Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on September 29, 2026

2026-09859, (Index No. 532882/26)

Francesca E. Connolly, J.P.

Linda Christopher

Helen Voutsinas

Janice A. Taylor

Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.

APPEAL by the respondents/defendants Rodneyse Bichotte Hermelyn, Kings County Democratic County Committee, and Kings County Democratic County Committee Executive Committee, in a hybrid proceeding, in effect, pursuant to Election Law article 16 to set aside amendments to the Rules for the Government of the Kings County Democratic County Committee adopted at a meeting held on August 25, 2026, of the respondent/defendant Kings County Democratic County Committee Executive Committee, and action for declaratory and injunctive relief, from an order and judgment (one paper) of the Supreme Court (Jill R. Epstein, J.), dated September 14, 2026, and entered in Kings County. The order and judgment, insofar as appealed from, denied those respondents/defendants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(10) to dismiss the petition/complaint insofar as asserted against them, enjoined those respondents/defendants from attempting to certify, implement, or give effect to the amendments to the Rules for the Government of the Kings County Democratic County Committee adopted at the meeting held on August 25, 2026, enjoined those respondents/defendants from permitting outgoing members of the respondent/defendant Kings County Democratic County Committee Executive Committee to exercise functions on substantial matters as part of the respondent/defendant Kings County Democratic County Committee Executive Committee, and declared that the amendments to the Rules for the Government of the Kings County Democratic County Committee adopted at the meeting held on August 25, 2026, are null and void.

Connolly, J.P. [*1]

OPINION & ORDER

This appeal requires us to determine which members of the respondent/defendant Kings County Democratic County Committee Executive Committee (hereinafter the Executive Committee) were authorized to vote on amendments to the Rules for the Government of the Kings County Democratic County Committee (hereinafter the Party Rules) during a special meeting held on August 25, 2026. The petitioners/plaintiffs (hereinafter the petitioners) assert that 11 members of the Executive Committee who either lost their races for reelection or chose not to seek reelection (hereinafter the outgoing members) were not authorized to vote on the amendments. By contrast, the appellants assert that the outgoing members were authorized to vote on the amendments.

To resolve this dispute, we analyze the Party Rules and Election Law § 2-106. We also analyze, as an issue of first impression for this Court, the effect of the 2019 amendment to Election Law § 2-112(1)(b), which provides that the "existing county committee shall exercise all legal authority" until the county committee's organization meeting. In view of this amendment, we determine that the pre-2019 case law that held that outgoing members were functus officio and, therefore, unable to act on "substantial matters" between the primary and the committee's [*2]organization meeting should no longer be followed. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth below, the Supreme Court properly determined that under the Party Rules, outgoing members of the Executive Committee were not authorized to vote in the special meeting, and accordingly, the amendments that passed on August 25, 2026, are invalid.

I. Factual and Procedural History

On June 23, 2026, New York State held a primary election. As part of that primary election, voters registered in political parties selected members of their political parties' state committee and county committee (see Election Law §§ 2-106[1]; 8-100). The respondent/defendant New York State Democratic Committee (hereinafter the State Committee) is the Democratic Party's state committee in New York, and the respondent/defendant Kings County Democratic County Committee (hereinafter the County Committee) is a county committee that governs the affairs of the Democratic Party in Kings County. In the Democratic Party primary, eight incumbent members of the State Committee from Kings County lost their races for reelection when voters in their districts selected different candidates. In addition, three members of the State Committee from Kings County chose not to seek reelection for those positions.^FN1

Election Law § 2-114(1) provides that each committee, such as the County Committee, "may prepare rules for governing the party within its political unit." Election Law § 2-114(2) further provides that such rules "may be amended or new rules adopted from time to time by a majority vote of the members of the committee present at a meeting at which there is a quorum," provided that certain specified conditions are met. It is undisputed that the Party Rules, as amended on September 26, 2024, were in effect during the relevant time period and govern the County Committee until properly amended.

