Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on August 26, 2026

2024-07710

Hector D. Lasalle, P.J.

Mark C. Dillon

Colleen D. Duffy

Betsy Barros

Francesca E. Connolly, JJ.

The respondent was admitted to the Bar in the State of New York at a term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department on May 29, 1991, under the name Michael Bruno Cosentino. By order to show cause dated September 19, 2024, this Court directed the respondent to show cause why an order should not be made and entered pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13 imposing discipline upon him for the misconduct underlying the discipline imposed by an order of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers of the Supreme Judicial Court dated March 28, 2024.

Per Curiam. [*1]

Per Curiam.

OPINION & ORDER

By order dated March 28, 2024, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Board of Bar Overseers of the Supreme Judicial Court (hereinafter the Board of Bar Overseers) publicly reprimanded the respondent for his violation of rules 3.5(d) and 8.4(d) and (h) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, which, respectively, prohibit a lawyer from engaging in conduct intended to disrupt a tribunal, and deem it professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice, or any other conduct that adversely reflects on his or her fitness to practice law.

Massachusetts Disciplinary Proceeding

The respondent was admitted to the Bar of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on June 19, 1991. In his answer to a petition for discipline filed against the respondent by an assistant bar counsel, the respondent admitted the allegations in the petition, establishing the following allegations as fact. The respondent's professional discipline in Massachusetts stemmed from a single matter in which he represented, beginning in July 2019, Giving Tree Health Center, Inc., and one of its owners, Brian Bairos, who were defendants in a civil action brought by CSI Engineering, LLC (hereinafter CSI). CSI sued in Plymouth Superior Court based on allegations that the defendants had failed to pay CSI for engineering services. The Plymouth Superior Court scheduled a trial in the matter for March 15, 2022. In early March 2022, Bairos consulted with a bankruptcy attorney. On March 9, 2022, the bankruptcy attorney and the respondent communicated with CSI's attorney about a potential settlement, but none was reached. On March 10, 2022, Plymouth Superior Court Judge Mark Gildea held a pretrial hearing where the respondent appeared on behalf of the defendants. During the hearing, the respondent informed Judge Gildea that a trial would likely be unnecessary because his clients had consulted with a bankruptcy attorney and would either default or file for [*2]bankruptcy protection prior to trial. Judge Gildea wished to telephone the bankruptcy attorney from the bench to determine which of the defendants had sought bankruptcy counsel, and CSI's attorney provided Judge Gildea with the bankruptcy attorney's telephone number.

While Judge Gildea's clerk was dialing the bankruptcy attorney's telephone number, the respondent took his cell phone out of his pocket and sent the bankruptcy attorney an email stating: "Court is going to call you. Don't pick up." At approximately the same time, the respondent also sent a text message to the bankruptcy attorney stating: "Don't pick up your phone." The bankruptcy attorney did not answer the call because he was occupied with a client. The respondent did not inform Judge Gildea that he was sending this email and text message to the bankruptcy attorney. However, the respondent inadvertently copied CSI's attorney on the email to the bankruptcy attorney, and CSI's attorney thereafter informed Judge Gildea of the email. Judge Gildea referred the matter to the Office of Bar Counsel.

In the respondent's answer to the petition for discipline, the respondent and the assistant bar counsel stipulated and agreed that the matter be resolved without a hearing, subject to acceptance by the Board of Bar Overseers, and the respondent waived his right to an evidentiary hearing on the facts and disciplinary violations, as well as on matters in aggravation or mitigation. The parties jointly recommended that a sanction of a public reprimand be imposed, and stipulated that they had reached their agreement "after due evaluation of all available evidence," and that, in consideration of their agreement, they had "forgone allegations or defenses and submissions of evidence on the merits which might have been advanced had the case been litigated." Subject to the joint assertion that the respondent's conduct did not cause harm to his clients, the respondent admitted that he violated rules 3.5(d) and 8.4(d) and (h) of the Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct. The respondent admitted that his conduct disrupted the Plymouth Superior Court and interfered with Judge Gildea's efforts to conduct a hearing. The parties acknowledged that the respondent's clients ultimately did not file for bankruptcy but stipulated to a judgment as to liability the day after the hearing. The parties further acknowledged that the respondent received a private admonition in Massachusetts in 2019 for conduct related to the respondent's firm's accounting.

In an order dated March 28, 2024, the Board of Bar Overseers voted to accept the stipulation and the joint recommendation of the parties and publicly reprimanded the respondent.

New York Proceeding

The respondent failed to notify this Court of his public reprimand in Massachusetts, later claiming that he was unaware of the requirement to do so pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13(d).

By order to show cause dated September 19, 2024, the respondent was ordered to show cause on or before November 4, 2024, why he should not be reciprocally disciplined.

In an unsworn submission, notwithstanding his stipulation to the facts of his misconduct and his violation of professional rules, and his waiver of a hearing, the respondent states that he was not provided any of the investigatory materials gathered by the Board of Bar Overseers, nor was he permitted to cross-examine any potential witnesses. He states that the Board of Bar Overseers drafted a summary that was part of the public reprimand, the complaint, the answer to the complaint, and the stipulation. He states that he made several edits to the stipulation that were not incorporated. He asks that this Court take no further disciplinary action as he has "suffered enough."

In response to this Court's order to show cause, the Grievance Committee for the Tenth Judicial District submits an affirmation noting that the respondent failed to avail himself of any of the defenses to the imposition of discipline pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13(b). To the extent that the respondent suggests that he was deprived of due process, the Grievance Committee argues that this defense is undermined by the respondent's voluntary entry into a stipulation by which he waived his right to a hearing and agreed to the imposition of a public reprimand. The respondent received notice of the charges against him and participated in the proceeding, with the assistance of counsel.

The respondent submits a reply in which he refutes the Grievance Committee's arguments.

Findings and Conclusion

Based on the admitted misconduct underlying the discipline imposed by the order of the Board of Bar Overseers dated March 28, 2024, we find that the imposition of reciprocal discipline is warranted. Regarding the sanction, this Court has found that:

"[i]n reciprocal proceedings, we generally accord significant weight to the sanction imposed by the jurisdiction where the misconduct occurred because the foreign jurisdiction has the greatest interest in fashioning sanctions for misconduct perpetrated therein. Therefore, when the sanction prescribed [*3]by the foreign jurisdiction is not inconsistent with the sanction for similar misconduct in this jurisdiction, the Court should impose the same sanction" (Matter of Megaro, 215 AD3d 67, 84 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

Therefore, we conclude that the respondent should be publicly censured.

LASALLE, P.J., DILLON, DUFFY, BARROS and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that, pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.13, the respondent, Michael B. Cosentino, admitted as Michael Bruno Cosentino, is publicly censured for his professional misconduct.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court