Decided and Entered: September 10, 2026

Index No. 72115/25|Appeal No. 6981|Case No. 2025-05546|

Before: Manzanet-Daniels, J.P., Moulton, Shulman, Rosado, O'Neill Levy, JJ.

[*1]

Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Laura A. Ward, J.), entered on or about August 6, 2025, which granted defendant's motion to hold nonparty respondent New York State Office of Mental Health (OMH) in civil contempt of defendant's order of commitment and ordered OMH to pay defendant a fine of $100 per day for every day after March 24, 2025, that defendant was not transferred to OMH custody for restorative care and treatment, pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law article 730, plus $250 in statutory fees, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Defendant was charged with assault in the second degree based on the complaint that he pushed his mother to the ground causing her to twist and injure her toe. He was remanded to the custody of the Department of Corrections and held at Rikers Island. The charge was later elevated from a misdemeanor to a felony based on his mother's age. After defendant was evaluated for competency a second time in January 2025, both evaluators concluded that defendant was unfit to proceed. Supreme Court agreed, and on February 24, 2025, it ordered defendant remanded to the custody of OMH for restorative treatment. The order of commitment required that the defendant "be transferred into the custody of the Office of Mental Health no later than March 24, 2025" and warned that a failure to do so would result in a finding of contempt. It is uncontested that the transfer was delayed until July 25, 2025.

Upon defendant's motion, Supreme Court found OMH in contempt on the record on May 28, 2025, because of the delay in transferring defendant to a secure psychiatric facility. The court held a damages hearing on July 2, 2025. After taking the testimony of Dr. Eric Goldsmith, an expert in forensic psychiatry, and reviewing Rikers Island medical records, the court assessed damages of $100 per day for defendant's actual loss, an amount that the court found was sufficient to indemnify him (see People v G.O., Sup Ct, NY County, Aug. 7, 2025, Ward, J., indictment No. 72115/25).

At the hearing, Dr. Goldsmith testified that he had diagnosed defendant with schizophrenia, that defendant historically had been successfully treated with antipsychotic medication, and that when properly medicated defendant was able to live independently, manage his hygiene, and follow through with his treatment sessions (id. at 3). However, Dr. Goldsmith explained, when defendant was not taking his prescribed medications, he would become incapacitated, unable to engage in self-care and hygiene, and unable to assist with his criminal defense (id.).

[*2]

In addition to Dr. Goldsmith's testimony, defendant's inability to manage his hygiene was reflected in various notes from Rikers' clinicians. A July 8, 2024 note stated that "[p]atient has poor ADLs and has been encouraged to shower to address his hygiene . . . and reports 'I take birdbaths in the sink every morning' '' (July 2, 2025 hearing tr at 30, lines 8-23). A January 20, 2025 note stated "[p]atient was strongly malodorous and continues to require encouragement to attend to his hygiene" (id. at 53, lines 17-25) and a May 13, 2025 note stated that "[p]atient had a malodorous smell consistent with patient poor hygiene despite encouragement from staff" (id. at 31, lines 21-25; at 32, lines 1-2).

Moreover, because defendant was noncompliant with treatment, Dr. Goldsmith opined that defendant "appear[ed] to be deteriorating" at Rikers and experiencing an increase in auditory hallucinations (G.O., indictment No. 72115/25 at 3-4). He testified that defendant's misperceptions of reality or voices in his head, "are . . . very distressing and functionally impairing symptoms for his [s]chizophrenia condition" (July 2, 2025 hearing tr at 17, lines 11-16).

Dr. Goldsmith further explained that Rikers Island does not have the capacity to compel medication over objection, a point not disputed by OMH (G.O., indictment No. 72115/25 at 4). However, Dr. Goldsmith believed that at a secure psychiatric hospital, which can compel a patient to take medication over his objection, defendant would be "very likely" to improve because most people transferred to OMH respond to medication and because defendant had responded positively to medication in the past (July 2, 2025 hearing tr at 23, lines 13-23; at 48, lines 12-19).

For the reasons stated in our recent case People v L.G. (238 AD3d 568 [1st Dept 2025]), we affirm the grant of the contempt motion based on the same contemptuous conduct: delayed transfer of the mentally ill defendant from Rikers Island that caused defendant cognizable harm. As we found in L.G., OMH's defense to the contempt finding, based on its alleged inability to comply with the court's order of commitment, lacks merit (see L.G., 238 AD3d at 569-570). Moreover, Supreme Court's determination that defendant's actual loss or injury was proximately caused by the delayed transfer, and its imposition of a fine in an amount sufficient to indemnify defendant, is supported by record evidence.

[*3]

OMH argues that defendant failed to prove that OMH's delay caused his mental health to deteriorate. However, the relevant issue is not whether defendant deteriorated while he was in custody but whether OMH provided the requisite restorative care. In any event, Supreme Court was entitled to credit Dr. Goldsmith's testimony that defendant's condition did deteriorate at Rikers. OMH's attempt to blame defendant for his loss because he is mentally ill and refuses treatment is risible. The purpose of a transfer to a secure psychiatric facility is so that a mentally ill defendant can receive statutorily mandated restorative care and treatment. To attribute defendant's loss or injury to defendant's preexisting mental illness, which causes defendant to refuse treatment, turns Criminal Procedure Law article 730 on its head.