Pursuant to Election Law § 2-112(1)(b) and article III, § 1 of the Party Rules, the County Committee is required to hold an organization meeting no earlier than September seventeenth and no later than October sixth following the primary election. At that organization meeting, the County Committee fills vacancies, selects officers, including the Chairperson, and considers amendments to the Party Rules.

Pursuant to article V, § 1 of the Party Rules, the Executive Committee is a "standing committee of the County Committee." Article V, § 7 of the Party Rules provides that, in general, the Executive Committee exercises the powers of the County Committee at all times in which the County Committee is not in session. Article V, § 3(A) and (B) of the Party Rules provide that the Executive Committee shall meet in regular bi-monthly meetings, except in the months of July and August, and further provide the circumstances under which the Chairperson may call special meetings of the Executive Committee. Meetings of the Executive Committee must be conducted in public session, unless a majority of the voting members vote to proceed in executive session.

Under the Party Rules, the Executive Committee "shall be composed of State Committee members elected from Kings County, persons elected by the Executive Committee to fill vacancies in its membership resulting from vacancies in the State Committee, and the Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer, and Assistant Treasurer of the County Committee." The voting members of the Executive Committee consist of "only those persons who were elected as State Committee members and those persons elected by the Executive Committee to fill vacancies in its membership resulting from vacancies on the State Committee."

At the time of the primary election, the respondent/defendant Rodneyse Bichotte Hermelyn was the Chairperson of the County Committee. However, a majority of the State Committee members elected at the primary election allegedly indicated that they intended to replace Bichotte Hermelyn with the petitioner/plaintiff Julio Peña III as Chairperson.

On August 19, 2026, Bichotte Hermelyn sent a notice of a special meeting of the Executive Committee to be held on August 25, 2026. The notice stated that the special meeting would consider and adopt proposed amendments to the Party Rules, and copies of the 10 proposed amendments were attached to the notice. Among other things, the proposed amendments would create new officers, expand the membership of the Executive Committee, and extend voting rights [*3]to every member of the Executive Committee.

On August 25, 2026, the Executive Committee, including all but one of the outgoing members, met in executive session and approved the proposed amendments. The votes of 10 of the outgoing members allegedly were necessary for the amendments to pass.

Thereafter, the petitioners commenced this hybrid proceeding and action against Bichotte Hermelyn, the County Committee, the Executive Committee, the State Committee, and the outgoing members, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. According to the petitioners, the proposed amendments were Bichotte Hermelyn's "11th hour undemocratic gambit to cling to power . . . that would have the effect of nullifying the will of Brooklyn's voters by permitting her to expand the Executive Committee with 48+ unelected members appointed by her." The petition/complaint (hereinafter petition) alleged that, under Election Law § 2-106 and the Party Rules, the outgoing members no longer possessed voting rights on the Executive Committee after the 2026 primary election, at which they were not reelected. The petition alleged that as a result, the amendments, which passed only with the votes of the outgoing members, were not validly adopted. The petition further alleged that the outgoing Executive Committee may not exercise authority over substantial matters prior to the County Committee organization meeting.

Bichotte Hermelyn, the County Committee, and the Executive Committee (hereinafter collectively the appellants) moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(10) to dismiss the petition insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the petition failed to join necessary parties. The appellants contended, inter alia, that all Executive Committee members who voted for the proposed amendments, not only the outgoing members, and the officers whose voting rights were created by the proposed amendments (hereinafter the proposed newly voting officers) were necessary parties under CPLR 1001(a), as the relief sought would vacate their votes and strip their rights. By contrast, the petitioners contended, among other things, that none of the individuals identified by the appellants were necessary parties because the only persons whose conduct was challenged, the Executive Committee, the County Committee, Bichotte Hermelyn, and the outgoing members, were fully capable of defending the process and complying with any order, making joinder of any other individual voting members, officers, or hypothetical future officeholders unnecessary under CPLR 1001(a).

In an order and judgment dated September 14, 2026, the Supreme Court, inter alia, denied the appellants' motion, enjoined the appellants from attempting to certify, implement, or give effect to the amendments adopted at the special meeting on August 25, 2026, enjoined the appellants from permitting the outgoing members to exercise functions on substantial matters as part of the Executive Committee, and declared that the amendments adopted at the August 25, 2026 special meeting are null and void. This appeal ensued.

