejackets are stowed in staterooms and extras provided on the main deck inside lifefloats and peapod row boats. All SAT.

Examined electrical system. Vsl's electrical is entirely 12 VDC, except for a shoretie & battery charger for in port use, electrical system was SAT. No installed emergency lighting, vsl leaves 12VDC lights on throughout the night in passageways and ladderwells, and has flashlights available near ladders as allowed by SNNE policy dated 02 MAY 2009.

Examined egress, escape hatches, & markings. Noted the escape hatch forward of the galley was not marked as an Emergency Exit and there were 03 crew members that sleep in the galley/mess deck area. Issued 01 WL item. All companion width openings measured 24" wide, no min req's in Old T (177.15-1), egress routes SAT.

Discussed the Night watchman requirements with the O/O, past practice was intermittent based on weather conditions, expected weather/sea conditions, number of pax onboard, etc. Notified O/O that a night watchman shall remain up at all times when passengers are onboard regardless of weather conditions or operational status, at anchor or underway.

Noted various special considerations where the vsl did not meet old Sub T, but met SNNE's policy letters, summarized as follows: Kerosene Nav Lights, Emergency Lighting for Sail Vessels with <50 volts electrical systems, & Cooking & Heating Installation on SPV (wood stoves).

ISIP exam complete. Issued 01 work list item for the marking of the emergency escape ladder way fwd of the galley, see deficiency tab for details.

This vessel was found to be fit for the intended routes and service as specified on the COI and in accordance with the appropriate regulations. Verification was completed in accordance with the SPV Inspection Direction message.  
DW

20 SEP 19: Rcvd detailed email notification including a photo showing correction of the WL item noted above. Cleared 01-WL item, no 835s issued, cleared, or remain outstanding.

COI was amended as directed with the CVC msg noted above, the new wording replaced the SNNE sentence regarding the night patrol man requirements, and other items noted above in paragraph #3.

Activity routed for review and closure.

/s/ D. Wharfe, CWO4

**Inspection Details**

<b>Inspection Type:</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>Unit:</b>
In-Service Inspection	19SEP2019	Marine Safety Detachment Belfast
<b>Inspection Type:</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>Unit:</b>
Deficiency Check	20SEP2019	Marine Safety Detachment Belfast

**Streamlined Inspection Program (SIP) Summary:**

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<b>Vessel Name:</b>	MERCANTILE
<b>Company Name:</b>	
<b>PHASE I</b>	
Inspector Comments:	
<b>PHASE II</b>	

Inspector Comments:

**PHASE III**

Inspector Comments:

**PHASE IV**

Inspector Comments:

**Location(s):**

Latitude:	Longitude:	Recorded Date/Time:	Description:
44°21.0 N	069°05.2 W	19SEP2019 18:23Z	Camden Harbor, ME

**Associated Parties:**

Name:	Type:	Role :
WILLIAMSON, RAYMOND F	Individual	Owner/Operator
<b>Address:</b>		
46 JOHN ST PO BOX 617 CAMDEN, MAINE 04843		

**TWIC Details:**

Worker Type:	Checked:	Compliant:	Noncompliant:	Remarks:
Other	0	0	0	

**Radiation Details:**

<b>Radiation:</b>	No Radiation Detected
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Operational Controls: (None)

**Log:**

Effective Date:	Description/New Value:	Logged By Unit:	Logged By:
22OCT2019	Closed Date: 10/22/2019 1:36:40 PM	Marine Safety Detachment Belfast	Ramos, John E
19SEP2019	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: No	Marine Safety Detachment Belfast	Wharfe, David R
19SEP2019	Owning Unit: Marine Safety Detachment Belfast	Marine Safety Detachment Belfast	Wharfe, David R
19SEP2019	Point Of Contact: Ray Williamson; 542-4083	Marine Safety Detachment Belfast	Wharfe, David R
19SEP2019	Start Date: 9/19/2019 6:23:36 PM	Marine Safety Detachment Belfast	Wharfe, David R
22OCT2019	Status/Subtype: Closed/Approved Inspection	Marine Safety Detachment Belfast	Ramos, John E
19SEP2019	Status/Subtype: Open/In Progress	Marine Safety Detachment Belfast	Wharfe, David R
23SEP2019	Status/Subtype: Open/Submitted for Review	Marine Safety Detachment Belfast	Wharfe, David R
19SEP2019	Title: SPV Overnight Passenger Verification	Marine Safety Detachment Belfast	Wharfe, David R
19SEP2019	Vessel: MERCANTILE	Marine Safety Detachment Belfast	Wharfe, David R

