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Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on July 22, 2026

2024-12116, (Index No. 521893/22)

Colleen D. Duffy, J.P.

Deborah A. Dowling

Barry E. Warhit

Susan Quirk, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of contract and a violation of General Business Law § 349, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Carolyn E. Wade, J.), dated September 3, 2024. The order granted the motion of the defendant ING Bank, N.V., pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

In July 2022, the plaintiff commenced this action against the defendant ING Bank, N.V. (hereinafter ING), among others, to recover damages that the plaintiff alleged it sustained as a result of a purported scam wherein the defendant Citibank, N.A., sent funds on behalf of the plaintiff, by wire transfer, to an account managed by ING for an unknown entity that the plaintiff had believed was its vendor. The plaintiff asserted, inter alia, causes of action to recover damages for a violation of UCC article 4-A, commercial bad faith, breach of contract, and a violation of General Business Law § 349. ING moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it, among other things, for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff opposed. In an order dated September 3, 2024, the Supreme Court granted ING's motion. The plaintiff appeals.

In opposition to a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(8), a plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing that the defendant was subject to the personal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (see Abad v Lorenzo, 163 AD3d 903, 904; Whitcraft v Runyon, 123 AD3d 811, 812).

"Under modern jurisprudence, a court may assert general all-purpose jurisdiction or specific conduct-linked jurisdiction over a particular defendant" (Fanelli v Latman, 202 AD3d 758, 759 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Qudsi v Larios, 173 AD3d 920, 922). "A court is authorized to exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation when the corporation's affiliations with the state are so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum State" (Manning v Budget Rent A Car, 241 AD3d 676, 677 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Motorola Credit Corp. v Standard Chartered Bank, 24 NY3d 149, 160 n 4). Here, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a basis for exercising general personal jurisdiction over ING, a bank [*2]that is incorporated and maintains a principal place of business in the Netherlands.

The Supreme Court properly concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish, prima facie, that ING was subject to personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR 302. As to specific jurisdiction, New York's long-arm statute, CPLR 302, provides, in relevant part, that New York courts may exercise personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary who transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state (see id. § 302[a][1]; Fanelli v Latman, 202 AD3d at 759). "In order to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists under CPLR 302(a)(1), the court must determine (1) whether the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State by either transacting business in New York or contracting to supply goods or services in New York, and (2) whether the claim arose from that business transaction or from the contract to supply good[s] or services" (Economy Premier Assur. Co. v Miflex 2 S.p.A., 212 AD3d 775, 776 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]). "In order to satisfy the second prong of the jurisdictional inquiry, there must be an articulable nexus or a substantial relationship between a defendant's New York activities and the cause of action sued upon" (id. at 776-777 [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, ING submitted an affirmation in which the affiants attested that ING neither maintains bank branches in New York nor conducts banking business in New York. The transaction at issue was commenced at the direction of the plaintiff, not ING, and ING's involvement was only to accept the wire transfer and deposit the funds into the designated Netherlands-based bank account. Under these circumstances, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that ING purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in New York.

The plaintiff also failed to demonstrate that personal jurisdiction could be exercised over ING pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(3). Accepting as true the plaintiff's allegations that ING committed a tortious act outside New York, causing harm to the plaintiff within the state, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate, prima facie, that ING regularly did or solicited business, or engaged in any other persistent course of conduct, or derived substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered in New York (see id. § 302[a][3][i], [ii]; Trotman v Priority Auto, Inc., 231 AD3d 1075, 1076).

The plaintiff likewise failed to make a prima facie showing that the causes of action asserted against ING arose from ING's ownership of real property in New York (see CPLR 302[a][4]; Vaval v Stanco, LLC, 219 AD3d 1466, 1468).

The plaintiff's remaining contention is without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted ING's motion pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the amended complaint insofar as asserted against it for lack of personal jurisdiction.

DUFFY, J.P., DOWLING, WARHIT and QUIRK, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court

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