II. Necessary Parties

Necessary parties are those who "ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded between the persons who are parties to the action or who might be inequitably affected by a judgment in the action" (CPLR 1001[a]; see Matter of Wohl v Bruen, 238 AD3d 818, 819). Here, the appellants failed to demonstrate that the alleged necessary parties needed to be parties in order for complete relief to be accorded between the petitioners and the appellants (see CPLR 1001[a]), and also failed to demonstrate that the alleged necessary parties would be inequitably affected by a judgment in this hybrid proceeding and action absent their joinder (see Manieri v Ebers, 242 AD3d 867, 869; Blatt v Johar, 177 AD3d 634, 635). The Executive Committee adequately represented the interests of the non-outgoing members who cast affirmative votes, as their role in adopting the amendments was a collective committee action rather than an individualized entitlement, and the hybrid proceeding and action will conclusively resolve the validity of the proposed amendments (see generally Matter of Max v Ward, 107 AD3d 1597, 1599). Further, because the subject proposed amendment's plain terms provided that any new voting rights for the proposed newly voting officers would not take effect until October 7, 2026, the day after the last date on which the County Committee could meet and organize (see Election Law § 2-112[1][b]), a judgment on this issue would not affect any presently existing entitlement (cf. Matter of Morgan v de Blasio, 29 NY3d 559, 560; Matter of Greenspan v O'Rourke, 27 NY2d 846, 846). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the appellants' motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(10) to dismiss the petition insofar as asserted against them.

III. The Outgoing Members Were Not Authorized to Vote at the Special Meeting and the Proposed Amendments Are Invalid

We now turn to the primary issue on appeal, whether the outgoing members of the Executive Committee had the authority to vote on the proposed amendments at the August 25, 2026 special meeting. The appellants argue that the outgoing members were authorized to vote because Election Law § 2-112(1)(b) provides that the existing County Committee exercises all legal authority until the organization meeting. The petitioners argue that article V, § 1 of the Party Rules, in conjunction with Election Law § 2-106(4), provides that State Committee members are elected as of the primary election, and therefore, the outgoing members were not authorized to vote at the August 25, 2026 special meeting, which occurred after the primary election at which they were not elected.

"Generally, courts will not interfere with the internal affairs of a political party" (Matter of Master v Pohanka, 10 NY3d 620, 624; see Bloom v Notaro, 67 NY2d 1048, 1049). The Legislature "manifested an intent of general noninterference with the internal affairs of political parties when it authorized party committees to formulate their own rules and organize themselves" (Bloom v Notaro, 67 NY2d at 1049; see Election Law § 2-114). As a result, "absent inconsistent statutory directives, the duly adopted rules of a political party should be given effect" (Matter of Master v Pohanka, 10 NY3d at 624 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of Kahler v McNab, 48 NY2d 625, 628). "Judicial intervention is only warranted upon a clear showing that a party or its leaders have violated [the Election Law] or the party's own rules adopted in accordance with law, or otherwise [have] violat[ed] the rights of party members or the electorate" (Matter of Wong v Cooke, 87 AD3d 659, 660 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

The arguments presented, both before the Supreme Court and on appeal, demonstrate considerable confusion as to the proper application of Election Law § 2-106, Election Law § 2-112, and the Party Rules. The parties conflate distinct concepts establishing the term in office, authority of the County Committee to act during the interregnum between the June primary and the organization meeting, and who is authorized to vote on the Executive Committee. As set forth below, a proper understanding of these principles demonstrates that under the Party Rules, the outgoing members were not authorized to vote at the Executive Committee special meeting on August 25, 2026.

A. Historical Context

Initially, some historical context regarding the timing of the primary elections and the organization meetings is necessary. Historically, New York held primary elections in the September preceding each general election (see Election Law former § 8-100[1][a]). Candidates for membership in either a state or county committee were elected in those September primary elections (see id. § 2-106[1]-[3]). State committees were required to meet and organize within 15 days of their election, and county committees were required to meet within 20 days of their election (see id. former § 2-112[1]).