Documents: (None)

**Certificates:**

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<b>Name:</b>	<b>Type:</b>	<b>Description:</b>		
COI - Amended 22Oct2019	Certificate of Inspection - Amended			
<b>Owning Unit:</b>	<b>Status:</b>	<b>Issued Date:</b>	<b>Expired Date:</b>	
Marine Safety Detachment Belfast	EXPIRED	17MAY2017	17MAY2022	



## Activity Summary Report

MISLE Activity ID: 6822766  
 Activity Type: Vessel Inspection  
 Title/Description: SPV Overnight Passenger Verification  
 Status: Closed - Approved Inspection  
 Point Of Contact: Brian Howard 850-830-4752  
 Owing Unit: Marine Safety Detachment Panama City  
 Originating Unit: Marine Safety Detachment Panama City  
 Start Date/Time: 26SEP2019 10:30Z  
 Prompt Date:  
 Team Lead: GREER, JOSHUA P

### Vessel Information:

<b>Vessel Name:</b>	<b>Call Sign:</b>	<b>Current Flag / Flag At Time Of Activity:</b>
TRADEWINDS	WDE2696	UNITED STATES / UNITED STATES
<b>Classification:</b>	<b>Primary VIN:</b>	<b>Length:</b>
Passenger Ship - Charter Fishing Vessel - General (More Than 6, Gross Tonnage < 100)	977244	65.0
<b>ITC/Convention (Subpart B):</b>	<b>Regulatory (Subpart C or D):</b>	<b>Year Completed:</b>
		1991
<b>Engine Compartment In An Open Space:</b>	<b>Fuel Compartment In An Open Space:</b>	<b>Vessel Constructed Of All Open Spaces:</b>
No	No	No
<b>Propulsion System Type:</b>		
Diesel Reduction		

### Vessel Associated Parties:

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Type:</b>	<b>Role:</b>
BRIAN E HOWARDS CHARTER FISHING LLC	Organization	Managing Owner
<b>Address:</b>		
619 VERMONT AVENUE FORT WALTON BEACH, FLORIDA 32547		
<b>Name:</b>	<b>Type:</b>	<b>Role:</b>
BRIAN E HOWARDS CHARTER FISHING LLC	Organization	Operator (managing)
<b>Address:</b>		
619 VERMONT AVENUE FORT WALTON BEACH, FLORIDA 32547		

### Inspection Results:

<b>System:</b>	<b>Inspection Results:</b>	<b>Date:</b>
01 - Certificates & Documentation	Inspected Satisfactory	26SEP2019
02 - Structural Conditions	Inspected Satisfactory	26SEP2019
04 - Emergency Systems	Inspected Satisfactory	26SEP2019
05 - Radio Communications	Inspected Satisfactory	26SEP2019
07 - Fire Safety	Inspected With Deficiencies Noted	26SEP2019
08 - Alarms	Inspected Satisfactory	26SEP2019
09 - Working and Living Conditions	Inspected Satisfactory	26SEP2019
11 - Life Saving Appliances	Inspected With Deficiencies Noted	26SEP2019
13 - Propulsion and Auxiliary Machinery	Inspected Satisfactory	26SEP2019



**Deficiencies:**

<b>Item Number:</b> 1	<b>Due Date:</b> 26SEP2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 26SEP2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 26SEP2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO <input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>System:</b> 11 - Life Saving Appliances	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 11117 - Lifebuoys incl. provision and disposition	
<b>Action:</b> 705 - Other - as specified	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Vsl required to have 1 waterlight that meets 46 CFR 160.050. The waterlight globe to protect light filament is missing. Vsl to replace waterlight. Vsl limited to daytime operations.

