Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on October 21, 2026

2025-02836, (Index No. 617725/20)

Francesca E. Connolly, J.P.

Linda Christopher

Barry E. Warhit

Donna-Marie E. Golia, JJ.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Christopher Modelewski, J.), dated January 9, 2025. The judgment, upon the granting of the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 4401, made at the close of the plaintiff's case, for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint, is in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint is denied, the complaint is reinstated, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, for a new trial consistent herewith.

On August 7, 2020, a vehicle owned by the defendant Richard Capobianco, Inc., and operated by the defendant Andrew Capobianco struck the plaintiff's vehicle in the intersection of First Street and Fourth Avenue in Huntington. It is undisputed that at that intersection, First Street is controlled by a stop sign and Fourth Avenue does not have a traffic control device.

At a jury trial on the issue of liability, the Supreme Court excluded from evidence three photographs depicting the condition of the parties' vehicles after the accident. The plaintiff presented Capobianco's deposition testimony, inter alia, that he turned onto Fourth Avenue from Larkfield Road, approximately 100 yards away from the intersection with First Street, and first saw the plaintiff's vehicle in the middle of the intersection "a split second" before striking her vehicle. The plaintiff testified that she stopped at the corner of the intersection, was able to see Larkfield Road to her right, and observed that there were no vehicles coming before she proceeded into the intersection. According to the plaintiff, the front of her vehicle had fully crossed the intersection when the defendants' vehicle struck the rear passenger's side of her vehicle without warning. Both witnesses testified that the impact caused the plaintiff's vehicle to spin around.

At the close of the plaintiff's case, the Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint. The court issued a judgment dated January 9, 2025, in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff appeals.

To be entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to CPLR 4401, a moving defendant has the burden of showing that there is no rational process by which the jury could find in favor of the plaintiff and against the moving defendant (see Delaney v Delaney, 83 AD3d 647, 648). In considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the trial court must afford the party opposing the motion every inference which may properly be drawn from the facts presented, and the facts must be considered in the light most favorable to the nonmovant (see id.). In making its determination, a court must not engage in a weighing of the evidence, nor may it direct a verdict where the facts are in dispute or where different inferences may be drawn or the credibility of witnesses is in question (see Bzezi v Eldib, 112 AD3d 772, 774).

Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1142(a), a driver entering an intersection controlled by a stop sign must yield the right-of-way to any other vehicle that is already in the intersection or that is approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard (see Walker v Joseph, 238 AD3d 805, 806), and a driver with the right-of-way is entitled to assume that other drivers will obey the traffic law requiring them to yield (see id.). A driver also has a common-law duty to see that which should have been seen through the proper use of the driver's senses (see Meehan v Town of Islip, 245 AD3d 929, 930). Thus, while a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle that has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision (see Yelder v Walters, 64 AD3d 762, 764), he or she still has a duty to exercise reasonable care to avoid a collision with another vehicle already in the intersection (see Ficalora v Almeida, 245 AD3d 891, 892).

Here, affording the plaintiff every inference which may properly be drawn from the facts presented, and considering the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there is a rational process by which the jury could have found that even if Capobianco had the right-of-way, the plaintiff's vehicle was already in the intersection, and that Capobianco failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision (see Pei Ru Guo v Efkarpidis, 185 AD3d 949). Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law dismissing the complaint.

In addition, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in precluding photographs depicting the nature and extent of damage to the parties' vehicles after the accident. Even where a trial is bifurcated, some evidence of damages may nevertheless be admitted, in the trial court's discretion, to establish liability at the liability phase of the trial, so long as such evidence is probative of liability and accompanied by an appropriate limiting instruction (see Patino v County of Nassau, 124 AD3d 738, 739-740). Here, where Capobianco testified that he did not see the plaintiff's vehicle until a "split second right before the impact," the photographs, which showed significant damage to the rear portion of the plaintiff's vehicle and the front portion of the defendants' vehicle, were relevant to whether either party's failure to see that which should have been seen through the proper use of their senses was a proximate cause of the collision and whether Capobianco failed to exercise reasonable care to avoid the collision (see Pei Ru Guo v Efkarpidis, 185 AD3d at 952; Patti v Fenimore, 181 AD2d 869, 871). Moreover, the probative value of the photographs was not substantially outweighed by the danger that it would unfairly prejudice the defendants or mislead the jury (see People v Scarola, 71 NY2d 769, 777; Pei Ru Guo v Efkarpidis, 185 AD3d at 952).

The plaintiff's remaining contentions are unpreserved for appellate review.

CONNOLLY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WARHIT and GOLIA, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court