In 2019, the Legislature enacted a series of changes to the electoral calendar (see L 2019, ch 5; L 2019, ch 6; L 2019, ch 55, part BBB, § 1). Among other changes, primary elections are now held in the June preceding each general election (see Election Law § 8-100[1][a], as amended by L 2019, ch 5, § 14). The Legislature also amended the timeline for state and county committee organization meetings (see L 2019, ch 42). After the 2019 changes, state committees must meet and organize "no earlier than September seventeenth and no later than October first following the June primary" (Election Law § 2-112[1][a], as amended by L 2019, ch 42, § 1). Similarly, county committees "shall meet no earlier than September seventeenth and no later than October sixth following the June primary" (id. § 2-112[1][b], as amended by L 2019, ch 42, § 1). As a result of the 2019 amendments, the interregnum between the election of state and county committee members and the organization meetings of the state and county committees went from 15 or 20 days, respectively, to approximately three to four months.

In 2019, the Legislature also amended Election Law § 2-112(1)(a) and (b) to add new language providing, respectively, that the "existing state committee" and "existing county committee" "shall exercise all legal authority" until the organization meeting, at which time the "new state committee" and the "new county committee" "shall assume all legal authority vested in" "the "previously organized state committee" and "the previously organized county committee" (id., as amended by L 2019, ch 42, § 1).

Election Law § 2-106 has existed in largely the same form since the Legislature's recodification of the Election Law in 1949 (see id. former § 13 ["Members of the state and county [*4]committees shall be elected at primary elections . . . . The members of both committees shall hold office until the election of their successors"]; see also L 1949, ch 100). In 1976, the Legislature enacted a further recodification of the Election Law, transforming it into the form that exists today (see L 1976, ch 233, § 1). The provisions of former section 13 were recodified in the current section 2-106, essentially unchanged (see id.). The Legislature did not amend Election Law § 2-106 in 2019.

B. Election Law § 2-106 Establishes the Term of Office for County Committee Members

Election Law § 2-106(1) provides that "[m]embers of the state and county committees shall be elected at the primary election." Election Law § 2-106(4) provides that "[m]embers shall hold office until the next election at which members of the committee are elected." Thus, Election Law § 2-106 sets the term of office for members of the State Committee and the County Committee as commencing upon their election at the primary election and ending at the next primary election for that position. Accordingly, the outgoing members' terms had ended by the August 25, 2026 special meeting.

C. Election Law § 2-112(1)(b) Establishes the Authority of the Existing County Committee During the Interregnum

The fact that the outgoing members' terms had ended by the August 25, 2026 Executive Committee special meeting, however, does not, by itself, answer the question of whether the outgoing members were authorized to vote at that meeting after their terms of office had expired. In a line of cases beginning in the 1940s, courts interpreting Election Law § 2-106 and its predecessor statutes concluded that a previously constituted committee became functus officio upon the election of a new committee in a primary election, rendering members of the old committee unable to act in substantial matters in the time between the primary election and the next organization meeting (see Matter of Torchin v Cohen, 286 NY 544, 547-548; Matter of Brocato v Tinari, 157 AD3d 782, 784; Matter of Mazur v Kelly, 170 AD2d 1037, 1038; Matter of Bauman v Fusco, 21 AD2d 470, 472). But those cases were decided before the 2019 amendments to Election Law § 2-112.

As a result of the 2019 amendment, Election Law § 2-112(1)(b) now provides that

"[e]very county committee shall meet no earlier than September seventeenth and no later than October sixth following the June primary. Until such organization meeting, the existing county committee shall exercise all legal authority. Upon the conclusion of such organization meeting, the new county committee shall assume all legal authority vested in the previously organized county committee."