46 CFR 180.70(d)(1)  
705c

**Resolution:**

Waterlight was replaced.

<b>Item Number:</b> 2	<b>Due Date:</b> 26SEP2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 26SEP2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 26SEP2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO <input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>System:</b> 11 - Life Saving Appliances	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 11117 - Lifebuoys incl. provision and disposition	
<b>Action:</b> 701 - Prior to carriage of passengers/cargo	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Vsl waterlight required to have 3 ft line. Vsl had line less than 3 ft attached to light. Vsl to replace with 3 ft line.

**Resolution:**

Vessel replaced line with 3 ft line.

<b>Item Number:</b> 3	<b>Due Date:</b> 26SEP2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection <input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation <input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX <input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Issued Date:</b> 26SEP2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 02OCT2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported <input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17 <input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO <input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated <input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07120 - Means of escape	
<b>Action:</b> 705 - Other - as specified	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	

**Description:**

Emergency escape must be marked in letter 1" high EMERGENCY EXIT KEEP CLEAR. Vsl did not have exit marked as required. Vsl to mark exit appropriately. Vsl restricted from carrying passengers overnight until rectified.

46 CFR 177.15  
46 CFR 185.30-15  
705c

**Resolution:**

The owner intalled a sign that is mounted at top of stairs for passengers to see regardless of which bunk house they are assigned to sleep.

<b>Item Number:</b> 4	<b>Due Date:</b> 26SEP2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 26SEP2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 02OCT2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 11 - Life Saving Appliances	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 11118 - Lifejackets incl. provision and disposition	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 705 - Other - as specified	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Life jackets are required for every person onboard. 1 lifejacket was unservicable. Vsl limited to total of 51 passengers until rectified.

46 CFR 180.71(a)  
705c

**Resolution:**

Owner purchased new jacket and outfitted/marked it as required.

<b>Item Number:</b> 5	<b>Due Date:</b> 26SEP2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 26SEP2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 26SEP2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07199 - Other (fire safety)	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 701 - Prior to carriage of passengers/cargo	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Vsl has flammable items stored in accommodation space. Vsl to remove items.

46 CFR 177.800(c)  
701c

**Resolution:**

Vsl removed items from accomodation spaces.

<b>Item Number:</b> 6	<b>Due Date:</b> 10OCT2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 26SEP2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 26SEP2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07114 - Remote Means of control (opening,pumps,ventilation,etc.) Machinery spaces	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 16 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 14 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Vsl to renew emergency fuel shut off markings.

46 CFR 185.30-20  
16c

**Resolution:**

Vsl marked fuel shut offs.

<b>Item Number:</b> 7	<b>Due Date:</b> 26SEP2019	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 26SEP2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 26SEP2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07108 - Ready availability of fire fighting equipment	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 701 - Prior to carriage of passengers/cargo	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO

**Description:**

Vsl required to have a total of 5 extinguishers onboard. 1 extinguisher found unservicable vsl to replace.

46 CFR 181.500  
701c

**Resolution:**

Vessel had extinguisher serviced.

**Narrative:**

This inspection was conducted in accordance with COMDT SMALL PASSENGER VESSEL (SPV) INSPECTION DIRECTION dated 13 Sep 2019. The CG-840T Inspection book was referenced as a job-aid.

Vessel Type: M/V TRADEWINDS is a 65 foot FRP vessel inspected under Subchapter T and operating on an Oceans or Limited Coastwise route.

**Executive Summary:**

This vessel was found to be fit for the intended routes and service as specified on the COI and in accordance with the appropriate regulations. Verification was completed in accordance with the SPV Inspection Direction message.

(07) deficiencies were issued this inspection, (07) deficiencies were cleared, and (00) deficiencies remain outstanding.

