2026 NY Slip Op 05875
October 9, 2026
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
IN THE MATTER OF ANAYA P. AND DOMINICK P. -------------------------------------------- ONEIDA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICES, PETITIONER-RESPONDENT;
v
MICHAEL P., RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. (APPEAL NO. 1.)
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
Decided on October 9, 2026
617 CAF 24-01962
Present: Curran, J.P., Montour, Ogden, Delconte, And Skinner, JJ.
PETER J. DIGIORGIO, JR., UTICA, FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
DENISE J. MORGAN, UTICA, FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.
SUSAN B. MARRIS, MANLIUS, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD.
SCOTT OTIS, WATERTOWN, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILD.
Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Oneida County (Jason D. Flemma, J.), entered July 16, 2024, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 10. The order, insofar as appealed from, determined that respondent had abused Anaya P. and had derivatively neglected Dominick P.
[*1]It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: In these proceedings pursuant to Family Court Act article 10, respondent appeals in appeal No. 1 from an order of disposition entered following a determination that, inter alia, respondent abused one of the subject children. Respondent appeals in appeal No. 2 from a separate order of disposition entered following a determination that, inter alia, he abused three other children. In each appeal, respondent contends that, in making its findings, Family Court erred in giving collateral estoppel effect to his conviction in a related criminal action of seven counts of predatory sexual assault against a child (Penal Law former § 130.96) and seven counts of sexual abuse in the first degree (§ 130.65 [4]). We reject that contention.
"The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating an issue which has previously been decided against [it] in a proceeding in which [the party] had a fair opportunity to fully litigate the point" (Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d 449, 455 [1985] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Joyce S. v Robert W.S., 142 AD3d 1343, 1344 [4th Dept 2016], lv denied 29 NY3d 906 [2017]). Respondent does not dispute that he was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues resolved against him in the criminal action, nor does he dispute that those issues are identical to the issues of his abuse of the children in these proceedings (see Matter of Suffolk County Dept. of Social Servs. v James M., 83 NY2d 178, 182-183 [1994]; Matter of Yeshua G. [Anthony G.], 162 AD3d 1470, 1470 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 NY3d 903 [2018]). Contrary to respondent's contention, the fact that these proceedings were commenced first does not prevent his criminal conviction, which was rendered before any determinations were made in these proceedings, from having a collateral estoppel effect (see e.g. Matter of Lea C. [Akil F.], 160 AD3d 724, 725-726 [2d Dept 2018]; Matter of Blima M. [Samuel M.], 150 AD3d 1006, 1007-1008 [2d Dept 2017]).
Entered: October 9, 2026
Ann Dillon Flynn
Clerk of the Court