According to the memorandum of Senator Zellnor Myrie, the sponsor of the bill that added this language to Election Law § 2-112, the Legislature was confronted with "questions . . . as to . . . whether the legal authority to act is vested in the previously constituted committee or the newly elected committee prior to the organization meeting following the primary election" (Senate Introducer's Mem in Support, Bill Jacket, L 2019, ch 42 at 5). The Legislature sought to "provide[ ] clarification that such authority is vested in the old committee until the conclusion of the organization meeting when such legal authority to act transfers to the newly formed committee" (id.).

Against this historical backdrop, the functus officio line of cases should be considered a product of the pre-2019 era, before the amendment to Election Law § 2-112, and should no longer be followed (see Matter of Torchin v Cohen, 286 NY at 547-548; Matter of Brocato v Tinari, 157 AD3d at 784; Matter of Mazur v Kelly, 170 AD2d at 1038; Matter of Bauman v Fusco, 21 AD2d at 472). As amended, Election Law § 2-112 does not carve out "substantial matters" from an outgoing committee's authority. Instead, the outgoing committee possesses "all legal authority" until replaced at the organization meeting. To the extent that the Appellate Division, First Department, continues to rely on the viability of the judicially created "substantial matters" rule, we respectfully disagree (see Matter of Gibbs v Manhattan Democratic Party—N.Y. County Democratic Comm., 226 AD3d 590, 591-592 [stating that "[u]pon the election of their successors at the primaries, the outgoing members were no longer empowered to exercise functions in substantial matters" (internal quotation marks omitted)]).

Further, as a general matter, county committees may properly delegate their powers to executive committees through their governing rules (see Matter of Bankoski v Green, 109 AD3d 690, 691; Matter of New York State Comm. of the Independence Party v New York State Bd. of Elections, 87 AD3d 806, 811). Article V, § 7 of the Party Rules provides that when, as here, the County Committee is not in session, the Executive Committee "shall have, possess, exercise and enjoy, without any limitation whatsoever, all the rights, privileges, powers and duties which are not by statute vested in . . . said County Committee exclusively and may not be delegated to the Executive Committee." Inasmuch as the County Committee, as it existed prior to the primary, retained "all legal authority" in the interregnum (Election Law § 2-112[1][b]), the existing Executive Committee likewise retained the authority delegated to it under the Party Rules.

Nevertheless, the Executive Committee's institutional authority to act during the interregnum is different from individual voting eligibility on the Executive Committee. The purpose of the 2019 amendment to Election Law § 2-112 was to preserve continuity and ensure that state and county committees retained all legal authority to act during the interregnum, without carving out substantial matters from that authority. Election Law § 2-112(1)(b) does not address, alter, or enlarge the category of persons entitled to vote on the Executive Committee.

Accordingly, the appellants' reliance upon Election Law § 2-112(1)(b) to establish the authority of the outgoing members to vote at the August 25, 2026 special meeting is misplaced.

D. The Party Rules Establish Who Is Authorized to Vote on the Executive Committee

The Executive Committee exists solely by virtue of the Party Rules and is not created by the Election Law (see Matter of D'Angelo v Executive Comm. of County Comm. of Republican Party of Kings County, 188 AD2d 649, 650; Greene v Kay, 78 AD2d 630, 631; Matter of Bauman v Fusco, 23 AD2d 404, 405, affd 16 NY2d 952). Accordingly, the voting rights on the Executive Committee are determined by reference to the Party Rules (see Election Law § 2-114[1]; Matter of D'Angelo v Executive Comm. of County Comm. of Republican Party of Kings County, 188 AD2d at 650; Matter of Bachmann v Coyne, 99 AD2d 742, 742).

Article V, § 1 of the Party Rules provides that the Executive Committee is "composed of State Committee members elected from Kings County, persons elected by the Executive Committee to fill vacancies in its membership resulting from vacancies in the State Committee, and the Chairperson, Secretary, Treasurer, and Assistant Treasurer of the County Committee." However, "only those persons who were elected as State Committee members and those persons elected by the Executive Committee to fill vacancies in its membership resulting from vacancies on the State Committee shall be authorized to vote" (emphasis added).^FN2

The operative question, therefore, is whether the outgoing members "were elected as State Committee members" as of August 25, 2026 ^FN3. We agree with the petitioners that they were not.