Issued paper COI Amendment for Conditions of Operation designating 24-hours roving patrolman/watchman, updated fire extinguishers to 5 and updated overnight sleeping accommodations to 14 passengers after measuring space for passengers and consulting applicable regs. Added verbiage to Routes and Conditions, fire fighting details, and overnight accommodations in edit vessel section of MISLE with new COI to be issued at next scheduled COI or dry dock. Vessel rep instructed to keep paper amendment with original COI.

**ADDED CONDITIONS OF OPERATION.**

AT ALL TIMES WHEN THE VESSEL IS CARRYING OVERNIGHT PASSENGERS, REGARDLESS IF THE VESSEL IS UNDERWAY OR NOT, SHALL HAVE A SUITABLE NUMBER OF WATCHMAN IN THE VICINITY OF THE CABINS OR STATEROOMS AND ON EACH DECK TO GUARD AGAINST AND GIVE ALARM IN CASE OF FIRE, MAN OVERBOARD, OR OTHER DANGEROUS SITUATION.

Items retained for MSD PC files: N/A

**Inspector Comments:**

25SEP2019: Attended the TRADEWINDS at Fishing Fleet Marina in Destin, FL in company with the vessel representative Brian Howard, one Captain, one Mate and CG Inspectors MSTC Greer and LCDR Powell to conduct an SPV Overnight Passenger Verification in-service inspection.

Conducted an inspection of the condition of overnight accommodations, fire protection equipment, lifesaving equipment, machinery, electrical equipment, means of escape, and the general health and safety of the vessel.

Reviewed the routes and conditions listed on the vessel's Certificate of Inspection (COI) including the number of passengers and overnight passengers permitted.

Reviewed the logs, logbook and documentation onboard to verify the following: abandon ship, firefighting, and man overboard drills; crew training; crew and passengers lists; passenger counts; voyage plans; and weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual maintenance inspections on lifesaving appliances. The Captain is not conducting or logging fire drills or EPIRB tests as required. Provided education on requirement. The Captain indicated the vessel had not conducted overnight trips in some time but he may take these types of trips in the future. I educated him on the requirement for a manifest and the donning of life jackets by overnight passengers and the need to have the passengers report to the muster location. He indicated he understood all requirements not currently being met and will comply in the future.

Lifesaving equipment was inspected and the waterlight for the ring buoy was found to be broken and not properly attached to the ring buoy. The owner purchased a new light and crew properly attached the waterlight to the ring buoy as required. The hydrostatic release for the life float installation was found to be marked with the installation date instead of the expiration date. The owner purchased a new HRU and installed it onto the life float installation and marked the expiration date for 2 years. One life jacket was found to be unserviceable. The crew destroyed the life jacket in my presence. A new life jacket was purchased, a light attached and marked as required with vessel name.

Verified the vessel had emergency instructions for the vessel. They were not mounted at the operating station but were instead mounted in the main lounge for everyone to review. The vessel also had a quasi watch station quarter bill onboard. Ensured the vessel crew was aware of and clearly understood their obligations in the event of an emergency including any additional requirements detailed on the COI.

The accommodation space has one exit that leads to a set of stairs that terminate right at a side entrance door to the parlor one deck above. The vessel is not required to have an additional means of escape based on size of the space. However, we discussed adding an additional emergency exit to forward passenger overnight accommodations so as to provide a means of escape in the event the parlor is the space on fire. The vessel owner agreed it would be a good idea and will look into installing additional exit.

The exit above had no markings providing any indication to anyone using the accommodation space that the stairs were the emergency exit. Required owner to provide signage to be read by people in either accommodation space EMERGENCY EXIT - KEEP CLEAR. The owner provided a sign as required. The crew also uses a chain to rope the entrance to the accommodation spaces as they are not currently being used except by crew to store items the vessel uses.

