2026 WL 2654360
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
NOTICE: UNPUBLISHED OPINION
NOTICE This is a summary disposition issued under Alaska Appellate Rule 214(a). Summary dispositions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d).
Court of Appeals of Alaska.

DARRELL LEROY SAM II, Appellant,
v.
STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.

Court of Appeals No. A-14603
September 9, 2026
Trial Court No. 4GA-18-00034 CR
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Thomas I. Temple, Judge.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Appearances: Elizabeth D. Friedman, Attorney at Law, Prineville, Oregon, under contract with the Office of Public Advocacy, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Ann B. Black, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Stephen J. Cox, Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Haines, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Star page 1 Darrell Leroy Sam II pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to second-degree sexual abuse of a minor and first-degree burglary.1 Pursuant to the plea agreement, Sam received an agreed-upon composite sentence of 17.5 years with 5 years suspended (12.5 years to serve) and a 10-year term of probation. The parties agreed to most of the probation conditions but left other probation conditions open to the discretion of the superior court.
At sentencing, Sam requested that certain information be added to the presentence report, and he objected to Special Probation Condition No. 14, which requires him to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices, email, and social media accounts for unapproved contact with minors under the age of sixteen. The superior court denied Sam's request to make certain additions to the presentence report and imposed Special Probation Condition No. 14 over Sam's objection. Sam now appeals, challenging both of these rulings.2
First, Sam argues that the superior court erred in denying his request to add information from the minor victim's confidential Office of Children's Services records to the presentence report. Sam's requested additions to the presentence report included information about the victim's history of being sexually abused and the fact that she communicated with other males on Facebook.
At sentencing, Sam argued that these facts were relevant because they cast doubt on the twelve-year-old victim's version of events. The superior court rejected Sam's request to add this information to the presentence report, concluding that the victim's history of being sexually abused and her communications with other males on Facebook were irrelevant to whether she was sexually abused by Sam.3 The court, however, included information in the presentence report that when the victim testified before the grand jury, she denied that Sam had engaged in any sexual penetration on the night in question.4
Star page 2 On appeal, Sam now argues that the additional information should be included in the presentence report because, according to Sam, these facts provide important context for his offense.
But the superior court could reasonably find that the additional information about the minor victim's contact with other males was irrelevant to Sam's sentencing case. Moreover, the presentence report already included Sam's version of events — namely, statements by Sam and his mother that, on the night of the incident, Sam went to the victim's home only after she contacted him on Facebook and invited him over. We therefore conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sam's request to add the requested information about the victim to the presentence report.5
Second, Sam challenges Special Probation Condition No. 14, which requires him, at the direction of a probation officer, to submit to warrantless searches of his electronic devices, email, and social media accounts for unapproved contact with minors under the age of sixteen. The parties agreed that, as part of his probation conditions, Sam would be prohibited from contacting minors under the age of sixteen unless in the immediate presence of an approved adult who knows the circumstances of Sam's crimes or with the permission of the probation officer or sex offender treatment provider, if applicable. But Sam argues that the court had an insufficient basis for imposing a search condition — that is, he argues that there is no nexus between his offenses and his use of electronic devices or social media. Sam also argues that the probation condition is not narrowly tailored.
But the superior court found that the search requirement was directly related to the facts of Sam's case. Sam told investigators and argued at sentencing that, on the night of the incident, he went over to the victim's home after she contacted him on Facebook and invited him over. Based on this conduct, the superior court found that there was “a direct nexus” between the facts of Sam's case and the electronic means through which he had contact with minors. The court also noted that Sam had “a history of crimes of dishonesty” that made close monitoring, including searches of his digital communications, essential to his success on supervision.
Sam also argues that Special Probation Condition No. 14 could be more narrowly tailored by requiring reasonable suspicion as a prerequisite to a search. But Sam did not raise this argument in the superior court and therefore must show plain error.6 We find no plain error here. We have previously rejected the argument that the Alaska Constitution prohibits the imposition of a probation condition authorizing suspicionless searches when there is a direct relationship between the authorized searches and the nature of the crime.7 And, as the State acknowledges, Special Probation Condition No. 14 is limited to searches for evidence of contact with minors and further limited to electronic searches of the specific applications or communications activity listed.
Star page 3 Given this record, we conclude that Special Probation Condition No. 14 bears a direct relationship to the particular facts of Sam's offenses and is narrowly tailored to the goal of monitoring his communications with minors.8
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.9

Footnotes

1
AS 11.41.436(a)(2) and AS 11.46.300(a)(1), respectively.
2
Sam also challenges the imposition of Special Probation Condition No. 15(a), which (as proposed in the presentence report) authorized warrantless searches of his person and property for evidence of unapproved contact with minors. The superior court, however, did not impose this probation condition at sentencing, and it does not appear in the judgment. We therefore conclude that this issue is moot.
3
Cf. Alaska R. Crim. P. 32.1(f)(5) (stating in part that “if the court determines that the disputed assertion is not relevant to its sentencing decision so that resolution of the dispute is not warranted, the court shall delete the assertion from the report without making any finding”).
4
Sam was initially indicted on one count of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor and one count of attempted first-degree sexual abuse of a minor in addition to one count of first-degree burglary. AS 11.41.434(a)(1), AS 11.41.434(a)(1) & AS 11.31.100(a), and AS 11.46.300(a)(1), respectively. He pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor for engaging in sexual contact with the minor victim and one count of first-degree burglary. As part of the plea agreement, the State dismissed the remaining count of attempted first-degree sexual abuse of a minor.
5
See Davison v. State, 282 P.3d 1262, 1266 (Alaska 2012) (explaining that appellate courts “review a trial court's decision to include disputed factual allegations in a presentence report for an abuse of discretion”).
6
See State v. Ranstead, 421 P.3d 15, 23 (Alaska 2018).
7
Compton v. State, 579 P.3d 850, 866-67 (Alaska App. 2025). We nonetheless noted that trial courts retain the discretion to limit a probation search condition by conditioning it on reasonable suspicion. Id. at 867.
8
See Ranstead, 421 P.3d at 20 (recognizing that a probation condition “that allows a warrantless search must bear ‘a direct relationship’ to the nature of the defendant's conviction”) (quoting Roman v. State, 570 P.2d 1235, 1242-43 (Alaska 1977)); cf. Echuck v. State, 2025 WL 554432, at *2 (Alaska App. Feb. 19, 2025) (unpublished) (noting that the sentencing court did not make any case-specific findings to support its conclusion that a probation condition authorizing warrantless searches was directly related to the nature of Echuck's offense and it was, therefore, “unclear whether the court found the necessary ‘direct relationship’ between the nature of Echuck's offense and searches for electronic communications with minors”).
9
The parties note that page 2 is missing from the approved version of the presentence report in the record before us. If this remains the case, either party may move to correct the record in the superior court. See Alaska R. Crim. P. 36.