David Bill Jr. pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to one count of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor for sexually abusing his pre-teen niece in the woods.¹ Pursuant to the plea agreement, the court imposed a sentence of 30 years with 20 years suspended (10 years to serve) and 15 years of probation. The parties agreed to a number of probation conditions but left the determination of additional probation conditions to the discretion of the court. The court subsequently imposed a number of probation conditions over Bill's objection. On appeal, Bill challenges three of the probation conditions to which he previously objected.

The first probation condition that Bill challenges is a general probation condition that prohibits Bill from “knowingly associat[ing] with a person who is on probation or parole or a person who has a record of a felony conviction unless prior written permission to do so has been granted by a probation officer of the Department of Corrections.” Bill partially objected to this condition on the ground that it violated his constitutional right to familial association because his brother has a felony conviction. He requested that the superior court amend the condition to exempt his brother.

The superior court denied this request. The court recognized that the condition implicated Bill's constitutional right to familial association with his brother and that special scrutiny was required as to this specific prohibition.² The court noted, however, that Bill's brother had multiple prior convictions, including a prior conviction for a felony sex offense, and found that association with him could therefore be detrimental to Bill's rehabilitation. The court ultimately ruled that giving the probation officer the authority to decide whether to allow Bill to associate with his brother was appropriate and the least restrictive alternative under the circumstances.

Bill now appeals, arguing that the superior court erred when it refused to categorically exempt Bill's brother from the challenged condition. Bill argues, in particular, that the superior court failed to properly apply special scrutiny because the court noted that the person Bill was seeking to associate with was his younger brother by ten years and not Bill's wife or child or anyone else dependent on Bill for food, clothing, or shelter. According to Bill, these comments indicate that the court believed that sibling relationships “did not merit constitutional protection,” and that the court therefore failed to apply special scrutiny.

We disagree with Bill that the court's comments suggest that the court used a lower level of scrutiny. Instead, we agree with the State that the court properly applied special scrutiny and that its comments were directed at analyzing the nature of the burden on the familial relationship.

Bill also argues that the court did not adopt the least restrictive alternative. But other than categorically excluding Bill's brother from the condition, Bill does not identify any other less restrictive alternatives. Ultimately, given that Bill's brother has multiple prior convictions, including a conviction for a felony sex offense, we conclude that the superior court acted within its discretion when it denied Bill's request to categorically exclude his brother from the requirement that the probation officer approve of future associations with known felons.³

The second probation condition that Bill challenges is a special probation condition that requires Bill's residence to be approved by the probation officer and “if decided appropriate, limited to communities with an adult probation office and/or an approved sex offender treatment provider.” Bill argues that the superior court failed to find a nexus between his conduct and this condition and that the superior court failed to apply special scrutiny.

We have previously affirmed a similar condition under very similar circumstances. In Guthrie v. State, the defendant, a convicted sex offender, was required “to either obtain appropriate sexual offender treatment or to reside in an area where he can be closely supervised.”⁴ We held that the condition was reasonably related to Guthrie's underlying offense because the record “support[ed] the conclusion that Guthrie is an untreated sexual offender who is at high risk to reoffend” and the condition was not unduly restrictive because it gave him “a wide variety of places to live.”⁵

Here, too, the record supports the conclusion that Bill is an untreated sex offender who is required to complete sex offender treatment (a condition he does not otherwise challenge). Indeed, at sentencing, the superior court found that, based on Bill's criminal history, it did not believe that it was safe for Bill to be around children, even if he had completed sex offender treatment. And to the extent that the probation officer unreasonably limits Bill's place of residence, Bill may seek judicial review of that decision.⁶ Accordingly, we conclude that the superior court acted within its discretion when it imposed this condition.

The third probation condition that Bill challenges is a special probation condition that prohibits Bill from “accept[ing] employment, educational programming, or engag[ing] in any volunteer community activity ... where minors under eighteen (18) years of age are present without the prior written permission of the probation officer.” In imposing this condition, the superior court made clear that it was not to be interpreted so broadly as to prohibit employment or other activities in which there may be incidental contact with minors. Rather, the intent was to restrict his ability to work at a school or a community youth center or other places where regular contact with minors would be a core duty and requirement of the position. The court stated that if he wanted to work someplace other than a school or community youth center, it expected permission to be “liberally granted.”

On appeal, Bill argues that this condition infringes on his right to earn a living. But the condition does not prevent Bill from earning a living; rather, it requires that Bill obtain the approval of his probation officer before accepting employment where there is prolonged contact with minors. Given the nature of Bill's offense, this condition is reasonably related to his rehabilitation and the protection of the public.

Moreover, when probation officers are authorized to grant permissions, it is presumed that those permissions will not be “unreasonably withheld.”⁷ If permission is unreasonably withheld, Bill may seek judicial review.⁸ Accordingly, we conclude that the superior court acted within its discretion when it imposed this condition.

The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.