The smoke detector in the accommodation space was operational, however the approval was only for "SINGLE STATION SMOKE ALARM" and was not "SINGLE STATION SMOKE ALARM ALSO SUITABLE FOR USE IN RECREATIONAL VEHICLES". Vessel representative was advised of the requirement and purpose/intent. Vessel to purchase and install proper smoke detector. Discussed with vessel representative the need to have smoke detectors higher in the space. Currently the detectors were a few feet from the ceiling. Representative to place them higher and they were reinstalled on the ceiling itself.

Ensured crew members knew the location of all firefighting equipment onboard the vessel and were familiar with its use including fire extinguishers and smoke/heat detectors. Discovered the COI did not have the correct number of extinguishers required. All had been serviced in 2019 but one was found to be undercharged. The owner purchased a new extinguisher to replace it.

Tested the emergency fuel shut off and closure of ventilation to the engine room. The valves and ventilation closures worked as required. The marking for the emergency fuel shut off was not in contrasting colors. The crew renewed the lettering to meet the requirement.

Verified that a 24-hour watch will implemented in the event of overnight trips and that there will be a suitable number of watchmen to patrol throughout the vessel during the night-time whether or not the vessel is underway, to guard against and give alarm to a fire, man overboard, or other dangerous situation. It was highly recommended that the operator designate the individual(s) in writing along with their duties and log their patrols. We recommended no more than 2 hours between each round to be conducted and discussed items that should be checked as part of the round. The Captain understood his obligation to ensure a crewmember was to stand the watch at all times passengers are onboard including when at anchor.

Inspected for potential fire hazards and found flammable cans of paint and other cleaning materials stored in the accommodation space. Directed the crew to clean it out and this was completed. We discussed the risks associated with the improper storage of flammable or combustible items onboard as well as the unsupervised charging of lithium-ion batteries and extensive use of extension cords and power strips. It was discovered that a small refrigerator in the parlor was powered with an extension cord. The crew indicated one of the other appliances in the parlor was to be moved to the engine room and this change would eliminate the use of any portable electric cord.

Examined the vessel to ensure that no unapproved alterations were made to electrical systems or galley areas since the vessel's construction. It did not appear that there were any but inspectors did not have original plans to verify. Electrical panels and switchboards were examined for evidence of bypassing overcurrent protection or installation of overcurrent devices rated greater than permitted and none were found.

Additionally the following was found and discussed with the owners representative and MSD Panama City inspectors to address at a future date. During the internal structural exam, several areas were noted as items to address at the next scheduled dry dock as follows: Opening at the top of bow where both sides of the hull meet due to previous damage reported to Coast Guard according to vessel rep; delamination on multiple structures in sleeping accommodations where structures attached to hull; delamination port side collision bulkhead in forepeak; Multiple transverse under floor beams delignification; soft deck on bow above accommodations (port side) and above engine room at aft entrance to parlor; delamination near bow, port side where the deck meets the hull.

Inspection continues.

//s// MSTC Joshua Greer

21OCT2019: Reviewed activity, printed and routed for signature.

Inspection continues.

//CWO4 Jason Johnson//M//

08JAN20: COI Validated, mailed.

//s// MST1 Michael Bangh

**Inspection Details**

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<b>Inspection Type:</b>	<b>Date:</b>	<b>Unit:</b>
In-Service Inspection	26SEP2019	Marine Safety Detachment Panama City

**Streamlined Inspection Program (SIP) Summary:**

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<b>Vessel Name:</b>	TRADEWINDS
<b>Company Name:</b>	
<b>PHASE I</b>	

Inspector Comments:

**PHASE II**

Inspector Comments:

**PHASE III**

Inspector Comments:

**PHASE IV**

Inspector Comments:

**Location(s):**

Latitude:	Longitude:	Recorded Date/Time:	Description:
30°23.5 N	086°30.4 W	26SEP2019 10:30Z	Fishing Fleet Marina, Destin, FL

**Associated Parties:**

Name:	Type:	Role :
HOWARD, BRIAN E.	Individual	Owner/Operator
<b>Address:</b>		
618 MAIN AVE. FORT WALTON BEACH, FLORIDA 32548		