The plain and ordinary reading of article V, § 1 is that the outgoing members—individuals who had either lost their races for reelection in the June primary election or chose not to seek reelection in that primary election—were not "elected as State Committee members" on August 25, 2026 (see generally Ellington v EMI Music, Inc., 24 NY3d 239, 244 ["The words and phrases used by the parties must, as in all cases involving contract interpretation, be given their plain meaning" (internal quotation marks omitted)]; Albanese v Consolidated Rail Corp., 245 AD2d 475, 476 ["The words of a contract must be accorded their fair and reasonable meaning, and its meaning should be based on reasonable interpretations of the literal language" (internal quotation marks omitted)]). Although the Party Rules do not contain an express definition of persons who "were elected," article VIII, § 2 provides that "[i]n each even numbered year, members of party committees to be elected by the direct vote of the duly enrolled Democratic voters shall be elected [*5]at the primary elections." In interpreting the Party Rules, as in interpreting contracts,

"[t]he entire [rules] must be reviewed and particular words should be considered, not as if isolated from the context, but in the light of the obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as manifested thereby. Form should not prevail over substance and a sensible meaning of words should be sought" (Riverside S. Planning Corp. v CRP/Extell Riverside, L.P., 13 NY3d 398, 404 [alteration and internal quotation marks omitted]; see Atwater & Co. v Panama R.R. Co., 246 NY 519, 524).

Viewed in that holistic manner, the Party Rules plainly tie the status of those who "were elected as State Committee members" to the most recent primary election. Here, that primary election occurred in June 2026. Consequently, by August 25, 2026, the outgoing members no longer held the status of individuals who "were elected as State Committee members."

A comparison to article VIII, § 1, which governs candidates for public office, underscores that the drafters of the Party Rules knew how to employ different terminology when they intended to convey different concepts (see generally Jin Ming Chen v Insurance Co. of the State of Pa., 36 NY3d 133, 140 ["the use of different terms in the same agreement . . . implies that they are to be afforded different meanings" (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)]). Article VIII, § 1 provides that "candidates for public office shall be nominated" at the primary election. That usage accords with the Election Law, as candidates for public office who win a primary election are not yet elected to that public office, but instead proceed to a general election where they may face other candidates (see Election Law § 8-100[1][a]). By contrast, the winners of primary elections for membership in county committees are "elected" (id. § 2-106[1]) and "shall hold office until the next election at which members of the committee are elected" (id. § 2-106[4]; see id. § 8-100[1][a]). Article VIII, § 2 mirrors that language with respect to members of party committees. Thus, the drafters' deliberate decision to use the phrase "were elected" in article V, § 1 indicates a clear intention to tie voting eligibility in that provision to the most recent primary election (see generally Robertson v Ongley Elec. Co., 146 NY 20, 24 ["when we find the parties using a certain word or expression in different parts of [an instrument], it is reasonable to suppose that it was always used in the same sense unless a different meaning was plainly intended"]). If the drafters of the Party Rules had not intended to connect voting rights in article V, § 1 with the election in the most recent primary election, they would have either used a different phrase than "were elected" or provided express clarification.

To the extent that the appellants contend that the outgoing members retained the authority to vote under the Party Rules because they had at one time been elected as State Committee members, that construction does not comport with the plain meaning of what it means to be "elected." Nor would it produce a coherent or workable rule. Under the appellants' construction, any individual who had ever been elected as a State Committee member from Kings County, including those who lost their elections or declined to seek reelection years earlier, would have been eligible to vote in the August 25, 2026 special meeting. Such a construction would lead to absurd results (see generally Macy's Inc. v Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., 127 AD3d 48, 54 ["a contract should not be interpreted to produce an absurd result" (internal quotation marks omitted)]).

