2026 NY Slip Op 06327
October 28, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
The People of the State of New York, respondent,
v
Jeff P. (Anonymous), appellant.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
Decided on October 28, 2026
2025-05989, (Ind. No. 1112/18)
Betsy Barros, J.P.
Paul Wooten
Lourdes M. Ventura
Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.
Patricia Pazner, New York, NY (Madeline Porta and Courtney Crosby of counsel), for appellant.
Melinda Katz, District Attorney, Kew Gardens, NY (Patricia E. Stewart, Katharine A. Morris, Johnnette Traill, and Nancy Fitzpatrick Talcott of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (John F. Zoll, J.), dated April 17, 2025, which, without a hearing, denied his motion pursuant to CPL 440.47 to vacate his sentence and to be resentenced in accordance with Penal Law § 60.12.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed.
In July 2018, the defendant was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted murder in the second degree. In 2024, the defendant moved pursuant to CPL 440.47 to vacate the sentence imposed and to be resentenced in accordance with Penal Law § 60.12. The Supreme Court denied the defendant's motion without a hearing. The court determined, among other things, that the evidence the defendant submitted did not demonstrate that he was a victim of domestic violence "at the time of the instant offense" (id. § 60.12[1][a]). The defendant appeals.
The Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (hereinafter the DVSJA) "permits courts to impose reduced alternative, less severe, sentences in certain cases involving defendants who are victims of domestic violence" (People v Martinez, 234 AD3d 874, 875 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Burns, 207 AD3d 646, 648). A court "may impose a sentence pursuant to the alternate DVSJA framework 'upon a determination following a hearing' that (1) 'at the time of the instant offense, the defendant was a victim of domestic violence subjected to substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse inflicted by a member of [their] family or household . . . as such term is defined in [CPL 530.11(1)]'; (2) 'such abuse was a significant contributing factor to the defendant's criminal behavior'; and (3) a sentence within the standard range provided by law 'would be unduly harsh' considering 'the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant'" (People v N.H., ___ NY3d ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 02437, *1, quoting Penal Law § 60.12[1]).
Here, as the Supreme Court determined, the defendant's evidence failed to corroborate his allegations that, at the time of the offense, he was a victim of domestic violence (see People v Latouche, 248 AD3d 1138, 1140; People v Naqvi, 236 AD3d 927, 928). Accordingly, as [*2]the defendant failed to meet his burden under CPL 440.47(2)(c), the court properly denied the defendant's motion without a hearing (see People v White, 226 AD3d 1054, 1055-1056).
The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.
BARROS, J.P., WOOTEN, VENTURA and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court