**TWIC Details:**

Worker Type:	Checked:	Compliant:	Noncompliant:	Remarks:
Other	0	0	0	

**Radiation Details:**

<b>Radiation:</b>	No Radiation Detected
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Operational Controls: (None)

**Log:**

Effective Date:	Description/New Value:	Logged By Unit:	Logged By:
08JAN2020	Closed Date: 1/8/2020 4:35:31 PM	Marine Safety Detachment Panama City	Bangh, Michael R
21OCT2019	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: No	Marine Safety Detachment Panama City	Johnson, Jason L
27SEP2019	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: No	Marine Safety Detachment Panama City	Greer, Joshua P
27SEP2019	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: Yes	Marine Safety Detachment Panama City	Greer, Joshua P
27SEP2019	Owning Unit: Marine Safety Detachment Panama City	Marine Safety Detachment Panama City	Greer, Joshua P
27SEP2019	Point Of Contact: Brian Howard 850-830-4752	Marine Safety Detachment Panama City	Greer, Joshua P
27SEP2019	Start Date: 9/26/2019 10:30:00 AM	Marine Safety Detachment Panama City	Greer, Joshua P
08JAN2020	Status/Subtype: Closed/Approved Inspection	Marine Safety Detachment Panama City	Bangh, Michael R
27SEP2019	Status/Subtype: Open/In Progress	Marine Safety Detachment Panama City	Greer, Joshua P
02OCT2019	Status/Subtype: Open/Submitted for Review	Marine Safety Detachment Panama City	Powell, Takila S
27SEP2019	Title: SPV Overnight Passenger Verification	Marine Safety Detachment Panama City	Greer, Joshua P
27SEP2019	Vessel: TRADEWINDS	Marine Safety Detachment Panama City	Greer, Joshua P

Documents: (None)

**Certificates:**

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<b>Name:</b>	<b>Type:</b>	<b>Description:</b>		
COI - Amended 08Jan2020	Certificate of Inspection - Amended			
<b>Owning Unit:</b>	<b>Status:</b>	<b>Issued Date:</b>	<b>Expired Date:</b>	
Marine Safety Detachment Panama City	EXPIRED	12JAN2016	12JAN2021	



## Activity Summary Report

MISLE Activity ID: 6828347  
 Activity Type: Vessel Inspection  
 Title/Description: SPV Overnight Passenger Verification  
 Status: Closed - Approved Inspection  
 Point Of Contact: Scotty Gray 561-797-2540  
 Owning Unit: Sector Key West  
 Originating Unit: Sector Key West  
 Start Date/Time: 02OCT2019 16:18Z  
 Prompt Date:  
 Team Lead: MORRIS, BENJAMIN L.

### Vessel Information:

<b>Vessel Name:</b> KATE	<b>Call Sign:</b> WDG7318	<b>Current Flag / Flag At Time Of Activity:</b> UNITED STATES / UNITED STATES
<b>Classification:</b> Passenger Ship - Charter Fishing Vessel - General (More Than 6, Gross Tonnage < 100)	<b>Primary VIN:</b> 525928	<b>Length:</b> 57.5
<b>ITC/Convention (Subpart B):</b>	<b>Regulatory (Subpart C or D):</b>	<b>Year Completed:</b> 1970
<b>Engine Compartment In An Open Space:</b> No	<b>Fuel Compartment In An Open Space:</b> No	<b>Vessel Constructed Of All Open Spaces:</b> No
<b>Propulsion System Type:</b> Diesel Reduction		

### Vessel Associated Parties:

<b>Name:</b> BLUE IGUANA CHARTERS LLC	<b>Type:</b> Organization	<b>Role:</b> Managing Owner
<b>Address:</b> 14045 83RD LANE N LOXAHATCHEE, FLORIDA 33470		
<b>Name:</b> LEE, SCOTTY	<b>Type:</b> Individual	<b>Role:</b> Operator (in control/in charge)
<b>Address:</b> 53 GARDEN COVE DR KEY LARGO, FLORIDA 33037		

### Inspection Results:

<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Inspection Results:</b> Inspected With Deficiencies Noted	<b>Date:</b> 02OCT2019
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**Deficiencies:**

<b>Item Number:</b> 1	<b>Due Date:</b>	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 22OCT2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07120 - Means of escape	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 701 - Prior to carriage of passengers/cargo	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Description:</b> Berthing area emergency escape hatch has been fitted with a large air conditioning unit on the top. While operable the hatch is extremely heavy. the air conditioner must be moved so that the hatch is clear at all times.			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Resolution:</b> Escape hatch has been replaced and the air conditioner has been relocated.			