Nor does Election Law § 2-112(1)(b) lend persuasive support to the appellants' interpretation. Section 2-112(1)(b) addresses only the continuity of the County Committee as an organizational body during the interregnum. It does not extend the term of the outgoing members or deem them "elected" for purposes of determining voting eligibility under the Party Rules. Article V, § 1 independently governs who may vote on the Executive Committee, and under its terms, that authority is conferred only upon those who "were elected as State Committee members."

We are likewise unpersuaded by the appellants' contention that interpreting voting eligibility in article V, § 1 according to its plain meaning will impair the County Committee's operations during the interregnum. That contention rests on a misunderstanding of the distinction between the County Committee's institutional authority, which Election Law § 2-112(1)(b) preserves, and who is authorized to vote on the Executive Committee, which is governed by the Party Rules. Election Law § 2-112(1)(b) and the Party Rules ensure that the County Committee can continue fulfilling its responsibilities during the interregnum. The Chairperson retains authority to [*6]notice and conduct meetings, the Executive Committee may exercise all legal authority delegated to it under the Party Rules, and those members of the Executive Committee who are authorized to vote under article V, § 1 may do so ^FN4. Nothing in our holding prevents the County Committee from meeting, organizing, filling vacancies in elective office under Election Law §§ 6-116 and 6-148(3), or performing any other statutory or internal functions. The appellants' broad claim of a governance vacuum therefore overstates the consequences of rejecting their strained interpretation of those individuals who "were elected" in article V, § 1. Holding that the outgoing members are not authorized to vote on the Executive Committee after the June primary election does not prevent the County Committee from acting. The appellants simply must act through the individuals who satisfy the eligibility criteria prescribed by the Party Rules.

Further, the proposed amendments do not appear to relate to any urgent matter. The appellants have identified no practical or administrative necessity for voting on these amendments during a special meeting on August 25, 2026, as opposed to waiting until the organization meeting, which could have occurred less than one month later. Although the Party Rules permit amendment by the Executive Committee when the County Committee is not in session, the Party Rules appear to contemplate that amendments of this nature will be presented at the organization meeting. The appellants' decision to advance these proposals during the interregnum, without any apparent urgency, suggests that the timing was driven by considerations beyond ordinary governance needs.

Ultimately, however, the reasons for calling the special meeting do not determine the validity of the proposed amendments; what controls is whether the Party Rules were followed. Here, for the reasons set forth above, by permitting the outgoing members to vote on the proposed amendments at the special meeting, the appellants violated the Party Rules. As it is undisputed that each of the proposed amendments passed only if the votes of the outgoing members are included, the Supreme Court properly determined that the proposed amendments passed at the special meeting on August 25, 2026, are invalid (see Matter of Futia v Westchester County Bd. of Elections, 307 AD2d 1055; Matter of Bachmann v DeFronzo, 164 AD2d 926, 929).

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court erred by enjoining the appellants from permitting the outgoing members to exercise functions on substantial matters as part of the Executive Committee. For the reasons discussed above, this holding rested on case law prior to the 2019 amendment to Election Law § 2-112(1)(b) and should no longer be followed.

IV. Miscellaneous

The parties' remaining contentions either are without merit or need not be reached in light of our determination.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly enjoined the appellants from attempting to certify, implement, or give effect to the amendments adopted at the special meeting on August 25, 2026, and declared that the amendments adopted at the special meeting on August 25, 2026, are null and void. However, the court should not have enjoined the appellants from permitting the outgoing members to exercise functions on substantial matters as part of the Executive Committee.

The order and judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof enjoining the appellants from permitting outgoing members of the Executive Committee to exercise [*7]functions on substantial matters as part of the Executive Committee; as so modified, the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from.

CHRISTOPHER, VOUTSINAS, TAYLOR and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the order and judgment is modified, on the law, by deleting the provision thereof enjoining the respondents/defendants Rodneyse Bichotte Hermelyn, Kings County Democratic County Committee, and Kings County Democratic County Committee Executive Committee from permitting outgoing members of the respondent/defendant Kings County Democratic County Committee Executive Committee to exercise functions on substantial matters as part of the respondent/defendant Kings County Democratic County Committee Executive Committee; as so modified, the order and judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, without costs or disbursements.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court