Decided and Entered: October 15, 2026

Index No. 153955/22|Appeal No. 7269|Case No. 2026-00882|

Before: Manzanet-Daniels, J.P., Shulman, Rodriguez, Higgitt, Rosado, JJ.

[*1]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard G. Latin, J.), entered December 24, 2025, which, to the extent appealed from, denied defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (State HRL) and the New York City Human Rights Laws (City HRL) for failure to provide a reasonable accommodation for his disability and failure to engage in a cooperative dialogue, and denied plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on those claims, unanimously modified, on the law, to the extent of granting plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment on his City HRL claim for failure to engage in a cooperative dialogue, and otherwise affirmed, without costs.

From 2005 until 2020, plaintiff worked in defendant's Information Technology Department, managing over 80 people in locations throughout the New York City area. On January 22, 2020, plaintiff was admitted to the hospital for a gallbladder condition and developed extensive complications. He ultimately remained in the hospital, and later a rehabilitation center, for a total of nine weeks, and became disabled.

Supreme Court properly denied both parties' motions for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims that defendant failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for his medical condition. The parties do not dispute that defendant was aware of plaintiff's condition and his request to take long-term disability leave through the end of 2020. There is also no dispute that defendant did nothing to engage plaintiff in an interactive process about the possibility of an accommodation. Defendant's failure to initiate a dialogue with plaintiff upon learning of his need for accommodation forecloses summary judgment for defendant under both HRLs (see Jacobsen v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 22 NY3d 824, 838 [2014]; Hosking v Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Ctr., 186 AD3d 58, 63 [1st Dept 2020]).

[*2]

Moreover, evidence in the record suggesting that plaintiff may have been unable to work with or without an accommodation does not entitle defendant to summary judgment on that basis, as defendant failed to engage in an interactive dialogue with plaintiff (see Jacobsen, 22 NY3d at 834-835). Although a fact-finder may ultimately find that a plaintiff cannot perform the position even with an accommodation a defendant "cannot jump to that ultimate conclusion without first engaging in a good faith interactive process" (Hosking, 186 AD3d at 67 ["At trial on a State HRL claim, the plaintiff employee still bears the burden of proving the existence of a reasonable accommodation that would have enabled the employee to perform the essential functions of his or her position," but "to prevail on a summary judgment motion . . . , the employer must show that it engaged in a good faith interactive process"] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see also Guarniero v City of Yonkers, 241 AD3d 514, 516 [2d Dept 2025], lv dismissed 44 NY3d 1072 [2026]). Similarly, the evidence that plaintiff was entirely unable to work forecloses summary judgment for plaintiff on his reasonable accommodation claims.

However, plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on his City HRL claim based on defendant's failure to engage, within a reasonable time, in a cooperative dialogue regarding his accommodation, as the record presents no issues of fact as to defendant's failure to engage plaintiff in a cooperative dialogue once defendant became aware of his condition (see Administrative Code of City of NY §§ 8-102; 8-107[28][a]; cf. Moye v Mount Sinai Hosp., 248 AD3d 623, 627 [1st Dept 2026]). Contrary to defendant's contention, an employer's failure "to engage in a good faith interactive process is . . . independently actionable under the [City] HRL" (Hosking, 186 AD3d at 64 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see also Lettau v 1199 SEIU Natl. Benefit Fund, 200 AD3d 462, 462 [1st Dept 2021]).

We have considered the parties' remaining contentions and find them unavailing.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: October 15, 2026