<b>Item Number:</b> 2	<b>Due Date:</b>	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 22OCT2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07107 - Fire patrol	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 16 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 14 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Description:</b> The vessel owner claims that there is a roving watch during all hours while the vessel is underway, but there is no program in place that outlines the role of the night time watch. Owner must create a written procedure for night watch and crew training.			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Resolution:</b> Owner has created a night watch program to include, training, logs, and written proceedings.			

<b>Item Number:</b> 3	<b>Due Date:</b>	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 22OCT2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07120 - Means of escape	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 16 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 14 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Description:</b> Emergency escape hatches are not properly marked. Owner must mark.			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO
<b>Resolution:</b> All emergency escape routes have been properly marked and lit.			

<b>Item Number:</b> 4	<b>Due Date:</b>	<b>Extended Due Date:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Not Available For Inspection
<b>Issued Date:</b> 02OCT2019	<b>Resolved Date:</b> 22OCT2019		<input type="checkbox"/> Security Violation
<b>System:</b> 07 - Fire Safety	<b>Subsystem:</b> N/A - No Subsystem	<b>Component:</b> 07110 - Fire fighting equipment and appliances	<input type="checkbox"/> Worklist Item/Do Not Show In PSIX
<b>Action:</b> 16 - Rectify deficiencies w/in 14 days	<b>Action Code:</b> c - To the satisfaction of the Coast Guard	<b>ACS/RO/TPO Finding Number:</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> SMS Related/Objective Evidence For MSO
<b>Description:</b>			<input type="checkbox"/> Self Reported
			<input type="checkbox"/> Reported Via PR17
			<input type="checkbox"/> Refer To ACS/RO/TPO
			<input type="checkbox"/> ACS/RO/TPO Associated
			<input type="checkbox"/> Accepted As Condition Of ACS/TPO



The wheelhouse serves as a berthing area for the Captain during overnight trips. This reclassifies that space as accommodations as apposed to operating station. The current 10B:C fire extinguisher required for operating station, must be upgraded to a 40 B:C as required in an accommodation space.

**Resolution:**

New 40 B:C extinguisher has been installed in the wheelhouse.

**Narrative:**

02 Oct 19: This vessel was found to be NOT fit for the intended routes and services as specified on the COI and in accordance with the appropriate regulations.

Verification was completed in accordance with the SPV Inspection Direction message.

During the SPV verification inspector found the following deficiencies.

1. The escape hatch from the forward berthing area had been fitted with an air conditioner on top (photos uploaded). While the hatch was still operable it took significant strength to open the hatch from inside the compartment. The owner stated that the air conditioner had been an approved installation and had been on the vessel since it was purchased over 30 years ago. Owner will remove the air conditioner and install a new hatch that is clear and properly marked.
2. The vessel currently does not have a written crew instruction list or night watch program in place. Owner will create a written program to include 24hr watch logs and crew responsibilities during night watches.
3. Emergency escape hatches are not properly marked. New markings will be installed with the new hatch.
4. While underway overnight the wheelhouse doubles as the Captains berthing. This space has been reclassified as an accommodation, and must therefore have a 40 B:C extinguisher as apposed to the 10 B:C required at the operating station. The owner will provide and mount the correct sized extinguisher.