Moreover, OMH submitted no evidence to contradict Dr. Goldsmith's testimony that OMH would seek and likely obtain an order to medicate defendant over his objection and that medication helped defendant in the past. The fact that two clinicians and the hospital director must determine that the proposed treatment is both necessary and narrowly tailored to address defendant's needs and requires a court order is not, as OMH argues, an act of independent third parties that break the chain of causation and defeat a damages claim. OMH's reliance on the defense of an intervening cause is misplaced where it cannot be said that the clinicians, hospital director, and judge caused, contributed, or brought about defendant's loss or injury (see Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., 51 NY2d 308, 315-316 [1980]).

OMH's contention that defendant was "provided with the highest level of psychiatric care" at Rikers does not demonstrate a lack of causation. OMH does not dispute Dr. Goldsmith's testimony that Rikers, which is not a hospital, does not have the "capacity" to compel medication over a patient's objection.^FN1 Certainly, offering treatment, which is then refused by a patient, is not the equivalent of providing treatment to the patient.

[*4]

We also disagree with OMH's argument that there is no evidence to support Supreme Court's damages valuation because the valuation is based on loss or injury that is not readily quantifiable. Section 773 of the Judiciary Law provides that if a party has suffered "an actual loss or injury" as a result of the contempt, that party is entitled to "recover damages for the loss or injury, [and] a fine, sufficient to indemnify the aggrieved party, must be imposed upon the offender, and collected, and paid over to the aggrieved party, under the direction of the court" (Judiciary Law § 773). The plain language of the statute provides that where there is an actual loss or injury, damages "must" be imposed upon the offender. It is only "[w]here it is not shown that such an actual loss or injury has been caused," as was the case in L.G., that "a fine may be imposed, [limited to] the amount of the complainant's costs and expenses, and two hundred and fifty dollars in addition thereto" (id.). Indeed, it is improper to impose the statutory fine of $250 (whether a single fine or multiple fines) if loss or injury is shown to be "actual and reasonably ascertainable," because the statute "calls instead for an assessment that will indemnify aggrieved parties" (see State of New York v Unique Ideas, 44 NY2d 345, 350 [1978]).

The statute also provides for indemnification for an actual loss or injury, without imposing any limitation. The statute is not limited to pecuniary loss or injury. Here, the fine is adequately supported by Dr. Goldsmith's testimony regarding the "very distressing and functionally impairing symptoms for [defendant's] [s]chizophrenia condition" and his testimony regarding the benefits to defendant from a placement in a secure psychiatric hospital. Although this type of loss or injury is not quantifiable with mathematical precision, it is nevertheless an actual loss or injury that must be compensated (see e.g. Matter of McCormick v Axelrod, 59 NY2d 574, 587 [1983] [affirming contempt fines for actual loss or injury to nursing home patients who were transferred in violation of a court order "based upon such factors as the degree of emotional upset suffered by each of [the] elderly women, the period of time required for adjustment to their new surroundings, and the benefits to petitioners from their new placements"]; see also Matter of Kenneth R. [Harold S.], 64 Misc 3d 234 [Fam Ct, NY County 2019] [awarding contempt fines for actual loss or injury to a severely disabled child as a result of the Administration for Children Services' failure to find a suitable placement for the child and provide him with essential services, which profoundly increased the stress in the child's life]).

[*5]

The harm to defendant is also evident considering, among other things, Dr. Goldsmith's testimony and the clinician notes regarding defendant's declining hygiene while at Rikers Island (see e.g. McCain v Dinkins, 84 NY2d 216, 223 [1994] [affirming contempt fines for actual loss or injury to homeless families who "suffer[ed] self-evidently unsanitary and unsafe traumas" by sleeping on the floor and on chairs overnight in Emergency Assistance Unit offices and washing in the public restroom sinks]).

OMH argues that we should limit the fine to the statutory fine of $250, pointing to our decision in L.G. However, in L.G., the defendant failed to provide any "evidence quantifying the loss or injuries she suffered as a result of the six-month delay in transferring her to [a secure psychiatric hospital]" (L.G., 238 AD3d at 570). There was no evidence of an actual loss or injury in L.G. because the defendant did not seek actual damages in her contempt motion. Rather, the defendant requested only that she be immediately admitted to a secure psychiatric facility. By the time the case was argued, the defendant was already placed in a secure psychiatric facility. Although the court allowed additional briefing, the defendant limited its relief to requesting that the court find the use of the term "forthwith" in a commitment order means that the transfer must occur within 10 days of the order. In contrast to L.G., here the defendant did present evidence of the very real negative consequences that flowed from OMH's inaction.

Considering the above, it is unnecessary to reach the parties' arguments regarding whether defendant suffered an actual loss or injury predicated on a loss of liberty.

THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

ENTERED: September 10, 2026