Decided and Entered:September 10, 2026

CR-23-1457

Calendar Date: January 12, 2026

Before: Garry, P.J., Clark, Pritzker, Powers And Corcoran, JJ.

[*1]

Corcoran, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Roger McDonough, J.), rendered January 27, 2023 in Albany County, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of conspiracy in the second degree, criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts) and endangering the welfare of a child (two counts).

The relevant facts may be found in our prior decision in this matter (246 AD3d 1218 [3d Dept 2026]). Briefly, during an investigation into a cocaine distribution operation, investigators intercepted cellular telephone calls implicating defendant. In August 2020, investigators executed a "rip operation" in which they conducted a traffic stop of defendant and arrested her on a purported outstanding warrant. In the course of the ensuing search of her person at the police station, defendant turned over cocaine that she had hidden in her undergarments.

Defendant was released at the time to avoid jeopardizing the ongoing investigation, but was later charged in an indictment with various offenses. After it emerged at trial that an Albany Police Department patrol officer's body-worn camera had recorded footage of the traffic stop and arrest of defendant that had not been disclosed, defendant challenged the People's certificate of compliance (hereinafter COC) pursuant to their discovery obligations under CPL article 245 and moved for a mistrial. Supreme Court denied the motion but, at defendant's request, gave a missing evidence instruction to the jury. Defendant was thereafter convicted of conspiracy in the second degree, two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and two counts of endangering the welfare of a child. Supreme Court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 4 to 12 years in prison upon the conspiracy conviction, concurrent determinate terms of six years in prison, to be followed by two years of postrelease supervision, upon each of the drug possession convictions, and concurrent one-year definite sentences upon each of the child endangerment convictions. Defendant appeals.

In our initial decision, we found that the verdict is supported by the proof at trial in all respects, but remitted so that Supreme Court could make the requisite determination of whether the COC filed by the People had been rendered illusory by the belated disclosure of the body-worn camera footage (id. at 1223-1224). Upon remittal, Supreme Court conducted a hearing and determined that the People had exhibited due diligence by making reasonable efforts to comply with CPL article 245. The matter has now returned to us and, with the additional findings of Supreme Court in hand, we affirm.

In assessing whether a COC was properly filed in compliance with CPL 245.50, the key issue is "whether the prosecution has exercised due diligence and made reasonable inquiries to ascertain the existence of material and information subject to discovery" (People v Bay, 41 NY3d 200, 211 [2023] [internal quotation marks, [*2]brackets and citation omitted]; see People v Harrell, 251 AD3d 1167, 1176 [3d Dept 2026]). Due diligence is a flexible standard that requires reasonable efforts by the People to comply with the requirements of CPL article 245, and "the relevant factors in determining whether the People acted with due diligence include 'the efforts made by the prosecution and the prosecutor's office to comply with the statutory requirements, the volume of discovery provided and outstanding, the complexity of the case, how obvious any missing material would likely have been to a prosecutor exercising due diligence, the explanation for any discovery lapse, and the People's response when apprised of any missing discovery' " (People v Coffey, 244 AD3d 1609, 1611 [3d Dept 2025], quoting People v Bay, 41 NY3d at 212; see People v Harrell, 251 AD3d at 1176).

As addressed at the remittal hearing, the charges against defendant resulted from a complex and lengthy investigation into a cocaine distribution conspiracy that led to, as is relevant here, a 521-count indictment against defendant and over 30 codefendants. The People described how they provided "timely, extensive and relevant disclosures to defendant prior to filing their" COC, including video surveillance footage, over 138,000 intercepted telephone calls and text messages, postings from various social media accounts, recovered firearms and drug test results (People v Reynolds, 239 AD3d 1098, 1099 [3d Dept 2025]). The prosecutor further represented to Supreme Court that no body-worn camera footage was turned over at that stage because none had been provided to him and an Albany police detective involved in the investigation had assured him that none existed. When the People thereafter learned during the trial testimony that a patrol officer who was present for defendant's traffic stop — an officer who, the People noted, arrived on the scene after the stop began and was not part of the broader investigation — had activated her body-worn camera, the People promptly looked into the issue, confirmed that the footage existed and provided it to defense counsel by the end of the day. Supreme Court credited the People's explanation of what transpired and, noting the complexity of the case, the overwhelming disclosure that had been provided in a timely manner and the lack of any reason to believe that the People should have been aware of the absent footage earlier, determined that the People had indeed exercised due diligence in fulfilling their discovery obligations. Our review leads us to agree with Supreme Court (see People v Harrell, 251 AD3d at 1176-1178; People v Harris, 246 AD3d 1300, 1304-1305 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 NY3d 971 [2026]; People v Grandoit, 242 AD3d 1298, 1300-1301 [3d Dept 2025]).

Turning to the remaining issues advanced by defendant on appeal that were not addressed in our initial decision, she challenges the propriety of the warrantless search of her person in the wake of the traffic stop.^FN1 "Police [*3]may legally stop a vehicle and conduct a warrantless search of a defendant's person and possessions incident to a lawful arrest," meaning one "that is supported by probable cause" (People v Daniels, 247 AD3d 1257, 1260 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 NY3d 1015 [2026]). Probable cause does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but does demand "knowledge of facts and circumstances sufficient to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed" (id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see People v Wilson, 251 AD3d 1282, 1289 [3d Dept 2026]).

Here, Supreme Court heard suppression hearing testimony from investigators who detailed how defendant's telephone had been wiretapped as a part of their broader investigation into drug activity and how they overheard multiple calls to and from that number indicating both her involvement in the drug trade and her specific plan to meet an individual on the day of the traffic stop to acquire product. The transaction was to occur at a local restaurant, and investigators placed the area under surveillance. Investigators saw a vehicle associated with defendant in the restaurant's parking lot with two children sitting therein and — after they watched her emerge from the restaurant, enter the vehicle and drive off with the children — the order was given to make the stop. The vehicle was stopped once it crossed into the City of Albany, and defendant was brought back to the police station, where investigators searched defendant and recovered from her undergarments packages of what proved to be cocaine.^FN2 According deference to the assessment of Supreme Court that the foregoing testimony and supporting documentary evidence submitted at the hearing was credible, we are satisfied that the People demonstrated probable cause to stop defendant's vehicle, place her under arrest and search her person (see People v McMillan, 185 AD3d 1208, 1212 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 35 NY3d 1112 [2020]; People v Cruz, 131 AD3d 724, 725-726 [3d Dept 2015], lv denied 26 NY3d 1087 [2015]).Defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine recovered from her person was, as a result, properly denied.

Defendant finally challenges the severity of the sentences imposed. Although that argument remains a live one despite her apparent release to parole supervision, it is unpersuasive (see People v James, 245 AD3d 1102, 1108 [3d Dept 2026], lv denied 45 NY3d 946 [2026]). In view of the circumstances of the present offenses and defendant's failure to accept responsibility for them, we cannot say that the concurrent sentences imposed by Supreme Court, which were all below the legally permissible maximum and lower than those requested by the People, were unduly harsh or severe (see People v Gilyard, 249 AD3d 1222, 1226-1227 [3d Dept 2026]; People v King, 225 AD3d 937, 937-938 [3d Dept 2024]).

Garry, P.J., Clark, Pritzker and Powers, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.