Inspection Continues  
 //s// Benjamin Morris, CWO, USCG

22 Oct 19: Attended vessel as before to conduct repair exam, and verify night watch implementation.

1. The escape hatch from the forward berthing area has been rebuilt and completely sealed. It is now easily opened from both inside the compartment and outside. The air conditioner has been removed and relocated.
2. Owner/Operator has written a night watch policy, logs, and specific training. This training will be conducted prior to every trip.
3. All emergency escape routes and hatches have been properly marked. Owner has installed emergency lighting in all berthing areas. These lights energize when power is lost and illuminate escape routes.
4. Wheelhouse has been reclassified as an accommodation space and now has a 40 B:C portable fire extinguisher.

SPV verification completed on this date and the vessel is found to be fit for its intended route.

Inspection Complete  
 //s// Benjamin Morris, CWO, USCG

**Inspection Details**

Inspection Type:	Date:	Unit:
In-Service Inspection	02OCT2019	Sector Key West

**Streamlined Inspection Program (SIP) Summary:**

<b>Vessel Name:</b>	KATE
<b>Company Name:</b>	
<b>PHASE I</b>	
Inspector Comments:	
<b>PHASE II</b>	
Inspector Comments:	
<b>PHASE III</b>	
Inspector Comments:	
<b>PHASE IV</b>	
Inspector Comments:	

**Location(s):**

Latitude:	Longitude:	Recorded Date/Time:	Description:
25°05.8 N	080°25.9 W	02OCT2019 16:18Z	Key Largo Harbor Marina

Associated Parties: (None)

**TWIC Details:**

<b>Worker Type:</b>	<b>Checked:</b>	<b>Compliant:</b>	<b>Noncompliant:</b>	<b>Remarks:</b>
Licensed Mariner	0	0	0	

**Radiation Details:**

<b>Radiation:</b>	No Radiation Detected
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Operational Controls: (None)

**Log:**

<b>Effective Date:</b>	<b>Description/New Value:</b>	<b>Logged By Unit:</b>	<b>Logged By:</b>
27JAN2020	Closed Date: 1/27/2020 8:03:08 PM	Sector Key West	Olmstead, Nicholas C
04OCT2019	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: No	Sector Key West	Morris, Benjamin L
04OCT2019	Involved Personnel Point Of Contact: No	Sector Key West	Morris, Benjamin L
04OCT2019	Owning Unit: Sector Key West	Sector Key West	Morris, Benjamin L
04OCT2019	Point Of Contact: Scotty Gray 561-797-2540	Sector Key West	Morris, Benjamin L
04OCT2019	Start Date: 10/2/2019 4:18:41 PM	Sector Key West	Morris, Benjamin L
27JAN2020	Status/Subtype: Closed/Approved Inspection	Sector Key West	Olmstead, Nicholas C
04OCT2019	Status/Subtype: Open/In Progress	Sector Key West	Morris, Benjamin L
22OCT2019	Status/Subtype: Open/In Progress	Sector Key West	Olmstead, Nicholas C
08OCT2019	Status/Subtype: Open/Scheduled, Action Pending	Sector Key West	Olmstead, Nicholas C
22JAN2020	Status/Subtype: Open/Submitted for Review	Sector Key West	Morris, Benjamin L
08OCT2019	Status/Subtype: Open/Submitted for Review	Sector Key West	Olmstead, Nicholas C
04OCT2019	Title: SPV Overnight Passenger Verification	Sector Key West	Morris, Benjamin L
04OCT2019	Vessel: KATE	Sector Key West	Morris, Benjamin L

**Documents:**

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Type:</b>	<b>Description:</b>
Escape hatch Photo	Photograph	Escape hatch with Air Condition attached.
Escape hatch photo	Photograph	Escape hatch with air conditioner attached.
Escape hatch repaired.	Photograph	Repaired hatch.
KATE overnight 835	Other	CG 835

**Certificates:**

<b>Name:</b>	<b>Type:</b>	<b>Description:</b>	
COI - Amended 08Oct2019	Certificate of Inspection - Amended		
<b>Owning Unit:</b>	<b>Status:</b>	<b>Issued Date:</b>	<b>Expired Date:</b>
Sector Key West	Revoked	28JAN2019	28JAN2024